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**Beyond the Foreigner:
Representations of Non-Roman Individuals and Communities in Latin
Historiography, from Sallust to Ammianus Marcellinus**

by

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Thesis submitted for the degree of :
Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) in Classics (Latin)
Philosophiae Doctor in Graecis et Latinis Litteris

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This thesis is approximately 99,500 words. It therefore conforms to the proscribed length of a Ph.D. thesis in the Faculty of Arts at the University of Durham.

ABSTRACT

From the foundation of the city of Rome in 753 BCE to the capture of the same in 476 CE, the ancient Romans came into contact with a diverse range of peoples. The Romans did not want only to conquer these peoples and incorporate them into the empire, but also they displayed a genuine interest in learning about foreigners.

Roman historical narrative demonstrates clearly this prevailing curiosity. This thesis examines the representations of foreign individuals and communities in five works: Sallust, *Bellum Jugurthinum*; Livy, *Ab Urbe Condita* 21-30; Justin, *Epitome* of Pompeius Trogus, *Historiae Philippicae* 11-12; Tacitus, *Germania*; Ammianus Marcellinus, *Res Gestae* 23.6. These authors represent a broad range of types of history writing (monograph, AUC history, universal history), and they span most of the history of Rome as an empire (40s BCE to the late 300s CE). Moreover, these works represent a diverse range of geographic locations in that they include the three major parts of the world as understood by the Romans: Africa, Europe and Asia. Finally, they cover—or they exist within the context of—the full range of the Roman-Foreign experience: victory (Numidia, Carthage), defeat (Persia), and non-result (Germani).

This thesis demonstrates that Roman historians employ a diverse range of presentations of non-Roman individuals and communities. Roman historians appear not to have been constrained by a narrow set of rules when it comes to writing non-Romans; rather, each author can be seen to be engaging in a wider Roman discourse on the foreigner. And this discourse extends beyond the Roman world and Roman historical writing: the historians of Rome can be seen as building upon, and responding to, the so-called father of history, Herodotus, whose own narrative established firmly that exploration of the foreigner is an important part of historical inquiry. Close analysis clearly demonstrates each presentation of a non-Roman character or community to be an intricate and fascinating construction, and understanding how the foreigner is conceptualised in the work is of critical importance. On the one hand, the presentation of foreigners fits into the historian's overarching aims and objectives in his work; on the other hand, the representation of foreigners can dictate the ways in which the Roman history is narrated. Non-Romans both fit into, and they provide direction for, Roman historical narrative. By studying the complexities of the presentation of non-Romans, therefore, this thesis enhances our understanding of the sophistication of Roman historical writing. Despite the continuing acknowledgement of the important role ethnography plays in writings of Herodotus and his Greek and Roman successors and imitators, there has not so far been a genre-wide detailed study of the ethnography in Greek or Roman historiography. This thesis, therefore, seeks to rectify partially this omission on the part of scholarship, and establish a foundation for future study of the non-Roman in Latin literature and Roman culture.

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AD MAIOREM GLORIAM DEI

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INTRODUCTION

The Cultural Diversity of the Roman Empire and the Roman Historian

I am greatly astonished to reflect on the painstaking exactitude and subtle learning with which the Greeks and Romans have surveyed our country, which is, to use their own words, the greatest part of Europe, and though it seems rough and wild, I imagine, in comparison with their own climate, they have expressed our customs, our emotional make-up and our spirits as graphically as a painter might delineate our bodies.¹

*unde etiam de terrena civitate, quae cum dominari adpetit, etsi populi serviant, ipsa ei dominandi libido dominatur, non est praetereundum silentio quidquid dicere suscepti huius operis ratio postulat si facultas datur.*²

The world in which we live is increasingly diverse.³ Cultural diversity is a fact of life in many nations that, as little as fifty years ago, were largely homogenous or, at the very least, perceived themselves as such. Diversity is increasingly seen as a sign of strength. This is not a new thing, but rather it is a return to a state that existed nearly two millennia ago. At its height, ancient Rome was in essence a community of many cultures. Although individual groups were attached to what was perceived as their natural locales (Gauls in Gaul, Greeks in Greece, Italians in Italy, for example), movement from place to place, and the overarching unity that *imperium Romanum* provided, meant that a Gaul, for example, could live anywhere in the empire: Gaul, Africa, Spain, Egypt—or Rome, for that matter. In the major Roman conurbations, furthermore, the population would be a mix of communities that reflected the diverse composition of the empire as a whole.

The diverse composition of the Roman world meant that in theory there existed a certain degree of sensitivity towards others, whether inside or outside the empire. It would have had to have existed, or else the empire would not have held together so long,

¹ Conrad Celtis, *Public Oration Delivered at Ingolstadt*, taken from Mellor (1995) 12.

² Augustine, *CD* (Preface).

³ One might be forgiven for wishing to use the term ‘multicultural’. To be sure, the term is a recent one, and it largely applies to the modern state that has in recent decades (1960s onwards) actively sought to broaden its cultural makeup, usually through active immigration.

especially when things started to go bad.⁴ The above quotation from Conrad Celtis suggests that at least there were some in the postclassical world that believed the Roman perception of their country and ancestors to have been accurate. To be sure, accuracy in portrayal *is* important. But Celtis' comment possibly suggests that ancient Roman authors were sympathetic to their subjects.

This thesis is an attempt to explore this idea, through the medium of Roman historical narrative, a literary genre that perhaps best reveals the reality of how the Romans interact with others. This is because Roman history-writing is about events that happened, things done by people who existed, Roman and non-Roman.⁵ And accuracy of presentation is a topos that most—if not all—ancient historians employ in their works.⁶

The idea of studying the foreigner in classical literature is not new. This thesis works in awareness of this scholarship. First and foremost is François Hartog's *The Mirror of Herodotus*.⁷ The 'Father of History' (so-called) is an appropriate place for

⁴ This is especially true of those whose communities became part of the empire, their territory now part of a Roman province. Ando (2000) is an excellent and thorough examination of this subject. Kallet-Marx (1995) demonstrates that the Romans do not simply annex territory, but the expansion of their *imperium* is a careful negotiation with those who become part of the Roman world. This suggests a degree of sophistication and sensitivity on the part of the Romans towards the cultures they bring into their empire.

⁵ For analysis of Latin poetic representations of the Other, see Thomas (1982). Thomas (rightly) points out that it is prose (i.e., history) writers such as Caesar and Sallust who establish that the Greek pattern of ethnography has 'passed into the mainstream of Roman literature' (2). His discussion of these prose writers (2-5) then provides the necessary background for reading ethnography in Horace, Vergil and Lucan.

⁶ On historians advertising the accuracy of their works, perhaps the most famous declaration may be found in Livy's preface: *facturusne operae pretium sim si a primordio urbis res populi Romani perscripserim nec satis scio nec, si sciam, dicere ausim, quippe qui cum veterem tum volgatam esse rem videam, dum novi semper scriptores aut in rebus certius aliquid allaturos se aut scribendi arte rudem vetustatem superaturos credunt* (1). Other examples include: Thucydides 1.20.3, 1.22.2-3; Sallust, *Jug.* 94.2; Tacitus, *Hist.* 1.1.2-3 and *Ann.* 1.1.2-3. See Moles (1993) 141-5. On the concern for historical accuracy in ancient historiography, see Woodman (1988) *passim*; Marincola (1997) *passim*.

⁷ Hartog (1980). See also Reverdin (1988); Gray (1995); Romm (1998) 173-90; Munson (2001); Sourvinou-Inwood (2003). Cf. Goldhill (2002) 17: 'Herodotus...although he writes as a Greek for Greeks, constructs a far more complex and subtle narrative than such gung-ho bias might suggest. There is, first of all, extensive praise for the early Persians who could indeed match Greek rigour and hardness; there is also a sympathetic relativism that recognises not so much the evident priority of Greek customs as the conventionality of all social norms'.

interest in the world of the Other to be explored. Herodotus himself—if what he writes is to be believed—was interested in exploring foreign lands in person, then in his writing, primarily to demonstrate his own learning. Two thousand and five hundred years after he wrote his *Histories*, we are still impressed by the complexities of his history. Hartog demonstrates that Herodotus adopts the approach of the mirror: the foreigner is perceived and set up as the opposite of the Greek, and must be read through the filter of the Greeks themselves. He (rightly) points out that

the *Histories* are a mirror into which the historian never ceased to peer as he pondered his own identity: he was the looker looked at, the questioner questioned, who always ended up by declaring his own status credentials.⁸

To be sure, Hartog makes a very convincing case. That the foreigner is important to Herodotus' writing is made clear by his famous preface, when he writes that his narrative includes both τὰ μὲν Ἑλλήσι, τὰ δὲ βαρβάροισι ἀποδεχθέντα, ἀκλεᾶ γένηται, τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ δι' ἣν αἰτίην ἐπολέμησαν ἀλλήλοισι. It appears as if the non-Greeks are the other half of the equation, a *sine qua non* for the narrative.

On the Roman side, the primary work remains Yves Dauge's excellent book *Le Barbare*.⁹ The book is a (very) thorough summary of representation of the foreigner in Latin literature, as well as a systematic analysis of the difficult concept of *barbarus*.¹⁰ But Dauge's work has clear limits. By being all-inclusive, detailed discussion is sacrificed. On Livy's *Ab Urbe Condita*, for example, Dauge only provides nine pages of analysis, and he provides only brief comment on Hannibal,¹¹ the dominant non-Roman of the extant

⁸ Hartog (1988) xxiii. History is not alone in doing this. So too tragedy: see Hall (1989). Vasaly (1993) 191-243 provides analysis of 'ethnic personae' in Ciceronian oratory. Schmidt (1999) provides a thorough and engaging examination of the topic in Plutarch.

⁹ Dauge (1981). There is also work on individual authors—e.g., Oniga (1995) on Sallust. Morstein-Marx (2001) 179 n. 4 comments that Oniga's book is a 'learned and valuable discussion of the influences of Hellenistic, ethnographic background on the excursus [at *Jug.* 17-19]; but he offers little on the literary function of the digression beyond noting (rightly) that Sallust's use of ethnographic conventions establishes the Numidians as fearsome opponents'.

¹⁰ Dauge (1981) 379-676. See also Lund (1990) 3-19 and 55-75. See *idem* 3 n. 1 for further bibliography.

¹¹ Dauge (1981) 174: 'Hannibal représente la *virtus* perverse, l'énergie humaine non reconnue par les dieux, l'intelligence immorale'. This, I feel, is too much a simplification of an complex character, whom I endeavour to redeem in chapter two.

narrative.¹² Dauge should be read for what he provides: an exposition of an inquiry that enables further study. Dauge shows that the approach to the non-Romans is not simple, that is, there is no single, easy to pin down attitude of the Roman to the foreigner.

The Romans primarily sought to understand themselves in light of others who became part of their world (and those who managed to maintain their independence from Rome), as well as how they themselves came into the position of the dominant world power. When studying the events (*res gestae*) of Roman history, it is surprising how much of it is taken up by wars between the Romans and others; the study of the narratives of these events (*memoriae rerum gestarum*) is the same. Given the amount of attention, then, to the recounting of these conflicts between Romans and foreigners, it is surely necessary and appropriate to examine closely how Rome's historians represented their nation's enemies. By doing so, we can come to a better understanding of the complexities of Roman historical narrative. That there is no single approach to the foreigner seems appropriate, for Rome fought against a wide range of enemies, and her experiences in warfare were so wide ranging. Through the texts selected, this thesis seeks to demonstrate this fact of Roman contact with foreigners.

Sallust marks the beginning of historical narrative meeting the standards set out by Cicero in his *De Oratore*. His *Bellum Iugurthinum* narrates the war between Rome and the African regent Jugurtha. Sallust's presentation of non-Romans is fascinating, given the wide array of characters presented by the historian: Masinissa, Jugurtha, Adherbal, and Bocchus, set against an equally diverse group of Romans, including Marius and Sulla. In this work there is not a single type of non-Roman. To put it another way, Sallust does not set out a mould from which all subsequent historians cast their foreign characters.

Sallust is different from the other four historians studied in this thesis in that all writers of Roman history after Sallust are writing not during the republic, but during the empire. The first of these is Livy. His history of Rome, the *Ab Urbe Condita*, covers all of Rome's past from its foundation to the Augustan regime. Chapter two examines in detail one portion of this work, the narrative of the Hannibalic War. It is an ideal part of the history to study in one way, for some might argue that the Second Punic War was the ancient equivalent of a world war. Hannibal is not the only non-Roman explored in this part of Livy. There are also fascinating characters such as Masinissa, Syphax, and Hanno.

¹² Dauge (1981) 170-79. Although he does in passing mention Syphax and Masinissa (174 and 175, citing 29.23.4). See chapter two, section 4.2.

How these characters interrelate with each other, and with the Romans, shows that Livy just like Sallust does not confine himself to a single non-Roman type.

The Augustan period also provided the background for Pompeius Trogus' universal history, the *Historiae Philippicae*. Not focusing on Rome, but rather incorporating the whole world, Trogus examines the history of all civilized communities in his narrative. This interest in all known communities may be a reflection of the historian himself, who was not Roman in the strict sense, that is, a Roman citizen living in Rome, but a Romanized Gaul living near Marseille (Massilia). However, some communities are more equal than others in that they receive more attention. This is especially true in the case of Macedonia and the Hellenic world in general. Given the dominance of individuals in the histories of Sallust and Livy, chapter three focuses on a larger than life character from Trogus' preferred community: Alexander. To examine his character is appropriate not only because there is continuing interest in him as one of the leading historical figures of the ancient world, but also for the simple reason that he travels widely, covering more of the world that Trogus describes in his history than any other ancient personage.

Tacitus must have a place in this thesis; he is certainly a standard by which other ancient historians continue to be judged. However, in this thesis it is not his *Annales* or *Historiae* that are under scrutiny, but rather his *Germania*. This is because of the unique nature of this work, the only self-standing ethnographic monograph (written in Latin) to survive. Given the sensitivity towards, and the diverse nature of, non-Roman individuals in Sallust, Livy and Trogus, it should not be surprising to find that the Germans and their country not only have a literary work to themselves, but that they dominate it so thoroughly. Chapter four explores how Tacitus writes up these Germans and their country.

The final chapter examines the last major historian to write in Latin, Ammianus Marcellinus. The end of his history, the *Res Gestae*, marks the end of a near-uninterrupted chain of Roman history in Latin from the foundation of Rome in Livy, continued by Tacitus, then by Ammianus. His history is important to this thesis in another respect. His history covers the conflict between Rome and Persia, namely the failed campaign of Julian against the Persians, in which Ammianus himself participated. It is somewhat appropriate that this study of non-Romans ends with a narrative of a campaign in which the Romans are rebuked. But it is not the narrative of Julian's invasion itself that chapter five considers, but the intricate digression on Persia and

Persians presented by Ammianus immediately prior to Julian's crossing into Persia. As the longest surviving digression in Latin historiography, it serves as a testament to both the historian's personal approach to the foreigner as a reflection of this particular community.

So, these five communities in five works of Latin history-writing mentioned here represent a broad church of the peoples with which the Romans came into contact, North, South and East. It also represents the broad nature of Latin historiography: monograph, annalistic history, universal history. Any similarities that may exist in the approach of these different historians will therefore enable us to reach a sound conclusion on the question of non-Roman representation.

In focusing on these historians, I make a conscious distinction between Roman history written in Latin, and the history of Rome written in Greek. The use of the national language of Rome is of course very important, for its use implies an ideological message, one of Roman power.¹³ While Greek was understood at Rome, that the historian's readership at large would be able to understand fully the message(s) of that history to the same degree as a history written in Latin is not an absolute certainty. To write in Latin is a cultural (and Romanocentric) statement from the first word of the narrative. Roman historians writing in Latin therefore allow their historic countrymen to express themselves, and to live, in a Roman literary country. But this is not to say that writing in Latin makes the sensitive treatment of foreigners in the genre difficult, and it does not in any way limit the ability of non-Roman characters to express themselves. In fact, sometimes the opposite proves true.¹⁴

The five writers studied in this thesis demonstrate that Rome was a culture not only interested in, but also very sensitive to, other cultures, not only in the intricacies of their culture, but also differences between non-Romans and other non-Romans. This approach towards the foreigner does not mean that the pride in the Roman nation expressed by historians such as Livy is misplaced.¹⁵ Roman history appears to be

¹³ On some of the perceptions of the Latin language (ancient and modern), see Farrell (2001).

¹⁴ E.g., Jugurtha in Sallust, or the Germani in Tacitus. Sallust notes that Jugurtha can speak Latin, and by doing so on one occasion when fighting the Romans (101.6), is able to cause confusion that works in his favour. See Kraus (1999a) 240.

¹⁵ E.g., *Prae. 11, ceterum aut me amor negotii fallit, aut nulla umquam res publica maior nec sanctor nec bonis exemplis ditior fuit, nec in quam civitatem tam serae avaritia luxuriaque immigraverint, nec ubi*

capable of demonstrating national pride, and presenting characters and communities in a fair light.

In his *Coniuratio Catilinae*, Sallust argues that writing history is a labour equal to physical labour (i.e., politics and military service): *pulchrum est bene facere rei publicae, etiam bene dicere haud absurdum est; vel pace vel bello clarum fieri licet; et qui fecere et qui facta aliorum scripsere multi laudantur* (3.1).¹⁶ Writing *facta aliorum* can refer to Romans and non-Romans alike. That a Roman historian can be seen as serving the state by writing about the *facta* of any people (so long as Romans are somehow involved), provides a positive frame of reference from which this study can begin.

tantus ac tam diu paupertati ac parsimoniae honos fuerit. On this passage, see Moles (1993) 155-6. On patriotism in Livy, see Paschoud (1993).

¹⁶ On this phrase, see Vretska (1976) 84-7; McGushin (1977) 43-5.

CHAPTER ONE

Non-Romans and Romans in Sallust's *Bellum Iugurthinum*

falso queritur de natura sua genus humanum, quod inbecilla atque aevi brevis forte potius quam virtute regatur (1.1)

Like the *Coniuratio Catilinae* (= *Cat.*), Sallust opens his *Bellum Iugurthinum* (= *Jug.*) with a preface (1.1-4.9) that offers what appear as general comments on the human condition. The above opening sentence could apply to any person of any community in any period—it can even appeal to us, readers of the *Jug.*, despite that we are separated from this writer by over two thousand years.¹ Of course, in both prefaces it (gradually) emerges that the historian is writing about his own nation: Rome.² Sallust tells an unsettling tale: he laments the poor quality of people in his time, mainly their unwillingness to strive for *virtus*.

The image offered by the preface of the *Jug.* is that due to this decline in the quality of the Roman people, the Roman nation is under threat. In terms of non-Romans, the empire could be injured through conflict with peoples from other nations. Although the implosion of the Roman empire is not immediately apparent in the *Jug.*, there is a strong feeling that in the textual present the situation is far from secure. The Jugurthine War finds the Romans in a difficult situation:

¹ Perhaps this is more the case with the preface of the *Cat.*, in which Sallust appears to push all human communities together by stressing how humans prove that they are different from, and more importantly that they are superior to, animals (1.1, *omnis homines qui sese student praestare ceteris animalibus summa ope niti decet ne vitam silentio transeant veluti pecora, quae natura prona atque ventri oboedientia finxit*). *Omnis homines* is the ultimate expression of collectivity; Sallust here refers to all people, Roman and foreigner alike. Its placement at the beginning of his sentence draws attention to this fact most effectively. On this preface, see Vretska (1976) 29-34, and Koestermann (1971) 27. On prologues in Sallust, see Egermann (1932); Earl (1961) 5-17 and (1972) *passim*; Büchner (1960) 93-106 (on the *Cat.*) and 106-13 (on the *Jug.*); Steidle (1958) 105-10. On virtue in the preface, see Pöschl (1940) 27-37. On the conventions of a proem in historiography, see Earl (1972). It is interesting to note that McGushin (1977) 30 perceives the preface of the *Jug.* as 'a far more effective piece of writing' than the preface of the *Cat.* On Sallust's historical thinking, see Klinz (1978).

² E.g., *Cat.* 2.2: *postea vero quam in Asia Cyrus, in Graecia Lacedaemonii et Athenienses coepere urbis et nationes subiungere, libidinem dominandi causam belli habere, maxumam gloriam in maximo imperio putare, tum demum periculo atque negotiis compertum est in bello plurimum ingenium posse*.

[A]n African leader rebelling against colonialism; protracted warfare and uneasy truce; European soldiers sickening from the exigencies of campaigning under the hot African sun; collaboration and treachery by fellow-Africans...³

Claassen's words ring true not only for the Ancient Romans, for this passage suggests to modern readers colonial and newly independent Africa. Africa is clearly a place where stability and sureness are things that cannot be taken for granted.⁴ In fact, to many ancient writers it is seen as a region where, as one moves further south (away from Roman Europe), the world loses its recognisable form.⁵ That things in the Jugurthine War are serious for the Romans may be suggested by the text itself, for the *Jug.* is longer than its predecessor in the Sallustian corpus: the compactness of Rome that is represented by the narrative of the Catiline conspiracy is replaced by the long and difficult textual traverse across the *Jug.*⁶

It is perhaps appropriate, therefore, that Sallust's *Jug.*, which narrates a conflict with Africa as its theatre, in its very core argument suggests to the reader that a simple story of a protracted and difficult conflict, one of Roman versus foreign, is not all that is to be covered. The historian's mission statement suggests this:

bellum scripturus sum quod populus Romanus cum Iugurtha rege Numidarum gessit, primum quia magnum et atrox variaque victoria fuit, dehinc quia tunc primum superbiae nobilitatis obviam itum est; quae contentio divina et humana cuncta permiscuit eoque vecordiae processit ut studiis civilibus bellum atque vastitas Italiae finem faceret. (5.1-2)

The war is important to Sallust, perhaps critical in Rome's history,⁷ for it is a conflict that was long, violent and varying in victory (5.1),⁸ and also one in which the human and

³ Claassen (1993) 273. Quinn (1979) 225 seems to agree: 'Like the *Catiline*, the *Jugurtha* has an oddly modern ring'. On the Romans becoming more comfortable with Africa, that is, shaping it to suit them, see Mattingly (1997), who discusses the second to fourth centuries CE.

⁴ E.g., Aulus Albinus' attack on Jugurtha's treasury at Suthul at 37.3-38.10. See Kraus (1999) 234-6.

⁵ E.g., Pomponius Mela, on which see Evans (1999). See also below, section 2.2 and 2.3.

⁶ Kraus (1997) 22 is therefore right to make the point that the length of the monograph reflects the size of Africa.

⁷ Harris (1979) 251 notes that 'the period of the Jugurthine War was one of changed attitudes towards war'. On this passage, see Leeman (1957) 5-6; Koestermann (1971) 41-2.

⁸ On *varia victoria*, see Yardley (2003) 12-13, who notes that it is picked up by Livy and Justin. It appears that *varia victoria* applies specifically to conflict against non-Romans with whom the Romans have exceptional difficulty overcoming. For example, on the

divine were thrown into confusion (5.2). Most important is the fact that one aspect of this conflict as seen by the historian is that the Jugurthine war did not have a clear point of termination, that it was followed almost immediately afterwards by civil disturbance and conflict, which then became *civile bellum*. Sallust envisions Roman history as not only one conflict following another, but also the Romans must deal with the fact that war is constantly changing. What starts as a foreign war on another continent gradually finds its way into domestic Roman politics. That this situation is a particularly difficult one for the Romans is suggested by Christina Kraus when she writes that ‘the Jugurthine war does not end: it is only shifting, faceted, various’, which is appropriate given that the protagonist himself embodies the ‘thematics of *discordia*’, even threatening the work itself.⁹ In terms of both form and content, then, Sallust’s monograph is unsettling to both the reader of the text and the characters within it.

As this chapter seeks to demonstrate, Sallust’s employment of foreign individuals in the *Jug.* can also be viewed as a device that the historian employs to complicate the text, possibly to create confusion for the reader as a result. He therefore stresses his message of *discordia* in another, perhaps more subtle way. Sallust requires us not only to examine critically the non-Romans in the monograph, but the Romans as well. Proper assessment of the foreigner cannot be properly done without critical assessment of the Roman who seek to conquer them. The Romans find themselves dragged into the ethnographic microscope, through the pairing of a Roman character with a non-Roman character. What Sallust writes about the Roman character is based in what he writes about his non-Roman equivalent, and vice versa.

I.

*ingenia hominum, sicut ubique, apud illos locorum quoque situs format.*¹⁰

I begin with the place where Sallust’s views on non-Romans perhaps are easiest to uncover, and where a powerful, early impression can be made by the historian: the

campaign against Viriathus, Justin writes that *in tanta saeculorum serie nullus illis dux magnus praeter Viriatum fuit, qui annis decem Romanos varia victoria fatigavit* (44.2.7).

⁹ Kraus (1999) 219. Note what she writes concerning the protagonist of the *Jug.*: ‘the prince is the embodiment, cause, and effect of disorder at all levels, political, military, and historiographical...Sallust uses him as the focus of his “thematics of disorder”, a turmoil which ultimately threatens even the historian’s project’. Cf. Koestermann (1971) 41-2.

¹⁰ Curtius Rufus 8.9.20.

digressions.¹¹ What is perhaps most surprising about the *Jug.* are the number of digressions it contains for a work of its size: three.¹² These are: chs. 17-19, 41-2 and 78-79. The first and third digressions are important here, because they describe Africa and the people who live there, and they set the scene for the representation of the non-Romans who populate this monograph.

Given the length of the monograph, we can disregard one reason for digressions right away: to give the reader a 'rest' from the narrative proper.¹³ This suggests that Sallust's main reason for including the digressions is to introduce information that is necessary for understanding the story.¹⁴ Understanding the events which Sallust describes in the monograph requires knowledge of what Africa and its inhabitants are like.¹⁵ But perhaps more important is the fact that we can link the digressions, including what Sallust writes about non-Romans, to his arguments on the human condition. Thomas Scanlon is one scholar who suggests that this is possible: 'Sallust's racial characterizations...do not contradict his anthropology of human vices and virtues, since

¹¹ The digressions in this work are covered (briefly) by Büchner (1960) 143-6. Steidle (1958) discusses the digression on party strife (60-5).

¹² Cf. Livy, in whose history the first digression (on Gauls) is in book 5—after some 300 pages of Oxford Text. In the *Cat.* there are as many as five digressions: the archaeology (5.9-13), the so-called 'first conspiracy' (18-19), Sempronia (25), contemporary politics (36.4-39.5), and the synkrisis of Caesar and Cato (53.2-54). Wilkins (1994) 5 disavows the final example, calling the *synkrisis* an 'extended discussion' instead. The abundant use of digressions in his monographs may be an attempt by Sallust to create a complex structure. Most discussions of Sallust discuss structure in some way, e.g., Kraus (1997). Scanlon (1989) is perhaps the best examination of the structure and its implications for the narrative of the *Jug.* See also Paratore (1973) 9-23. Giancotti (1971) is a detailed examination of structure in Sallust (and Tacitus). He treats the *Jug.* in considerable detail (85-164), summarizing the work of previous scholars (85-104). He also carefully points out differences between the digressions (212-4, on the first and third digressions). See also the analysis of Ciruelo (1973) 39-40, especially the chart on p. 39.

¹³ Pointed out by Green (1993) 185 when he asks 'did the reader of the Jugurthine War really require respite from the narrative before the twentieth chapter, a point at which Thucydides, Herodotus and Polybius had scarcely concluded their introductions?'

¹⁴ Moreover, Thomas (1982) 1 provides the five topics covered by ethnographic studies such as this digression: physical geography; climate; agricultural produce; origins and features of the inhabitants; and political, social and military organization. In this digression Sallust touches upon all five areas.

¹⁵ Wilkins (1994) 17 notes that 'the digressions in the *Jug.* are 'more successfully integrated into the overall narration', and that they 'are less obtrusive, relatively shorter, of fairly uniform length, and more evenly and logically distributed' than in the *Cat.*

these racial traits are secondary to universal human qualities'.¹⁶ The preface and the digressions therefore can be seen to reinforce each other, building each other up.

We should note the interesting pattern of the digressions: the narrative aside, the Roman digression on party strife stands with a non-Roman digression on either side. In terms of the historian's placing of the digressions, therefore, we can imagine them thus: Africa-Rome-Africa. This alternation between Roman and non-Roman appears even more interesting if we consider the Roman digression as an example of *res internae* and the non-Roman digressions as instances of *res externae*: thus the digressions in the arrangement follow the pattern of annalistic history.¹⁷

One might be forgiven for entertaining the possibility of a fourth digression in the monograph, or rather a first digression—the preface. The ending of the preface encourages the reader to think that he has digressed (4.9, *nunc ad inceptum redeo*).¹⁸ If we do consider the preface as a digression, then, we can observe another interesting feature of the *Jug.*: it begins by discussing humanity in the broad sense (the preface), and builds towards a specific discussion of a foreign community (Lepcis), via discussions of the nature of Africa in general and Roman political difficulties. Discussion of the Romans appears to be a (brief) pause on a journey of increasing non-Roman self-awareness: from humanity in general the reader passes to Africa in general in terms of an overview of its geography and its history, via the disorder of Roman politics to a specific, praiseworthy non-Roman *exemplum*. The subject of the Roman digression, moreover, provides a history of Roman political strife from its origin to its ever-increasing interference in the normal workings of the *res publica*. The reader might contrast the view of Africa that Sallust offers in the first digression with the digression on Roman political strife. Africa, the reader might reflect, has not experienced such political difficulties as those that currently exist at Rome. This may be seen as a good thing—for the Africans. So, how we perceive a digression may affect how we perceive another digression. This appears to be the case on the basis of how Anton Leeman divides the monograph, into three

¹⁶ Scanlon (1989) 175 n. 51. He notes that 'Sallust is "universal" in his willingness to posit universal human motives among diverse peoples'.

¹⁷ On this structure as it pertains to Sallust's successor, Livy, see Kraus (1994) 9-13 and Rich (1997).

¹⁸ On this phrase, see Wiedemann (1979); Koestermann (1971) 41; Berry (1996) 209. Cf. Tacitus, *Annals* 4.33.4; Ammianus 31.2.25: *sed ad reliqua textus propositi revertamur*; Arrian, *Indica* 17.7: ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐδὲ ἡ ὑπόθεσις μοι τῆσδε τῆς ξυγγραφῆς τὰ Ἰνδῶν

sections divided by the three digressions. The first digression, for example, Sallust follows with the first phase of the conflict (Kriegsphase), which Leeman labels *Romae omnia venalia*.¹⁹ This ‘theme’ for this section then builds up to Sallust’s digression on party strife. Or, to look at it another way, Sallust’s narrative in chapters 20-40 forces the historian to narrate why things at Rome are so difficult. This contrasts with the first digression, where such a situation does not exist.

1.1 On African Geography and History (chs. 17-19).

This digression is perhaps the most formal of the three, for it has both the hallmark beginning (17.1, *res postulare videtur Africae situm paucis exponere et eas gentis, quibuscum nobis bellum aut amicitia fuit*) and ending (19.8, *de Africa et eius incolis ad necessitudinem rei satis dictum*).²⁰ This careful separation of narrative and excursus signals the importance of the digression: the reader is meant to pause and reflect. But this is misleading, for it provides the reader with a sense of boundaries that will quickly break down as the events of the narrative unfold. Beginnings and endings, or any form of structure for that matter, will prove meaningless even if they exist.

1.1.1 African Geography (ch. 17).²¹

Sallust helps explain why this digression exists at this point in the narrative by connecting the first part of the excursus to the narrative that immediately precedes it. Immediately prior to beginning the digression, the historian notes the division of Numidia between Adherbal and Jugurtha, noting the features of the parts given to each: Jugurtha gets the more fertile and populated portion, and Adherbal the more desirable portion in terms of physical attributes (e.g., harbours) (16.5)—or so it seems at first glance, but this is not really the case (*specie quam usu*).²² The Romans seem to have favoured Adherbal, when in

νόμιμα ἀναγράψαι ἦν, ἀλλ’ ὅπως γὰρ παρεκομίσθη Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ἐς Πέρσας ἐξ Ἰνδῶν ὁ στόλος, ταῦτα δὴ μοι ἐκβολὴ ἔστω τοῦ λόγου.

¹⁹ Leeman (1957) 9-13.

²⁰ On 17.1, see Koestermann (1971) 87; on 19.8 see Koestermann (1971) 97.

²¹ On ch. 17, see specifically Oniga (1995) 37-50.

²² As Green (1993) 194-5 points out, the portions given to Jugurtha and Adherbal correspond to aspects of the character of each Numidian. Adherbal’s region, which is more adequately supplied by nature, goes with his gift for oratory. Jugurtha’s region, on the other hand, is more fertile, and therefore naturally strong, which suggests that it goes with Jugurtha’s natural bodily and mental strength, noted by Sallust in his character portrait of the lead character (see below, section 3.1).

fact they have favoured Jugurtha. Having described the features of each man's region, Sallust then offers a general overview of African geography. The reader therefore understands exactly the advantages and disadvantages of the parts of the territory given to each person.

It is interesting that Sallust begins by mentioning that there is part of the continent that is not usually visited on account of its harsh environment (17.2).²³ This creates an impression of Africa as a place hostile to people, although the historian does not apply this statement to the entire continent. It provides a boundary in the geographic sense, informing the reader that while the part of Africa in which the Jugurthine conflict takes place is not hostile to humans, it is near to one which is. The Romans therefore face the risk of crossing over to this hostile region, or having this region impede their campaign.

When Sallust formally tackles the issue of African geography, he begins by declaring his opinion that Africa represents the third part of the world, while some geographers classify it as part of Europe.²⁴ Making Africa a region in its own right increases the immensity of the task before the Romans: their campaign involves leaving Europe.

The brevity of the description of Africa hides its complex geographic composition. Sallust begins by providing the boundaries of the continent (17.4). This clear definition of African geographic space works well with Sallust's clear definition of the textual space that he sets aside to discuss African geography and history mentioned above (17.1 and 19.8). Africa as a place and the way in which it is described are similar: both are clearly marked off from what exists elsewhere. Moreover, the historian gives Africa a place in which it can exist in this (textual) Roman world, but the size of the digression in relation to the monograph as a whole suggests that Africa has a limited role in Rome's past, and the people who inhabit this region have minimal effect in the history and geography of the Roman world.²⁵

²³ Cf. Polybius 12.3.1-6, where the historian criticises the account of African geography provided by Timaeus. Polybius strongly refutes Timaeus' claims that African land is hostile to agriculture and animals. Polybius appears especially concerned about the latter, for he then lists the number of animals that exist there.

²⁴ See Koestermann (1971) 88.

²⁵ While this may not represent 'textual colonization', a term offered by Rutledge (2000), it should be taken as an expression of Roman textual power over another culture. Tacitus' *Germania* is perhaps the best example of a Roman historian taking the opposite approach (see chapter four).

Sallust then turns to the nature of the land, pointing to the rough sea, lack of natural harbours, the fertile ground, suitability for livestock and the lack of rainfall (17.5).²⁶ In the third and final sentence he describes the physical attributes of the Africans, which establishes in what ways they are different from the Romans (17.6). It is perhaps significant that the historian does not here describe the character of these people. He seems to expect the reader to infer the African character based upon physical characteristics, or to discover the nature of the Africans through the actions of the African characters in the course of the war.

We can observe a clear flow of thought in this brief passage. Sallust begins by decoupling Africa from its European 'master' (17.3), then he describes this newly created independent region in its own right (17.4-5), finally describing those who live in it in terms of their physical characteristics (17.6).²⁷ Africa goes from being part of a world that is largely controlled by the Romans to being a separate region. The third step is to give Africa its own inhabitants. It is one thing to describe a place, but it is something more to describe what exists (or who lives) in it.²⁸ Sallust does not note that the Africans are in any way not suited to life in this region. Rather, their ability for great endurance (*patiens laborum*) suggests that they are capable of thriving anywhere.²⁹ Given that their land is amenable to grain and to livestock, only the limitations of water supply might call upon the endurance of the Africans.

The explication of African geography serves to reinforce Sallust's claim in his mission statement that this was a difficult conflict for the Romans, and therefore we understand one reason for the existence of this digression. The harsh sea and lack of harbours suggests that getting to (and more important getting supplies to) Africa will prove very difficult in a Roman military campaign. Conversely, the fertile soil and

²⁶ Green (1993) 188: '[Sallust] has...fully enclosed the space of his "Africa"'. He also notes (189) that the historian catalogues Africa from what it has in abundance to that which it has the least. On the fertility of North Africa, cf. Herodotus 4.198-99, who appears to contradict himself when he notes that the soil of Libya is too poor to be compared with the soil of Asia or Europe (4.198.1), but then goes on to discuss the land around Cyrene, which is so fertile that there are three harvest-times (4.199.1).

²⁷ Cf. Oniga (1995) 39-40.

²⁸ Cf. chapter four, section one on the first few chapters (chs. 1-5) of Tacitus' *Germania*. The possible connection is also picked up by Oniga (1995) 44-5.

²⁹ On *patiens laborum*, see Koestermann (1971) 89. On its possible relationship to Roman *virtus*, see Thomas (1982) 20-21; Dauge (1981) 249-54.

suitability of livestock means that Jugurtha's side will be well equipped.³⁰ The description of the Africans serves to suggest that they will be a formidable fighting force, a difficult opponent for the Romans to overcome.³¹

1.1.2 African History (chs.18-19).

Before Sallust begins his section on African (pre-)history, he explains that he is about to shift from a geographical explication to an historical one, and he is careful to point out the potential limits of the discussion that follows.³² That Sallust feels it appropriate to discuss African history is understandable. Given what the Jugurthine war means for Africa, that is, it marks the beginning of a permanent Roman presence in this region, Sallust's *Jug.* can be seen as the last chapter of the history of Africa as an independent area. The exposition of early African history also serves to give the reader a context by which he can approach the events of the monograph.

An important aspect of this account is that here Sallust informs the reader that his information comes from a non-Roman historical source, a translation of the work of Hiempsal:³³

*quamquam ab ea fama quae plerosque optinet divorsum est, tamen uti ex libris Punicis, qui regis Hiempsalis dicebantur, interpretatum nobis est, utique rem sese habere cultores eius terrae putant, quam paucissimis dicam.*³⁴ *Ceterum fides eius rei penes auctores erit.* (17.7)

By writing this, Sallust seeks to convey that he had access to primary information that makes his description of African history—and therefore the actions built upon it—more accurate than previous Roman versions.³⁵ Sallust also makes an important contribution

³⁰ Green (1993) 189-90 points out that the physical attributes of the Africans suggests their capability for hard work, which in turn suggests that they are capable of virtue.

³¹ This is also the conclusion of Green (1993) 193, that the main reason for the digression is 'not to describe the real geography and nations of Africa, but to establish a geographical and topographical framework, formally embodying those characteristics of hardness, untamedness, and semi-civilization which identify the Numidians'. Cf. Oniga (1995) 46-9. On Sallust's version of Numidian origins, see Morstein-Marx (2001).

³² On Sallust's division of the digression into two parts, see Oniga (1995) 37.

³³ Sallust's use of Hiempsal's books is discussed by Oniga (1995) 51-68. Cf. Koestermann (1971) 90; Syme (1964) 153; Morstein-Marx (2001) 195-7.

³⁴ On *paucissimis dicam*, cf. Ammianus' introduction to his digression on the Persians, where he claims *dixere paucissimi* (see chapter five, section 2.1).

³⁵ On this passage, see Koestermann (1971) 90. In this passage Sallust's reason for writing his history of Africa follows the convention offered by most Roman historians (including Sallust himself) for writing a work of history (cf. Livy. *Prae.* 2: *novi semper*

to Roman knowledge on the region in that any future histories of the Jugurthine war, which might use Sallust's monograph as a source (e.g., Livy), will benefit from the veracity of Sallust's representation of the region. The historian establishes an important precedent for Roman historians in that he encourages them to think about primary non-Roman sources. The inclusion of an African history written by an African can be read as an act of liberation, for the Africans can speak for themselves, albeit in Latin translation. This seems to be the case when Sallust writes *interpretatum nobis est*. The Africans get to speak for themselves, which can be seen as a substitute for Jugurtha's reluctance to speak in the narrative proper. Mark Morstein-Marx suggests how Sallust's use of Hiempsal's history benefits the Africans:³⁶

This, then, is supposed to be a native *logos*, whose appearance temporarily refocalizes the text, reorienting its implied cultural viewpoint from Roman-centered 'colonial discourse' that otherwise dominates the monograph, and giving us a picture of a foreign world as it is (allegedly) seen from within; we are invited to see the Numidians in the context of their own traditions and beliefs about their history.³⁷

The term 'colonial discourse' is an appropriate term for a culture that, whether deliberately or not, built a world empire. To offer an historical context, by the time Sallust wrote Rome's colonisation of the world is largely complete: Carthage has been defeated, and Spain, Greece and Gaul have been made into provinces. This discourse was/ is not necessarily oppressive. This passage is an excellent example of this, for notionally the Africans can speak for themselves. What Sallust also seeks is to be considered a good historian, and the citation of an original and possibly unique source

scriptores aut in rebus certius aliquid allaturos se aut scribendi arte rudem vetustatem superaturos credunt). In this case, then, ethnography is justified in the same way as history, thus elevating this digression to a status higher (although how high is a matter for debate) than digressions usually are permitted.

³⁶ Scanlon (1989) 138-43 highlights parallels between African history in this monograph and the development of Rome in the *Cat.* Cf. Morstein-Marx (2001) 195: 'the story of Numidia's origins and rise to power related in *Jugurtha* 18, like the "Roman archaeology" of the *Catiline*, illustrates Sallust's special interest in the peculiar environmental, social and moral factors that motivate the rise of states'. On the political ramifications of the Romans using other languages, see Habinek (1998) 34-68.

³⁷ Morstein-Marx (2001) 197.

such as this achieves this.³⁸ So, he does this on the back of the African historians/geographers, and vice versa: by being cited in Sallust's work, the African writer stands to gain credibility in another culture. And the result is that the historian expands his work to include both the Roman and non-Roman points of view on what happened and why.³⁹

Sallust's starting point is what he takes as the very beginning of African history, the Gaetulians and Libyans. The digression proves to be a comprehensive overview of African history. Sallust could, but does not, recount only the last few centuries of African history. A reasonable (late) point from which he could have begun, for example, is Masinissa. Starting at the earliest possible point suggests that understanding Africa's past in its entirety is important to Sallust.

The first inhabitants of Africa Sallust appears to describe in unflattering terms. They behave like animals, and they do not conform to the basic principles of human civilisation—i.e., no recognisable form of government and no laws (18.2, *ei neque moribus neque lege aut imperio cuiusquam regebantur; vagi, palantes, quas nox coegerat sedes habebant*). Not only do the early Africans not have government nor laws, but also they lack fixed settlements—they are nomads. By identifying the Africans as nomads, Sallust situates this early culture within the ancient tradition on nomads that goes back to the most famous of all nomads, Herodotus' Scythians, and this suggests that Sallust is writing this digression as his contribution to the tradition in foreign community representation.⁴⁰ The starting point of African history, then, establishes the Africans to be as distant as possible in terms of cultural sophistication from the Romans of Sallust's day. Rome,

³⁸ Note that Sallust chooses what Hiempsal wrote over the prevailing tradition (*quamquam ab ea fama quae plerosque optinet divorsum est*). See Marincola (1997) 105; Paul (1984) 74.

⁴⁰ In allowing the Africans to argue their case, the speeches of Adherbal must also be considered. In this case the Roman-African and intra-African relations are analysed by Sallust. See below, section two.

⁴⁰ On nomads in classical antiquity, see Shaw (1995). He notes (24-25) that Sallust works within ancient ideology of nomads rather than direct observation (given his tenure as governor), and that his presentation fits in with 'the orthodox view' of nomads as set out by previous authors (including the Cyclopes of the Homeric *Odyssey*). Shaw notes that from Sallust the image of the nomad 'remained till the end of antiquity a synonym for barbarism, savagery, and utter alienation from the world of civilized men' (24). Cf. Ammianus Marcellinus on the Huns, in what is possibly the last ethnographic digression in Latin historiography. Ammianus notes that the Huns have neither homes nor laws nor political rulers (31.2.4-7). Nomadism and lawlessness, therefore, seem to go together. On the Scythians in Herodotus, see Hartog (1988) 3-206.

therefore, enjoys something that the early Africans do not. African nomadism acts as a kind of frontier, too: at this very early period in human history, the Africans existed in a form more animal-like than human.⁴¹

Describing the early inhabitants of Africa in this way provides a point of comparison not only with the present-day Africans, but the Romans of the past as well. Sallust perhaps intends the reader to contrast early Africans with early Romans, just as in the main narrative the reader might contrast present-day Africans and Romans. This negative representation of Africa's past (negative in that early African do not distinguish themselves as do early Romans)⁴² undermines the communities who inhabit this region from the start: thus by the time the events narrated in the *Jug.* occur, and the reader learns of them from Sallust's narrative, the Africans have been put into a position of weakness from which it will be difficult, if not impossible, to escape. Or Sallust may intend this picture of the earliest Africans to be positive, as these Africans do not have the negative aspects common in more advanced cultures such as Rome in Sallust's day.⁴³ As Africa develops, then, the historian may want his reader to note the ways in which Africans develop the same interest in negative things as Rome, or the ways in which the Africans avoid them.

The beginnings of human civilisation come from, appropriately perhaps, a Greco-Roman—or rather a European—source: Hercules.⁴⁴ This provides the reader

⁴¹ Roman perception of people living at the edge of the world as representing a state where the recognisable form of humanity begins to break down (or does not exist) is well-established. Cf. Tacitus, *Ger.* 46.4 (see chapter four, section one). On Africa specifically, see Evans (1999) on Pomponius Mela whose writing on Africa describes the 'grotesque' nature of these frontier people.

⁴² Here Sallust may be writing the early Africans in response to what he writes about the Romans and others in the archaeology of the *Cat.*

⁴³ Cf. Tacitus, *Annals* 3.26.1-3: *vetustissimi mortalium, nulla adhuc mala libidine, sine probro, scelere eoque sine poena aut coercionibus agebant. neque praemiis opus erat cum honesta suo pte ingenio peterentur; et ubi nihil contra morem cuperent, nihil per metum vetabantur. at postquam exui aequalitas et pro modestia ac pudore ambitio et vis incedebat, provenere dominationes multosque apud populos aeternum mansere. quidam statim aut postquam regum pertaesum leges maluerunt. hae primo rudibus hominum animis simplices erant.* See Martin and Woodman (1996) 239-45.

⁴⁴ As Green (1993) 190 points out, the travels of Hercules were associated with the idea of bringing civilisation to the Mediterranean world. By suggesting that Africa is civilised, and especially that it is made so by its association with a figure that is also part of Roman culture, Africa's civilised nature can be seen to be tied to Rome's. If this is the case, then Africa's (that is, Numidia as representing Africa as a whole) fighting against Rome can perhaps be seen as rejecting the civilisation that Hercules (and therefore Rome) represents.

with something to which he can relate as he works through Sallust's African history. Just as the Greeks treated the arrival of Hercules' children as an history event, so too the history of Africa can begin with this mythical-historical figure. Rather, it is the death of this figure that marks the beginning of African history: his army, made up of men from many nationalities, dispersed, and some come to Africa (18.3). The region develops not from the evolution of its own people, but rather from immigrants. The Africans are therefore like the Romans in that they find their origins in people who came to the region, but they are unlike the Romans in that the earliest settlers are from a wide range of nationalities, and not a single community, Troy. In the sentences that follow, the historian records different paths of development for the Gaetulians and Libyans. The different speed of each community's development is the appearance of cities. The Gaetulians are slow to develop cities, given the lack of building resources and their inability to trade (18.5-8).⁴⁵ The Libyans, on the other hand, quickly develop cities. This is explained by their occupation of the better part of Africa, while Sallust points out that the Gaetulians inhabit the part of Africa near the region with the inhospitable conditions he mentions in his geographic explication. Not only do the Libyans have cities, but they are able to trade with the Spanish, as they live closer to them (18.9). This confirms that African development comes from interaction with Europeans; isolation from Europeans, as the Gaetulians demonstrate, results in a backward culture.⁴⁶

The next section of the digression charts the development of African civilization (18.11-19.2). Sallust records the expansion of the Gaetulians (via intermarriage with the Persians) and the creation of the Numidians, and their successful take-over of other groups (18.11-12). A second expansion comes from outside, as the Phoenicians establish colonies and one such colony develops into Carthage (19.1-2). The arrival of these two

⁴⁵ Morstein-Marx (2001) 183 notes that Sallust also draws upon distance from the sea as a sign of strength: 'distance from the sea and from maritime commerce preserves the pristine valor of the "barbarian"'. He points to a passage from Caesar (Sallust's near-contemporary), *Bellum Gallicum* 1.1.3, where the Belgae are credited as being the strongest given the lack of merchants with whom they have contact. This has important implications for Jugurtha when the Romans divide Numidia between him and Adherbal at 16.5 (see above). Cf. Cicero, *Rep.* 2.5-6.

⁴⁶ This can be said to establish a challenge for the Romans in that their presence in Numidia (eventually) results in an improvement in the quality of life through Roman-Numidian trade. It is surely possible to read the Jugurthine War in this context. The Romans will declare war on Jugurtha when his actions against Adherbal results in the death of Roman traders (16.3). The Romans declare war not so much to avenge the

important cultural groups, Persians and Phoenicians, establishes firmly that Africa is a place of interest to civilised cultures, and that these societies can have a role in shaping the development of the region.

The intermarriage of the Libyans and Gaetulians and the new arrivals that Sallust mentions in this section is important for this reason. Improvement for Africans comes through joining with new communities from outside Africa. The Gaetulians and Libyans are described as

asperi incultique, quis cibus erat caro ferina atque humi pabulum uti pecoribus. ei neque moribus neque lege aut imperio cuiusquam regebantur; vagi, palantes, quas nox coegerat sedes habebant. (18.1-2)

Several things suggest the simplicity of these peoples: lack of laws and government; their beast-like feeding preferences; and their nomadic nature. Some of the new arrivals immediately establish their differences from the original Africans through their construction of homes, made from the ships that bring them to Africa. It appears that being in contact with Medes and Armenians helps the Libyans, for Sallust writes that all three develop cities (18.9).⁴⁷ This is an important sign of civilisation. But the opposite occurs as well: when the Gaetulians intermarry with the Persians, the new community remains nomadic (18.8). So, on the one hand the arrival of a new community in Africa changes Africa for the better, while on the other hand a new community adopts the ways of an pre-existing African community. Both of the newly formed communities grow, but in different ways: the Libyans and their neighbours grow economically as they begin to trade with the people in Spain (18.9); the Persians grow in numbers, to the point where the next generation is known by a different name. They are now a community in their own right. The Libyans now come under the power of the Persians and Numidians, who by working together establish themselves as the main community in Africa. This is most powerfully suggested by 18.12: *deinde utrique alteris freti finitimos armis aut metu sub imperium suum coegere.*⁴⁸

deaths of their citizens, but rather to protect the trade interests in Numidia which the traders had established.

⁴⁷ And the Libyans change the Medes, although not necessarily for the better. The Libyans, Sallust writes, gradually changed the name of the Medes to the Moors, a name that comes from their barbarian language (18.10, *nomen eorum paulatim Libyes corrumpere, barbara lingua Mauros pro Medis appellantes*).

⁴⁸ On the use of *metu* in this phrase, Koestermann (1971) 93 refers to the use of the same word in the opening of Tacitus' *Germania* (see chapter four, section one). Possibly the Romans saw the use of fear as a physical instrument (suggested by its appearance in

The final third of the digression provides other information about Africa, some of it relevant to the reading of the *Jug*. The first section names other communities of, and places in, Africa. This is a general overview of all of Africa, as if Sallust feels that such an overview is necessary to appreciate fully the region and the events that he will describe taking place there. Roman rule over part of Africa is noted first, then Jugurtha's territory, and finally that of Bocchus. In terms of cultural worth, Sallust can be seen as going from most important to least important. There is also a hierarchy in terms of Roman knowledge of Africa: Sallust begins with the part of Africa that the Romans not only know, but occupy. Next comes Jugurtha's kingdom, of which they have some information. Finally, there is Bocchus' territory, of which Sallust and the Romans know very little—in fact, the Moors know of the Romans only by name, and the Romans had no knowledge of the Moors prior to the Jugurthine conflict (19.7). The digression concludes, therefore, by giving the Romans a reason to conduct this war, and for the reader, a reason to read the *Jug*: to discover fully this region.

1.2 On Lepcis (chs. 78-79).

Sallust's third and final digression, on Lepcis, is similar to the first in that it deals with a non-Roman topic.⁴⁹ It is different from the first digression in that it appears to be a distraction from the historian's story, that is, it provides information that is not directly relevant to the narrative.⁵⁰ However, we can see the third digression as complementing the first, for Sallust first writes about Africa in general, while here he writes in specific terms. He can therefore reinforce the information provided in the first excursus. We recall that in his general survey of Africa, he refers to the physical attributes of Africans. By writing about the Philaeni, Sallust proves that what he writes is correct, but more important he can go further: to show that physical prowess is matched by quality of character. This serves to strengthen the historian's positive presentation of Rome's opponents just as the Romans are beginning to hold their own with Jugurtha.

18.12 beside *armis*) of contact between different non-Roman communities. Note that it reaches Rome during the course of the war (fear of Jugurtha?) at 39.1. Sallust's use of *invadere* in that passage suggests the profound change in the war, that Jugurtha is invading Rome itself through the fear felt by the Romans. See Koestermann (1971) 159.

⁴⁹ Lancel (1995) 93 notes the Greek origin of this story. He also writes that Sallust probably collected information on this legend during his African residency.

⁵⁰ Interest in the Philaeni in antiquity has been noted. See Koestermann (1971) 278-9, for example.

In the *hic* and *nunc* of the story, the town is a Roman ally and the residents fear that a leading man of the town is plotting a defection. This individual is not only named by Sallust, but also the historian is careful to point out that he is not one to follow government nor laws (77.1, *advorsum quem neque imperia magistratum neque leges valerent*). This possible treachery Sallust contrasts with the town as a whole, which the historian is careful to note has been loyal to the Roman people since the outbreak of the war (77.2-4).

Sallust begins the digression (78.1)⁵¹ by going back to the foundation of the city: the Sidoniani came to found Lepcis to escape civil war.⁵² Having provided an historical context to the city, it is then given a geographic context (78.2-3), an inverted order to the division of geographic and historical material in the previous non-Roman digression. This sets this digression on a specific African region and people apart from the previous discussion on Africa in general.

The historian then notes the mixing of the local language with the neighbouring Numidians, and the maintaining of their laws from their old country (78.4-5), which places Lepcis in a geographic and cultural context that helps the reader appreciate its value—to the Romans. The city is described as having an adequate harbour, encouraging the reader to think that trade with Rome, or the conveying of supplies for the Roman war effort, are possible. The cultural information describes the people of the city in relation to the present enemy of Rome—Numidia. Declaring the connection to the Numidians in terms of language links the two communities. This makes his statement of Lepcis' loyalty to Rome appear as a military victory for the Romans, and the reaffirmation of the loyalty of this community to Rome can also stand for a capture of a Numidian *urbs*. But as contrast Sallust separates Numidia and Lepcis, noting that the *leges* and *cultus* of Lepcis are similar to those of their original homeland: thus this community is differentiated from the Numidians in an important way. The historian reinforces

⁵¹ This should perhaps be called the first beginning of the digression, for 79.1 seems to start the digression anew, or to mark that chapter off as a digression within a digression (*sed quoniam in eas regiones per Lepcitanorum negotia venimus, non indignum videtur egregium atque mirabile facinus duorum Carthaginiensium memorare*).

⁵² That the Sidoniani found a new city to escape civil war in their old city may have particular resonance with Sallust's reader, who may think about the current political situation in Rome. What the historian may be suggesting here is that migration to escape from civil war is an acceptable course of action, albeit an undesirable one, and therefore if the Romans wish to avoid mass migration, they must put an end to the present civil war.

national tradition through geography: the distance between the two capitals, and the region in between is unaccommodating to humans. Sallust lessens any Roman sense of achievement from the obtaining of Lepcis, preferring the Romans to fight on for a real victory against Jugurtha himself.

The final point about Lepcis is that it is 'an ideal city...by which to illustrate the internal *concordia* of a state and the patriotic *virtus* of its people'.⁵³ Scanlon also argues that

the central digression on Leptis and the heroic Carthaginian brothers not only stands as a thematic counterbalance to the political rivalry of the Romans, but also lifts the themes out of the narrower, nationalistic focus of Roman civil strife into the wider purview of the human experience or human nature at large.⁵⁴

The Lepcis digression, therefore, has many possible interpretations from many different national and ideological standpoints. Despite the fact that Romans do not play a role *in* the digression, it is clearly important *to* them. Sallust wants his reader to learn from the positive example set by the people in the digression.

It is not Lepcis *per se* that interests Sallust, but an event that takes place here (79.1, *eam rem nos locus admonuit*). Or—to put it another way—discussing the foundation of Lepcis enables the historian to discuss something important that happened there, and this is something to which Sallust (rightly) feels the reader ought to direct his attention. The story begins by suggesting that co-operation between non-Roman communities is possible, for the Carthaginians and the Cyrene residents put aside their differences fearing attack from a third party. Sallust here may be trying to suggest that co-operation between non-Romans is possible. This digression might be meant as an example of non-Roman co-operation to prepare the reader for, or warn the Roman characters of the monograph about, the forthcoming agreement between Jugurtha and Bocchus. In the test to determine the frontier between the two kingdoms, Sallust creates a clear impression of the better community, for the Carthaginian pair, the Philaeni, undertake their journey with exemplary zeal. The pair from Cyrene are less determined, and having not travelled far enough in their eyes, they accuse the Carthaginians of cheating (79.5-7). The sand storm that delays the pair from Cyrene may be seen as the land working with the people who are hard-working, and punishing those who are not. But there may be

⁵³ Scanlon (1989) 162.

⁵⁴ Scanlon (1989) 169.

more here, for Sallust now calls these people *Graeci*. The Philaeni, on the other hand, are Africans in the truest sense, for they are so loyal to their community that to secure this advantageous border position they agree to be buried alive. This makes them part of Africa itself, and it makes the community they represent appear to have a natural connection to this region. It might be seen as the Carthaginians making an African identity for themselves that centres on the fact that they are native to Africa. The historian's declaration *nunc ad rem redeo* belies the powerful message of this chapter: the historian feels no need to explain, confident that he has made his cultural point of observation clear and that the Roman reader will be suitably enriched.

This praise of Carthage achieves one very important thing in this work: it allows Sallust to make his *metus hostilis* theme an integral part of the monograph once again, more so here than in the previous excursus. The reader here gets to see Carthage in action. And perhaps there is a positive message for Rome here, that collectivity (in the sense of people not working alone but together) is a good thing. Just as these Carthaginians could do it, so should the Romans. And Sallust can suggest that the Romans can do this through the co-operation of Marius and Sulla in the final section of the monograph.

1.4 Conclusion.

In the non-Roman digressions in the *Jug.*, the historian offers different pictures of a community, both of intrinsic interest and important to any full reading of the monograph and, in a wider view, the Sallustian corpus. The two digressions that focus on Africa and Africans, moreover, are very different from each other. The first digression clearly fits into the work, for it can be said to provide information that aids in the understanding of a text that is predominantly set in Africa. So too the digression on Lepcis, although it appears to further one particular aim, rather than provide general geographic and historical background. The Lepcis digression allows Sallust to explore further the Africans whom he examines in his first digression. The Roman reader of the monograph comes to a better understanding of what Africa means at the point where the Roman characters begin to take control of the campaign in Africa.

II.

*hoc illud est praecipue in cognitione rerum salubre ac frugiferum, omnis te exempli documenta in inlustri posita monumento intueri.*⁵⁵

So, in his preface Livy provides one of the many compelling reasons for the study of history and for Livy, a good reason for writing the history of Rome *ab urbe condita*. Not only does history provide examples, but Roman history provides the best examples.⁵⁶

However, we need to keep in mind that Livy, by writing history, was working within an already established tradition and, further, that the use of *exempla* stretched as far back as the Homeric epics. One influence on Livy was Sallust; a passage in the preface of the *Jug.* suggests that for this historian *exempla* were a particular interest:

nam saepe ego audiui Q. Maxumum, P. Scipionem, <alios> praeterea civitatis nostrae⁵⁷ praeclaros viros solitos ita dicere, quom maiorum imagines intuerentur, vehementissime sibi animum ad virtutem adcendi. scilicet non ceram illam neque figuram tantum vim in sese habere, sed memoria rerum gestarum eam flammam egregiis viris in pectore crescere neque prius sedari quam virtus eorum famam atque gloriam adaequaverit. (4.5-6)

The phrase *memoria rerum gestarum*⁵⁸ can be taken as a validation for the history writing process itself: thus these exemplary Romans place the idea of *exempla* at the heart of historical narratives and, in particular, this monograph.⁵⁹ It appears that Sallust is impressed by these men: they uphold his belief in the adherence to *virtus*, something that the historian in the preface (of which this passage is a part) complains most strongly that contemporary Romans lack. The adherence to virtue makes the men mentioned here *exempla* to Sallust (and he hopes, to his readers as well) just as their ancestors are *exempla* to Scipio and Quintus Maximus.⁶⁰ By referring to these two men, Sallust establishes a

⁵⁵ Livy, *Prae.* 10. For comment, see Moles (1993) 152-5.

⁵⁶ See Chaplin (2000) for a treatment of *exempla* in Livy.

⁵⁷ On the use of the first-person plural in Latin historiography, see Marincola (1997) 287-8.

⁵⁸ Mentioned by Kraus (1997) 51, where it forms the opening to her chapter on Livy. But the terms 'history-writing/ historiography' and 'history' are not so easy to pin down, as Kraus and Woodman (1997) 1 are careful to point out.

⁵⁹ Cf. Flower (1996) 46: 'Sallust speaks of the inspiration drawn from their ancestors' *imagines* by earlier statesmen, specifically Fabius Maximus and Scipio Africanus. This is important to Sallust who is using the whole notion of the influence of power of historical *exempla* to justify the notion of writing of history. Indeed he refers to a general oral tradition for which he claims to have personal evidence (*saepe ego audiui*)...'

⁶⁰ Not only patricians, but also *novi homines* (cf. 4.7, *etiam homines novi, qui antea per virtutem soliti erant nobilitatem antevenire, furtim et per latrocinia potius quam bonis artibus ad imperia et*

position of familiarity for his reader. Knowing that Scipio and Fabius were exemplary characters from Rome's past, Quintus Maximus in particular, enables the Romans to think outside the temporal confines of the monograph, back as far as the Hannibalic War. Referring to exemplary Romans of the period of the Hannibalic War means that exploring the exemplary nature of non-Romans from that period is not out of place. This establishes a place for Masinissa in the monograph, given that he is a contemporary of the men mentioned above. Not only does this character play an important part in the *virtus* / *fortuna* debate that the historian discusses in the preface, but also he plays a critical role in the equally important battle between *concordia* and *discordia* in the early portion of the *Jug.*

2.1 Defining Masinissa: Sallust's Non-Roman *Exemplum*.

What makes Masinissa an important part of the monograph is the way that he is not just a character to whom the historian refers at seemingly random points in the narrative, but rather he is carefully incorporated by Sallust into this historical project.⁶¹ The first thing that Sallust does is define Masinissa as an exemplary character:

bello Punico secundo, quo dux Carthaginensium Hannibal post magnitudinem nominis Romani Italiae opes maxime adtriverat, Masinissa rex Numidarum in amicitiam receptus a P. Scipione, quoi postea Africano cognomen ex virtute fuit, multa et praeclara rei militaris facinora fecerat. ob quae victis Carthaginensibus et capto Syphace, quouis in Africa magnum atque late imperium valuit, populus Romanus quascumque urbis et agros manu ceperat regi dono dedit. igitur amicitia Masinissae bona atque honesta nobis permansit; sed imperi vitaeque eius finis idem fuit. (5.4-5)⁶²

The textual position of this passage is critical. It follows immediately Sallust's mission statement (5.1-2) and it is joined to it by a single sentence in which the historian claims that there is some background information he needs to provide before his narrative can begin.⁶³ This positions Masinissa as an outgrowth of Sallust's aim in writing up this war,

honores nituntur). The implications of this sentence on the *novus homo* of the *Jug.*, Marius, are discussed below, section four.

⁶¹ Koestermann (1971) 42-4 considers this reference to Masinissa as the beginning of a section of the monograph that extends to the end of the first digression.

⁶² Cf. Livy, *periocha* L, where the death of Masinissa is recorded (*Masinissa, Numidiae rex, maior XC annis decessit, vir insignis*).

⁶³ 5.3, *sed priusquam huiusmodi rei initium expedio, pauca supra repetam, quo ad cognoscendum omnia illustria magis magisque in aperto sint*. Moreover, we can compare this situation to the *Cat.*, where after Sallust declares his topic to be the conspiracy of Catiline, he describes the character of this villain (5.1-5).

and the actions of everyone, Roman and non-Roman, will be judged against this positive picture of Masinissa.⁶⁴

Sallust begins by mentioning Hannibal, Rome's great enemy.⁶⁵ This provides Masinissa with a goal: it is his task to displace him as the leading African. In a way the historian does this for him: Hannibal appears at the beginning of this passage, where he serves as a chronological indicator, named only to provide a temporal frame of reference for Masinissa. In this central part of this passage, Sallust provides two consequential pieces of information: (1) Masinissa's friendship with Scipio and (2) his many excellent deeds in battle. Scipio's *virtus* lies in between these two details, which positions Rome, and virtue, at the heart of the Masinissa references in the monograph.

Having placed Masinissa in this important position, Sallust builds upon it in the final sentence of this passage (*igitur amicitia Masinissae...fuit*). We find two ideas here offered as two co-dependent expressions, both essential to our understanding of Masinissa's role in Roman history and, moreover, in the *Jug.*: the African prince enjoys a lifetime of *concordia*, a lifetime as *rex*,⁶⁶ on account of his continued *amicitia* with the Romans. This indicates that *amicitia* with Rome is a means by which *concordia* is created and then maintained. Failure to uphold this is one path to *discordia*.

2.2 Masinissa and Jugurtha.

We are still moving through the very early stages of the monograph as Sallust immediately follows his definition of Masinissa with a highly condensed history of the Numidian royal family (5.6-7). The historian, through the history of the Numidian

⁶⁴ Moreover, the mission statement is the only text separating Masinissa from the Scipio-Quintus Maximus passage at 4.5-6 (discussed above). The presence of Scipio in both passages links them: Scipio is an *exemplum* in the first passage, he helps make Masinissa an *exemplum* in the second.

⁶⁵ Hannibal is by far one of the most important foreigners encountered by the Romans. This study naturally cannot overlook him: the next chapter endeavours to do him justice in the context of his most famous appearance in historiography: Livy 21-30. Hannibal's appearance here possibly has another significance. In all of Sallust's writings he blames the fall of Carthage as the event that initiated Rome's decline (e.g., *Cat.* 10.1-6; *Hist.* 1.11, 1.12). Within Sallustian thought Hannibal is possibly the best representation of *metus hostilis*, for he is someone the Romans feared in the past, and the memory of whom they fear in the present.

⁶⁶ It appears that Sallust names Masinissa as *rex* without attaching to it any of the negative stigma that the Romans perceive as part of the term. Sallust criticises monarchy in the *Jug.* at 113.1. To judge by what Sallust writes in his appraisal of Masinissa, the criticism of kings does not appear to apply in this case.

royals, progresses from the time of Masinissa to the textual present, the time of Jugurtha, and this enables the reader to move almost seamlessly from the exemplary Masinissa to the first person to be compared to him.

Jugurtha is not allowed to rest on his family connections, however. Although he is a member of the royal household, Sallust positions Jugurtha on the margin of this community by noting that he remained a commoner (5.7). If we view this as placing distance between Masinissa and Jugurtha, it is a temporary situation, for immediately after introducing Jugurtha, the historian proclaims Jugurtha's exemplary quality in describing his character (6.1, *pollens viribus, decora facie, sed multo maxime ingenio validus*). Sallust's proclamation of Jugurtha's merit is then proved when Jugurtha demonstrates himself to be a noble fighter, first in his own country and later in Spain (7.1-7). This exemplary behaviour, therefore, while coming from Jugurtha's ancestor Masinissa, we can also imagine flowing back towards him.

Scipio seeks to reinforce Jugurtha's positive behaviour, to make it perpetual in fact, when he writes a letter to Micipsa commending the exemplary young African:

Jugurthae tui bello Numantino longe maxuma virtus fuit, quam rem tibi certo scio gaudio esse. nobis ob merita sua carus est; ut idem senatui et populo Romano sit summa ope nitentur. tibi quidem pro nostra amicitia gratulor. habes virum dignum te atque avo suo Masinissa'.
(9.2)⁶⁷

We are not surprised that Masinissa is mentioned here. This Scipio, as a descendant of the Scipio with whom Masinissa enjoyed *amicitia*, is as much acknowledging his own past as he is that of Jugurtha. By citing Masinissa in a letter Scipio reinforces the idea of Masinissa as an *exemplum* that Sallust himself appears to suggest only a few chapters previously. Therefore, a character writing backs up what the historian writes, that is, the historian uses Scipio writing about Masinissa to back up his opinion of Masinissa.

Hearing of, and then reading about, this exemplary behaviour undermines Micipsa and builds up Jugurtha at the same time: it suggests that Micipsa was wrong to

⁶⁷ I place quotations around all passages in direct discourse. The importance of direct discourse in the set-up of the argument of the *Jug.* has been noted by Büchner (1960). In his catalogue of the letters and speeches in the monograph (183-90), we note that the first four are all connected in some way to Masinissa. Büchner's analysis demonstrates their relevance to the narrative. On the use of different speech modes in Sallust, see Cizek (1995) 123-4, where he notes (124) that it is in the letters that Sallust often positions his theoretical stances (and he cites Adherbal's letter at 24.1-10 as an example).

try and remove Jugurtha.⁶⁸ Sallust therefore both draws together and separates at the same time, bringing Jugurtha and Masinissa closer together, while putting distance between Masinissa and Micipsa. This shows that the memory of a past figure can mean something different to people of the same nationality—even to people of the same family. Micipsa appears to learn from his mistake when he tries to win over Jugurtha. He therefore gives the impression that he understands what Scipio's reference to Masinissa means (and so he should, being a closer relation to Masinissa than is Jugurtha). Micipsa's final act of reconciliation with Jugurtha comes in his death-bed speech, which Sallust records in direct discourse, which we can read as a response to Scipio's letter. However, this action by Micipsa fails, for after the speech the historian notes that Jugurtha understands (*intellegebat*) Micipsa to be disingenuous (11.1). Masinissa is not mentioned here; rather, in his place we find *discordia* (10.6, *nam concordia parvae res crescunt, discordia maxime dilabuntur*). Here, *maxime discordia* replaces *maxima virtus*.

One notices a remarkable change in Jugurtha's character to the point where not only does he understand discord, having been introduced to it by Micipsa, but also he embodies it, as Kraus argues.⁶⁹ Scipio's letter, a symbol of Jugurtha as a virtuous character, Sallust now replaces with a new, more vivid symbol, that of the head of his part-brother Hiempsal, who is murdered in the struggle for the Numidian throne.⁷⁰ Micipsa's warning about *discordia* in his death speech suits this scene especially, for around Hiempsal's death there is clearly the impression of *discordia*.⁷¹ This new, violent Jugurtha represents a re-writing of Masinissa's meaning, that is, Jugurtha does not so much deviate from Masinissa's past as re-write it. After all, Jugurtha cannot deviate too far from the past of his own family. Re-writing Masinissa has implications for both the Romans and the non-Romans in the monograph. For the non-Romans, those who base their arguments on the tradition of Masinissa will find their arguments are without foundation. For the Romans in the text, the changed nature of Masinissa means that the comparison between good Roman and good non-Roman is no longer possible. Without

⁶⁸ The length of Sallust's description of Micipsa's concerns about Jugurtha (6.2-3) contrasts the rapid movement in the narrative so far, thus allowing the reader a longer look at the erroneous Micipsa. Cf. Kraus (1999) 226-7.

⁶⁹ Kraus (1999) 220, also noted above in my introduction.

⁷⁰ This is also the conclusion of Earl (1961) 64, who notes that the 'turning-point' in Jugurtha's character 'comes, perhaps, with the murder of Hiempsal'.

⁷¹ 12.5, *qui postquam in aedis irrupere, divorsi regem quaerere, dormientis alios, alios occursantis interficere, scrutari loca abdita, clausa effringere, strepitu et tumultu omnia miscere*.

a good non-Roman for comparison, this seems to free the Romans to explore the darker side of their own character, just as Jugurtha explores the darker side of the Numidian character. For the benefit of the Romans, the exploration of the darker side of their character only begins to emerge towards the end of the monograph, at which point Jugurtha has explored—to its utmost limits and perhaps even beyond—the darker side of the Numidian psyche.

2.3 Masinissa, Adherbal and the Romans.

Jugurtha's transformation does not mean that the image of Masinissa as the pro-Roman goes away. Rather, it opens the way for another character to take up the role as the new disciple to the memory of Masinissa. This is Adherbal, who visits Rome early in his battle with Jugurtha. Adherbal therefore finds himself in the political heart of the Roman world, in the senate, seeking to urge the Romans to act. Early in his speech he refers to his grandfather in order to urge the Romans to help him:

'quae quom praecepta parentis mei agitare, Iugurtha, homo omnium quos terra sustinet sceleratissimus, contempto imperio vostro Masinissae me nepotem et iam ab stirpe socium atque amicum populi Romani regno fortunisque omnibus expulit'. (14.2)

He refers to Masinissa again later in the speech:

'familia nostra cum populo Romano bello Carthaginiensi amicitiam instituit, quo tempore magis fides eius quam fortuna petunda erat. quorum progeniem vos, patres conscripti, nolite pati [me nepotem Masinissae] frustra a vobis auxilium petere'. (14.5-6)

Ironically, Adherbal mentions the speech of his father, which means his oration will fail: the *discordia* of Micipsa's speech, listened to by Abherbal, is then internalised in Adherbal's oration. The idea of African-Roman friendship is important to Adherbal: he not only mentions *amicitia* twice alongside Masinissa, but on two additional occasions in his speech.⁷² The significance of this scene cannot fail but impress upon us its significance, for here we find a non-Roman in the political heart of Rome, advising the Romans on how to act. Adherbal appears to cross the boundary of national (Numidian) politics, for in referring to Masinissa he makes a case for Roman self-interest, that is, what is in the best interest of the Romans, both in Africa and in Italy. We can read this speech as both a call to help Adherbal in his present difficulty, and an appeal to them to live up to the responsibility of the dominant world position. Adherbal surely is being

⁷² 14.5, *ceteri reges aut bello victi in amicitiam a vobis recepti sunt*; 14.18, *abunde magna praesidia nobis in vostra amicitia fore*.

prophetic here, perhaps unknowingly referring to Africa's future as part of the Roman world.

Moreover, in the second citation of Masinissa, Adherbal refers to the time when Roman-Numidian *amicitia* came into existence, the Hannibalic war, which recalls Sallust's reference to Masinissa discussed above (see above, section 2.1). Adherbal and Sallust therefore appear to be working in unison in that they define African history by the same point of reference: the Hannibalic war. Adherbal, by referring to the Hannibalic war, creates a joint history between Rome and Numidia that is complete. It is a history that has both a beginning and an end. The beginning is the Hannibalic war and the exemplary actions of Masinissa and his Roman allies; the ending is the Jugurthine war, specifically Adherbal's deviation from the paradigm set by Masinissa. This is because Adherbal might understand what Masinissa represents. There is something critical missing here—exemplary behaviour like that of Masinissa. To be an exemplary Numidian, Adherbal must be like Masinissa, that is, he must prove himself as a man of action in Africa. Complaining in Rome can be seen as being the opposite. Jugurtha can still be seen as Masinissa's exemplary descendant: Jugurtha acts in Africa while Adherbal makes his complaints in Rome, just as Masinissa did,⁷³ and perhaps it is this that the Romans appreciate more: thus they are at least partially justified in their lack of support for Adherbal.⁷⁴

The Romans provide a piecemeal solution to the Adherbal-Jugurtha conflict, and it is to their discredit that Adherbal must return to the senate to remind them once more about his grandfather in the vain hope of help (24.10). Adherbal does not return to Rome *per se*, for since his last speech his position has become increasingly precarious to the point where now he is trapped. This time he writes to the Roman senate, which we can take as a follow-up to his speech *and* a response to Scipio's letter. The reference to

⁷³ Cf. Paul (1984) 56 who notes another contrast here, between Adherbal and Masinissa when he argues that as Adherbal has not done any services for Rome, he offers Masinissa's past services as his own. See also 20.2, where Sallust points to the differences between the characters of Jugurtha and Adherbal (*ipse* [sc. Jugurtha] *acer, bellicosus, at is* [sc. Adherbal] *quem petebat quietus, imbellis, placido ingenio, opportunus iniuriae metuens magis quam metuendus*). Combined, Jugurtha and Adherbal would make a good pair, or at least Sallust might have us believe. Cf. *Cat.* 3.1, *pulchrum est bene facere rei publicae, etiam bene dicere haud absurdum est; vel pace vel bello clarum fieri licet*. On this passage, see Vretska (1976) 84-7; McGushin (1977) 43-5. Sallust defends his decision to write history instead of engage in political life. But co-operation in the *Jug.* is not so easy—see Wiedemann (1993) 56.

⁷⁴ See Kraus (1999) 224-6 on the early picture of Jugurtha (chs. 6-7).

Masinissa in this speech has an ironic meaning, for there is in fact a new *exemplum* here: Adherbal, an example of a situation to avoid.⁷⁵ Adherbal here erects himself as a monument to Jugurtha's future crimes, just as Hiempsal's head symbolised the emergent new Jugurtha in the past (see above).

The failure of the Romans to act effectively in this situation has more serious repercussions for them, for Adherbal is murdered. With both of his co-rulers now dead, Jugurtha can immerse himself fully in *discordia*. Shortly after Adherbal's death, Roman failure is demonstrated most effectively in the very heart of Rome and, interestingly, Masinissa provides us with the starting point for this scene. Sallust notes the presence in Rome of another descendant of Masinissa, Massiva.⁷⁶ Jugurtha, perceiving him as a threat, arranges his murder. Jugurtha then seeks to thwart the trial of the murderer (35.8-10). The fact that Jugurtha is able to plan and carry out this plot and to manipulate the Roman legal criminal procedure provides Sallust with an opportunity to demonstrate most effectively the social and political problems in Rome (i.e., corruption, susceptibility to manipulation). Moreover, Jugurtha's plotting symbolises his presence in Rome, that is, he is able to deal effectively with a situation that has the potential to threaten his interests. Sallust may intend the reader to think that the Romans will fail to deal with affairs in Africa which, as Adherbal suggests in his speech, threaten Roman interests.

2.4 Masinissa and Marius.

Given the obvious importance that Sallust places in the failure of the Romans to uphold the memory of Masinissa, which in turn explains the difficulties that Rome will experience in the early stages of the Jugurthine war, one way in which the historian can effectively convey a sense of an improvement on the Roman side is to offer a Roman character who lives up to Masinissa's image. This person could be Marius, the dominant Roman character in the final third of the work. As Marius is the subject of the next section of this chapter (see below), I make only a brief analysis here.

⁷⁵ Note Livy (*Prae.* 10, *inde tibi tuaeque rei publicae quod imitere capias, inde foedum inceptu, foedum exitu, quod vites*). In this sentence, then, Livy places positive examples (things to imitate, such as Masinissa in Sallust) alongside examples to avoid.

⁷⁶ 35.1, *erat ea tempestate Romae Numida quidam nomine Massiva, Gulussae filius, Masinissae nepos, qui quia in dissensione regum Iugurthae advorsus fuerat, dedita Cirta et Adherbale interfecto profugus ex patria abierat.*

First and foremost, we can observe Marius as working with Masinissa in an interesting way, via textual geography.⁷⁷ If we consider part of the *Jug.* in which Sallust and the characters refer to Masinissa as a section guided by him (as I hope the previous sections demonstrate), and we take into account the predominant role of Marius in the final section of the monograph (chs. 80-114), we note that the textual space occupied by each character is nearly the same.⁷⁸ This enables the two men to work together in surrounding Jugurtha in the textual sense: the *virtus* of both men acts as a boundary that Jugurtha *sine virtute* cannot overcome.

Second, we can view Marius as a substitute Masinissa, or a Roman version of him. This places Sallust's *novus homo* at the heart of Africa, allowing him to cross a cultural boundary and thus overcome the previous difficulties in African warfare experienced by the Romans. This fits in with Sallust's argument of a common ground among all peoples. In the early Roman-Jugurtha battle scenes (Metellus' early campaigns, for example) the historian stresses the fact that it is a most unsettling experience for the Romans. This is not because the Romans are inexperienced or poor fighters, but it is a direct result of the difficulty of fighting in Africa, as well as Jugurtha's ability to create disorder. However, once Marius assumes command, there is a noticeable improvement in Roman fortunes (see below, section 4.3).

2.5 Adherbal, Masinissa and Carthage.

Adherbal's speech to the Romans at 14.1-25 is significant in another respect. Adherbal not only makes effective use of the *exemplum* of Masinissa, but also through his speech provides an interesting analysis of the history of his own nation, which is relevant to both himself and the Romans listening to him. At 14.10 Adherbal mixes personal, family, and national interests:

numquamne ergo familia nostra quieta erit? semperne in sanguine ferro fuga versabitur? dum Carthaginienses incolumes fuere, iure omnia saeva patiebamur: hostes ab latere, vos amici procul, spes omnis in armis erat. postquam illa pestis ex Africa eiecta est, laeti pacem agitabamus, quippe quis hostis nullus erat, nisi forte quem vos iussissetis.

⁷⁷ I borrow this term from Scanlon (1989). His paper explains how this concept functions in the *Jug.* To be sure, textual geography plays an important role in how Roman historians set up their presentations of non-Roman individuals and communities. This is an aspect of the genre that this thesis seeks to highlight, as this chapter and the four that follow illustrates.

⁷⁸ Or, using the Reynolds' Oxford Text, thirty-one and thirty-two pages to Masinissa and Marius, respectively. For Masinissa, I count from the beginning of the monograph to the reference at 35.2.

The opening two questions establish the personal difficulty in which Adherbal feels his family finds itself at present. In the second question *semper* expands the temporal parameters of Adherbal's speech: Adherbal is thinking of his family's situation in the past as well. He then discusses the situation for the nation of Numidia when he refers to Carthage. The reason why things were difficult in the past, Adherbal argues, is because Numidia faced a serious challenge from the Carthaginians, whose presence made life in Numidia very difficult, as their enemy was close and their Roman allies were far away. Carthage's proximity to Numidia appears to create *metus hostilis*. Numidia appears to have a rival state which carries the threat of imminent destruction.

Adherbal would seem to be suggesting that Numidia and Rome had something in common in the past in that both countries feared destruction at the hands of Carthage. Adherbal draws upon the common past of Rome and Numidia to call for help in the present. That Adherbal can perceive and articulate his understanding of *metus hostilis* suggests that he sees the history of his nation in a similar way as the Romans see their own history—he appears to understand Roman history better than the Romans. Adherbal, therefore, could be seen as making Sallust's belief in *metus hostilis* a universal theorem within the context of Sallust's writing.⁷⁹ Moreover, Numidians thinking like Romans means that the internal strife faced by Adherbal foreshadows the difficulties with which the Romans will be faced. That is, the Adherbal-Jugurtha conflict may be read as a prequel to the Marius-Sulla conflict.

There are some interesting differences between Adherbal's perception of what Carthage means for Numidia and what Sallust thinks Carthage means for Rome. Most important is the geographical question. Adherbal notes that Carthage is close by, and her Roman allies are far away (*hostes ab latere, vos amici procul*). There is, surely, a greater intensity to Numidia's fear of the enemy due to the fact that she is so close to Carthage.⁸⁰ In fact, as Carthage borders Numidia, they could not be closer. Second, the fear of Carthage held by the Numidians has a context more strongly grounded in conflict since Adherbal suggests that Numidia's survival is due to her having to defend herself

⁷⁹ On *metus hostilis* as a universal theorem before Sallust, see Earl (1961) 47-8 and Vretska (1976) 203-6.

⁸⁰ Cato in Plutarch suggests that Carthage is close to Rome—three days away by sea voyage (*Cato* 27.1, εἴτα θαυμασάντων τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὸ κάλλος, εἰπεῖν ὡς ἡ ταῦτα φέρουσα χώρα τριῶν ἡμερῶν πλοῦν ἀπέχει τῆς Ῥώμης). Cf. Pliny, *NH* 15.74-5.

(*spes omnis in armis erat*). This comment appears to criticise the Romans, who, as Adherbal points out, were far away and not offering help. The differences between the Numidian and the Roman experience in their conflict with Carthage suggests that *metus hostilis* is a wide-ranging concept, that is, fear of the enemy can take on different forms for different nations, even when the nation that is being feared is the same.

Adherbal's argument is enhanced by the image of Masinissa that is present in his speeches. The person who leads the campaigns in defence of Numidia is, of course, Masinissa. Adherbal expects his listeners to remember this, and that by defending Numidia Masinissa was in effect helping Rome against Carthage. Rome's destruction of Carthage benefitted Numidia, for which she repays Rome by fighting for her against other enemies. This establishes a pattern of Rome helping Numidia and vice versa. Adherbal expects assistance in the present which upholds the pattern of assistance in the past. That is, should Rome need support against a new enemy, or help in sorting out her domestic situation, Numidia will be there to help. Perhaps the Romans do not feel it is appropriate for Numidians to involve themselves in Roman political difficulties, and this is why they do not feel the need to devote their energies wholeheartedly to dealing with Numidia's internal problems.

2.6 Conclusion.

But of course in the end we already know Masinissa to be an *exemplum*. Modern scholarship has studied this fascinating character of Roman (and African, we ought not to forget) history to the point where he becomes an exemplary character for us as well as some (but not all) of the characters in Sallust's monograph.⁸¹ The *Jug.* itself has, for one scholar, become an *exemplum* itself, to be treated as a paradigm for subsequent African history.⁸²

⁸¹ Walsh (1965) 149: 'a berber prince was an irresistibly exotic subject...we read how at the age of eighty-eight, *sans* teeth but with other faculties unimpaired, he led his troops on horseback to decisive victory over the Carthaginians. His love-life attracted admiring attention; his affair with Sophoniba, invested with significance quite fictitious, was depicted by historians and painters of both the ancient world and the Renaissance. The achievements of his virility were enthusiastically recounted...'. On Masinissa and Sophoniba as covered by Livy, see chapter 2 section 4.4.

⁸² Claassen (1993). She makes many interesting comparisons, including likening aspects of Jugurtha's character and his actions to those of Shaka Zulu and Idi Amin.

Jane Chaplin in her recent book demonstrates the importance and complexities of the historian's use of examples from the past (*exempla*).⁸³ Masinissa is an excellent—if not the best—example of this feature in Sallust's writing. The *exemplum* of this character serves to demonstrate the difference in the interpretation of the past between the Romans and the Numidians. The Romans fail to understand Masinissa's role in the past, a past which they share. As they fail to understand Numidia and Rome's past, it is probable that they will also fail to understand Numidia and the people who live there in the present.

III.

Numidian tactics and Numidian perfidy could be matched only by Roman tactics and Roman perfidy. Perfidy is by no means limited to the Africans. The Romans resort to many of the same tactics, but these are for Sallust the products of strategy...so, for Sallust, 'perfidy' has two interpretations. What is good strategy in the colonial conquerors is a fatal weakness in their African antagonist.⁸⁴

In this passage from Jo-Marie Claassen's essay, she proposes that in Sallust's narrative of the Jugurthine war there is a double standard between the presentation of characters and actions of the Roman and Africans. This suggests that Sallust (whether deliberately or not) glosses over Roman shortcomings while he concentrates on African ones. This has serious repercussions for our study of foreign community and individual representation in the *Jug*. One way of testing Claassen's argument is to look at Romans and Africans side-by-side.⁸⁵ In this section I examine Marius and Jugurtha.⁸⁶ The reason for choosing these two characters is simply the fact that each is the leading character of the Roman and foreign sides in the conflict.

⁸³ Chaplin (2000).

⁸⁴ Claassen (1993) 287-8.

⁸⁵ The idea of pairing people for comparison and contrast in Sallust is a most important aspect of his work that stretches back to as the beginning of his career as a writer of history—to the preface of the *Cat.* 4.2-3, where one could argue that the historian places himself in opposition to most Romans who seek public office. Sallust prefers the private life of an historian. While these two pursuits may seem at odds, as the historian argues at 3.1, whether one works for the country by deeds or words, both are honourable.

⁸⁶ I take a generally positive view of Marius in the *Jug*, something that runs counter to prevailing scholarly opinion. Even so, the deficiencies of his character are apparent. Kraus (1997) 23-7 highlights Marius' negative qualities.

The previous section, in which I discussed Jugurtha and then Marius in the context of Sallust's employment of the Masinissa *exemplum* are, as I pointed out, one part of a much larger picture. The reasons for looking at Jugurtha are clear.⁸⁷ Marius makes an ideal bedfellow for Jugurtha. It is he who defeats Jugurtha; and scholars have shown interest in assessing their similarities.⁸⁸ There are four main areas where we can best gain an appreciation of Marius and Jugurtha as a window to the larger view of foreign community representation in the *Jug.*: the introduction of Marius and Jugurtha; the silence of Jugurtha versus the oratory of Marius; Marius and Jugurtha head-to-head in battle; finally, the end of the monograph as it pertains to each character.

3.1 The Introduction of Jugurtha and the Introduction of Marius.

A good place to compare the two men, or at the very least to begin to understand these two men as Sallust interprets them, is to look at their respective introductions. This way similarities and differences become immediately apparent, and from there we can trace these throughout the *Jug.*

Jugurtha's character, as we noted above, is described very early in the work. In fact, we can argue that Sallust defines Jugurtha at the earliest possible moment: it comes after the preface, declaration of topic and brief history of the Numidian household. Further, after Masinissa, Jugurtha is the first person to be described by the historian, and the first to be discussed at length as to his character: thus the protagonist sets the tone for the work. It is a positive evaluation:

qui ubi primum adolevit, pollens viribus, decora facie, sed multo maxume ingenio validus, non se luxu neque inertiae corrumpendum dedit, sed, uti mos gentis illius est, equitare, iaculari, cursu cum aequalibus certare, et cum omnis gloria anteiret, omnibus tamen carus esse; ad hoc pleraque tempora in venando agere, leonem atque alias feras primus aut in primis ferire, plurimum facere et minum ipse de se loqui. (6.1)

⁸⁷ Kraus (1999) 242, claims Jugurtha is a leading figure of ancient African history, alongside Hannibal and Cleopatra. Against these two, however, Jugurtha is the weakest.

⁸⁸ E.g., Kraus (1999) 239-42. Also Earl (1961) 75; Scanlon (1987) 49; Kraus (1997) 27 (these three examples are cited by Kraus [1999] 239 n.65). And they are placed side-by-side by Propertius (3.5.15-6, *victor cum victo pariter miscetur in umbris: / consule cum Mario, capte Iugurtha, sedes*). On Marius, see Steidle (1958) 79-83; Ciruelo (1973) 64-73. Ciruelo discusses only Jugurtha (53-64) and Marius in detail.

It is hard from this passage to see how Jugurtha could become such a villain. Nor does the historian attribute to Jugurtha the traits of the *barbarus*.⁸⁹ Several aspects of his character are highly to be praised: physical strength, attractiveness, acute intellect, and self-control are a few of his qualities. These all point to Jugurtha as capable of *virtus*. Kenneth Quinn notes that this passage

carries a stage further an element which is already discernible in the *Catiline*: Sallust's sympathy for the anti-hero, the man who belongs to the establishment but renounces its tarnished values. Where Catiline is the noble outlaw whose crimes are in part redeemed by his personal courage and his personal magnetism, Jugurtha is the noble savage.⁹⁰

Here Jugurtha is figured as a Roman character taken one step further. Jugurtha is a reworking of Catiline. Or—to put it another way—in writing Catiline Sallust was getting the necessary practice to write Jugurtha. Because Jugurtha works against two communities—Numidia and then Rome, although not both at the same time—he is a more complicated character than Catiline, who fights against his own community only. It is also an important act of self-referentiality on the part of the historian, who invites the reader to recall the relevant features of Catiline's character and his actions as he reads the *Jug*.

It is therefore worthwhile to consider the point in the preface of the monograph where the historian outlines the essential qualities of someone who displays virtue. We can then determine how close or how far Jugurtha is from Sallust's ideal:

sed dux atque imperator vitae mortalium animus est. qui ubi ad gloriam virtutis via grassatur, abunde pollens potensque et clarus est neque fortuna eget, quippe probitatem, industriam, aliasque artis bonas neque dare neque eripere cuiquam potest. (1.3)

The general qualities that Sallust describes here are not incompatible with his definition of Jugurtha's character a few chapters later—in fact, they match up quite well. Jugurtha's fulfilment of this definition gives him at least a partial grounding in Roman ideology, since the Roman reader is invited to perceive Jugurtha not as an enemy, but almost as a Roman.⁹¹ Jugurtha appears to display what Sallust feels the ideal Roman should be—or

⁸⁹ Noted by Dauge (1981) 111. On Jugurtha in this passage, see Pöschl (1940) 54: 'dies ist *virtus* im römischen Sinn'.

⁹⁰ Quinn (1979) 225-6. On the term 'noble savage', see the introduction to chapter four.

⁹¹ Cf. Koestermann (1971) 45-6. Earl (1961) 61 notes that *virtus* does not necessarily apply to Romans only; it 'is open to all men engaged in all activities if they exercise *ingenium* to achieve *egregia facinora* through *bonae artes*'.

what the Romans used to be. Given that Jugurtha will be an enemy of the Romans, Sallust here may be seen to foreshadow the difficult nature of the conflict that he will narrate in this work, for the Romans must battle against such a person. It appears, then, that the historian is at least partially justified in writing in his mission statement that this conflict was *magnum et atrox variaque victoria* (5.1). This impression of Jugurtha is unlikely to be a lasting one, however. Rather, through his conduct, especially following the death of Micipsa, that Jugurtha repeatedly demonstrates his negative qualities, for he kills, lies, and bribes.

Marius' introduction in the narrative is different from his African counterpart in that the historian does not formally describe Marius' character at the outset.⁹² Marius' character therefore must emerge through his words and his actions,⁹³ and this comes through his early appearances as part of Metellus' forces.⁹⁴ Here the two men appear to be working together.⁹⁵ In the following passage Sallust suggests this:

exercitus partem ipse [sc. Metellus], reliquos Marius ducebat. sed igni magis quam praeda ager vastabatur. duobus locis haud longe inter se castra faciebant. ubi vi opus erat, cuncti aderant. ceterum, quo fuga atque formido latius cresceret, divorsi agebant. (55.4-7)

This passage carefully builds upon the previous comments made by Sallust on the improving Roman fortunes in the conflict (55.1): thus this co-operation between Marius and Metellus can be seen as the cause of such success. The historian shows the two men

⁹² This comes at 63.2: *at illum iam antea consulatus ingens cupido exagitabat, ad quem capiundum praeter vetustatem familiae alia omnia abunde erant: industria, probitas, militiae magna scientia, animus belli ingens, domi modicus, lubricitudo et divitiarum victor, tantum modo gloriae avidus.*

⁹³ His actions after the battle for Capsa lead Sallust to discuss Marius in positive terms (92.1-2). It is interesting to note that the historian's analysis is strictly internal, i.e., the assessment is based solely on what Marius has done *inside* the monograph, unlike the portrait of Sulla (see below, section 5.2), which refers to events outside the *Jug.* Note also that impressions of Marius are offered by both (1) the Romans and (2) the Numidians, followed by (3) a joint assessment concluding this passage: (1) *milites modesto imperio habiti simul et locupletes ad caelum ferre*, (2) *Numidae magis quam mortalem timere, postremo omnes*, (3) *socii atque hostes, credere illi aut mentem divinam esse aut deorum nutu cuncta portendi.*

⁹⁴ On Metellus, see La Penna (1967) 196-209.

⁹⁵ This is one of the important themes of the *Jug.*, the co-operation of the old nobles and *novi homines*—see Wiedemann (1993) 50: 'the best noble commander cannot succeed if he ignores the talent of a *novus homo*; but a talented *novus homo* can only succeed in co-operation with a talented aristocrat'. Wiedemann here means the 'ambiguously positive' character sketch of Sulla (ch. 95), but the rule can apply to Metellus-Marius as well: Metellus learns the cost of not nurturing his talented *novus homo*. Marius, by working with Sulla, appears to understand the lesson well. On Marius and Sulla, see below section 4.1.

coming together, first keeping separate camps, then one camp. The reader experiences the improving Roman *fortuna* through the beginning of co-operation.⁹⁶

The differences between Metellus and Marius are stressed later in the monograph. This first appears through the close attention that Sallust pays to Marius. In a personal scene, the historian describes Marius making an offering to the gods when he has his fortune told (63.1). Here, Marius is told to place his confidence in *fortuna* for all his efforts will be successful. This leads the *novus homo* to dream of the consulship and Sallust backs up his aspirations for higher political office when he catalogues Marius' qualities (63.2).⁹⁷ Metellus appears not to be as praiseworthy as Marius when he does not take seriously Marius' desire to run for office: surprised by Marius' request, he pretends to speak in Marius' interest when he tells him that he ought not to think above his social position (64.2). Then Sallust includes Metellus' remark that it will be time for Marius to run for the consulship when Metellus' son does the same (64.4).⁹⁸ This taunt, Sallust writes, results in Marius coming to hate Metellus.

So, at first Metellus and Marius work well together, then they dislike each other. What is interesting here is that the two Romans work together when the war effort demands, that is, they are fighting in Africa. Once Marius thinks of Rome, his hoped-for political career, mutual dislike manifests itself. We can therefore interpret the Metellus-Marius relationship in an interesting way if we recall Sallust's mission statement. While the two men can work together in dealing with the conflict with Jugurtha, there is a more damaging relationship here, to each other and Rome: the challenge of the *superbia* of the nobles. This scene shows Metellus, a noble, clearly acting as arrogant.

⁹⁶ Wiedemann (1993) 55 argues that in this passage the co-operation between Marius and Metellus exists 'only at surface level'.

⁹⁷ But Sallust does not here explicitly attribute virtue to Marius (*at illum iam antea consulatus ingens cupido exagitabat, ad quem capiundum praeter vetustatem familiae alia omnia abunde erant: industria, probitas, militiae magna scientia, animus belli ingens, domi modicus, lubricitudo et divitiarum victor, tantummodo gloriae avidus*). The phrase *industria, probitas, militiae...avidus* does suggest virtue, or at the very least the potential for virtue. Pöschl (1940) 12-58 appears to equate *industria* with *virtus*. He also discusses Marius and virtue (48-54).

⁹⁸ Earl (1961) 72-3 suggests that Metellus may have been right to try and dissuade Marius from seeking higher office, given Marius' lack of experience and lack of success in previous offices held.

3.2 Jugurtha's Silence, Marius' Oratory.

'urbem venalem et mature perituram, si emptorem invenerit' (35.10)⁹⁹

This single sentence is the only utterance of Jugurtha in a work that is heavily punctuated by his silence. Jugurtha clearly offers quality instead of quantity; he effectively diagnoses Rome's ailment, although ironically it is an affliction that up to this point he has been most keen to exploit.¹⁰⁰

In fact, noting the places where Jugurtha does not speak is most illuminating. There are several occasions prior to his utterance where the reader might expect Jugurtha to speak, only to find that he does not, or someone (including Sallust) prevents him from doing so. At the conclusion of the historian's description of Jugurtha's character (6.1), Sallust notes that Jugurtha says little of his exploits (*minimum ipse de se loqui*). When the corrupt nobles urge Jugurtha to employ bribery as a means of achieving his desires, and when Scipio offers his exemplary advice, Jugurtha offers no response (8.1-2), that is, he does not appear to commit to either course of action.¹⁰¹ After Micipsa's deceptive speech, Jugurtha is said to have *benigne respondit* (11.1)—Sallust hides Jugurtha's reply from the reader.

We can also read the silence of Jugurtha as an act by him to suggest his difference from another member of his community—Adherbal. Adherbal's two lengthy speeches stand in sharp contrast to Jugurtha's reluctance to speak. As I pointed out above in the section on Masinissa, while Adherbal may have the opportunity to speak in the Roman senate, Jugurtha is perhaps still the more impressive character as he acts in Africa.

⁹⁹ A similar utterance is also recorded in the summary of book 64 of Livy: *cedens urbe fertur dixisse: "O urbem venalem et cito perituram, si emptorem invenerit"*.

¹⁰⁰ Jugurtha's silence is noted by Kraus (1999) 221-2. On this phrase, see Koestermann (1971) 150-1. Another utterance of Jugurtha is recorded by Plutarch, *Marius* 12.3-7. Jugurtha's treatment after he is sent to Rome is summarised. When thrown into prison, he remarks Ἡράκλεις...ὥς ψυχρὸν ὑμῶν τὸ βαλανεῖον. Plutarch concludes Jugurtha's life when he writes a single-line epitaph: ἀλλὰ τοῦτον μὲν ἔξ ἡμέραις ζυγομαχήσαντα τῷ λιμῷ καὶ μέχρι τῆς ἐσχάτης ὥρας ἐκκρεμασθέντα τῆς τοῦ ζῆν ἐπιθυμίας εἶχεν ἀξία δίκη τῶν ἀσεβημάτων. On Jugurtha in Plutarch's *Marius*, see Schmidt (1999) 204.

¹⁰¹ In this case Jugurtha's silence suggests the possibility that he either fails to understand the advice he is given, or he rejects it. He may simply be refusing to commit to either advice at this time. This point works particularly well in light of what I argue in section 3.2 above, for it is not until Micipsa's speech that Jugurtha appears to make a choice as to which course to follow.

Adherbal speaks in order to encourage the Romans to act on his behalf, while Jugurtha acts to bring about what he desires. Not only does Jugurtha's policy of not speaking work, but he successfully undermines Adherbal's speaking, for his rebuttal to Adherbal's first speech is (1) not made by him, but by his representatives, and it is conveyed by Sallust in indirect discourse, and (2) is undermined by bribery.¹⁰²

Marius is not a big talker by any means, but he does speak more than Jugurtha. In fact, his main speech act is the longest oration (in any speech mode) in the entire monograph: six pages in the Oxford text.¹⁰³ This places Marius' verbal expression in stark contrast to Jugurtha's silence. Moreover, the speech does not appear out of place in the narrative which surrounds it, for in the lead-in to Marius' oration Sallust describes the situation in the aftermath of his election as consul (84.1-5). The historian points to his support from the plebeians (84.1), then the hostility towards him on the part of the senate (84.3). It is because the second detracts from the first that Marius speaks (84.5, *hortandi causa, simul et nobilitatem uti consueverat exagitandi, contionem populi advocavit*).¹⁰⁴ Sallust first stresses opposition to Marius in the senate. Marius, by seeking to further the senate's dislike of him through his words, fits in with Sallust's second stated aim of the *Jug.*: the beginning of the challenge to the *superbia* of the Roman nobility. The *homo novus* goes to great length in his speech to stress the difference between the *nobiles* and himself (e.g., 85.13-16). Marius challenges the political élite by being a hero to the commons and therefore an enemy to those who possess power, first in words (as his speech effectively achieves),¹⁰⁵ then, more important perhaps, in deeds, by bringing the conflict to a successful close.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰² 15.1, *postquam rex finem loquendi fecit, legati Iugurthae, largitione magis quam causa freti, paucis respondent*. On Jugurtha's bribery, see Kraus (1999) 221-32.

¹⁰³ For a detailed analysis of the speech, see Koestermann (1971) 294-313. The length of this speech compares with four pages for the first speech of Adherbal, one page for Adherbal's second speech, three and a half pages for Memmius' oration, and one and one and a half pages for the first and second Sulla-Bocchus conferences, respectively.

¹⁰⁴ Kraus (1999) 242 calls the speech 'Marius'...effective...demagoguery'.

¹⁰⁵ But note that in his speech he asks the question whether his audience believes that words or deeds make a better man (85.14, *nunc vos existimate facta an dicta pluris sint*).

¹⁰⁶ Of course here there is the fact that Sulla, a patrician, helps him in his military campaign. For Sulla and Marius, see below, section 5.2

3.3 Marius versus Jugurtha.¹⁰⁷

Perhaps the best way to look at Marius and Jugurtha is to examine closely an example of the two men side-by-side, in this case the two fighting each other. Of course by doing this Marius is likely to come across as the better character, for under his leadership the Roman army experiences improved fortunes in their campaign against Jugurtha—they win, that is. However, it is important to note that Marius and Jugurtha do not actually face each other in battle.¹⁰⁸

But this is a strikingly different picture from the early military encounters experienced by the Romans against Jugurtha. In one battle the Romans, under the leadership of Metellus, fare badly against Jugurtha who clearly proves the better military man.¹⁰⁹ This Roman low-point is the Muthul river, where the Roman military effort collapses into confusion.¹¹⁰ Sallust's employment of natural elements in the confusion at Muthul brings the land itself into the conflict, as if Africa herself helps Jugurtha's men by fighting the Romans.¹¹¹ By contrast Sallust's *novus homo* refuses to let the unfamiliar territory get in his way: thus he overcomes one obstacle that Metellus cannot.

Capsa stands as a good example of Marius' military skill.¹¹² Here, the historian begins by mentioning the difficulty of the task: the strong natural position of the city and the inhospitable environment, including poisonous snakes (89.5-6).¹¹³ This establishes

¹⁰⁷ La Penna (1967) 220-6 provides an analysis of Marius as a military leader.

¹⁰⁸ On the effect upon the narrative of Marius and Jugurtha not appearing together, see Kraus (1999) 239-40. By not meeting before battle, Marius and Jugurtha do not have the opportunity to come to an understanding of their respective places in the Numidian-Roman conflict as, say, Scipio and Hannibal do before Zama in book 30 of Livy. On this very important meeting, see section 6.2 of the next chapter.

¹⁰⁹ Leeman (1957) defines the second (chs. 43-77) and third phase (chs. 80-114) of the war as being dominated by Metellus and Marius, respectively. See Leeman (1957) 13-32, especially 26-32. What divides Metellus and Marius, and marks the change from the Romans coping in this conflict to their beginning to win it, is the Lepcis digression. The African *exemplum* therefore can be said to have some effect on Roman performance in the Jugurthine conflict. On this digression, see above, section 1.3.

¹¹⁰ Kraus (1999) 236-7.

¹¹¹ This is also suggested by Kraus (1999) 236: 'the Romans are nearly undone no fewer than three times by visual confusion, mirages produced by the synergism between the terrain and Jugurtha's trickery'.

¹¹² On Marius in this section (88.2-94), see Leeman (1957) 21-2; Ciruelo (1973) 69-71.

¹¹³ Cf. Lucan, *Pharsalia* 9.604ff, where Cato's men while in Africa must suffer the danger of poisonous snakes. Animals are an important marker of the geographic point(s) where it is no longer suitable for humans. See below, 61 n.17.

clearly the challenge before Marius, as Sallust makes the situation appear as beneficial to Jugurtha and as difficult as possible to the Romans. Moreover, it is interesting that Marius' decision to capture Capsa is not due to the city's strategic importance. Rather, he desires a victory to equal Metellus' at Thala (89.6).¹¹⁴

Before the battle begins, Sallust reinforces the difficulties facing Marius here: the inability to obtain an adequate overview of Capsa and a shortage of supplies.¹¹⁵ There is an interesting contrast between the amount of attention that Sallust devotes to the extensive Roman preparations for taking the town with the speed of the capture of the same (91.1-4), which contrasts Jugurtha's ability to employ both delay and rapid motion.¹¹⁶ The speed with which the Romans capture the city reflects positively on them in that it suggests that the extensive Roman preparations were appropriate, that is, the Romans can now judge with reasonable accuracy what they need to do to bring about victory. Marius' command of the Roman army has brought about an understanding of what a Roman needs to do to achieve what he desire in Africa. Equally important here is the fact that in this episode Marius enjoys what appears to be the greatest concentration of fortune in the *Jug.* in his favour.¹¹⁷ This heavy prevalence of *fortuna* underlines the

¹¹⁴ Note also that Sallust compares Capsa to Thala (and, therefore, contrasts the leadership style of Marius and Metellus—see Scanlon [1989] 144-6), noting the difference in the water supplies available to each city. The limited water availability at Capsa is not a problem, the historian notes, for the inhabitants do not make the problem worse with things that encourage hunger or thirst (Sallust mentions salt). These people perceive the reason for eating to relieve hunger. This avoidance of things that encourage luxurious living traits then reflects back on Marius' forthcoming attempt to take the city.

¹¹⁵ 90.1, *igitur consul omnibus exploratis, credo dis fretus—nam contra tantas difficultates consilio satis providere non poterat, quippe etiam frumenti inopia temptabatur, quia Numidae pabulo pecoris magis quam aruo student et, quodcumque natum fuerat, iussu regis in loca munita contulerant, ager autem aridus et frugum vacuos ea tempestate, nam aestatis extremum erat—, tamen pro rei copia satis providenter exornat.* On the position that a general would need to take to observe and direct a battle, see Goldsworthy (1996) 149-63. Marius wanting to get a view of the whole of Capsa can be seen in a cultural context, that is, for the consul to see all of Capsa gives him a degree of control over it, making his capture of it easier to achieve. And by extension—if we read Capsa as representing the Numidian whole—Marius' wish for a totalising view would bring his capture of the country closer to being a reality.

¹¹⁶ On this feature of Jugurtha's character, see Kraus (1999) 232-7.

¹¹⁷ See Kraus (1999) 241. It is frequently noted that Marius benefits from both virtue and fortune, although not at the same time—see Kraus (1997) 217, citing Earl (1961). Scanlon (1989) 165-6 connects Marius' virtue here to the nearby digression on the Philaeni, which itself is meant as an *exemplum* of virtue. Avery (1967) comments on the heavy infusion of fortune in the chapter immediately following the digression. In this description of Sulla's character (95.3-4), Sallust attributes both virtue and fortune to him, although, perhaps significantly, the word *virtus* does not appear—it is alluded to,

darker side of Marius' character to which Sallust now seeks to draw the reader's attention, which presumably the historian will want to explore further. While Jugurtha, in his greatest victory over the Romans forces them to go *sub iugum* (38.9), Marius goes further: he puts the Numidians to death (91.7). Marius proves to be less gracious in victory than his Numidian opponent: Jugurtha is satisfied with a symbolic act which humiliates the Romans, but no life is lost; Marius, on the other hand, may be seen as going too far in executing his captives. Marius appears to be someone who is capable of a violation of the laws of war (*ius belli*).¹¹⁸ This action can be seen another way. Marius' execution of the Numidian prisoners may be seen as an admission by the Roman general of his inability to deal with the wider issues of his campaign. Marius can defeat the Numidians, but he cannot come to terms with them. To Marius the Numidians remain a threat even when they have been thoroughly defeated in battle. In effect, Marius displays a weakness in conquering the people he is fighting. He can win the battle, but he cannot win the war. Executing the prisoners prevents them from taking up arms again.

The historian appears to defend Marius. This is not as a direct result of the unique circumstances faced by the Romans in this battle, but due to the people the Romans have been fighting. Sallust appears to justify Marius' concerns (if any) about the Numidians. At the end of this episode Sallust writes that Numidians are *genus hominum mobile, infidum, ante neque beneficio neque metu coercitum*. All the things that Marius does to the Numidians are therefore justified by the national traits of this community. If Marius thinks the Numidians cannot be trusted to behave in a manner appropriate to a defeated group, that is because it is exactly so. The implication of what Sallust writes here is considerable, for the historian in effect justifies any action taken by Marius—or any other Roman, for that matter—in the future, both within the context of this war, and in any future conflict.

That Sallust appears to excuse what Marius does in one sentence, followed by writing of the growth of Marius' prestige on account of these actions, recalls the

however, by the historian's reference to *animo ingenti, cupidus voluptatum sed gloriae cupidior, otio luxurioso esse*. On Sulla and fortune, Balsdon (1951) 9 writes: 'at what stage in his life Sulla first became obsessed by the notion of luck it is hard to know. It may have started as early as 106 BC with his capture of Jugurtha. Whether luck is connected to Marius or Sulla, it is clear that such adherence to *fortuna* begins with an association to Jugurtha. Sulla as *felix* is a feature in Plutarch's biography of him'.

¹¹⁸ Marius' execution of the residents of Capsa can be seen another way, that by executing the innocent inhabitants of this city the Romans are avenging the execution of the Roman businessmen by Jugurtha at Cirta.

quotation from Claassen at the start of this section. It reveals that the historian treats Roman actions differently from Numidian actions, despite the fact that Jugurtha is not actually present at this battle for us to compare the actions of each character. Not only does Marius defeat Jugurtha by capturing cities in Numidia, but also he effectively fights Jugurtha through the text itself. First, once Marius is elected consul, he dominates the narrative. Second, Etienne Tiffou points to the structure of the monograph. Sallust uses structure to place Jugurtha in a textual position that places him at a clear disadvantage: he is surrounded by strongly anti-Jugurthine passages. First comes Marius' election to the consulship (ch. 63). The digression on Lepcis (discussed above) comes after the Numidian's successes in fighting the Romans. In the middle is the 'anxiety of Jugurtha', an emotional state that signifies Jugurtha's future defeat.¹¹⁹

3.4 The End for Marius and Jugurtha.

In his discussion of the ways in which the *Jug.* appears to be an incomplete work, David Levene offers the end of the monograph as the first clue.¹²⁰ It is certainly a very enigmatic conclusion. In considering Marius and Jugurtha, we can see the ending as a continuation of the differences between, and the separation of, the two characters that the historian establishes and develops in the narrative.

In his conclusion to the monograph Sallust not only mentions the end of the conflict with Jugurtha, but also he shifts attention to another external conflict facing Rome, perhaps one that the historian here wishes for the reader to understand as more serious. It is the final two sentences that need concern us most:

sed postquam bellum in Numidia perfectum et Iugurtham Romam vinctum adduci nuntiatum est, Marius consul absens factus est et ei decreta provincia Gallia, isque Kalendis Ianuariis magna gloria consul triumphavit. et ea tempestate spes atque opes civitatis in illo sitae. (114.3-4)

It is a rather peculiar ending to the conflict with Jugurtha, for while it does mention the impending arrival of Jugurtha in Rome,¹²¹ it focuses the reader's attention on Marius

¹¹⁹ Tiffou (1974) 445. Cf. Leeman (1957) 19-26, who sees the third and final phase of the conflict as dominated by Marius.

¹²⁰ Levene (1992) 53-5.

¹²¹ Livy too mentions Jugurtha's presence in Marius' triumph (*periocha* 67, *in triumpho C. Mari ductus ante currum eius Iugurtha cum duobus filiis et in carcere necatus est*).

and his new sphere of war.¹²² In other words, Jugurtha is brought to Rome, and Marius is kept away from the city. One interpretation of this ending is that the work ends by downplaying the significance of the war Sallust has spent so long narrating, that perhaps this was meant to suggest that the conflict with Jugurtha was not such an important event in Roman history after all.¹²³ But this appears to contradict what Sallust himself writes, that the Jugurthine war was long, bloody and of varying fortune. Rather, the historian seamlessly blends one conflict into another, which magnifies the Jugurthine war by making it seem like a conflict that leads into future conflicts. The final sentence of the monograph conveys the weight the Romans place in Marius' success in the next conflict, for they place their hopes in him. Marius and the narrative of the Jugurthine war appear to diverge at this final point—or so it would seem. The Jugurthine war no longer seems as important, and therefore neither does Jugurtha, given that the war and its instigator now appear to be overshadowed by the new conflict against the northern invaders. Jugurtha was but one man; the Romans now face countless thousands. But the confidence in Marius is grounded firmly in his past actions, that is, his success in bringing the Jugurthine war to a conclusion. And his successes are brought into doubt by Sallust's and the reader's knowledge of exactly what the future Marius will do—and will fail to do—in the future.

To understand fully this ending as it pertains to Jugurtha, we need to expand our focus to consider this passage in the wider context of the final few chapters of the monograph. In the final third of the monograph, Jugurtha's role is remarkably limited, and it contrasts sharply with his role in the early stages of the monograph. The final scene to contain Jugurtha, his capture, is described with minimal detail, almost in a matter-of-fact style as if the historian is losing interest in his work (113.5-6). In the setting of the ambush, Jugurtha is not named—he is called 'Numidian' (*tamen postremo Sullam accersi iubet et ex illius sententia Numidae insidias tendit*). It appears to be a trap designed to give the Romans Numidia itself. And what is especially interesting is that a few sentences previously the other major African character of the monograph, Bocchus,

¹²² Cf. Koestermann (1971) 388-9. Cf. Tacitus, *Germania* 37.4 where he appears to refer to this conflict. Tacitus suggests that Marius is less than triumphant.

¹²³ Pelling (1997) 237. Cf. Paul (1984) 19-20: 'nor was the Jugurthine war of great importance. Jugurtha's activities were no great threat to the maintenance of Roman power, even in Africa; the successful end of the war occasioned little if any increase to Roman provincial territory...there was no alteration in the power-position in the western

has his identity removed by the historian too. He is referred to as *Maurus* only (113.1 and 113.3).¹²⁴ Sallust suggests that the Romans, now that their African war is approaching its conclusion, are thinking not of the individuals with whom they have dealt, but of the country in which they have been campaigning and her neighbours. The removal of Jugurtha's and Bocchus' identity can be read as an act of defeat in that they are deposed from their positions as regents. Depriving the states of their rulers makes the countries easier to conquer. It is, perhaps, a return to the situation at the early stage of the text, that is, the digression at chs. 17-19, where the historian writes about the region in general, with no individual Africans identified. When Jugurtha reappears, it is only so that Sallust can place him under Roman control, as he is passed from Roman to Roman. Jugurtha is given to Sulla, who in turn takes him to Marius (113.6, *Jugurtha Sullae victus traditur et ab eo ad Marium deductus est*). The use of passive verbs in this sentence serves to convey that Jugurtha is now a passive character in the sense that he is a captive of the Romans, and thus what he does is under the direct control of his Roman captors.

This sentence sets up the final chapter of the monograph, for it places Jugurtha and Marius in the final position for analysis. That the two sentences are to be taken together is suggested by the repetition of *vinctus*.¹²⁵ The use of the word in the second sentence emphasises that Jugurtha has been captured, and that this is a situation from which he will not escape. Moreover, that Jugurtha is a man of few words is important here. To recall, on his eviction from Rome Jugurtha makes his only utterance in direct discourse. In his final appearance, he is not only silent once more, but he is contextualised within the speech act of someone else. Writing *Jugurtham Romam vinctum adduci nuntiatum est* (114.3), Jugurtha's final action, coming to Rome as a prisoner, is announced by someone else. In both his capture and his arrival in Rome as a prisoner, Jugurtha remains silent.

Mediterranean and no evidence of any important change in the condition of the Numidians'.

¹²⁴ Bocchus is not only addressed by his nationality here, but also Sallust makes a comment about the fact that Bocchus' indecision may be a result of that fact that he is a king (113.1, *ceterum dolo an vere cunctatus parum comperimus. sed plerumque regiae voluntates ut vehementes sic mobiles, saepe ipsae sibi advorsae*). Attacking Bocchus' constitutional position excuses partially his indecision. It should not be seen as a direct result of Bocchus' nationality, as Sallust does not make a specific negative comment about the nature of African regents.

¹²⁵ See Koestermann (1971) 385.

Most important for Jugurtha is that his *final* end—his death—is not recorded. To some this is a most important hallmark of closure,¹²⁶ and by leaving it out here, Sallust denies the Numidian foe his final dignity. Jugurtha, therefore, is truly defeated, for his death appears not to be worth Sallust's effort in writing down.¹²⁷

The ending for Marius is quite positive in two ways.¹²⁸ First, the conclusion establishes Marius' future, his leadership role at the request of the state to meet a new external threat. The confidence that the Romans show in Marius here is made possible by his actions in the Jugurthine conflict. Marius' success in a past conflict suggests to the Romans' success in a future foreign conflict. His success at ending the Jugurthine conflict is pointed to in an interesting way in this scene. Sallust in this ending notes the date on which Marius assumes the consulship and undertakes his triumph, which contrasts with the general lapses in chronology.¹²⁹

Second, there is the final sentence of the monograph (*et ea tempestate... sitae*).¹³⁰ While Marius shares the penultimate sentence with Jugurtha, he has the final sentence to himself. It places Marius not in the context of the *Jug.*, but the monograph concludes in the context of Marius. The phrase *spes...sitae* recalls part of Marius' lengthy speech (85.4).¹³¹ The hope of the Roman people at this final point in the narrative, and the earlier political manoeuvres of Marius appear to be one and the same, therefore. The Jugurthine conflict ends with neither a reference to Jugurtha nor the difficulties he caused. Instead the reader's attention is looking forward, at some point in the future. This creates a final difference, one within the Roman community, between the Romans

¹²⁶ See Levene (1992) 55.

¹²⁷ In the Loeb edition of Sallust, note that the editor feels the need to provide the modern reader of the *Jug.* with this closure, for in a final footnote to the text, Jugurtha's death is mentioned: 'Jugurtha was taken to Rome, where, after being led with his two sons before Marius' chariot in the triumphal procession, he was starved to death, or, according to some, strangled, in the Tullianum'. Even here there is anti-closure for Jugurtha, for the exact manner of his death is unknown.

¹²⁸ Koestermann (1971) 388 also suggests the positive nature of this ending for Marius.

¹²⁹ E.g., Wiedemann (1993) 50-1, on the winters dividing some campaigning seasons. It is interesting to note, as Wiedemann points out, that Sallust possibly employs the third digression, on Lepcis, as the division between the campaigns of 108 and 107 B.C.E. Cf. Syme (1964) 142-7.

¹³⁰ Koestermann (1971) 388-9 also considers this sentence on its own.

¹³¹ On *spes* in Sallust, see Scanlon (1987).

inside and those outside the text, between hope for the future and knowledge of the past.¹³²

But what about Sulla? He is not mentioned in the final paragraph of the monograph. This is despite the fact that he plays a critical role in the final section of the monograph, and it is through his efforts, with Bocchus, that Jugurtha is captured. In this final section, as the next section of this chapter demonstrates, the Jugurthine war in its final stages is more about Sulla's actions than it is about Marius'. It is Sulla's victory, the capture of Jugurtha and his delivery of the African regent to Marius, that the historian narrates immediately before noting the Roman defeat at the hands of the Gauls. Marius' eclipsing of Sulla's achievement can be seen as indirectly setting up the conflict between the two men. By not mentioning him in the final paragraph, Sallust conveys that Marius and his fellow Romans appear to overlook Sulla's positive contribution to the Jugurthine war, and they overlook Sulla in general. This may be Sallust repeating himself. Marius' prominence over Sulla can be compared to Adherbal's and Hiempsal's attempt to marginalise Jugurtha (chs. 11-12). For both Adherbal and Hiempsal such an action has serious consequences. Sallust may be suggesting the same thing for Marius here. What Marius ought to have done, the historian might be trying to suggest, is to incorporate Sulla into the campaign he is about to undertake. That Marius should do this is clear given the extremely valuable help Sulla has provided.

Reading Sulla as an internalised Jugurtha has advantages. First and foremost, it can allow Sallust to confirm his belief that the Jugurthine conflict was a war against a foreinger which spilled over into Roman domestic affairs. Second, it allows the historian to set up his impression of Sulla which will carry over to narratives of the period which follows. And this might include Sallust's own writings, especially what he writes about Sulla in his *Cat* (5.6-8).

3.5 Conclusion.

Marius and Jugurtha make ideal bedfellows. They stand as the leading characters on the Roman and foreign sides of the battle that Sallust narrates in this monograph. But with Marius there is added depth, for not only is he drawn in many ways against Jugurtha, but

¹³² Cf. Syme (1964) 176: 'Sallust takes leave of Marius at the point and season when Rome looked to him for salvation...there was melancholy and irony if the reader gave a thought to how the great general was to fare in later years...Marius had saved the Republic, only to subvert it by all manner of craft and violence. That is the verdict of Livy'.

also his actions and character are drawn against other Romans, especially Metellus, whom he replaces, and Sulla, with whom he is supposed to work in conjunction, and who will eventually replace him as the dominant figure in Roman politics. This is somewhat ironic, given that one advantageous aspect of Jugurtha's character is supposed to be his ability at substitution.¹³³ The Romans therefore prove to have become most adept creatures, therefore, outperforming Jugurtha at his own game. If we read Jugurtha's abilities as national characteristics, moreover, Marius becomes a Numidian. But the conclusion of the monograph shows that his own people in Rome look to him as someone able to save their nation. To Sallust Marius is therefore a transcultural figure, one who transcends national boundaries.

IV.

Mauris omnibus rex Bocchus imperitabat, praeter nomen cetera ignarus populi Romani itemque nobis bello neque pace antea cognitus. (19.7)

I now turn to a second instance of comparison and contrast between a Roman and an African, this time Sulla and Bocchus.¹³⁴ That the non-Roman of this pair has a place in the monograph is suggested by the passages quoted above from the digression on Africa and Africans. It is surprising that the interaction of these characters has not received more attention. In her study of the character of Catiline, A. T. Wilkins notes that although there are some substantial speeches in the *Jug.*, they do not cause difficulties to the text as do the speeches in the *Cat.* But in her list of speeches in the *Jug.*, she omits what is perhaps the most important example: the Sulla-Bocchus debates.¹³⁵

The examination of the Sulla-Bocchus conferences is not as involved an exercise as the Marius and Jugurtha treatment, as the scenes available for examination are not only brief (but not too brief), but also they exist near the end of the monograph—almost right at its end. This might suggest that comparing these two characters is a comparison in the second degree, that is, a lesser comparison than the Marius-Jugurtha one, and

¹³³ See Kraus (1999) 237-42.

¹³⁴ For an overview of Sulla in the *Jug.*, see La Penna (1968) 226-32. That Bocchus provided valuable assistance to the Romans, and that Sulla provided valuable assistance to Marius, in Livy's version of the end-game portion of this war is suggested by the *perioccha* of book 66 (*Iugurtha pulsus a C. Mario Numidia cum auxilio Bocchi, Maurorum regis, adiutus esset, caesis proelio Bocchi quoque copiis, nolente Boccho bellum infeliciter susceptum diutius sustinere victus ab eo et Mario traditus est; in qua re praecipua opera L. Corneli Syllae, quaestoris C. Marii, fuit*).

¹³⁵ Wilkins (1994) 17.

possibly dependent on it. The Sulla-Bocchus comparison requires appropriate consideration of the Marius-Jugurtha pairing.¹³⁶

One aspect of this comparison stands in its favour and we should note it here. This is the valuable service that the episodes do for the monograph by performing a function in it: dialectic. Dialectic serves an important role in historical works, possibly giving them a sense of closure.¹³⁷ In this section, however, while I acknowledge the closural qualities of these scenes, I focus on their message regarding Romans and non-Romans.

That Sulla can be paired with Marius (as a fellow Roman fighting Jugurtha) and Bocchus (with whom Sulla interacts frequently) establishes Sulla as a figure that bridges the Roman and the non-Roman worlds, and between the two main factions in Rome. Sulla therefore holds a delicate and important position in the monograph. Sulla's behaviour is therefore central to how the reader perceives the Roman and non-Roman characters in this monograph. There is much to be gained by the Romans by Sulla's success: victory in the war with Jugurtha, good relations between the political orders in Rome, and positive relations with another African community.

4.1 Sulla and Marius, Bocchus and Jugurtha.

The main reason why Sulla and Bocchus are of special interest is the fact that through their involvement in the *Jug.* they are not only contrasted against each other, but also against a character from their own community. This is where Marius and Jugurtha come into play. Sallust places Sulla in opposition to Marius,¹³⁸ and the historian appears to contrast Bocchus with Jugurtha.

One key difference between Marius and Sulla may be observed from the outset: the point in the narrative where Sallust discusses each man's character. For Marius, it appears that Sallust prefers actions to define Marius' character as events unfold, with an

¹³⁶ Note that Sulla and Jugurtha can be compared through their character portraits. Both men are credited by Sallust as displaying a keen intellect. Leeman (1957) 22-5 calls chh. 95-101 'die letzten militärischen Ereignisse: Marius und Sulla gegen Jugurtha und Bocchus'. This suggests that we can take the penultimate section of the monograph (the final section being, presumably, chh. 102-114) as either Marius or Sulla or both against Jugurtha or Bocchus or both. Marius and Sulla can be working together or apart, and the same applies for Jugurtha and Bocchus. The sequence of names suggests that it is Marius versus Jugurtha and Sulla versus Bocchus, in which case the two Romans work together to defeat the African enemy, and vice versa.

¹³⁷ On dialectic, see Levene (1992) 64-6.

analysis coming after Marius has participated in the fighting and the important fortune-telling scene has occurred (63.2-7). Sulla, on the other hand, is described before he does anything: thus the reader can contrast what Sallust writes about this character and what he actually does, or he can judge Sulla by what the historian writes about him versus what Sulla will say and do. This is important as Sulla will do a considerable amount of talking in the section of the monograph in which he appears: thus as the analysis of his speaking passages below will demonstrate, he can be seen to be the voice of Rome. The description of Sulla's character, then, is appropriate, for unlike Marius, he is not an action man, but rather a talker, although he is the one to capture Jugurtha.¹³⁹ His talking role comes out best in his dealings with Bocchus.

In general Sallust is positive in his examination of Sulla—or so it appears.¹⁴⁰ He begins by establishing how Sulla is different from Marius: he is a patrician, although the standing of his family has fallen due to less than illustrious ancestors (95.3). We can contrast this with Scipio and Quintus Maximus in the preface (4.5-6, see above section three). Instead of the ancestors of these Romans as models to emulate, Sulla is given an example to avoid: he can avoid being judged as unpraiseworthy as his forefathers.

Now for Sulla's positive qualities. He has a keen intellect—similar to Jugurtha.¹⁴¹ Despite his adherence to luxury in private life, he is fully committed to his duties (*otio luxurioso esse; tamen ab negotiis numquam voluptas remorata*). This phrase establishes that despite this typical patrician trait Sulla is capable of devoting himself to the job at hand—this perhaps suggests virtue of some kind.¹⁴²

¹³⁸ On Sulla and Marius together, see Tiffou (1974) 453-61.

¹³⁹ In fact, Sallust draws attention to this difference by placing scenes in which Sulla talks and Marius acts side-by-side. After Sulla's first conference with Bocchus, for example, the historian shifts the scene to Marius' winter campaign (103.1ff).

¹⁴⁰ For an overview of Sulla in the *Jug.*, see La Penna (1968) 226-32. On Sulla's character portrait, see Koestermann (1971) 340-2; Steidle (1958) 83-90; Pomeroy (1991) 130-1.

¹⁴¹ Cf. Sallust, *Hist.* 3.91, where the same expression is used to describe Mithridates.

¹⁴² Sulla also has *fortuna*, but in this character portrait Sallust appears to stress Sulla's fortune in the context of his civil war undertakings (95.4, *atque illi, felicissimo omnium ante civilem victoriam, numquam super industriam fortuna fuit*). On Sulla's fortune, see Tiffou (1977) 355-6, who notes that Sulla's *fortuna* is different from Marius'. Cf. Valerius Maximus 6.9.6, who acknowledges Sulla's negative aspects, but draws attention to his *virtus* as well: *eiusdem virtus, quasi perruptis et disiectis nequitiae qua obsidebatur claustris, catenas Iugurthae manibus iniecit*.

The conclusion of the character portrait, however, is very ominous. While Sulla may have virtue in the textual present, the historian writes that Sulla also possessed fortune, and it was this that brought this character to his most prominent position during and following the civil wars (95.4). Sallust or the people about whom he is writing appear to wonder whether his fortune was greater than his virtue (*multique dubitavere fortior an felicius esset*). Sallust appears to suggest that despite these positive aspects of Sulla, all is for naught, for in the future, Sulla will prove himself a dangerous character (*nam postea quae fecerit, incertum habeo pudeat an pigeat magis disserere*).¹⁴³ We can see this as the historian pegging Sulla at a position lower than Marius, for Sallust's warning about Marius appears less severe than this comment on Sulla.¹⁴⁴ Sulla compensates for what dangers he may later represent when he quickly proves his worth as a soldier, despite his inexperience (96.1-3). Another contrast presents itself here, between Sulla the soldier and Sulla the future diplomat.

Immediately after Sulla's arrival in Marius' camp, Jugurtha and Bocchus join forces. Bocchus does not enter the war on account of any threat posed against his kingdom, but merely from the promises that Jugurtha makes (97.1-3). Unlike Sulla and Marius, Bocchus and Jugurtha are not of the same nation. However, as both are non-Romans, and both are from Africa (and their kingdoms exist side-by-side), this situation provides Sallust with an opportunity to show whether all Africans are the same or whether within this 'group' there are discernible differences. Thus we obtain a most valuable insight into how this historian interprets and therefore writes non-Romans.¹⁴⁵

Sallust contrasts Jugurtha and Bocchus in both words and deeds. As we noted, Jugurtha speaks seldom, leaving Sallust to speak for him. Bocchus, on the other hand, does speak, sometimes for himself and sometimes through Sallust. The historian also points to the differences between these two in their dealings with each other. When Jugurtha seeks an alliance with Bocchus through marriage, Sallust writes that such bonds mean less to Africans than they do to Romans, for polygamy is permitted for both

¹⁴³ This is an example of Sallust referring to events outside the temporal scope of the monograph in order to influence the impression of characters and events within it. Cf. Levene (1992) 55-9, esp. 58-9.

¹⁴⁴ 63.6, *tamen is ad id locorum talis vir—nam postea ambitione praeceptus datus est*.

¹⁴⁵ There is another African pair in Jugurtha and Bomilcar. Wiedemann (1993) 56 points to this pair as another example of the difficulties—or impossibility—of (African) co-operation. Bomilcar does not work with Jugurtha, but rather against him: he is bribed by the Romans to try and convince Jugurtha to lay down his arms (chs. 61-2).

Numidians and Moors (80.6).¹⁴⁶ This comment also links Bocchus and Sulla. The references to Sulla's poor behaviour as a husband is a negative aspect of his character (95.3), and it recalls what the historians writes about Bocchus.

There is another example of contrast within Africa that we can mention, that between Bocchus and the Philaeni. The episodes which feature Bocchus occur after this important digression. The reader, therefore, can contrast the exemplary behaviour of the Carthaginians with the unpraiseworthy wavering of Bocchus. We can even bring Jugurtha into this comparison, creating a pair Bocchus-Jugurtha to stand alongside the Philaeni twins. Instead of working together, as the Philaeni do, we see the Jugurtha-Bocchus pair as one where one has to compel the other to act. Rome and African have something in common, therefore: just as the Romans of the present are not as honourable as their ancestors, the Africans of today are not as praiseworthy as Africans from the past.

4.2 Sulla and Bocchus.

Sulla and Bocchus meet twice in an effort by the Romans to secure Jugurtha's capture, and in Bocchus' effort to secure minimal damage—and at the same time to maximise possible benefit—from the Roman-Jugurthine conflict. Both communities, Rome and Mauretania, therefore, have an interest in coming together.¹⁴⁷ As I pointed out, their meetings come near the end of the monograph. This means that Sallust in these scenes has a good opportunity to set out a final, lasting impression of non-Romans (and Romans for that matter) that he wishes the reader keep in mind as the narrative concludes.

The importance of these two scenes is suggested by how the historian sets them up, that is, the alternation between direct discourse and indirect discourse,¹⁴⁸ where the historian carefully employs the two speech modes to further his desired impression of

¹⁴⁶ Note Claassen (1993) 273 n.1: 'Sallust explains that in an African polygamous system an alliance by marriage carries less weight than in monogamous Rome, an observation that probably did not always hold true in a society where serial polygamy among the ruling classes was the norm'.

¹⁴⁷ Called 'die diplomatische Abwicklung' by Leeman (1957) 25. On Sulla and Bocchus, see Leeman (1957) 25-6; Sensal (2001). Plutarch discusses Sulla and Bocchus in his *Sulla*, 3.2-6. See Schmidt (1999) 204.

¹⁴⁸ On these terms, see Laird (1999) 89-90 and 94-6.

Sulla and Bocchus.¹⁴⁹ In the first scene, Sulla speaks first, and in direct discourse (102.5-11). The authority suggested by presenting Sulla's in this speech mode reinforces Sallust's argument on Sulla's eloquence (restated just prior to Sulla speaking, 102.4) and it gives credence to what Sulla says. Bocchus' reply, in indirect discourse, undermines his feeble attempt (in Roman eyes) to justify his actions so far, that he was seeking to protect his kingdom.

In the second meeting (ch. 110), the allocation of direct discourse and indirect discourse roles are reversed at first. Bocchus gets to speak first, and he does so in direct discourse. Catherine Sensal notes other shortcomings suggested by the historian through his writing of this scene.¹⁵⁰ His tone is fully conciliatory: even when he refers to his so-called defence of his kingdom, which connects this speech with his previous oration on a thematic level, he does so here only to say that he will cease all military operations.

Sulla's reply, in indirect discourse, is important in that Sulla appears to transcend the immediate topic at hand, the capture of Jugurtha. Rather, he discusses the wider issues of peace and common Roman-Mauretanian interests. By placing Sulla's words in indirect discourse, therefore, the reader focuses on what Sulla says, not the supposed eloquence of his words. Sulla here speaks not so much about the current state of affairs in Africa, but more on the long-term issue of Roman-African policy. That Sulla does this builds effectively upon Bocchus' *mea culpa*. Sulla does not need to point out to Bocchus his flaws; Bocchus has sufficiently pointed them out and apologised. Rather, Sulla shows Bocchus what can be made of his confession of fault, to present a possible future that can now come about thanks to Bocchus' speech.

There is an aspect of the Sulla-Bocchus pairing beyond their speaking to each other that we ought to consider. This is that Bocchus, right until the end of his involvement in the events of the war, remains consistent in his refusal to make a lasting commitment to either side in the conflict.¹⁵¹ Bocchus, on the other hand, begins at a

¹⁴⁹ See Tiffou (1974) 457-8 and Büchner (1960) 201-2.

¹⁵⁰ Sensal (2001) 69-70. She also compares (71-2) Bocchus' introduction (the lead-in to his speech) to those of the other non-Romans in this monograph (Micipsa and Adherbal). She suggests (72-4) that the influence on Sallust in his construction of Bocchus comes from Sulla's own *Res Gestae*.

¹⁵¹ Including right up to the penultimate chapter of the monograph: *Maurus, adhibitis amicis ac statim immutata voluntate remotis ceteris, dicitur secum ipse multum agitavisse, voltu et oculis pariter atque animo varius; quae scilicet tacente ipso occulta pectoris patefecisse. tamen postremo Sullam accersi iubet et ex illius sententia Numidae insidias tendit* (113.3-4). Paul (1984) 256 points to the similarity of the language used to criticise Bocchus' wavering and the Numidian

low-point, wavering in his support for Jugurtha, sometimes assisting him, sometimes standing on the sidelines. By finally joining with the Romans, he partially redeems himself for his previous non-committal position. He is now working for the Roman cause, whatever that may be, and this should provide benefit to Rome and to Bocchus. Sulla, on the other hand, in the *Jug.* is working for Rome's interests, but as Sallust has made clear in this character portrait, this will not always be the case. One way we can look at this is that Bocchus' new found allegiance to Rome in some way compensates Rome for Sulla's future turning against his nation. Or—to look at it another way—Bocchus' new found loyalty to Rome frees Sulla from the same. And this may be a way for Sallust to suggest the trouble that Rome will experience in the future, that she has foreign allies, but her own citizens are fighting against her.

There is another possible interpretation of Bocchus' words and actions. By declining to make a firm commitment to Rome, Bocchus can be seen as wanting to keep Rome out of African affairs. Bocchus may see Rome as a negative influence, and he wants to save his nation from being infected by Rome's current and developing ills. That Bocchus may be right to think this way is suggested by a passage early in the monograph when Sallust records the meeting between the Roman nobles and Jugurtha (8.1), where the historian is careful to note that the Romans who speak to Jugurtha care more for material wealth than they do for virtue. And the historian notes that these men are influential with Rome's allies (*potentes apud socios*).¹⁵² The Romans thus appear to infect

temperament, which suggests that Sallust perceives Bocchus' variability as a racial characteristic. This might suggest that both Bocchus and Jugurtha are the same, but this trait comes through in Bocchus while Jugurtha is able to set it aside. Moreover, Paul (rightly, in my view) suggests that Bocchus' indecision must have been heavily emphasised in Sulla's memoirs, which would ultimately serve to stress his abilities as a diplomat. Sallust may have been influenced by Sulla's presentation, and therefore Bocchus appears to be someone inclined to waver more than he actually was.

And the focus upon Bocchus' unwillingness to commit to either Rome or Jugurtha does not end (just as it probably did not begin) with Sallust. Plutarch notes this too in his *Sulla* (3.6, οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὁ Βόκχος ἀμφοτέρων κύριος γενόμενος, καὶ καταστήσας ἑαυτὸν εἰς ἀνάγκην τοῦ παρασπονδῆσαι τὸν ἕτερον, καὶ πολλὰ διενεχθεὶς τῇ γνώμῃ, τέλος ἐκύρωσε τὴν πρώτην προδοσίαν καὶ παρέδωκε τῷ Σύλλῃ τὸν ἰογόρθον). Cf. his *Marius*, 10.3-6.

¹⁵² Sallust's *complures novi atque nobiles* win in part due to their majority and the fact that they speak to Jugurtha first. To a degree priority wins out over quality. In the previous chapter the historian notes the close relationship between Jugurtha and Scipio, and immediately following the nobles' encouraging Jugurtha, Scipio speaks to Jugurtha privately. Even though Scipio advises Jugurtha to avoid the practice of bribery, which the Roman nobles specifically encourage Jugurtha to do, Scipio seems to fail in helping to shape a positive Jugurtha. That Jugurtha receives conflicting advice might seem to

Jugurtha with negative characteristics already present in their own community, and they encourage him to take advantage of that weakness. The Romans therefore negatively affect Africans. Bocchus' attempts to delay confirming support for Rome positions him as someone who is fighting for the old Africa, that is, a continent before Romans became involved in its affairs. Bocchus may even be thinking of the 'golden age' of Africa, the presence of Carthage, who may have served to maintain a delicate balance in African affairs which Rome has unhinged through her destruction of Carthage and her campaign in Numidia. Bocchus seems to acknowledge that Africa is in decline, and that decline has been brought about largely through contact with Romans.¹⁵³ This also says something about Bocchus' impression of Sulla and the man Sulla represents, Marius. They are symptoms of the wider Roman problem. That Bocchus eventually does choose to help Rome can be seen as implying that Rome's infection of Africa cannot be stopped, and that men like Sulla and Marius will prevail not only in Africa, but also that they will turn their African successes into Roman ones, and just as their actions in Roman politics will damage Rome, so too do their actions in Africa damage the continent. Africa therefore proves to be the testing ground what what will eventually happen in Rome on a grander scale. Bocchus, therefore, does not surrender for Africa, but in a way he surrenders for Rome too.

V.

This chapter has (hopefully) illustrated the complexities of Sallust's presentation of non-Romans and the Romans with whom they come into contact. Not only does Sallust offer two intrinsically fascinating digressions that explore Africa from different angles, but also there are the wide array of complex characters that populate the monograph, non-Roman and Roman: Masinissa, Jugurtha, Marius, Sulla, Bocchus, and many others. Through the interrelation of these characters, the historian is able to explore the seemingly thin boundaries between Romans and foreigners, or to suggest that such boundaries do not even exist. The *Jug.* effectively does this through Sallust's construction of a complex view of Rome's and Africa's past, present and future, which

justify his duplicitous actions in his campaigns against the Romans, and to excuse other Africans (i.e., Bocchus) for the same.

¹⁵³ It seems to me that Bocchus acknowledges this at 113.3: *dicitur secum ipse multum agitavisse, vultu colore motu corporis pariter atque animo varius; quae scilicet ita tacente ipso occulta pectoris patefecisse*. It is interesting to note that Sulla's son, Faustus Sulla, around 56 BCE

mixes together the Roman and African: Masinissa represents a near-idyllic non-Roman past, Jugurtha a confusing and difficult present for the Romans, Marius and Sulla combined show uncertainty concerning Rome's future, and Bocchus (reluctantly) seems to give away the African future. Ultimately the transgression of boundaries between Roman and African here can be read as upholding—or even carrying further—the dominant impression of *discordia* in the monograph.

In the end Sallust's representation of non-Romans is self-serving, as it is with all writers of Roman history. To recall his mission statement, one of Sallust's aims in writing the *Jug.* is to chart the beginnings of the challenge to the arrogance of the nobility (5.1, *tunc primum superbiae nobilitatis obviam itum est*). The war in Africa, that is, Roman interaction with, and defeat of, Africans serves to build up those Romans, such as Marius and Sulla, or rather explore them in embryonic form to set them up for the future conflict to which the historian refers. Moreover, this monograph serves Sallust on a personal level, building up confidence in his abilities as an historian, and setting the scene for his more ambitious next project: the *Historiae*. The exploration of Africa and characters such as Jugurtha, therefore, must be read as a necessary step in Sallust's continuing quest to produce good history.

had minted a denarius, which on the reverse side depicts Bocchus kneeling before Sulla, with Jugurtha kneeling behind the chair.

CHAPTER TWO

*omnia aequare unus hostis potest:*¹

Hannibal and Others in Livy, *Ab Vrbe Condita* 21-30

[T]he third decade is the best and kindest to study in isolation...it is a demonstrably rounded whole, and can easily be studied as a unit...the theme of the Second Punic War engaged Livy's historical imagination and patriotic nostalgia more than any other section.²

In his illuminating assessment of the third decade of Livy's history, the *Ab Vrbe Condita* (=AVC), P. G. Walsh perceives books 21-30 as if it is an historical narrative in its own right. Even if the reader wishes not to read Livy, perhaps this section should be the exception. The 'patriotic nostalgia' to which Walsh refers here fits in nicely with the historian's declaration in his preface of pride in his country.³ In writing about the Hannibalic War, although several centuries have lapsed since the foundation of the republic, Livy is still dealing with the distant past that he finds so inspiring. We can thus view the third decade as an ambassador for the work as a whole. We can also argue that books 21-30 are *unique*, narrating as they do a prolonged episode in Roman history that saw the Roman nation stretched to near-breaking point. It was the greatest test the

¹ The phrase comes from 30.26.8, *sed omnia aequare unus hostis Hannibal potest*. It is explored in section 6.2.

² Walsh (1982) 1058. Cf. Burck (1971) 21: 'both modern historians and those of antiquity are agreed that the Second Punic War exposed the Romans, with all their military, material, physical and moral strength, to a struggle for survival such as was not seen in any other epoch of Roman history. With factual and artistic conciseness, the third decade of Livy represents a literary achievement that satisfactorily reflects the greatness and unique qualities of those war years'. And in writing about Carthage, Livy is engaging with representations of this community in Greek historiography: see Barceló (1994). Note his comment (1) 'the Romans were not only responsible for the material destruction of her community [sc. Carthage], but also projected a malicious and distorted view of their vanquished enemies'.

³ E.g., *Prae.* 11, *ceterum aut me amor negotii suscepti fallit, aut nulla umquam res publica nec maior nec sanctor nec bonis exemplis ditior fuit, nec in quam civitatem tam serae avaritia luxuriaque inmigraverint, nec ubi tantus ac tam diu paupertati ac parsimoniae bonos fuerit*. (also cited in the introduction of this thesis; see above). See Ogilvie (1970) 28-9 and Moles (1993) 155-6. The Hannibalic war was a source of pride for twentieth century Italians too. Hardwick (2003) 46 discusses the 1937 film *Scipione l'Africano* directed by Carmine Gallforie. The film appropriates Rome's victory for fascist ideology: 'the film depicted the Carthaginians as uncivilized in behaviour and black and Semitic in appearance and represented the wars between Rome and Carthage as a conflict between authoritarian unity and anarchy'.

Roman nation had experienced thus far in her history. The threat of the extinction of Rome was so massive, and the (perceived at least) power of the enemy was so great, that the portrayal of this foreign community calls for detailed examination.

In this community one person stands clearly in a prominent position: Hannibal. Few non-Romans could so engage the passions of the Romans, and arouse feelings of admiration or fear, sometimes both emotions at the same time.⁴ With this non-Roman, the historian has the opportunity to play with, and to mould Roman interpretation of, one of the greatest men in history.⁵ He was a man who almost brought about the destruction of Livy's community (and thus would have prevented the AVC from being written). Livy went so much further than just (re)creating the events of this war. Hannibal not only is sensitively portrayed by the historian in this narrative, but also he is given a special position within it. During the narrative of his campaign against Rome, he occupies a position of power over the narrative.⁶ Conversely, with increasing Roman successes leading up to Rome's victory the historian carefully matches this with the return of Roman (textual) order. These two aspects of the third decade form the first and last topics of this chapter. In between there are explorations of how Livy constructs relationships both between and within various non-Roman communities: Hannibal's relations with the communities in Italy; the intrinsically fascinating narrative of Syphax and Masinissa; and the presentation of political difference within Carthage. That these relationships are varied in their construction, and important to the narrative as a whole, helps us not only understand better how Livy's history works, but it also aids greatly our goal of unlocking the methods that Roman historians employ in their positioning of non-

⁴ The influence of Cleopatra on how Livy presents Hannibal should be (briefly) mentioned. At the time of writing the AVC, memory of Cleopatra and the threat to Rome that she represented, was still fresh in the minds of Livy's readers (although Octavian would no doubt have exaggerated the threat she posed). So, there is at least the possibility of Augustan influence on Livy's Hannibalic narrative. I discuss Cleopatra in my section on Masinissa in this chapter. Note Kraus (1999) 242, who suggests a link between Hannibal, Cleopatra and Jugurtha. On some similarities between Hannibal and Jugurtha, see section one below. On history that is focused heavily on personalities, see Woodman (1977) 28-56 on Velleius Paterculus. Woodman notes (33-4) that the portrait description of characters is appropriate to shorter works, such as Sallust's monographs (see chapter one *ad loc.*), but they do exist elsewhere, including Livy (see below, section I and II).

⁵ This also appears to have been noticed by Walsh (1982) 1066.

⁶ I note here that I also take Hannibal as representative of Carthage as a whole, *pace* some of the differences between Hannibal and his thinking compared to Hanno and Maharbal, for example (see below section V).

Roman characters in their narratives. We have seen this already in the previous chapter on Sallust. This study of Livy 21-30 will help us build upon that work.⁷

I.

‘For Livy characterisation is a central preoccupation’⁸

In history and legend the figure of Hannibal is so large that it needs at least a book to contain it, even without taking account of the second life he led in exile, to which he was forced after 195 [B.C.E.], by the hostility of the Romans and the ingratitude of his own people.⁹ At the very heart of that exceptional destiny, the few years’ duration of the campaign that took him from Spain to the south of Italy are an almost inexhaustible topic for historians.¹⁰

As a Roman history, the AVC must exhibit appropriate Roman narrative markers to help the Roman reader make sense of the vast amount of Roman history that Livy includes in his history. The early chapters of Book 21 play an important role in establishing the impression of Hannibal and the war in general that Livy wishes to convey,¹¹ as well as establishing Hannibal as the dominant character in the narrative.¹² By essentially making the narrative appear to centre itself around Hannibal at this important initial stage, Livy

⁷ To state again my point from the introduction (above, 2 n. 10): given the abundance of foreign community material, it is surprising to find that Dauge (1981) writes very little about Livy and makes no comment on Hannibal.

⁸ Walsh (1982) 1068. So too Laistner (1947) 81: ‘like other ancient historians Livy was deeply interested in personalities, that is to say, in the leading military and political figures’.

⁹ On the post-Hannibalic War life of Hannibal, see section VII below.

¹⁰ Lancel (1995) 381-2.

¹¹ Hence the attention given by Burck (1962) 57-64 to the early chapters of book 21. He divides book 21 into three parts: chh. 1-20 (introduction and Hannibal’s arrival in Spain and Saguntum), chh. 21-38 (crossing the Alps), and chh. 39-63 (early Roman-Carthaginian conflicts).

¹² From the Roman perspective, the failure of the Romans to put their mark on the preface not only gives narrative control to Hannibal, but it also causes the hallmark structural elements of AVC history to appear to break down. We can observe this happening even before Hannibal achieves his crushing victory over the Romans at Cannae (in fact, the breakdown in structure may anticipate Rome’s defeat at Cannae). Levene (1993) 38, for example, points to the misplacement of the list of prodigies for the year 218 BCE. Here, a constituent aspect of a Roman history is not missing, but it is not in its traditional place. But these are early days for Hannibal, and possibly Livy wants the reader to understand that just as Hannibal will become an increasingly serious threat to

takes a deliberate standpoint in that he appears to put Hannibal ahead of the Romans of that time. This no doubt builds up Hannibal, as it gives him control in the text *before* he has established his dominant position in the war. It also serves a specific purpose in Livy's goal for this part of his history: to stress most strongly to his Roman reader the seriousness of this conflict. By beginning the third decade with no Roman immediately visible, but with Hannibal centre stage, Livy effectively achieves this.¹³ Rome (textually, at least) appears undefended against Hannibal and his army.

1.1 The preface to the Hannibalic war.

One feature of Livy's history that scholars discuss is the frequent insertion of prefaces when the historian commences a new section to his history.¹⁴ A section as important as the Hannibalic war, not surprisingly, begins with a preface. For our reading of foreign individuals and communities in this section of Livy's history, it plays an important role. We expect the introduction to a particular pentad or decade to provide insight into the nature of the narrative ahead, and the introduction at book 21 is no exception. In fact, we find that in terms of our subject of study, it is an exceptionally revealing introduction:

in parte operis mei licet mihi praefari quod in principio summae totius professi plerique sunt rerum scriptores, bellum maxime omnium memorabile quae unquam gesta sint me scripturum, quod Hannibale duce Carthaginenses cum populo Romano gessere. (21.1.1)

First, we cannot but fail to notice the predominant position of the historian himself in this introduction. Livy brings himself into the narrative at an important stage in his work,¹⁵ which stresses the seriousness of the next section of Roman history that his work will cover.¹⁶ There is of course a sense here of Livy proclaiming the better nature

Rome as the narrative proceeds, so too he will be an increasingly serious threat to Livy's history.

¹³ Cf. 6.1.4, where Livy after his mini-preface directs the reader's attention to a most prominent Roman—Camillus. Cf. Kraus (1994) 88-9.

¹⁴ E.g., Briscoe (1973) 49; Kraus (1994) 83; Cizek (1995) 152; Oakley (1997) 381-2.

¹⁵ As he does in other introductions (e.g., the preface): *facturusne operae pretium sim, si a primordio urbis res populi Romani perscripserim, nec satis scio, nec, si sciam, dicere ausim, quippe qui cum veterem tum volgatam esse rem videam...* For comment, see Ogilvie (1970) 25 and Moles (1993) 141-5.

¹⁶ This is not the first time Livy has sought to direct the reader's attention to the significance of a particular period of Rome's history. He does something similar at 7.29.1-2: *maiora iam hinc bella et viribus hostium et vel longinquitate regionum vel temporum spatio quibus bellatum est dicentur. Namque eo anno adversus Samnites, gentem opibus armisque validam, mota arma; Samnitium bellum ancipiti Marte gestum Pyrrhus hostis, Pyrrhum Poeni secuti. quanta*

of his work over other histories, for he likens the caveat that he makes in this one part of his work to that which many other historians make to their history as a whole.

Important in this opening sentence is not so much the historian's voice but how he sets up the war. He calls it the most memorable war that was ever waged (*bellum maxime omnium....gesta sint*). He backs up what he writes in the opening sentence by later pointing out how close Rome comes to defeat. We might well expect Livy to provide reasons for this later in this introduction (see below). This position held by the Carthaginians in the text reflects positively on them: it tells us that Livy acknowledges a particular foreign community has been capable of challenging Rome to such a degree, although we must keep in mind that he makes this statement from the safe temporal position of the war having long since won by Rome.

While the historian notes that the Carthaginians fought the Romans under the leadership of Hannibal (*Hannibale duce*), Livy does not name any Roman leaders. Naming a single Carthaginian, in contrast to no named Romans, means that Livy seeks to direct the reader's gaze upon Hannibal alone at this important opening point of the third decade. Understanding the Second Punic War, therefore, and possibly Livy's history (as the war plays an important part in the history of Rome) is tied directly to understanding Hannibal.

In the second and third sentences the historian effectively builds upon what he writes in the opening sentence:

nam neque validiores opibus ullae inter se civitates gentesque contulerunt arma, neque his ipsis tantum unquam virium aut roboris fuit, et haud ignotas belli artes inter sese sed expertas primo Punico conferebant bello, et adeo varia fortuna belli ancepsque Mars fuit ut propius periculum fuerint qui vicerunt. odiis etiam prope maioribus certarunt quam viribus, Romanis indignantibus quod victoribus victi ultro inferrent arma, Poenis quod superbe avareque crederent imperitatum victis esse. (21.1.2-3)

In the second sentence Livy stresses the seriousness of this war, both in terms of the fact that both sides were extremely powerful, and both are already enemies from a previous encounter (21.1.2). The frequent appearance of war (*arma ~ belli artes ~ bello ~ varia fortuna belli*) reinforces the seriousness of this conflict.¹⁷

rerum moles! quotiens in extrema periculorum ventum, ut in hanc magnitudinem quae vix sustinetur erigi imperium posset! See Morello (2002) 70.

¹⁷ It also plays upon an image of Carthage as a war-like nation that has been conveyed by earlier Latin texts. Cf. Lucretius 5.1303-7: *belli docuerunt vulnera Poeni | sufferre et magnas Martis turbare catervas. | sic alid ex alio peperit discordia tristis, | horribile humanis quod gentibus esset in armis, | inque dies belli terroribus addidit augmen.* Bailey (1947) 1528 understands *Poeni* as referring to Hannibal. The reference to *discordia* here is significant. That the Romans

In these three sentences Livy gives Carthage the two main elements it will need in order to fight Rome successfully: a leader and resources. While Rome too has the resources to fight Carthage, it has yet to find a leader. This situation will be a prolonged weakness on Rome's part, as the chapters that follow this introduction focus upon and develop Hannibal as a character, and stress his uniqueness.

It is perhaps the final phrase of the second sentence, and the third sentence of this introduction that are most important. Livy now weighs up both the Roman and Carthaginian sides at this pre-*bellum* stage. First, looking forwards to the end of the war, he assesses its outcome experienced by both Rome and Carthage. Livy suggests that the position of the victors was not much better than that of the defeated (*et adeo varia fortuna belli ancepsque Mars fuit ut propius periculum fuerint qui vicerunt*). This statement most effectively conveys the near-extinction that Rome will experience in this war, which creates a powerful feeling of nervous anticipation on the part of the reader.

Livy's claim that this conflict was one in which there was varied fortune (*adeo varia fortuna*) is important. This is a concept that is central to Sallust's interpretation of the Jugurthine war.¹⁸ What is interesting is the geographic location of *varia fortuna* in these historians: both narrate conflicts in which Africa or people from Africa play a leading role. This could be, then, an indication of a general Roman perception of Africa and its people. The Romans experience varied fortune in both conflicts, which is

perceive Carthage is a war-like nation may be related to the general perception of Africa as a hostile place: thus Carthage merely reflects the land in which she is situated. Herodotus, in his description of Libya, for example, seems to suggest this when he catalogues some of the features of the eastern part of Libya (4.191.3-4). The land is home to bizarre creatures such as enormous snakes, headless creatures with eyes in their chests and 'wild men and wild women', and other fabulous creatures (καὶ οἱ ἄγριοι ἄνδρες καὶ γυναῖκες ἄγρια καὶ ἄλλα πλήθει πολλὰ θηρία ἀκατάφειστα). On the danger posed by snakes in Africa, see Lucan's *Pharsalia*, where the poet includes a lengthy discussion of the poisonous snakes which Cato and his men must face (9.604-838). See also Valerius Maximus 1.8.ext.19 on Regulus' invasion of Africa, where at a river crossing several of his men are eaten or crushed by a giant snake. He notes that the Romans fear it more than Carthage (*omnibusque et cohortibus et legionibus ipsa Carthagine visam terribiliorem, atque etiam cruore suo gurgitibus inbutis corporisque iacentis pestifero adflatu vicina regione polluta Romana inde summovisse castra*).

¹⁸ Granted, Sallust does not write *varia fortuna*, but his mission statement suggests that it is firmly in mind when he writes the *Jug.*: *bellum scripturus sum quod populus Romanus cum Iugurthae rege Numidarum gessit, primum quia magnum et atrox variaque victoria fuit* (5.1). Tacitus posits *varia fortuna* in the mouth of Calgacus in his speech at *Agricola* 30.2: *priores pugnae, quibus adversus Romanos varia fortuna certatum est, spem ac subsidium in nostris manibus habebant*. See Ogilvie and Richmond (1967) 253-4. On fortune in Livy, see Kajanto (1957) 63-100; he does not mention the use of *varia fortuna* in this passage.

something that is disruptive to Rome's continual growth as the leading world power. This suggests that Africa is a place where Roman power breaks down, or that it is a source of those agents that can cause disruption to Roman power—Jugurtha and Hannibal in their respective narratives are good examples of this. In terms of Roman history-writing, there is a progression from Africans causing *varia fortuna* to the Romans first in Africa under Jugurtha, then taking the conflict to Europe and more importantly to Italy under Hannibal (perhaps Livy is trying to suggest this by making his varied fortune stronger than Sallust's when he writes *adeo varia fortuna*). Perhaps Livy is trying to suggest that fortune becomes more varied and dangerous the closer it comes to Rome. And for the Carthaginians it appears dangerous because the good fortune their hero Hannibal achieves in the early years of his campaign will ultimately turn on them when the Romans invade Africa. Both the Romans and the Carthaginians, therefore, experience both sides of *fortuna*. In the course of the third decade, then, it truly is *varia*. Putting these two conflicts back in the right order, that is, positioning Livy's Hannibalic War before Sallust's Jugurthine War, allows another perception of mixed fortune: in terms of chronology Hannibal brings varied fortune to the Romans in Italy, but then in the time of Jugurtha the Romans eventually turn it back on Jugurtha in Africa under Marius and Sulla. He backs up what he writes in the opening sentence by later pointing out how close Rome came to defeat.

In the third sentence, Livy presents the main issue that each side has with the other: for the Romans that the Carthaginians, as a defeated party in the previous war, should dare instigate a war with Rome; for the Carthaginians, because the Romans behaved with arrogance (21.1.3). This is a very careful balancing of the two sides in the war by the historian.¹⁹ For one thing it suggests no bias on the part of the narrator, as he records that each side has a (seemingly legitimate) grievance against the other. But given Livy's—and for that matter Sallust's—less than positive comments on the nature of contemporary Rome, the Carthaginian charges against the Romans may seem to be especially relevant.²⁰ If this is the case, Carthage's position at the start of Livy's account

¹⁹ On the other hand, in conveying the Carthaginian grievance against Rome, the use of the verb *crederent* raises questions, for it says that the Carthaginians believed Rome to have displayed arrogance, but this belief may be misplaced.

²⁰ I take it that the prevailing attitudes of Livy and his readers, that is, the Romans of the Augustan period, are important in the consideration of the AVC. See section 4.4, for example, for my comments as to how Livy's and the Romans' recent memories of Cleopatra may be relevant in thinking about Sophoniba.

of the Hannibalic War is a more favourable one than that of her enemy. Carthage, therefore, receives the benefit of having the narrative slanted in her favour rather than in favour of Livy's own nation. This possible pro-Carthage slanting of the narrative is important when thinking about the historian's presentation of Hannibal in the early chapters of book 21.

Moreover, the reference to Carthage as the defeated party brings back to the reader's mind (here I mean readers of the AVC) the events of that conflict in which Carthage experienced defeat: the Sicilian War. This was covered by Livy in his fourth pentad.²¹ The reference to Roman arrogance can be read as intratextual in that it encourages the reader to reflect on what the historian wrote about Roman behaviour towards Carthage in those books. What Livy writes about Rome and Carthage in these books, therefore, must be understood in the context of what Livy has written thus far in his history. That Livy in his preface to books 21-30 refers to the defeat of Carthage in the Sicilian War suggests that in writing the Hannibalic War he wishes to develop further theme(s) that he explored in the previous pentad.

The initial Hannibal experience of the opening sentence is then far overshadowed by what comes next: the story of Hannibal's oath, Hanno's first speech against Hannibal, and Livy's description of Hannibal's character. As the second of these episodes concerns Hanno (whom I treat in section V), I will now turn to the first and third of these episodes to show how Livy impresses firmly the dominant image of Hannibal into his narrative at this opening stage.

1.2 Hannibal's past and Rome's future: a story from Hannibal's youth.

P. G. Walsh notes how the historian creates a highly developed character in Hannibal.²² While the introduction hints at the power that Hannibal will exert in this part of the AVC, it does not reveal Hannibal the person. Sallust may explore Jugurtha as a character early in the *Jug.*, but freed from the need to write a lengthy philosophical introduction, Livy can get to Hannibal much sooner. Explaining the non-Roman appears to be a priority to this historian.

²¹ The periocha for book 16, the first book of the account of the first Punic (Sicilian) war, appears to have contained a digression on the Carthaginians and the origin of their city (Per. 16, *origo Carthaginensium et primordia urbis eorum referuntur*). This digression may have contained cultural observations that the historian would want to be kept in the reader's mind throughout the fourth, fifth and sixth pentads.

²² Walsh (1961) 104-5. Cf. Burck (1971) 22.

Livy chooses not to present Hannibal on the eve of battle with the Romans, but rather to show a younger Hannibal:

fama est etiam Hannibalem annorum ferme novem pueriliter blandientem patri Hamilcari ut duceretur in Hispaniam, cum perfecto bello exercitum eo traiecturus sacrificaret, altaribus admotum tactis sacris iure iurando adactum se cum primum posset hostem fore populo Romano.
(21.1.4)

Writing about Hannibal as a youth expands the narrative scope of the third decade to fit not the temporal scope of the war, but rather to fit Hannibal.²³ It is Hannibal's story, not Rome's. It is Hannibal's promise to be the enemy of the Roman people, not his attacking of a Roman ally, that begins Hannibal's campaign. The war, and Livy's account of the war, is thus an extension of Hannibal's feelings and thoughts. This places Hannibal at the forefront of this narrative; everything that he does, and Rome's responses to Hannibal's actions, all flow from this story.

The scene is also powerful for its intimacy. By describing Hannibal taking the oath, Livy positions himself and the reader as a witness to the event. This scene, therefore, not only places Hannibal in a historical context, but a personal one as well, showing that he is not just a military leader, but also a person with familial bonds. Because it is an event shared by father and son, on the other hand, it also has a degree of intimacy in it, as a private family moment. Of course we can express this bond in military terms that relate specifically to the Hannibalic war as well, for not only are they father and son, but at the time of this oath Hamilcar is about to cross into Spain. There Hannibal will (eventually) replace his father, and the Hannibalic war will begin. We also have a scene of continuation, between a present military commander and a future one, and a clear progression of conflict, from campaigning in Spain to war against Rome.

²³ If Livy was narrating events in a strictly chronological order, then this scene would have been more appropriate to book 20, which appears to have narrated events from the end of the Scilian War to the outbreak of the Hannibalic War (241—202 BCE). Had it been placed in book 20, this scene would have served as a narrative seed, encouraging most strongly the reader to read on to the next pentad. In fact, it may be possible that the scene did appear in book 20, and that Livy repeats it here for emphasis.

1.3 Hannibal's character at 21.4.2-10.

'Hannibal représent la *virtus* perverse, l'énergie humaine non reconnue par les dieux, l'intelligence immorale'²⁴

The third part of Livy's construction of Hannibal is the character portrait. By describing Hannibal's character at this beginning point in the third decade, the historian builds up Hannibal's dominance in the narrative even further. Every action taken by Hannibal, and every Roman action taken against Hannibal, is read against this complex analysis of Hannibal's character.

We can divide Livy's Hannibal portrait into three parts: (1) his wide appeal; (2) his positive qualities; (3) his negative qualities. Livy's description of Hannibal begins by stating his universal appeal—to the Carthaginians. He is equally capable of being a leader and following a leader; he is capable of commanding the respect of both the leaders above him and the soldiers under him (21.4.3-4).²⁵ This establishes clearly what Hannibal means for the Carthaginians: he is someone who works well within the Carthaginian system (in this case the army), in his endeavours to achieve something for Carthage. Hannibal can be seen to meet the needs of Carthage's army, and Carthage's army appears to be suited to be led by Hannibal. By narrating this first Livy establishes that what is most important in the consideration of Hannibal is whether he is suitable for Carthage.

²⁴ Dauge (1981) 174.

²⁵ On the character portrait of Hannibal, see Bernard (2000) 49-52. What is interesting is that in this section of the narrative Livy does not describe specifically Hannibal's abilities as commander. Cf. Cicero, *De Officiis* 1.108, who not only defines succinctly what Hannibal can do in the field, but also matches him up with Quintus Fabius Maximus: *Callidum Hannibalem ex Poenorum, ex nostris ducibus Q. Maximum accepimus, facile celare, tacere, dissimulare, insidiari, praeripere hostium consilia.*

Silius Italicus provides an interesting scene when Hannibal is welcomed as leader. Silius provides a précis of Hannibal's character as an explanation why the army wants Hannibal as leader (1.186-8, *hinc fama in populos iurati didita belli, | hinc virides ausis anni fervorque decorus | atque armata dolis mens et vis insita fandi.*) What is especially interesting is that one group of Hannibal's army hail him first, the Libyans, which Silius follows by describing Libya (1.193-219). This augments the power of Hannibal: the reader now understands that another important area of Africa supports Hannibal's upcoming campaign against the Romans. The description of Libya is later followed by a description of Spain (1.220-39), where Hannibal will begin his campaign, in which the poet draws particular attention to the mineral wealth of the Iberian peninsula. Hannibal therefore both finds support from, and motivation for the conquest of, particular regions of the world, both of which contribute to his war effort.

The second part of the character portrait (21.4.3-7) focuses on Hannibal's physical abilities. This section and the one following explain what Hannibal means for the Romans, that is, Livy establishes the kind of threat Rome faces in fighting Hannibal. From this angle Hannibal appears as a most impressive specimen: he does not tire easily, he can endure both hot and cold, he consumes moderate quantities of food and drink, and he controls his need for sleep (21.4.7-8).²⁶ Hannibal appears to be the ideal military person.²⁷ And possibly his physical attributes represent his community as a whole, that is, not only does Hannibal display these impressive qualities, but the soldiers under him also aspire to these qualities—or they will be given them by their new leader. Again, this serves a specific purpose in setting up Hannibal as an opponent of Rome: she can be seen to face an army of Hannibals. Hannibal's abilities in the physical sphere suggest that he will be capable of withstanding the difficulties of protracted warfare, and so will his army. Of particular importance is the fact that Hannibal is physically explicated (later to be mentally explicated) in a manner similar to the Africans in Sallust, viz. Jugurtha in the *Jug.*²⁸ Hannibal, therefore, appears to fit within the paradigm established by the Romans for their African adversaries. Hannibal can be seen in historiographical terms as a descendant to Jugurtha, as Livy follows Sallust's example. What will serve to impress about Hannibal, therefore, will be how he is able to live up to, and then outperform, the specifications set out by Jugurtha.

Livy concludes by discussing Hannibal's personality. It is here that the historian notes some less than positive aspects of this character. This contrasts with the character's positive physical aspects stated above, but they also work well with them: it

²⁶ Cf. Plutarch, *Alexander* 22.4-23.1, where Alexander is said to have mastery over his appetite. So too Catiline in Sallust: *corpus patiens inediae, algoris, vigiliae supra quam cuiquam credibile est* (*Cat.* 5.3). Ammianus notes the same restraint in Julian (25.4.4, *hoc autem temperantiae genus crescebat in maius, iuvante parsimonia ciborum et somni quibus domi forisque tenacius utebatur*).

²⁷ On generalship in ancient Rome, see Harris (1979) 10-16; Campbell (1987); Eckstein (1987) and (1995) 161-93; Gruber (1988); Meulder (1995); Goldsworthy (1996) 116-70; Ash (1999); Steel (2001) 113-61. These authors combined cover the topic from the middle republic to the imperial period. Our best ancient source is Polybius, who explores the art of the commander in his *Histories* (9.12.1-21.1). It is significant that then Polybius goes on to discuss the character of Hannibal (9.22.1-26.11): thus the Carthaginian leader is allowed to emerge as a natural extension of Polybius' discussion of what a good commander is.

²⁸ *Jug.* 6.1. Both Jugurtha and Hannibal are described first and foremost by their physical strength, and neither shows interest in things esoteric.

further the image of Hannibal as a soldier. The historian clearly feels that these traits are as important as the qualities (21.4.9, *has tantas viri virtutes ingentia vitia aequabant*). Virtue and vice are identified as equal forces in Hannibal, and that they are equal gives Hannibal a complexity matched by no other non-Roman in Latin historiography.²⁹ It might seem to pose the question which of *virtus* and *vitium* will win. Given what Livy writes in this passage, it appears that vice will be the victor. But the efforts of his soldiers, and his praise of them, suggests that virtue plays an important part in how Carthaginians and other non-Romans perceive themselves and their efforts.³⁰ The virtue of his soldiers turns back and builds up Hannibal, as soldiers reflect their commander. The soldiers reflect their commander, and vice versa—this is important in all Latin historical narratives.³¹ As the narrative of the Hannibalic war unfolds, and, as the sections of this thesis that follow suggest, this is the case. The historian focuses on the unpleasant aspects of Hannibal's personality: cruelty, treachery, and neither respect for nor fear of the gods.³² These negative aspects of Hannibal surely would strike a chord with the Roman reader of Livy, for they position Hannibal as different from what a Roman should be—at least in Livy's estimation.

The most important comment that Livy makes here is *perfidia plus quam Punica* (21.4.9), referring to Hannibal's possession of treachery greater than usual for his

²⁹ Cf. Sallust on Catiline: *L. Catilina...fuit magna vi et animi et corporis, sed ingenio malo parvoque* (*Cat.* 5.1). For Livy to suggest that Hannibal possesses *virtus* is significant, albeit perverse virtue, for as the chart provided Moore (215) indicates, the historian ascribes virtue 232 times to Romans, and only 65 times to non-Romans, roughly 65% less often. On the use of *virtus* in Livy, see Moore (1989) 5-14. Moore (5) makes one very important point, that at the time of the Hannibalic war the concept of virtue changed from general excellence to military service for the state. Most of Livy's usages of the word are of the pre-Hannibalic war meaning. This is a possible reason why the historian's references to virtue appear mostly in the first decade, as Moore (1989) 12-3 points out, and there is a very noticeable decrease after book 30. Hannibal, therefore, apart from Scipio, may represent one of the last characters to demonstrate this quality in the eyes of Livy.

³⁰ In one speech to his army (21.43.2-44.9), Hannibal refers to the *virtus* of his soldiers three times (21.43.6, 43.13, and 43.17). There is also what I regard as implied virtue on the part of Hannibal's men in their actions at Tarentum (see below, section III).

³¹ This is especially the case of Alexander, where his soldiers serve to point to when and how their commander deviates from his native community. See the next chapter on Alexander in Justin *passim*.

³² Cf. Cicero, *De Officiis* 1.38, where he refers to Hannibal's cruelty, in contrast to other foreigners who behaved more justly.

people.³³ Hannibal can be seen to take on personally the perfidy displayed by his people in the previous war, detailed by the historian in the fourth pentad. The reader therefore might look for evidence of Hannibal's perfidy, and possibly compare that to the (supposed) demonstration of it in Carthaginian behaviour in the narrative of the Sicilian War. Given that Hannibal has more *perfidia* than is customary in a Carthaginian, the historian can suggest here in an interesting way that this war will be (much) more difficult for the Romans than the previous war, and therefore that the narrative of the present war expands upon what the historian wrote in the previous narrative unit. The reader therefore is asked to compare this war to the previous one. And it builds up Hannibal at the same time, for it suggests that Hannibal has a particular Carthaginian trait in great abundance. Finally, Livy in this comment can be seen to connect Hannibal and his community at a critical point in the story, given that Hannibal will spend so much time away from his native community. Hannibal is shown by the historian to have a bond with the nation away from which he must campaign for most of his life.

The picture that the historian proffers in this passage is that of a complex man, someone who equally exudes what a Roman can both admire and scorn. The key to our reading here is that flaws to which Livy points are seen as extended inherited national characteristics, with Hannibal demonstrating what Livy perceives to be common to all Carthaginians, but Hannibal has a more abundant supply of those characteristics. By doing this, Livy casts Hannibal firmly in the image of Carthage, yet Hannibal displays additional elements that make him unique, irrespective of his nationality. Hannibal, therefore, is both a member of a community, but also he moves beyond the boundaries of that community in the intellectual sense, just as by crossing into Spain and attacking Rome he does so in the geographic sense. Being able to transcend (even just partially as in this case) the boundaries of his community will help Hannibal in an important way, for it helps us understand Hannibal as someone who can effectively co-ordinate an army

³³ Cf. Polybius 9.22.8, τινὲς μὲν γὰρ ὥμὸν αὐτὸν οἶονται γεγονέναι καθ' ὑπερβολήν, τινὲς δὲ φιλάργυρον. Polybius appears to be more vague on whether Hannibal has these qualities, placing the identification of cruelty in Hannibal on others (Greeks? Romans? Carthaginians?). Polybius ties this to Hannibal's interest in money. Polybius mentions this again later on in the character analysis (9.25.1-4). At the very end of this section, the historian appears to decouple Hannibal's predilection for cruelty and his fondness for money by noting that for the former he was famous among the Carthaginians, and for the latter he was famous among the Romans (9.26.11, κρατεῖ γέ μὴν ἢ φήν παρὰ μὲν Καρχηδοίοις ὡς πηλαργύρου, παρὰ δὲ Ῥωμαίοις ὡς ὠμοῦ γενομένου [αὐτοῦ]).

made up of many nationalities and his ability to campaign so long in foreign lands (qualities in Hannibal that Livy admires in his assessment of Hannibal in book 28—see section II below), as the narrative will repeatedly demonstrate.³⁴

We should briefly here acknowledge the possible connection between Livy's Hannibal portrait here and that of Catiline in Sallust. I have suggested that Livy in writing his Hannibal portrait is following the pattern established by Sallust in his description of Jugurtha, but there are clearly stronger connections with Sallust's Roman villain.³⁵ What is interesting here is that Sallust's version, which describes the character of a Roman, is then used as a model by Livy to describe a foreign character. That is not totally surprising, for Catiline and Hannibal have something in common: both are perceived by the Romans as an enemy of the state. Hannibal in Livy can be seen therefore as a slight variation on the Sallustian original, not a character turned inside-out by Livy. Catiline's position in Sallust establishes a position for Hannibal in Livy. Despite Catiline being described as a villain, he does show many qualities that are worthy of praise.³⁶ If Livy wants the reader to understand Hannibal as a non-Roman Catiline, then it is possible that Hannibal will, on occasion at least, display positive qualities that will earn him the reader's admiration. As we observed above, some aspects of the character portrait suggest that Hannibal is worthy of the admiration of anyone, Roman or Carthaginian. He displays the qualities of universal *bonus vir*. Moreover, as we shall see in the Tarentum episodes, Livy also shows Hannibal in a positive light in the narrative itself.

³⁴ Cizek (1995) 173 argues for the connection between the portrait of Hannibal here and his final appearance in Livy—his suicide (39.50-2). I discuss Hannibal's suicide in section VII.

³⁵ E.g. by Walsh (1982) 1067-8. See also Clauss (1997). The portrait of Catiline occurs at *Cat.* 5.1-8.

³⁶ On Catiline's good qualities, which come to the forefront as he faces defeat and death, see Wilkins (1994).

II.

καὶ γὰρ περιστάσεσι παραδόξαις καὶ ποικίλαις ἐχρήσατο καὶ φίλοις
τοῖς ἔγγιστα μεγάλας ἐσχηκόσι διαφοράς, ὥστε καὶ λίαν ἐκ τῶν κατ'
Ἰταλίαν πράξεων δυσθεώρητον εἶναι τὴν τοῦ προειρημένου φύσιν.³⁷

Livy returns to the subject of Hannibal's character in book 28.³⁸ It is surely important to ask why Livy writes about Hannibal's character in book 28, given that the historian has basically explored Hannibal's character thoroughly in the preceding seven books through Hannibal's words and actions. And it might seem especially out-of-place given the strong portrait located at the beginning of book 21.

Perhaps the narrative structure of the third decade can help us understand why Livy writes again about Hannibal the person in book 28. There are a few good reasons. In one sense to discuss Hannibal at this point is appropriate, for the historian notes that in this year (206 BCE) Hannibal does not campaign (28.12.1). With no action from Livy's non-Roman prime mover, discussing his character fills an obvious void in the narrative. Moreover, the historian excuses Hannibal's inaction, noting his personal injury (28.12.2). Despite this, the Romans are careful not to provoke Hannibal into action.³⁹ This reveals that Livy's Romans understand that an inactive Hannibal can become an active threat—and probably a successful one too—should he wish. Personal injury cannot be taken as a sign of weakness of personal will.

A second reason for discussing Hannibal at this point concerns marking off Hannibal's career as a leader of a successful Roman campaign. At the end of book 27, Hannibal's brother, Hasdrubal, is defeated and killed by the Romans when he tries to join forces with Hannibal in Italy. The Roman commander orders Hasdrubal's head to be removed and sent to Hannibal who, when he gazes upon it, realises that he will lose to Rome.⁴⁰ At the opening of book 28, then, Hannibal is beginning a new phase in his

³⁷ Polybius 9.24.2.

³⁸ Kraus (1997) 60. She specifically notes the connection between 21.4 and this passage.

³⁹ We can see Hannibal's injury as balanced by the awe the Romans hold for Hannibal, when in the same sentence Livy points out that *tantam inesse vim, etsi omnia alia circa eum ruerent, in uno illo duce censebant* (28.12.1). The phrase *uno illo duce* is important: it may be a play on the *unus vir* theme. For *unus vir* in Livy, see Santoro l'Hoir (1990) 230-2.

⁴⁰ 27.51.11-12, *C. Claudius consul cum in castra redisset, caput Hasdrubalis quod servatum cum cura attulerat proici ante hostium stationes, captivosque Afros victos ut erant ostendi, duos etiam ex iis*

career. His character, Livy may have thought, would require a positive re-assessment that would refocus the reader's attention on the impressive nature of this character as he experiences the rapid decline in his fortunes in the remaining three books of the third decade.

Another reason for re-evaluating Hannibal might be that the historian felt that he needed to reposition Hannibal in his narrative given the arrival of Scipio. Writing Hannibal here might suggest that Livy is writing around Scipio. As the historian re-evaluates Hannibal, he can work through how he will present Scipio. This passage therefore serves as a turning point: the character portrait refers to Hannibal's past, his character and actions up to this point in the war, and they are about to be true no longer; for Scipio they are the blueprint for how he should be. Scipio, therefore, can replace Hannibal as the greatest commander in the Hannibalic War.

This possible Hannibal-Scipio relationship could have a geographic context. Livy is impressed by Hannibal's ability to campaign so successfully, and for so long, in a distant country (28.12.3). This points to the challenge that Scipio will face: a lengthy campaign in Africa. Livy's reader would be right to recall the experiences of the Romans in Sallust's account of the Jugurthine War. To connect these two narratives, it appears that the Romans could perceive Africa as a testing ground to determine whether a commander is a success or a failure. Livy's reader would first recall the early disappointments experienced by Rome in Africa. But the success of Marius would demonstrate that a Roman commander can succeed in Africa. Sallust's narrative presents a mixed picture, one of Roman failures and Roman successes.⁴¹ That Rome eventually triumphed in Africa means that Scipio has the responsibility to continue Rome's record of military success in this region.

Livy reveals a certain degree of personal admiration for Hannibal here when he writes that it is in adverse conditions that Hannibal appears to be a more noble character (28.12.2, *ac nescio an mirabilior adversis quam secundis rebus fuerit*). This is a rare personal

solutos ire ad Hannibalem et expromere quae acta essent iussit. Hannibal tanto simul publico familiarique ictus luctu, agnoscere se fortunam Carthaginis fertur dixisse. On this passage, see Jaeger (1997) 94-9. The use of *fertur* at 27.51.12 seems to question whether Hannibal actually voiced his understanding, or whether others understand Carthage's fate on Hannibal's behalf.

⁴¹ Livy may also want to reader to compare Scipio's career post-Carthage to Marius' career post-Numidia. Both are hailed as heroes upon their return to Rome. However, the political careers of Marius and Scipio are less than exemplary. Scipio has another challenge in that he must avoid Marius' failures as a politician.

confession from Livy. The picture here is of Hannibal as a masterful leader, someone who can endure the protracted campaign in Italy. What is more interesting is the quality of Hannibal's leadership, for the historian notes the difficulties in keeping order in an army that comprises soldiers from a multitude of nations (28.12.3).⁴² This is an aspect of Hannibal's leadership that transcends Livy's narrative, for it even finds its way into poetry.⁴³ The problems as Livy sees them are immense (28.12.3-4, *exercitu non suo civili, sed mixto ex conlutione omnium gentium, quibus non lex, non mos, non lingua communis, alius habitus, alia vestis, alia arma, alii ritus, alia sacra*).⁴⁴ Despite these tremendous differences, Hannibal is a successful leader as he brings them all together in one force (28.12.4).⁴⁵

This statement has further meaning for our understanding of foreign community representation in Livy. By describing Hannibal's leadership as a difficult task (irrespective of the fact that the historian applauds Hannibal's ability to make it work), Livy in effect suggests that creating a collective comprised of many cultural groups is a difficult task.⁴⁶ The differences between so many communities are such that any

⁴² Hannibal's ability to deal effectively with a community (his army) made up of many nations is also suggested just before the battle of Zama, where Livy writes that Hannibal addresses each national group differently (30.33.8). Cf. 21.43.2-44.9, where Livy records in direct discourse Hannibal's speech to his troops in which he addresses his army as *Carthaginienses*. Hannibal is not speaking only to the Carthaginian soldiers in his army, for the historian notes that an interpreter was present (21.42.1), but he is clearly thinking about Carthage's interests (e.g., the regaining of territory lost to the Romans in the first Punic war). Cf. Alexander and Darius in the next chapter, where the handling of (that is, the success or failure so to do) armies made up of more than a single nation is meant to reflect back on their characters.

It is perhaps significant that Livy does not mention here that Hannibal's army is made up of a substantial number of mercenaries. Mercenaries can display the characteristics of being *barbari*—see Eckstein (1995) 125-9 on mercenaries in Polybius.

⁴³ Silius Italicus, 16.19-22: *tot dissona lingua | agmina, barbarico tot discordia ritu | corda virum mansere gradu, rebusque retusis | fidas ductori tenuit reverentia mentes*. On references to multi-ethnic armies in Latin poetry, see Dewar (2003).

⁴⁴ This passage is based on Polybius 11.19.4 (εἶχε γὰρ Λίβυας, Ἰβηρας, Λιγυστίνους, Κελτούς, Φοίνικας, Ἰταλούς, Ἕλληνας, οἷς οὐ νόμος, οὐκ ἔθος, οὐ λόγος, οὐχ ἕτερον οὐδὲν ἦν κοινὸν ἐκ φύσεως πρὸς ἀλλήλους).

⁴⁵ While Hannibal's men do not speak a single language (*non lingua communis*), it appears that at least some of them speak Latin. In one battle Hannibal sends men into the Roman camp who wear Italian clothes and speak Latin. He urges the Roman soldiers to flee as the camp has been taken by the Carthaginians (26.6.11).

⁴⁶ Livy perhaps can be seen dividing Hannibal's army when he narrates the battles between Romans and Hannibal's army. In his account of Cannae, for example, the historian charts the actions of the Gauls, Spaniards, Numidians and 'Africans' (22.46.1-7), and their basic appearance and weaponry. This section could be called an

attempt at organisation is exceptionally difficult—if not impossible. The fact that it is Hannibal, himself from a community foreign both to the Roman reader and to many of the soldiers in his army, who is able to bring these people together, and keep them together, is impressive to say the least. In this passage, then, Livy shows a certain degree of sensitivity towards the differences that exist between community groups. He acknowledges the difficulties of national groups co-existing without trying to find fault with the communities for this difficult co-existence. Rather, the historian focuses on the positive: Hannibal's success at keeping them as a single, unified group not only stresses his ability as a leader, but also it hints that he understands all too well the challenges of having a multinational force (and perhaps he is able to address the different needs of the different communities).

That in this passage Livy follows closely Polybius' discussion of Hannibal at 11.19.1-7 is significant. In addition to the points above, by basing his comments on Hannibal upon Polybius' comments on the same, Livy validates what Polybius has written. Furthermore, Livy makes a wider and more far-reaching cultural comment. By agreeing with the assessment of Hannibal made by a Greek, Livy suggests not only that he is able to appreciate fully the significance of his Carthaginian protagonist, but also that he is able to appreciate the assessment of Hannibal made by someone from a culture other than Livy's own. And Hannibal is built up further, for he receives qualified praise from two different authors from two different cultures.⁴⁷ That Hannibal can be praised by a Greek and a Roman in turn validates what these two historians write in their assessments, that is, their comments on his ability to deal successfully with an army with a diverse cultural composition.

ethnography of Hannibal's army. All these groups, with their unique special fighting skills, face a seemingly unified Roman soldiers and cavalry. Note that Livy draws attention to the ferocious appearance of the Gauls, which frightens the Romans (22.46.5).

Varro, in his speech to the Capuans after his defeat at Cannae, seems to go against the balanced account of Livy when he describes Hannibal and the men under him in very unflattering terms (22.5.12, *hunc natura et moribus immitem ferumque insuper dux ipse efferauit, pontibus ac molibus ex humanorum corporum strue faciendis et, quod proloqui etiam piget, vesci corporibus humanis docendo*). Livy, it seems, allows his Roman characters to display their bias against Hannibal and those who serve under him.

⁴⁷ It is also significant that Livy agrees with Polybius despite the passage of time between their narratives. That is, in the century and a half between Polybius' *Histories* and Livy's *Ab Urbe Condita*, it appears that Hannibal remains an intrinsically fascinating character, and he does not have any of his leadership acumen taken away from him.

III.

'[T]he pages devoted by ancient historians to the campaign waged in Italy by the Punic leader...are no more than communiqués on his victories'⁴⁸

We have thus seen some of the ways in which Livy carefully and powerfully positions Hannibal at the forefront of the third decade. Our next step then is to look at Hannibal in action, for this will aid in achieving an understanding how he builds upon, or works against, this enviable textual position that the historian affords him. To build upon this gives Hannibal further power in the narrative, for it strengthens his already enviable position and in the end it makes the task of defeating him much harder for the Romans. To work against it helps the Romans, for it allows them eventually to regain control over their history. Livy does allow the Romans to re-establish mastery over their history, but not yet.

With Hannibal the historian goes even further. Hannibal is not only a character that is dominant within, and exerts power over, the narrative of the second Punic war, which in itself is an act of cultural transgression as he does this within a Roman history. He also appears to go beyond even the defined parameters of his own community. To appear to be able to control the historical narrative of another community is one thing, but in one narrative in Livy 21-30 Hannibal appears to become a transnational figure.

The narrative that effectively demonstrates this is Tarentum.⁴⁹ It is a most interesting story, one that cleverly explores the question(s) of the Roman-Carthaginian, Roman-'Italian' and Carthaginian-'Italian' relationships.⁵⁰ Partially this is a result of Tarentum's interesting cultural position as a Greek-established city in Italy, but further from Rome than Hannibal's other encounters. Its position farther away from Rome brings Tarentum closer to Carthage. It can be seen to exist as a mid-way point between Rome and Carthage, at least more so than the other cities with which Hannibal deals (e.g., Capua). This gives Livy ample scope to explore the relationships between the different sides in the Hannibalic war in a more neutral environment.

⁴⁸ Lancel (1995) 386.

⁴⁹ Tarentum is one of the key episodes of the Hannibalic war in which Livy may have drawn heavily upon Polybius: see Tränkle (1977) 206-10 for analysis. On the issue of Livy using Polybius as a source, see Tränkle (1977) 13-26. Polybius' Greek background may have inclined him to favour the Tarentines and their Carthaginian allies.

⁵⁰ The question of Roman-Italian relationships is discussed in detail by Lomas (1993).

This imagined geographical equipose is matched by the distribution of the episodes in the Hannibalic narrative. Not only is the Tarentum story important to the war, but also it is important to our reading of Livy's third decade, as it appears to occupy that all-important central position: Livy divides the story into five main episodes: two 'introductory' episodes featuring Hannibal preparing for the capture of Tarentum;⁵¹ the central episode in which he captures the city; and, finally, two episodes that narrate Rome's recapture of the city. There is therefore a balance in terms of the distribution of the episodes of this narrative between Rome and Hannibal: two Hannibalic episodes counterbalanced by two Roman ones on either side of the battle for Tarentum. We can go further here: the two Hannibalic episodes occur in the Hannibalic pentad of the third decade, where Hannibal dominates. The capture of Tarentum occurs near the end of this pentad, thus suggesting that Hannibal's taking of the city is the final, perhaps greatest, event in this campaign in the ideological—if not in the military—sense.⁵² The two episodes that focus on Rome's recapture of the city occur in the first and second book of the Roman pentad: thus the recapture of the city may be interpreted as an early sign of Rome's improving fortunes in the war.⁵³

The two introductory episodes occur in book 24, which in a way encourages us to look at them together, almost as a single episode.⁵⁴ Despite their brevity, they are important as they seek to establish the relationship between Hannibal and the Tarentines that will enable Hannibal to take the city in the main episode in the next book. To plan the capture of the city is one thing, even if aided from within by Tarentines. But something different occurs here. Livy establishes an emotional tie between Hannibal and some of the Tarentines: thus he draws the city toward the Carthaginian leader on a personal level, which in turn will make the taking of the city much easier, for in effect he will emotionally have won it over. We find that this is the case from the very outset of the first episode: *ad Hannibalem, cum ad lacum Averni esset, quinque nobiles iuvenes Tarento venerunt, partim ad Trasumennum lacum, partim ad Cannas capti dimissique domos cum eadem*

⁵¹ Livy has prepared the reader for Tarentum joining Hannibal at 22.61.12, where he names the city in his list of cities that join Hannibal in the aftermath of his victory at Cannae.

⁵² Cf. Levene (1993) 52, where he catalogues a series of Roman defeats which begin with Tarentum.

⁵³ Cf. Walsh (1961) 173. For Luce (1977) 27 Capua marks the rising fortunes of Rome.

⁵⁴ Burck (1962) 109-12 shows an interest in this narrative, although he only focuses on the episode on the fall of the city to Hannibal.

comitate qua usus adversus omnes Romanorum socios Poenus fuerat (24.13.1). Livy begins by creating the image of a journey, from Tarentum (*Tarento*) to Hannibal (*ad Hannibalem*). By also stating where Hannibal is located (*ad lacum Averni*), the historian maps out a specific route, from Tarentum to the lake Avernus, that both the reader and Hannibal can follow back to the city.

Next, there is the connection that exists between Hannibal and these Tarentines. Livy identifies them as released captives from two key Hannibalic victories, Trasimene and Cannae: thus the Tarentum narrative that will unfold is connected to the key Hannibalic triumphs of this pentad, which in turn makes this narrative seem like a natural continuation of them, as if Hannibal goes from strength to strength.⁵⁵ These Carthaginian victories are still fresh in the reader's mind, for the historian does not allow them to be forgotten.

But most important of all here is what Livy writes about how Hannibal treats the Tarentines who now stand before him. They are released with courtesy, an action undertaken by Hannibal with all Roman allies.⁵⁶ Hannibal's policy of clemency towards Roman allies in Italy now pays a handsome dividend: the Tarentine young men remember this past kind act (*ei memores beneficiorum eius*), hence their presence before him now. Despite geographic proximity to Rome (because they are in Italy), the kind treatment that Hannibal showed these men makes them feel closer to Hannibal than to Rome emotionally; this emotional bond then translates into a desire for geographical closeness. The Tarentine young men not only say that they have convinced the majority of the city's youth to prefer alliance with him over Rome, but also they ask him to move his army closer to the city (24.13.2). Asking Hannibal closer to their city makes joining with him easier, for the closer Hannibal is to Tarentum makes Rome appear farther away, and therefore a less attractive option in terms of military or political alliance.

This memory of Hannibal's past actions not only creates a link of closeness between Hannibal and the Tarentines, but it also serves to separate the Tarentines from the Romans. Given that this act of remembrance occurs within an act of remembrance,

⁵⁵ If the gaining of Tarentum is viewed as a result of Hannibal's successes at Trasimene and Cannae, his loss of Tarentum will mark an end to that winning streak in a most profound way. By losing Tarentum, then, history re-writes itself, for just as Cannae leads to Tarentum, Tarentum can lead back to Cannae (cf. the geographic route that the Tarentines map out for Hannibal); the Roman capture of Tarentum cancels out Cannae. See below for Hannibal's reaction to the loss of Tarentum.

⁵⁶ See 22.58.1-4 on Hannibal's treatment of the defeated allies and Romans.

an history, Livy places his history of Rome in a very precarious position, if we take *memoria* as a way of expressing history (*memoria rerum gestarum*).⁵⁷ Here Tarentine recollection of the past is given legitimacy. While the possible Roman version is not discredited here, the historian's failure to include it may be seen as giving the Tarentines the right to have only their version known.⁵⁸ As I mentioned in the previous chapter, therefore, by this difference in recollection between the Romans and the Tarentines the difference between their communities is expressed in an ideological sense, which is appropriate given the different outcomes that each community experienced (Romans killed or shamed, Tarentines spared and released).

I mentioned how the Tarentine narrative appears to have a clear connection to the earlier Hannibalic successes, and even appears to be a continuation of them through the past experience of the Tarentine youths. The impression that Tarentum comes to Hannibal as a natural development of events is suggested another way in this first episode. The Tarentine legates not only ask Hannibal to move his forces closer to their city, but also they follow this request by explaining both how this will help bring the city to Hannibal and how easy the defection of the city will be (24.13.2-4). It is only after this—and after Hannibal concludes their meeting with promises—that he expresses his desire to take the city, and he understands the benefits that the capture of Tarentum will bring (24.13.5, *ipsum ingens cupido incesserat Tarenti potiundi. urbem esse videbat cum opulentam nobilemque, tum maritimam et in Macedoniam opportune versam regemque Philipppum hunc portum, si transiret in Italiam, Brundisium cum Romani haberent, petiturum*).⁵⁹ Tarentum is not only about Hannibal building upon his past successes, but also it is about widening the scope of the war to include the Macedonians—on Hannibal's side. Tarentum here is clearly seen as a cultural gateway, enabling Hannibal access to other cultural groups, and ultimately bringing them to Italy.

⁵⁷ Noted by Kraus (1997) 51. Cf. Sallust, *Jug.* 4.5.

⁵⁸ Roman recollection of these defeats, Cannae in particular, can be seen through their use of it as an historical organising device. After the defeat, Livy frequently expresses events as occurring *post Cannensem cladem*. Therefore, the Roman version receives legitimacy in an important way. Hannibal and the Tarentines perhaps are being set up by Livy only to be rebuffed later. On memory in the third decade, see Jaeger (1997) 99-107. On Cannae, see Chaplin (2000) 50-72.

⁵⁹ That Livy notes the Romans still hold Brundisium is significant. Livy gives the Romans a strategic Italian port to match Hannibal's capture of Tarentum. As Hannibal's control of Tarentum will provide him with access to the Macedonians, Roman control of Brundisium gives them the opportunity to prevent that access.

The second episode (24.20.9-16) effectively builds upon the bond Livy creates between Hannibal and the Tarentines from the first episode. While in the first episode the Tarentine legates remember Hannibal's kind treatment of them by releasing them, here Hannibal repeats his favourable actions towards the Tarentines when his army reaches the city's territory. The army immediately goes from behaving as if it were campaigning in a hostile country to behaving as if they are in friendly—or possibly their own—territory:

in Tarentino demum agro pacatum incedere agmen coepit. nihil ibi violatum neque usquam via excessum est; apparebatque non id modestia militum sed ducis iussu ad conciliandos animos Tarentinorum fieri. ceterum cum prope moenibus successisset, nullo ad conspectum primum agminis, ut rebatur, motu facto castra ab urbe ferme passus mille locat. (24.20.10-11)

Despite the fact that Hannibal's men are not in hostile territory, Hannibal instructs his men on how to behave. This reminds us that while Hannibal is thinking to the future when he will possess the city, his army lives in the present where Tarentum is just another city in an enemy country. Even when the Tarentines fail to make contact, Hannibal is careful not to put his hoped for gain at risk, so his army marches out of Tarentine territory, with Hannibal ensuring that his army does not damage what he hopes will soon be his (24.20.14-15).⁶⁰

The longest episode is (naturally, perhaps) the central one in which Livy narrates Hannibal's capture of Tarentum (25.7.10-11.20).⁶¹ Just as in the first episode, there is a sense that Hannibal is not creating the situation, but responding to a situation created by others that works in his favour. The first chapter begins by reaffirming the general's desire for taking the city, followed by Livy's statement that the events that help bring it about come from elsewhere (25.7.10, *cum Tarentinorum defectio iam diu et in spe Hannibali et in*

⁶⁰ This is an example of Hannibal's 'focalisation', something that Hannibal frequently does in the Hannibalic pentad. At several points in these books, Hannibal is made by Livy to be thinking ahead to the next phase of the war, which this historian narrates shortly afterwards. The appearance is that Hannibal is directing the course of Livy's narrative. Cf. 21.5.1, where Hannibal perceives war in Italy from the moment he becomes leader of Carthaginian forces in Europe. On focalization and the 'enemy' of the writer's / reader's community, see the example of Achilles in Vergil's *Aeneid* in Smith (1999).

⁶¹ Its length and detail are deliberate by Livy, for Walsh (1982) 1070 notes the critical importance this episode plays in the historian's construction of a sense of balance between the Hannibalic and Roman pentads of the third decade: 'Livy is concerned to show that the events of Book XXV, the end of the pentad, still reflect Carthaginian predominance. Hence the victories of Marcellus in Sicily at the centre of the book are

suspicionem Romanis esset, causa forte extrinsecus maturandae eius intervenit). Despite the time that has elapsed since the Tarentines first came to Hannibal, and the set back he experiences when the youths fail to make contact, Hannibal's goal is still to gain the city. Hannibal's ability to focus on not one, but many goals is impressive. That Hannibal keeps his focus on gaining this city within the overall scope of the war reflects positively on him. He does not move onto another, easier goal. His setbacks here are not ignored either. He keeps his goal in mind, and tries again, learning from his previous experiences. If anything, Hannibal's experiences with the Tarentines in the previous episodes serve him in this main episode, for he is now fully aware of the situation at Tarentum, that the city is not wholly on his side. Anti-Hannibal elements may have prevented the men from coming to him, and now he is aware of their power in the city.

If Hannibal's previous Tarentine experiences strengthen him, he gets additional help from Livy, who presents Rome in a negative light at this key point in the narrative. He refers to Rome's recent relations with this city. Rome's recent execution of Tarentine hostages establishes a clear difference between the approach taken towards this community by Hannibal and Rome, and it makes Rome appear in a bad light at a key moment. The agent by which Tarentum defects from Rome to Hannibal is Rome herself. This causes the two important Greek cities in Italy, Tarentum and Thurii, to become outraged (25.8.1, *huius atrocitas poenae duarum nobilissimarum in Italia Graecarum civitatum animos irritavit cum publice, tum etiam singulos privatim ut quisque tam foede interemptos aut propinquitatem aut amicitiam contingebat*). By identifying them as Greek here, Livy immediately establishes a sense of distance from Rome on a cultural level which reinforces their political disenchantment with Rome. And it recasts Italy (or this part of it) as not wholly Roman. Now culturally distanced from Rome, but not yet controlled by Hannibal, Tarentum is formally positioned in between Rome and Carthage, and this makes Hannibal's taking of the city seem easier than if Tarentum were still tied to Rome. Another way in which Livy distances Tarentum from Rome, and brings it closer to Hannibal at the same time, occurs when the Tarentine youths decide to confer with Hannibal concerning the way in which they might achieve their city's freedom from Rome (25.8.4). By involving Hannibal in the devising of the plan, the Tarentines bring him into Tarentine society as he helps them decide what is essentially the most appropriate action for Tarentum at this time. At the same time, Hannibal shows that he

hemmed in by the Italian reverses at Tarentum and Herdonea earlier, and by the destruction of the Roman armies and their leaders in Spain at the close of the book'.

is conscious of the need for allowing the Tarentines to feel that they will be independent from Carthage, just as they wish to be from Rome: thus he issues them with promises that guarantee their liberty (25.8.8, *congressi cum Hannibale rursus fide sanxerunt liberos Tarentinos leges <suas> suaque omnia habituros neque ullum vectigal Poeno pensuros praesidiumve invitos recepturos; prodita praesidia Carthaginensium fore*). By promising Tarentum that her *libertas* will be maintained, Hannibal offers this community what Livy offers the reader in writing the history of Rome after the expulsion of the kings. That concept of *libertas*, so important to the historian as the cohesive force in Roman culture, here serves as a cohesive force between Hannibal and the Tarentines, between the man who offers it and those who enjoy it.

And so the capture of Tarentum takes place. Once inside the city, an act achieved by Tarentines and Carthaginians working together, Hannibal quickly merges the Carthaginian and Tarentine together, to make them one force to defeat the Romans. Hannibal dispatches his Gallic soldiers with Tarentine guides so that they may occupy key strategic points in the city:

tum duo milia Gallorum Poenus in tres divisa partes per urbem dimittit; Tarentinos <iis addit duces binos>; itinera quam maxime frequentia occupari iubet, tumultu orto Romanos passim caedi, oppidanis parci. sed ut fieri id posset, praecipit iuvenibus Tarentinis ut, ubi quem suorum procul vidissent, quiescere ac silere ac bono animo esse iuberent. (25.9.16)

By specifically pointing out that Hannibal's soldiers in this particular operation are Gallic, Livy expands Hannibal's own (military) community and therefore he suggests that the capture of Tarentum is an action by all peoples against the Romans, even by national groups naturally associated with neither the leader of the attacking force nor the city itself. The attack on the city proves to be successful, for different communities suspect different causes of the uproar: the Tarentines suspect the Romans and the Romans suspect the Tarentines (25.10.1-2), but no fear of attack is directed against Hannibal's forces. This separates the Romans and the Tarentines from each other as much as is possible, for they show their mutual distrust for each other while at the same time the Tarentines and Hannibal's forces effectively work together. Despite the confusion of the city being overrun, Livy carefully draws the lines of national similarity and difference.

The Romans who survive the assault flee to the citadel, which protects them from being defeated militarily by Hannibal's men and from being defeated ethnically by their lone position compared to the co-operating multinational force of Hannibal and the Tarentines. When Livy points out the strength of the citadel's fortifications, that it cannot be taken by assault or siege works, he suggests the immensity of the cultural

difference between the Romans and the people of Tarentum. Also, the shorter than normal height of the walls (25.11.9) suggests that the Romans' attempt to defend themselves against the strong Hannibalic-Carthaginian forces is destined to fail, or prove a most difficult labour. As a counter to this Hannibal builds his own wall-like defence (25.11.2). This separates his men and the Tarentines from the Romans and it joins Hannibal and the Tarentines in a labour of foundation at the same time. The walls represent a new city, one that is not exclusively Carthaginian nor Tarentine; it is a Carthaginian-Tarentine hybrid. The speed with which the Romans attack the wall (25.11.4), almost from the moment work begins on it, demonstrates that they understand what this wall represents.

Hannibal not only joins his own men and the men of Tarentum together in battle. He also does so in counsel. This Livy demonstrates when Hannibal summons the leading men to discuss the difficulty of taking the citadel (25.11.12-18). After explaining to the Tarentines the nature of the problem, they guide him to a solution, a naval blockade of the port by Carthaginian ships. Hannibal adds to this solution through his explanation (which Livy records in direct speech) of how he will get the Tarentine ships into the open sea (25.11.16-17).⁶² The Tarentines commit Carthaginian resources and the Carthaginians commit Tarentine resources to the military operation; both commit each other's materials to a joint effort.⁶³ The wall was an act of creating something together, but here they take the next step, working together to take down what they both perceive as a threat to their newly created community: the Romans. The effect of Hannibal's plan (25.11.18, *haec oratio non spem modo effectus sed ingentem etiam ducis admirationem fecit*) suggests that at the end of the central episode Hannibal is most

⁶² It is interesting here to compare Polybius' version at 8.34. Hannibal explains what needs to be done to counter possible actions of the Romans. The Tarentines, in indirect discourse, voice their lack of understanding of what Hannibal is suggesting, to which he replies (in indirect discourse) what his plan is, but after Polybius notes Hannibal's assessment of the layout of the city. Polybius carefully constructs this scene, moving from the lack of understanding on the part of the Tarentines, to Hannibal coming to an understanding of a possible solution, to his imparting this knowledge on the Tarentines. With all three parts expressed in the same speech mode, Polybius makes the ignorance of the Tarentines, the learning of Hannibal and the learning of the Tarentines all part of a singular, coherent journey of discovery. It is somewhat ironic that Hannibal, through his assessment of the layout of Tarentum, imparts a solution to the Tarentines to their joint problem, when one might expect it to occur the other way round. Polybius shows Hannibal to be more familiar with the city than its native residents.

⁶³ Cf. Burck (1962) 111.

successful in his winning over of the Tarentines, for he rouses their passions just as before he has done for his own soldiers.⁶⁴

This achievement by Hannibal appears more impressive if we recall another narrative in which the Carthaginian deals with an Italian ally. This is Capua,⁶⁵ where Hannibal does not behave in an admirable way. Rather, instead of joining with the Capuans to make a new, better community, he merely tries to take over the existing state. This meets with resistance: the son of the man who brings Hannibal to Capua declares his intention to murder Hannibal. Livy deliberately constructs an intimate scene set in the garden in which father and son debate the matter, showing the rift in this state that Hannibal causes (23.8.2-9.13). Hannibal not only causes this mini-civil war, but also it occurs at the most private level: the family. Shortly afterwards, Hannibal symbolically assumes a political office in Capua and acts like a magistrate, demanding one of his opponents be delivered to him, despite the fact that he has no right to make such a request (23.10.5).

Comparing Hannibal's behaviour at Capua to that at Tarentum, we see that Hannibal's approach has clearly changed. In fact, it appears that Hannibal has learnt valuable lessons from Capua and the benefits of those lessons bear fruit at Tarentum. Hannibal's experiences in Roman-centred Italy lead to his improvement as a leader—not of his army, but of political communities. That he comes of age as a leader in a foreign land is significant: Hannibal can learn anywhere, and from anyone. By the time he comes to control Tarentum, he has fought with, and he has come into contact with, many communities that are under the influence or control of the Romans. Hannibal therefore learns from people from whom the Romans have failed to learn.⁶⁶

This aspect of the Tarentum narrative recalls an interesting observation made by T. J. Luce, who writes that Livy was particularly interested in whether communities retain

⁶⁴ Here it is worth comparing Polybius' version, on which Davidson (1991) 21 observes that both Polybius and Hannibal understood the importance of continually renewing the hopes of allies, as Hannibal successfully does here (8.33.2-3). Interestingly, in Polybius' version, the confidence of the Tarentines is such that they no longer feel the need of the Carthaginian support in order to match their enemy—the Romans. In this case, the Carthaginians' and Tarentines' joining together results not in the creation of a single community, as in Livy's version, but in a better, more self-confident Tarentine one.

⁶⁵ This episode is noticeably absent in Burck (1962).

⁶⁶ On the Romans learning from their Italian campaign of expansion, see Chaplin (2000) 32-49 on the Caudine forks.

their national characteristics when they are in foreign lands.⁶⁷ Here, Hannibal and the Tarentines, by their coming together as one community seem to make Tarentum an equal home to them both by their effective joining to solve a dilemma of defence. Although the Tarentines are in their natural home, Hannibal does not at all appear out of place nor does he appear less capable of understanding the task at hand. This truly builds up Hannibal. It serves to justify Livy's praise of him in book 28 (see above, section II).

Of course it is worth keeping in mind that it is shortly after this capture of Tarentum that Hannibal makes his march on Rome itself.⁶⁸ Although this march does not result in the capture of Rome, we can place the march into a context that takes account of the earlier events at Tarentum. If we reflect on Hannibal's actions in the Tarentum narrative, we can see the events therein as creating the appropriate mindset for Hannibal to march on Rome. By his careful treatment of Tarentum, he shows his ability as an international diplomat, his ability to work around Rome in a cultural sense and join with communities that are different from Rome, but are close to Rome in the geographical sense. This allows Hannibal to establish himself geographically—and therefore culturally too—in Italy. Tarentum clearly foreshadows this event: with the Romans trapped in the citadel at Tarentum, Livy foreshadows the Romans in Rome, themselves taking cover behind the city walls, hoping that their walls will protect them, just as those at Tarentum protect the Roman forces there.

Before turning to the Roman recapture of the city, there is one key passage that I would like to discuss:

neque aliud tempus belli fuit quo Carthaginienses Romanique pariter variis casibus immixti magis in ancipiti spe ac metu fuerint. nam Romanis et in provinciis, hinc in Hispania adversae res, hinc prosperae in Sicilia luctum et laetitiam miscuerant; et in Italia cum Tarentum amissum damno et dolori, tum arx cum praesidio retenta praeter spem gaudio fuit. (26.37.1-3)

Livy's assessment is important, for Tarentum is figured as an indicator of the current state of Hannibalic war. The historian does not confess any advantage to either side, but rather stresses that the war is a rather even-handed one so far, with both sides experiencing both victories and defeats. His opening sentence makes this situation most apparent. Important also is the historian's drawing of attention to the emotional effects of this war. Both the Romans and Carthaginians have experienced the same feelings

⁶⁷ Luce (1977) 281-2.

⁶⁸ For a reading of this episode, see Burck (1962) 120-3.

towards this war, *spe ac metu*, hope and fear. The emotions felt by both sides emphasise most interestingly the evenness of the war at this stage. It also connects the Romans and Carthaginians. The two opposing nations experience the same feelings, hope and fear, which possibly suggests that war brings communities together in that their feelings are similar. War affects all nations in the same way. The question at this point, which Livy may want the reader to answer, is which side will experience which emotion from this point on in the Hannibalic War.

Given the textual position of the reference, at an early stage of the Roman pentad of the Hannibalic narrative, thus near the centre of the work, this image of neither side near victory seems appropriate. The Carthaginian capture of the city is placed firmly at the centre of the assessment, with the Roman loss of the city viewed as one of the central events of this evaluation of the war's progress at the centre of the work. For most of this passage Livy carefully balances one event with another, a defeat with a victory (defeat in Spain joined with victory in Sicily, for example), but with Tarentum the city is considered by itself as an indication of the most critical phase of the war, the war with Hannibal in Italy: the Romans lament the loss of the city, but the retention of the citadel is cause for celebration. In fact, the structure of the sentence carefully balances the one against the other: [a] *cum Tarentum amissum damno et dolori*, [b] *tum arx cum praesidio retenta praeter spem gaudio fuit* (26.37.3). As we can see [a] is balanced or mirrored by [b]. Thus while on the one hand the Romans weigh province against province,⁶⁹ they also weigh part of Tarentum against another part of Tarentum. The city again shows itself to be a microcosm of the war as a whole, and a critical part of Livy's war narrative. Hannibal's success in this war in miniature, therefore, establishes the possibility of victory for Carthage.

We can go even further here, and by doing so we understand even more how central the Tarentum narrative is to Livy's treatment of Hannibal's Italian efforts. When we look more closely at what the historian writes about Italy, we read that he not only balances one part of Tarentum against the other, but also that he balances two other key events against each other: Hannibal's abandoned march on Rome and the capture of

⁶⁹ Cf. 26.5.1, where Hannibal weighs his desire to gain the citadel of Tarentum versus his desire to keep Capua.

Capua by the Romans.⁷⁰ Even though Hannibal does not march on Rome, the near-event is treated as if it actually happened, that is, the threat that Hannibal represents to the city of Rome itself is so serious that it becomes a fact. As a Roman military loss, it must be cancelled out by a gain. This leaves Tarentum, a single military event, as the determining event in the Italian campaign. Although at this point it is described as a balanced situation so far, Livy and the reader are aware that this cannot continue: therefore in the end one side must prevail over the other and therefore win the battle for Italy. Livy's positioning of Tarentum, therefore, is central to our reading of this part of the Hannibalic narrative.

The Romans (represented here by Livy) are not the only ones to see Tarentum as a critical part of their Italian campaign. The historian writes that the Romans balance the capture of the city against the loss of Capua (26.37.6, *Carthaginienses quoque Capuae amissae Tarentum captum aequabant*). The Carthaginians compensate themselves for the loss of Capua by the gain of Tarentum. Given Hannibal's behaviour in these two communities, it is by no means a negative situation to be in. Rather, the loss of Capua helps set aside the poor behaviour of Hannibal there. What remains *hic* and *nunc* in the war is Tarentum, where Hannibal's behaviour has been, basically, exemplary.

This balance in which Tarentum figures then carries forward to the next episode which features the city, which comes shortly after Livy's assessment of the war I have just discussed. In a brief episode Livy tells us that the siege of the city continues, and the outcome is that neither side achieves its goal. In fact, not only is there a balance in result here, but the balance is inverted. Livy notes that the Tarentines are successful in their sea campaign, while the Romans are on land. The Romans occupy the citadel, and the harbour is perceived as part of it. To campaign with success on land, while the Tarentines do so on sea, allows Livy to stress again the balance of the situation here. The Romans and the Tarentines are successful in the same space. Moreover, the balance in the conflict is matched by a balance in words in the final sentence of this important passage (26.39.23, *ita aequatae res ad Tarentum, Romanis victoribus <terra, Tarentinis> victoribus*

⁷⁰ Cf. Kraus (1997) 60: 'Hannibal's march on Rome is inspired by the certainty that Capua, the Campanian city where he winters after his first campaign season in Italy, is about to fall to the Romans (26.7)'.

mari. frumenti spes, quae in oculis fuerat, utrosque frustrata pariter). To each of the Romans and the Tarentines Livy awards *victoria*.⁷¹

If Rome is to win her war against Carthage and Hannibal, the Romans must retake Tarentum. The recapture of Hannibal's ally takes place at 27.15.4-16.9.⁷² Compared to Hannibal's capture of the city, the Roman recapture of the city is a short episode. This suggests Rome's improved fortunes in the war: they can recapture Tarentum in less time than it took Hannibal. Interestingly, just as for Hannibal his taking of the city begins not by his action, but his response to a situation, the visiting of the Tarentine youths, likewise for the Romans the means by which they retake the city comes from outside their community. That Livy appears to diminish this event through his personal comment weakens the satisfaction that the Romans may feel for retaking the city, for he begins his account in a detached tone (27.15.9, *Fabium Tarentum obsidentem leve dictu momentum ad rem ingentem potiundam adiuvit*). The phrase *leve dictu* diminishes any sense of Roman achievement. It draws attention to the fact that the retaking of the city was due more to chance than to skill of the Roman army. Therefore, the retaking of the city is not what is very important; rather, the Romans will be judged by how they deal with the city once retaken.

In the battle for the city, Livy again stresses Carthaginian-Tarentine similarity and Tarentine-Roman difference. This proves to be a final, defining moment in Livy's play with the nationality issue in this narrative.⁷³ From the Roman point of view, the Carthaginians and the Tarentines are one and the same: hence they kill both without distinction, as Livy is careful to note (27.16.6, *alii alios passim sine discrimine armatos inermis caedunt, Carthaginienses Tarentinosque pariter*). The conjunction *-que* with *pariter* ironically joins the two peoples at a most critical time—their deaths. Having shown no difference between the Carthaginians and the natives of the city, the Roman soldiers then disperse themselves throughout the city (27.16.7), thus they penetrate all sections of it as Hannibal's men did before, which we can take as a symbolic act of attempting to become

⁷¹ This reading is based upon Walsh's Teubner text. Conway's Oxford text reads *Carthaginiensibus* for *Tarentinis*, which Walsh rejects. Reading *Tarentinis* here suggests that the Tarentine war effort is their own, and that here is Romans versus Tarentines. The Carthaginians, therefore, are incorporated into the Tarentine community, rather than vice versa.

⁷² A similar account of the fall is recorded by Plutarch in his *Fabius Maximus* 21.1-23.3.

⁷³ Its importance in the historian's arrangement of events in the third decade is noted by Walsh (1982) 1070.

the city by occupying it, although they do so without local aid as Hannibal's men did. As an ending to this narrative, the wall that divides the city from the citadel is destroyed (27.16.9, *muris inde qui urbem ab arce dirimebat dirutus est ac disiectus*). As I noted above, the walls function as a symbol for Roman-Tarentine difference. With the complete destruction of the wall, the Romans remind the Tarentines that they cannot rebuild the distinction between the Roman and the Tarentine.

As a postscript to the Tarentum narrative, we find that its Roman recapture is seen as a similar action to Hannibal's initial seizure of the city.⁷⁴ When he hears of the fall of the city to the Romans, Hannibal remarks that the city has fallen from his control in much the same way in which he had gained it (27.16.10, *'et Romani suum Hannibalem' inquit 'habent; eadem qua ceperamus arte Tarentum amisimus'*). By expressing his comprehension of the situation in direct discourse that the city falls in the same way as it was gained, Hannibal shows that even in the Roman pentad of Livy 21-30 he understands both his position and that of the city at this point in the text. It is possible that this is another moment where Hannibal perceives the growing tide against him.⁷⁵ The balance that we have seen in many parts of the Tarentum narrative exists right until its end, thus in turn reinforcing the textual position of the Tarentum narrative perfectly balanced on either side of the important divide between the Hannibalic and Roman pentads.⁷⁶ By being taken in the same way by both sides of the conflict in their respective pentads, we understand the axial position of Tarentum in the third decade.

By regaining Tarentum and so thoroughly taking control of the city, first by infesting all parts of the city, then destroying the symbolic cultural divider between the Tarentines and themselves (the wall between the city and the citadel), the Romans suggest their improving military fortunes in the war. It marks an improvement both in

⁷⁴ As Catin (1944) 57 suggests: 'une ruse lui donne Tarente, une ruse la lui reprend'.

⁷⁵ Cf. 26.11.4 (*in religionem ea res apud Poenos versa est, auditaque vox Hannibalis fertur, potiundae sibi urbis Romae modo mentem non dari, modo fortunam*). In this passage the natural world plays a role in suggesting to the Carthaginians that their quest to defeat Rome (here to take the city itself) is denied. In the passage that comes after the Roman recapture of Tarentum, Hannibal appears to come to this realisation through his own thinking. The idea of Hannibal coming to an increasingly clear understanding of his future in this conflict is also suggested through the speech modes employed. In the first passage, Hannibal's voice is said to have been heard (*audita...vox Hannibal fertur*), while in the second passage his words are recorded in direct discourse.

⁷⁶ Likewise this balance even exists here at the end of the narrative, with Hannibal hearing of the loss of Tarentum just as he defeats the forces besieging Caulonia at 27.16.9-10.

the military sphere and in cultural relations. The good Roman conduct here contrasts with their unacceptable behaviour at Syracuse in the previous book.⁷⁷ Granted, the Roman forces do aggressively assault the Tarentine and Carthaginian opposition (27.16.6, *alii alios passi, sine discrimine armatos inermis caedunt, Carthaginienses Tarentinosque pariter*). Attack against their enemy, whether armed or unarmed, is not criticised by the historian. Rather, it is up to the leader of the Roman side, Fabius, to show that the Romans behave in an appropriate manner. Fabius does not allow wide-spread plunder of Tarentum (27.16.8, *sed maiore animo generis eius praeda abstinuit Fabius quam Marcellus*). Livy examines Rome's military commanders for signs of better behaviour towards other communities, just as Hannibal is the focal point for Carthaginian behaviour towards others. This is especially appropriate given that Hannibal has been the focal point for Livy's positive evaluation of Carthaginian treatment of others. To recall, Hannibal was successful in ensuring that his army did not ravage Tarentine territory (24.20.9-10), focusing instead on ravaging Italy. On entering Tarentine territory they proceeded peacefully. If Hannibal's forces can follow his orders,⁷⁸ then if the Romans want to show their ability to deal reasonably with others, they must do so here. In effect, they must match Hannibal's achievement.

Hannibal, finally, by saying that the Romans too have their own version of him suggests that he understands this all too well,⁷⁹ in fact, he may at this point be beginning

⁷⁷ For a reading of the Syracuse episode as representing the larger state of the growth of the Roman empire, and the negative implications of this, see Rossi (2000). Cf. Burck (1962) 112-18. It seems likely that Livy wants the reader to contrast Roman behaviour at Syracuse with that at Tarentum. That both cities were founded by Hellenic states might suggest that in the mind of Livy they are broadly similar.

⁷⁸ It is interesting to note that Livy at the end of this passage singles out two groups within Hannibal's forces here, the Numidians and the Mauri, who are sent to neighbouring territory to obtain supplies (24.20.16). This reinforces the positive image of Hannibal's control of his men at a time when he must show full control over them. Having his army appear as a unified whole at the start of the passage helps this. The naming of two groups within his army at the end of this passage only makes Hannibal's control seem more impressive. It reminds the reader that Hannibal's army is made up of various African communities, which have different skills and possibly different outlooks and expectations of this war—and possibly different expectations of the Tarentum adventure. This episode may have influenced Livy in his statement at 28.12.3 (see above, section 2).

⁷⁹ Cf. Plutarch, *Fabius Maximus* 23.1 ("ἦν ἄρα καὶ Ῥωμαίοις Ἀννίβας τις ἕτερος· ἀπεβάλομεν γὰρ τὴν Ταραντίνων πόλιν ὥσπερ ἐλάβομεν", ἰδία δὲ τότε πρῶτον αὐτῷ παραστῆναι πρὸς τοὺς φίλους εἰπεῖν, ὥς πάλαι μὲν ἑώρα χαλεπὸν αὐτοῖς, νῦν δ' ἀδύνατον κρατεῖν ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων Ἰταλίας).

to understand that for him the near future holds many more defeats. It is Tarentum that affords Hannibal this realisation: thus we here come to an understanding of this narrative's central role, not just textually but also thematically, to Livy's third decade.

What the Tarentum narrative demonstrates is that there are two journeys that Hannibal undertakes in Livy's third decade. The first is his military journey: first growing in power as he achieves victory after victory, which is accompanied by a steady move closer and closer to the centre of the Roman world. In the second half of the narrative, this journey goes into reverse, leading to his defeat at Zama. Second, there is a personal journey, one that can almost be called a journey of self-awareness. Here, Hannibal shows little understanding as a political leader at first, both at Saguntum and Capua. At Tarentum, however, just as he is about to begin his downward slide in the military sense he appears to understand fully—and is also able to implement effectively—appropriate political behaviour. Military success leads Hannibal to ignore political duty; political understanding arrives with the beginning of military failure. It is a very ironic situation for Hannibal, but it does suggest that complexity of his character as Livy chooses to present it in the AVC.

IV.

P. G. Walsh writes that 'Livy is especially fond of contrasting foreigners'.⁸⁰ And so he should be, given how many of them appear in the AVC. In drawing attention to Livy's interest in non-Romans, Walsh is referring in particular to the story surrounding Hieronymus. In this section I explore another example: I refer to Livy's narrative of the conflict between Syphax and Masinissa, two African leaders of the time of the Hannibalic war, which consistently attracts scholarly attention.⁸¹ One of these men, Masinissa, has proved to be one of the more popular non-Romans for study,⁸² pointed to as *the* non-

It also foreshadows what Hannibal will say to Scipio at Zama (30.30.12, *quod ego fui ad Trasumenum, ad Cannas, id tu hodie es*). Cf. below, section 6.2.

⁸⁰ Walsh (1961) 86-7.

⁸¹ In Johner (1996), for example. Also Lancel (1995) 398-400, but not Burck (1962).

⁸² Walsh (1961) 87 writes 'Masinissa is in fact a foreigner with almost all the Roman virtues', which may explain Livy's (as well as many modern scholars') interest in him. As an historical survey of Masinissa, see Walsh (1965).

Roman *exemplum* in Livy.⁸³ Livy does more than explore these two characters in their own terms within the context of the Hannibalic war: he both compares and contrasts each against the other, and he examines them in light of Roman and Carthaginian ideas.⁸⁴ Given the close link between the two characters, the fact that they appear different yet at times the same suggests that Livy here has the opportunity (and he takes advantage of it) to experiment with foreign community representation in ways that the character of Hannibal alone does not allow.

4.1 The introduction of Syphax and Masinissa (24.48-49).

First, the position of this first episode requires comment. Existing as it does in the first pentad, three books from the main group of Syphax-Masinissa narrative, this introductory episode might appear rather out of place. Livy's placement of this episode in the Hannibalic pentad suggests 1) he figures the Syphax-Masinissa story into both halves of the third decade, which suggests the importance of this narrative to the narrative of the Hannibalic war as a whole, for it plays a role in both parts; 2) the nature of this episode, the Romans seeking new allies in Africa, guides the reader's attention forward, for both characters are African, and appear as a direct result of the two Roman commanders building upon their recent successes in Spain by thinking forwards to possible actions in Africa.

The other key aspect of this first episode is how Livy sets it out, with roughly an equal amount of attention to both Syphax and Masinissa. This suggests an evenness in the way Livy is approaching the story, that both characters appear to begin their involvement in the Roman-Carthaginian conflict on equal terms. As the story unfolds, therefore, it will be a case of who moves closer to which side.

The first chapter (24.48) is devoted to Syphax, to whom the elder Scipios send legates upon learning that he is an enemy of Carthage (24.48.2-3). The reason for Syphax's sudden hostility towards Carthage is, perhaps surprisingly, not explained here. To do so might give the Roman ambassadors some additional information which would aid them in their discussions with the king, but by leaving out this information Livy allows the negotiations to occur in a neutral environment, simply an exchange between Romans and Syphax. Further, by not mentioning the reason for the termination of

⁸³ Walsh (1961) 239. Cf. Johner (1996) 238-41. In recording his death in book 50, the writer of the *periochae* calls him *vir insignis*.

⁸⁴ Cf. Johner (1996) 51-2.

Syphax-Carthage relations Livy focuses the reader's attention not on this past event, but on the future, just as the Scipios do by desiring this conference with the king (24.48.1, *in Africam quoque spem extenderunt*). This focus on the future extends to the negotiations, where the Roman ambassadors tell Syphax that should he continue to fight the Carthaginians, the Romans would look upon this favourably and would do all that was possible to aid the king at some future time (24.48.3, *si perseveraret urgere bello Carthaginenses, gratam eam rem fore senatui populoque Romano et adnisiuros ut in tempore et bene cumulatam gratiam referant*). Here the projection into the future goes further, for now the image is not merely of the Romans looking to a possible African campaign, but they invite their hoped-for ally to think of the possible benefits he might enjoy after the war. Here Syphax is encouraged to think further into the future, and if he agrees to work with the Romans in the present, his hoped for future will happen, bringing about Roman victory in the war in the interim, as it must happen before Syphax enjoys the rewards of which the Romans speak.

It is therefore not surprising that Syphax is fully aware of the potential of this offer (24.48.4, *grata ea legatio barbaro fuit*)⁸⁵ which he takes up by discussing strategy with the Romans. Syphax is described here as a *barbarus* in order to establish a starting point for his presentation, away from which the historian may work as he narrates the continuing joint efforts of the Romans and Syphax. Syphax appears to want to move away from being identified as a *barbarus* when he works quickly to improve his military's abilities, which the historian notes are poor (24.48.7). Syphax can move away from being seen as a *barbarus* by transforming his army from a barbarian one into a sophisticated one. Syphax's army therefore reflect back upon Syphax; the improvement of the army will make Syphax an improved regent. And there is evidence already of Syphax's improvement. He shows himself in a good light by seeking to establish formally his new ties with Rome by sending his own ambassadors back with the Roman ones to the Scipios (24.48.9). By noting that Syphax sends the same number of ambassadors to the Scipios as they send to him, we see that in one way Livy suggests that the two sides are equal in diplomatic terms, which in turn is meant to suggest that for both sides the alliance is a fair one. As if to stress this point further, in the next two sentences the

⁸⁵ Cf. Silius Italicus 16.171, where Syphax is introduced as *nec nudus virtute*. This comes after Scipio's concluding of an alliance with Masinissa (16.135-68). Scipio refers to Masinissa's virtue when he addresses Masinissa (recorded by Silius in direct discourse): *si pulchra tibi Mavorte videtur, | pulchrior est gens nostra fide. dimitte bilinguos | ex animo socios. magna hinc te praemia clarae | virtutis, Masinissa, manent* (16.155-8).

historian shows how each side helps the other: Syphax instructs his ambassadors to encourage the Numidian forces in the Carthaginian army to desert (24.48.10), and Statorius successfully organises Syphax's army into a more coherent force (24.48.11). The speed with which Statorius is able to bring Syphax's army up to Roman standards suggests their quality (Livy may mean to imply that there was only minor organisational work needed to make Syphax's army more effective), and therefore the Roman desire to align itself with Syphax is reinforced in positive terms. On the other hand, Livy may mean for this to be a warning also: Syphax's army may be a valuable addition to the Roman forces, but if Syphax or any future leader of Numidia were to position himself against Rome, then the Romans will find themselves facing a formidable opponent. If this is the case, Livy can be seen as foreshadowing the conflict with Jugurtha. The past narrative is Sallust's *Jug.*, and the future narrative is Livy's own account of Rome's war against Jugurtha.⁸⁶

Carthage now responds to this Roman diplomacy by seeking an alliance. However, it is not Masinissa that the Carthaginians approach, but his father, who is the current leader of the other part of Numidia. This not only allows the reader to contrast Syphax and Masinissa (who will be introduced shortly), but also Rome and Carthage. Rome appears to be making the first move, and Carthage responds to that move. This contact with African regents therefore suggests a change in the war: Rome is now the main mover, and Carthage responds, or it is on the defensive. This is in fact not far from the truth, for Roman fortunes in the war are already improving (slightly), and will continue to improve in the following books.

By Masinissa not being in control of the state at this particular point, the reader contrasts Syphax as a leader and Masinissa as a leader in waiting. This proves to be, then, the starting point for the two characters' respective journeys. Syphax, as king, has only one place to go—down—while on the other hand Masinissa, whose age Livy states in order to stress his youth (24.49.1, *septem decem annos natum* and later *iuvem*), can look forward both to his rule as king, and to his (long) life ahead. Perhaps ironically, Livy hints at Masinissa's future not as an ally of Rome, under whom the reader knows he will fight, but as someone associated with Carthage. This is because Carthage seeks an alliance with Masinissa's father. We understand another important journey before Masinissa, therefore: his turning to Rome. To match this ideological journey (for we can

⁸⁶ Livy narrates the story told by Sallust's *Jug.* beginning in book 62, when Livy records the death of Micipsa. The main narrative begins in book 64.

understand Masinissa accepting Rome as both a political and military partner), there is a temporal journey, from the time of Masinissa's father, to Masinissa. In order to stress the considerable labour that this journey will involve, not only does Gala join Carthage, but Masinissa fights for Carthage, and even distinguishes himself in battle (24.49.4). But as with Jugurtha, distinguishing oneself in battle for an ally does not mean one's later notoriety will come from, or reflect back upon, that community. The journey from fighting notably for Carthage, to fighting notably for Rome, and receiving recognition from the Romans for such actions, seems to be a long road ahead of Masinissa.

4.2 Syphax chooses Rome, then Carthage (28.17-18 and 29.23-24)

Just as there is a balance between the Syphax and Masinissa introductory episodes in book 24, when Livy returns to the intra-African narrative in books 28-29, we see this pattern continued. There are two episodes in book 28 that show Syphax first on the Roman side, then on the Carthaginian side. This Livy balances with the story of Masinissa's varying *fortuna* in the digression on him in the next book.

The first episode in a way appears to be a re-run of Syphax's previous appearance in book 24. The younger Scipio expresses his desire to move the campaign forward, to Africa, and like his predecessors, he realises the strategic importance of the African king to his plan (28.17.3-4).⁸⁷ At this point Livy goes a bit further than he does in the previous episode, and he explains Syphax's political and geographic position (28.17.5-6) that he reinforces powerfully a few sentences later.⁸⁸ Syphax as a character is therefore defined not by his own personal characteristics, but rather his importance to Roman military strategy. By doing this at this particular point, Livy suggests that this encounter with Syphax is a much more important one. Scipio's hoped for African campaign is approaching. Here the historian makes a negative comment on the king. He notes that Scipio, in assessing his chances in winning Syphax's support, believes that the king's

⁸⁷ Burck (1971) 34 writes that Scipio's dealings with Syphax serve the primary aim of demonstrating Scipio as a praiseworthy character. Syphax therefore serves as a device for directing the reader's gaze at the admirable Roman. That it is an African that serves this role is important; by doing this Livy foreshadows that Scipio's abilities will be best demonstrated through his actions in Africa: thus the historian anticipates the African campaign at the end of the Hannibalic narrative. Scipio also demonstrates his positive character when he deals with Masinissa over the Sophoniba affair (discussed below).

⁸⁸ 28.17.10, *magnum in omnia momentum Syphax adfectanti res Africae erat, opulentissimus eius terrae rex, bello iam expertus ipsos Carthaginenses, finibus etiam regni apte ad Hispaniam, quod freto*

present agreement with Carthage will not hold too strongly. This is because Syphax, as a *barbarus*, will give his support to whoever has the upper hand, and at this time it is the Romans (28.17.7-8).

This negative comment on Syphax is surrounded on both sides by Livy's observations on the strategic importance of Syphax and his country to Rome (as noted above)—which shows both the benefits and the drawbacks of having this king as an ally. This juxtaposition between the good and bad aspects of Syphax and his country (or the differences between Syphax and his country) is then internalised in the man himself, illustrated by Syphax's actions: in this episode he will ally himself to Rome, while in the next one he will do so with Carthage.

What will make Syphax's later defection from Rome to Carthage the more negative is the scene which follows, where Scipio himself comes to see Syphax, something which the king requests (28.17.8-9). Not only does Scipio meet with Syphax, but also Hasdrubal from Carthage arrives, and Syphax entertains both men at a banquet. The scene is perhaps one the most fascinating of Livy's third decade, for just as here Syphax is meant to be choosing to which side he will ally himself in the war, he gets to make the choice with both sides represented before him at the same time.⁸⁹ That the two men even recline on the same couch at the meal stresses the importance of this scene (28.18.5). Scipio's ability to impress Hasdrubal at this meeting helps Syphax make up his mind, for if an enemy of Rome can appreciate Scipio, the king should be able to recognise the Roman general's potential as an ally. By making the alliance with Scipio, Syphax demonstrates that he can appreciate Scipio's qualities.

This joining of Scipio and Syphax in alliance is undone by another joining—a union of marriage between Syphax and the daughter of Hasdrubal. In fact, when Livy mentions that Hasdrubal and the Numidian king discussed the matter on Hasdrubal's previous visit (29.23.3)—the visit at which Scipio was present—the historian goes back in time and undermines the Syphax-Scipio agreement almost before it is made. Just as Scipio perceives Syphax's predilection for not honouring agreements, which he uses to his advantage, Hasdrubal does the same. But Hasdrubal appears to understand better

exiguo dirimuntur, positus. This phrase describes Syphax's position as vital to both sides in the war.

⁸⁹ Cf. Kraus (1997) 61, who cites this episode as an example of Livy planting a narrative 'seed'. This episode's main function is to foreshadow Scipio's meeting with another Carthaginian—Hannibal. Therefore, in the scene Syphax is merely a dry run for the forthcoming main event.

than Syphax, for he also perceives a weakness in the king that he can exploit to his advantage: the Numidian's predilection to sensuality (29.23.4, *ad eam rem consummandam tempusque nuptiis statuendum—iam enim et nubilis erat virgo—profectus Hasdrubal ut accensum cupiditate—et sunt ante omnes barbaros Numidae effusi in venerem—sensit*). As this passion is directed to Hasdrubal's daughter, the Carthaginian also has something against which he can ensure that Syphax will remain true to his word, for Hasdrubal, unlike Scipio in the previous episode, devotes some thought to the possibility that Syphax will defect back to the Romans at some point (29.23.6, *ceterum Hasdrubal, memor et cum Scipione initae regi societatis et quam vana et mutabilia barbarorum ingenia essent*).⁹⁰ Hasdrubal therefore takes advantage of this link between himself and Syphax, and draws the king irrevocably to his side saying that Syphax must now not only fight for his ally, but the homeland of his wife. By making this bond with Syphax, Hasdrubal does something here that Scipio could not do: he makes Syphax in effect Carthaginian.

The key interesting element here is that two characters from two different cultures, one Roman, one Carthaginian, both perceive what they believe to be a trait in the Numidian national character. The difference here is that Scipio uses it to his advantage without considering the possible consequences for himself, while Hasdrubal demonstrates forethought. There is one possible reason why this is the case here: because Hasdrubal and Syphax are both Africans, Hasdrubal is able to read the king better than can Scipio, a non-African.

It is significant that both Scipio and Hasdrubal perceive Syphax as *barbarus*, although this does not happen at the same time.⁹¹ Hasdrubal's perception of Syphax as *barbarus* is the more interesting one, for he understands Syphax to have a greater lust than is typical of a barbarian (29.23.4). Hasdrubal believes Syphax to be typical of people of his nation, Numidia, and to have greater sexual desire than most barbarians. Hasdrubal therefore not only expresses a common view of barbarians, but of a specific barbarian culture—Numidians. What Livy appears to suggest here is that Hasdrubal, because he is a Carthaginian, has additional insight into what the Numidians are like due to his nation's geographic proximity to Numidia. Rome, therefore, appears to have a particular disadvantage in this region: because they are not African, nor do they possess Africa or any part of it, their understanding of Africa and its inhabitants is limited.

⁹⁰ Cf. 22.22.6, *Abelux erat Sagunti nobilis Hispanus, fidus ante Poenis; tum, qualia plerumque sunt barbarorum ingenia, cum fortuna mutaverat fidem*.

⁹¹ Scipio perceives Syphax as a *barbarus*, 28.17.7; Hasdrubal perceives the same, 29.23.4.

4.3 The digression on Masinissa (29.29-30).

At one point in the AVC the historian notes that due to the size of his project, he will leave matters out that are not relevant to Roman affairs.⁹² But he had already broken that rule in his account of the Hannibalic war, when he provides the background on Masinissa.⁹³ This is the digression on Masinissa, which balances the attention the historian has paid Syphax in the two episodes we have just discussed.⁹⁴ However balanced the arrangement of the episodes may be, in terms of the impression that the historian offers it is unbalanced, for unlike Syphax, whom Livy portrays positively at first, then negatively, the image of Masinissa is positive almost all the way through the narrative. We saw this in his debut episode where Masinissa demonstrates his good qualities. This episode effectively builds on this.

It is important to note the way in which Livy shifts from his narrative of the war to the digression on Masinissa. The event that appears to bring Masinissa to the historian's attention is not just any action on the part of the African, but his arrival as an ally to Rome when he joins the Romans in battle (29.29.4-5). Thus we understand that Masinissa's perceived importance here is the fact that he sides and fights with the Romans. The historian believes that this symbolic event is very important when he writes that his sources are divided as to how large Masinissa's forces were (29.29.5). The two figures quoted are considerably different; it proves to be irrelevant to Livy, for despite the possibility that Masinissa joins the Romans with only two hundred horsemen, the historian still calls the African the greatest of all kings of his time, and he provided the greatest aid to the Romans (29.29.5, *ceterum cum longe maximus omnium aetatis suae regum hic fuerit plurimumque rem Romanam iuverit*). It is for this reason that Livy finds it appropriate to digress from the war and focus on Masinissa.

⁹² 39.48.6, *cuius belli et causas et ordinem si expromere velim, immemor sim propositi quo statui non ultra attingere externa, nisi qua Romanis cohaerent rebus*.

⁹³ The result is commented upon by Walsh (1982) 1070: 'Book XXIX seems to be described deliberately in a lower key; after the Spanish triumph and before the culminating victories in Africa, it describes the meticulous preparations and the crossing of the forces of Scipio to Africa, though the romantic saga of Massinissa's struggle for survival in his native region provides some high colour'.

⁹⁴ In Burck (1962) 144-7, the adventures of Scipio in Africa at 29.24-29 and 29.34ff are discussed. Burck leaves out this episode on Masinissa and the previous episode on Syphax. However, it is interesting to note that Syphax's defection leads to Scipio's movement from Italy to Africa, and begins with Scipio writing to the king (29.24.1-3).



By giving his background on Masinissa, his losing and then regaining his father's kingdom (*quam varia fortuna usus sit in amittendo recuperandoque paterno regno*) Livy does something for Masinissa that he does not do for Syphax. He gives this character a past, which means that instead of just being a character who appears in a particular point in the Hannibalic narrative as the historian comes across him, Masinissa is given this additional dimension, something that he shares only with Hannibal among the non-Romans. Likewise, the background on the passing of his country's leadership also gives Masinissa a context. The general sense of disorder in the passing of the throne from person to person provides Livy's African hero with the chance to impress when he establishes lasting order. Further, not only does Livy give Masinissa a past in this digression, but because of his joining forces with the Romans just prior to this digression, the historian points out that he has an equally distinguished future ahead of him. Thus this present event, Masinissa's joining the Romans, appears to be but one event in a remarkable life.

Masinissa is also closely tied to the experiences of Hannibal in Livy's narrative. Like Hannibal, Masinissa experiences *varia fortuna*. But Masinissa's fortune does not happen in parallel to Hannibal's. Rather, Masinissa experiences the benefits of fortune as Hannibal experiences declining fortune. Masinissa, therefore, is worthy of study in this history for the same reason as Hannibal and, most important, he is as worthy an object for study as the war as a whole. This description of Masinissa's experiences not only echoes those of the leading non-Roman of the work, but it is also in the spirit of why Livy believes this war to be so important. Just as Rome comes so close to defeat, so does Masinissa.

This sharing of *varia fortuna* between Masinissa and Hannibal can be seen to establish a relationship between their communities. This means that the experiences of Numidia must be read against the experiences of Carthage. What happens to Hannibal and Carthage could happen to Numidia. That Carthage plays an important role in Numidia's history is clear from the previous chapter when Sallust, in the speech he records for Adherbal in the senate, defines Numidia's past by her difficulties in dealing with Carthage (*Jug.* 14.10; see above, chapter two, section 2.5). To recall, for Adherbal the defining moment of Numidia's past is defending herself against Carthage. Adherbal's comment, which suggests the difficulties Numidia faced in defending herself, may be taken as implying that he saw this period of Numidia's history as the nation experiencing adverse fortune. That Masinissa was king of Numidia during at least part of the period

mentioned by Adherbal establishes Masinissa's experience of adverse fortune, and that he was able to overcome these difficulties suggests his exemplary nature.

The importance of Masinissa's story to Livy's narrative is suggested by the fact that Livy's starting point is, in effect, a key turning point in his life: the death of his father (29.29.6, *militanti pro Carthaginiensibus in Hispania pater ei moritur*). I point out two other journeys that are present here, one in the geographic sense and one in a political sense. In geographic terms, by mentioning that Masinissa was in Spain when his father dies, Livy (albeit temporarily) places the African outside his natural environment. As his role here is to participate in the African part of Livy's narrative, his journey must be towards Africa. In political terms, by writing that Masinissa here fights for the Carthaginians, the historian establishes for Masinissa the journey that he must take: from being a fighter for Carthage to being a fighter for Rome.

The speed with which the digression proceeds reflects positively on Masinissa, for he quickly undertakes his task and receives support from a local king and soldiers (29.30.2-3). The support he receives from the Africans in a way suggests that his geographic journey is well under way, for by offering him aid, the king shows that Africa acknowledges Masinissa as worthy of ruling in Africa. So, Masinissa's homecoming is not just returning to Africa, but also being accepted in Africa.⁹⁵ The former is still important, however: when he reaches the frontier of his future kingdom he gains five hundred followers. This suggests that as he gets closer to the geographic centre of his world, the more support he will receive, which in turn points to his worthiness to lead his country.

4.4 Syphax versus Masinissa (29.31-32 and 30.11-15).

About the actual battle between Syphax and Masinissa little need be said. As I pointed out in my introduction to this section, the Syphax and Masinissa story may be viewed as

⁹⁵ This is an interesting point of contrast between Masinissa and Hannibal, whose return to Africa near the end of the war (30.20.3) is not so positively portrayed. We get a rare emotional response from Hannibal, who is clearly upset at the order to return (30.20.1, *frendens gemensque ac vix lacrimis temperans dicitur legatorum verba audisse*). In his speech Hannibal makes it clear that he sees his return to Africa as a defeat (*vicit ergo Hannibalem non populus Romanus totiens caesus fugatusque, sed senatus Carthaginiensis obtrectatione atque invidia*). His reference to Hanno in the next sentence pairs this utterance with the speeches of Hanno in book 21. Hanno is perceived by Hannibal as having won the political battle at last. The irony is that Hannibal sees Hanno's victory as the downfall of Carthage, just as Hanno perceived Hannibal's victory at Saguntum as the defeat of Carthage (21.10.10).

a parallel to the main Roman-Carthaginian one. Just as Rome struggles in the early stages of the conflict, so too does Masinissa. Events justify Livy's claim that Masinissa experiences varied fortune (29.29.5, *ceterum cum longe maximus omnium aetatis suae regum hic fuerit plurimumque rem Romanam iuverit, operae pretium videtur excedere paulum ad enarrandum quam varia fortuna usus sit in amittendo recipiendoque paterno regno*). Masinissa goes from having just regained his kingdom, to being defeated by Syphax's forces and reduced to being a single fugitive, to gaining a new force and defeating Syphax himself in battle, thus not only regaining his kingdom, but also gaining Syphax's.⁹⁶

That Masinissa experiences *varia fortuna* is significant. The phrase is intratextual in that it connects Masinissa's experiences in his personal campaign to those of the Romans in the war as a whole, expressed by Livy in his preface to the third decade (21.1.2; see above, section one). Masinissa and the Romans share something, in that both must endure a most difficult campaign. By charting Masinissa's fall and rebirth here, Livy can foreshadow Rome's eventual triumph in the Hannibalic War.

While Masinissa perseveres despite the setbacks he encounters, almost to the point of death, Syphax has to be pressured by Hasdrubal to act in the first place (29.31.1-6). This, therefore, is a striking difference between the two men: Masinissa is a man of action, while Syphax is a man of inaction. Likewise, in terms of the political alliances of the two men, Masinissa is shown to be able to act under his own motivation. Syphax must be motivated by others.

In terms of foreign community representation, the most interesting episode in the Syphax-Masinissa story occurs after the defeat of the former and the victory of the latter. This is, of course, the tragic (I use this word with care) romance between Masinissa and Sophoniba. But it is not just a story of lost love. Rather, it allows Livy to play further with the similarities and differences between the two men. It also offers a key insight into Livy's use of cultural stereotypes, that of the passionate African, a topic that has attracted critical attention.⁹⁷ The question will be, then, whether Masinissa's display of this stereotype reduces Roman admiration for him within the specific context of Livy's narrative of the Hannibalic war.

⁹⁶ Not only does Syphax's defeat and capture reflect well on Masinissa, but Levene (1993) 74 suggests it does the same for the Romans, for they are shown by Livy as giving thanks to the gods when they learn of the king's capture.

⁹⁷ Haley (1990). Dauge (1981) *passim* (cited by Haley [1990] 375) also points to this as a frequent Roman perception of foreign cultures.

While Syphax and Masinissa up to this point in the story have been shown by Livy to have many differences, it is here that they show themselves to be alike. Rather, it is Masinissa who shows that he is like Syphax, for Syphax is absent from this episode. To Masinissa's credit, at the end of this episode he shows himself to be fully aware of this fact (30.13.14, *neque prudentiorem neque constantiorem Masinissam quam Syphacem esse, etiam iuventa incautiorem; certe stultius illum atque intemperantius eam quam se duxisse*). This suggests a degree of self-awareness on the part of Masinissa, previously only experienced by Hannibal. Here Masinissa actually goes further than merely to liken his actions, and therefore himself, to Syphax's actions and character. He consciously places himself in a position lower than his former adversary. This is an inversion of positions between the two, this time restoring the two characters to their original positions in the story. For Syphax to be in a better position than Masinissa is not really possible, as he is now a prisoner of Rome, and thus apart from Livy's final comment on him at the very end of book 30 (see below), the self-criticism that Masinissa offers here is all the more potent. But, in Masinissa's defence, perhaps the fact that he criticises himself redeems him. Unlike Syphax, he is able to understand his shortcomings.

We need also to consider the role of Sophoniba in this episode. As a foreigner to this country, and as the source of Livy's criticism of Syphax and Masinissa's self-criticism, Sophoniba as a character adds to the complexity of this story.⁹⁸ On one level, the tragedy of Sophoniba can be seen as foreshadowing the defeat of Carthage in the Hannibalic war, or for the decline and destruction that Carthage will ultimately experience.⁹⁹ Sophoniba functions as the measuring device by which the two African

⁹⁸ Johner (1996) 53 (rightly) reads Sophoniba as a symbol of Carthage. Johner interprets Sophoniba's experiences here as foreshadowing Carthage's own fall. Masinissa's devotion to her, especially in assisting her suicide and not turning her over to the Romans, means that in the end Masinissa remains devoted emotionally to Africa, despite his political allegiance to Rome. For another example of the body of a woman as representative of a nation, this time Rome, see Joshel (1997).

In writing about the tragic experiences of Sophoniba here, Livy may be inviting comparison with Vergil's treatment of Dido in the *Aeneid*. Whether this comparison is possible depends on whether Livy was able to consult Vergil's poem when he was writing the sixth pentad. I believe that this is possible. It is the fact that both are Carthaginian female characters that makes comparison so inviting. Sophoniba through her tragic experiences in Livy could be meant to suggest that for Carthaginians history repeats itself. That is, association with someone with a connection to Rome, whether past, present or future.

⁹⁹ Keith (2000) 102: 'in Roman epic...dead and dying women assume a new thematic and aesthetic prominence, for the beautiful female corpse possesses an intrinsic importance

characters can be judged on the most personal level. And as an African herself, although she comes from a different community than Masinissa or Syphax, she is both a neutral third party and close enough to both characters to give them something to which they can relate. Sophoniba therefore allows the comparison to go further and to penetrate the private aspects of the character's personalities. This makes Livy's narrative of Syphax and Masinissa the most fascinating in the third decade: we get a full picture of the two men.

On the *prima facie* level the character of Sophoniba shows Syphax and Masinissa to be alike. But there is a key difference that we must note here. Sophoniba's contact with Syphax is limited—she simply excites his passions upon his setting eyes on her (29.23.4, *ad eam rem consummandam tempusque nuptiis statuendum—iam enim et nubilis erat virgo—profectus Hasdrubal ut accensum cupiditate—et sunt ante omnes barbaros Numidae effusi in venerem—sensit, virginem a Carthagine arcessit maturatque nuptias*).¹⁰⁰ In fact, it is interesting to note that she does this without even being named—she is merely the daughter of Hasdrubal. With Masinissa, on the other hand, it is rather more complicated: here Livy carefully describes the meeting of the two, including Sophoniba's speech (30.12.12-16).¹⁰¹ As if to reinforce her words, Livy adds to this scene by mentioning her beauty and her clasping of Masinissa's hands (30.12.17). The success of her speech is such that she and Masinissa are married almost immediately (30.12.19). Interestingly, it is here that Livy indirectly likens Masinissa to Syphax, noting his people's inclination toward passion (30.12.18, *ut est genus Numidarum in venerem praeceps*) which recalls his comment on Syphax in the previous book (29.23.4, *sunt ante omnes barbaros Numidae effusi in venerem*).¹⁰² And when Laelius arrives and attempts to seize Sophoniba as a captive (for he perceives her to be a prisoner just as Syphax, her husband, is), Masinissa successfully reasons with him

in Roman political myths of war and city foundation, the pre-eminent subjects of epic at Rome. At crucial moments in the legendary history of Rome the rape and death of a woman sets in motion events leading to the establishment of political institutions central to the Roman state'. Livy appears to adopt a different approach for his presentation of non-Roman women. While the misfortunate experiences of Roman women serve as catalysts for change in Rome, the deaths of non-Roman women prophesy the downfall and the deaths of their communities. With Sophoniba the fall of Carthage is a long-term vision; this is not the case with the other major female non-Roman character to appear in Livy: Cleopatra. On Sophoniba as a Cleopatra figure, see below.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. Haley (1990) 375.

¹⁰¹ Walsh (1961) 230 points to it as an example of Livy's speech writing ability. Cf. Cizek (1995) 172; Bernard (2000) 95-8 and 400-2.

¹⁰² Haley (1990) 375.

to allow the dispute to be settled by Scipio. The chapter concludes with Masinissa and Laelius working together to complete the job of capturing Numidia (30.12.21-22). That what Masinissa wants and what Rome needs (or feels is appropriate) are not the same does not affect adversely Masinissa. This episode begins with Masinissa and his Roman companion divided, but Masinissa succeeds in bringing them together by suggesting a temporary solution. The success of Masinissa as a diplomat is re-affirmed by the fact that they are able to work together without Livy referring to any animosity between them. Rather, they not only work together, but they are successful in gaining the other cities of Numidia.¹⁰³

Just as a non-African shows the common weakness of the two Africans, another foreigner helps Masinissa redeem himself. This is Scipio. Here Masinissa is contrasted with Scipio, where his passion highlights Scipio's personal restraint.¹⁰⁴ Scipio seems to understand that his ally undertook these actions by mistake, an error that could not be helped. In his speech (30.14.4-11), Scipio interestingly begins by assessing what he believes is Masinissa's assessment of him: thus the evaluation goes both ways, Roman-Numidian and Numidian-Roman. Scipio shows that he appreciates the viewpoint of a non-Roman looking at a Roman, and he knows how his viewpoint of Masinissa's directs the African character's actions.

Moreover, Scipio's reading of Masinissa reading Scipio can be interpreted in another way. The qualities that Scipio thinks Masinissa sees in him are the qualities Scipio wishes Masinissa to possess. Scipio wishes to recast Masinissa in his own image. Scipio shows himself to be a very laudable Roman in Livy; that Masinissa should be encouraged to be like Scipio is a compliment indeed. The Roman directs Masinissa's character, making Masinissa Roman, holding the foreigner to Roman values.

Masinissa's response to the speech suggests that he comes to understand that Scipio is right (30.15.1, *Masinissae haec audienti non rubor solum suffusus sed lacrimae etiam obortae; et cum se quidem in potestate futurum imperatoris dixisset orassetque eum ut quantum res sineret fidei suae temere obstrictae consuleret—promisisse enim se in nullius potestatem eam traditurum—ex praetorio in tabernaculum suum confusus concessit*). But, as a final act of defiance

¹⁰³ Notice here Livy's careful wording in the final part of the sentence (*misso Syphace et captivis ceteras urbes Numidiae quae praesidiis regiis tenebantur adiuvante Masinissa recipit*). Laelius obtains the other cities in Numidia 'with the help of Masinissa'. Masinissa is not an equal partner in this military operation.

¹⁰⁴ Haley (1990) 376.

(and independence, perhaps) he says that he will not hand his wife over and subsequently he assists Sophoniba in committing suicide (30.15.2-8). Just as Sophoniba speaks directly to Masinissa on their first encounter, she does so again as she commits suicide (30.15.7-8). This gives the Masinissa-Sophoniba narrative a prominent beginning and ending. The Sophoniba drama is one in which the central character is noticeably silent: he responds to what other characters say through his actions. In this story Livy takes advantage of an excellent opportunity to explore the character of Masinissa and to offer a view of non-Romans on a very personal and intimate level. The Sophoniba story is acknowledged as more fiction than fact.¹⁰⁵

There is another aspect of this story we ought to consider. Livy's readers might associate Sophoniba with another African female character of recent history: Cleopatra. Hannibal, Jugurtha and she could be seen as an African triumvirate, cutting across time in their campaigns against Rome. Reading Sophoniba's story as a re-run of Cleopatra would give this narrative special relevance. If Sophoniba can be taken as a Cleopatra figure, then that makes her lover, Masinissa, an Antony figure.¹⁰⁶ Both Sophoniba and Cleopatra ultimately chose suicide over being a Roman prisoner, and for that decision the Roman might respect them.¹⁰⁷ But Masinissa does not make the same mistake as Antony, that is, he remains loyal to Rome. He makes a difficult personal sacrifice in order to satisfy the demands of his Roman friends. Masinissa can be said to make a personal sacrifice for the benefit of the community as a whole—and it is not even his community. Antony does the opposite. In Augustan propaganda Antony could be said to have sacrificed his community for the sake of his relationship with Cleopatra. This episode, therefore, would be an highly charged one for Livy's readers, who might recall the anti-Antony and Cleopatra propaganda of the 30s BCE.

The historian also includes an epilogue to his narratives of Syphax and Masinissa. This is the references that Livy makes to the two African characters at the end of book

¹⁰⁵ On the story as largely invention, see Walsh (1965) 149.

¹⁰⁶ It is unfortunate that we cannot compare the presentations of Masinissa and Sophoniba to that of Antony and Cleopatra in Livy's section on the late 40s and 30s BCE.

¹⁰⁷ Horace, for example, seems to understand Cleopatra's decision to commit suicide rather than appear in Octavian's triumph (1.37.29-32, *deliberata morte ferocior, | saevis Liburnis scilicet invidens | privata deduci superbo | non humilis mulier triumpho*). See West (1995) 189-90.

30.¹⁰⁸ Both Syphax and Masinissa appear in the conclusion to the third decade: thus their story is tied to Rome's at this critical moment of Roman victory. Masinissa's victory comes first, with Livy announcing the territories awarded to him by the Romans (30.44.12). This complements Scipio's public victory, in which the historian records the death of Syphax in private (30.45.30.4-5).¹⁰⁹

The positioning of these two 'epilogues' is critical to our reading of Syphax and Masinissa in the Hannibalic narrative. By appearing first, Masinissa is given a prominent position over Syphax, and yet by appearing in the penultimate chapter rather than the final one, he does not distract the reader's attention from Scipio's final moment of glory, returning to Rome and receiving his name.¹¹⁰ Moreover, as Scipio has not yet returned to Rome, the giving of Syphax's former kingdom occurs with both Scipio and Masinissa in Africa, thus it appears as a domestic action rather than an international one. African matters are dealt with in Africa. Syphax, however, is both geographically and textually placed in Rome, for before Syphax's appearance Scipio begins his journey to Rome and after it he receives his name. Here, his receiving the *cognomen* Africanus has a specific meaning, as it re-inforces the image of Syphax as the disgraced former ruler of an African state.

V.

The story of Syphax and Masinissa that I discussed above in a way leads to the next topic. Given the closeness of the two characters, both in terms of geography (both are African), politics (they at first rule different parts of what Livy considers one country, and Masinissa succeeds Syphax), and personality (they share a passion for the same woman), it is possible to look at that story not as a conflict between two characters of

¹⁰⁸ I consider the importance of book 30 as an ending in the final section of this chapter. I treat the sense of endings that Livy creates for Syphax and Masinissa in this section as it deals specifically with bringing this story to an end, while in section VI I consider book 30 as Livy re-establishing Roman order to the narrative.

¹⁰⁹ Not at Rome, but at Tibur. Syphax is denied a presence in Rome or he denies the Romans their victory over him by dying before he can appear in Scipio's triumph. Note that Livy provides two versions of the death of Syphax: citing Polybius 38.46.10, Livy notes that Syphax may have survived and was part of Scipio's triumph. Livy reprieves Syphax's death sentence in order to make Scipio's (and Rome's) victory complete.

¹¹⁰ However, as Luce (1977) 22 n. 45 notes, Masinissa possibly had the honour of marking the end of another section of Livy's history, where the historian places Masinissa's death at the end of the sixth decade.

different communities, but two characters of the same community. Just as Livy can direct the reader's gaze at a person or community, he also suggests that he can do the same within a community, to show the different subgroups within it. That he should do this at all is significant, for it suggests to us that Livy was careful as to how he portrays foreign communities, that is, he sought to bring out differences between different non-Roman characters just as does for Roman characters. Given the differences between Quintus Fabius Maximus and Scipio Africanus that Livy suggests in this portion of his history, for example, it is appropriate that he should do the same with Rome's opponent. In this section I will look at two examples where the historian explores the differences within a non-Roman community: Carthage.

5.1 Hanno, Leader of the Anti-Barcine Faction.

We have already noted how Livy constructs the early portion of the third decade to show Hannibal in control in an impressive way. What is interesting is that there is yet another way that Livy does this in the early portion of book 21, through the speeches of Hanno, the leader of the anti-Barca faction in the Carthage. Through his opposition to Hannibal, both before Hannibal takes command and after he has begun war with Rome, Hanno attacks the actions of Hannibal which, after Hanno's objections are dismissed, serves to solidify Hannibal's control of the narrative,¹¹¹ for opposition noted (and explored by Livy) and then defeated serves to strengthen the one opposed. As Gottfried Mader demonstrates, Hanno serves Hannibal by interpreting Hannibal from a moral perspective.¹¹² Likewise, Hanno's speeches (as well as all the Carthaginian debates in Livy) appear to be written from a pro-Roman perspective, arguing perhaps what a Roman would argue. This makes these speeches un-Carthaginian: Hanno does not speak in the best interests of his own community.¹¹³ That Hanno speaks more for the Romans than his own people seems to be the case when after his second oration, the

¹¹¹ Cizek (1995) 155 notes the careful shifting between Hannibal and Hanno episodes in this early part of book 21. Mader (1993) 205 n. 3, citing Will (1983) 166, notes that the rise in Hannibal's position in Carthage is accompanied by a symmetrical decline in that of Hanno.

¹¹² Mader (1993) 209.

¹¹³ Walsh (1982) 1060 notes that these debates 'seem to be imaginative rather than genuine versions of political debates, shedding oblique glory on Rome and blaming Carthage for her provocation and conduct of the war. The result is that we are almost totally ignorant of Carthaginian attitudes in Africa until the final stages'. And by then it is too late.

Carthaginian senators perceive that Hanno spoke more bitterly against Carthage than the Roman ambassador (21.11.1, *cum Hanno perorasset, nemini omnium certare oratione cum eo necesse fuit, adeo prope omnis senatus Hannibalis erat; infestiusque locutum arguebant Hannonem quam Flaccum Valerium, legatum Romanum*).

5.1.1 The First Speech (21.3.3-6).¹¹⁴

The key detail concerning the first speech that Hanno makes is that it occurs before Hannibal takes command. The topic of Hanno's oration, that the young Hannibal ought not to be sent to join his father in Spain, suggests that Livy is imagining an alternative history here, one where the Carthaginians choose not to send Hannibal to Spain.

Hanno's position is set out immediately: (21.3.3, *et aequum postulare videtur...Hasdrubal, et ego tamen non censeo quod petit tribuendum*). The desire to send Hannibal to Spain is a reasonable one, but Hanno is opposed to it. Apart from the obvious contradiction in this opening remark, causing confusion both for the reader and the Carthaginian politicians (as Livy declares: *cum admiratione tam ancipitis sententiae in se omnes convertisset* [21.3.4]), by the use of such a balanced and startling opening statement Hanno demonstrates his credentials as leader of the anti-Barca party.

Hanno's closing remark in this first speech foreshadows what Hanno will say in his second speech, that Hannibal has done the opposite, assaulted a foreign nation in contempt of international law (*ius gentium*). Hanno's expression *aequo iure* does not suggest that Hannibal's political education should be Carthage specific: it could mean law in general. A broad education in law may actually benefit Hannibal in his campaign, making him more adept at, and sensitive to, meeting the needs of the communities he meets. In this way, then, Livy suggests that Hanno will have to speak again: Hanno will have to remind the Carthaginians that what he said proved to be correct.

When Hanno's speech ends, Livy makes the distinction between those who side with Hanno and those who do not (21.4.1, *pauci ac ferme optimus quisque Hannoni adsentiebantur; sed, ut plerumque fit, maior pars meliorem vicit*). A few, whom the historian identifies as the best men in Carthage, vote with Hanno. This effectively suggests that Hanno's actions as an opponent of the Barcine faction are pointless, and at the same time the historian validates this losing position. Hanno and his supporters are identified

¹¹⁴ The speeches by Hanno recorded by Livy in book 21 do not appear in Polybius' narrative. Clauss (1997) 174-77 suggests—rightly in my view—that Hanno in these

here as *pars meliorem*, the better part of the Carthaginian senate and the Carthaginian people as a whole. If the majority of the Carthaginian politicians side with Hannibal, we can safely assume so do the majority of the Carthaginian people.

But it is Hannibal's party who win the day. It is interesting that it is at this end point that Livy records that they are larger than Hanno's faction. Before the debate gets under way, Livy wants the reader to believe that it is a debate of equals; now that it is over, the reality is declared. Most important here, though, are the historian's contrasts between the two parties, between the quality of Hanno's group and the quantity of Hannibal's supporters. The triumph of Hannibal in the debate (which is ironic, for neither he nor any of his party speak, or Livy denies their voice by not recording their rebuttal of Hanno's arguments) is stressed in the next sentence, where not only is Hannibal sent to Spain, but also he is immediately hailed by his father's army. This sentence contrasts one part of Carthage, the government, where there is division, and the army, where there is overwhelming unity (Livy writes that it is *omnem exercitum* who hail Hannibal's arrival). This whole army is the final and absolute dismissal of Hanno and those who vote for him. Despite the fact that they are better, they are the minority that finds itself in a much weaker position. In the Carthaginian senate Hanno's group is defeated by the majority, *maior*, which still suggests that there is a place for them in Carthage. The *omnes* of Hannibal's army, which can be seen as a representative of the Carthaginian state, is both exclusionary and inclusionary. Hanno and his party have no place in an entity that expressed total support for Hannibal; and at the same time Hannibal appears strong through the inclusiveness that his army demonstrates towards him. The *omnes* of the Carthaginian army in Spain immediately comes to include Hannibal whom the soldiers welcome so warmly. Hannibal appears to leave division behind him, dismissing it, and to create unity ahead of him.

If Hanno speaks for Rome, then his defeat in the debate over Hannibal's future suggests that Carthage seeks and he is successful in asserting their independence. The Romans through Hanno seek to influence Carthaginian action on the political level, while Carthage acts on a military level. Hanno and the Romans, this passage seems to suggest, simply do not think alike, and therefore Livy suggests indirectly why the two sides will come into conflict. That Hanno is a better Carthaginian is a Roman value judgement that seems to compensate Hanno for his political defeat. And a possible pattern is

scenes is a Carthaginian Cicero figure. Both Hanno and Cicero, for example, accuse Hannibal and Catiline respectively of having sexual relations with men.

emerging, that those non-Romans who most think like Romans are doomed to failure (which can include the loss of their lives). We can think back to Adherbal in Sallust's *Jug.* (see above, chapter one, section 2.3). Adherbal of course speaks *to* the Romans, not *for* them, but he clearly has their interests in mind just as much as his own. Jugurtha, like Hannibal, thinks for himself (and by extension his own community), and therefore he is more successful. We can provide a counter-example too: Masinissa becomes a loyal Roman ally, and he experiences life-long success as a result. But we can perhaps excuse Masinissa's success. Unlike Hanno and Adherbal, Masinissa does not start as pro-Roman, but he does become pro-Roman, and he is able to prove his pro-Roman nature through fighting with the Romans against Carthage. Masinissa, therefore, unlike Hanno and Adherbal, has to work for Roman support, and thus to Sallust and Livy he is better capable of understanding the advantages of being on Rome's side means, and the disadvantages of not being pro-Roman.

5.1.2 The Second Speech (21.10.4-13).

As the Carthaginians did not heed his advice the first time, in the second speech Hanno has the opportunity to reflect on the mistakes that the Carthage government has made.¹¹⁵ The reason for a longer second oration is clear. In the first speech Hanno is making a preventative argument: he tries to convince the other Carthaginians not to send Hannibal to Spain so that the damage that Hanno knows Hannibal will cause will not occur. Here in the second speech he argues both for punishment and compensation. Hannibal must be decried for the inappropriate action he has undertaken, and now there are consequences and possible remedies to consider.¹¹⁶

This time, it is interesting to note, Hanno is not listed as the leader of a group, but rather he appears alone (21.10.2, *Hanno unus adversus senatum*). The military consensus that heralds Hannibal's arrival in Spain has now infected the Carthaginian senate, with only Hanno immune. His increased isolation has not compelled him to change his position. The argument that the anti-Barca crusader voices in his second oration builds upon the first speech. In fact, in one way it appears to pick up where the first one leaves off, with fire imagery (21.3.6, *ne quandoque parvus hic ignis incendium ingens exsuscitet ~*

¹¹⁵ Mader (1993) 211: 'the second speech vindicates the warning in the first, thus giving his analysis and criticism an objective reality'.

¹¹⁶ The careful arrangement of the speeches of Hanno and the Saguntum narrative is noted by many scholars—see Burck (1962) 63.

21.10.4, *iuvensem flagrantem cupidine regni viamque unam ad id cernentem*).¹¹⁷ This joining of the two speeches in this way creates an image of Hanno in speech encircling Hannibal in action with something that no person can overcome, thus making him inactive.

While the reference to fire establishes a connection between the two speeches of Hanno, which strengthens his position in the text because he appears consistent, if not popular, the different use of fire threatens to undermine Hannibal. Here it is the location of the fire that is the key, for in the first speech it exists within Hannibal, with the Carthaginian leaders heaping fuel upon it. In the second speech it has grown and now consumes those same people who fed it in Hannibal (21.10.5, *aluitis ergo hoc incendium quo nunc ardetis*). Hannibal and the Carthaginians are now joined together, with Hanno instead encircled by the fire. The fact that Hanno's own imagery turns against him helps to suggest the growth in Hannibal's power so far in the narrative.

No less important are Hanno's arguments why it is important for Carthage to acquiesce to the demands of Rome. He offers solid reasons for doing so: (1) it is easier to appease Rome now than at some later point when their demands will be much more severe (21.10.7), and (2) the gods are on the side of the Romans, for Hannibal has broken the *ius gentium* (21.10.9). He even goes as far as to reposition Hannibal from assaulting Saguntum to assaulting Carthage, thus suggesting that every ounce of effort that Hannibal exerts trying to destroy that city brings about the ruin of Carthage. This becomes most poignant when he speaks of the Carthaginians perishing under the falling of the stonework of Saguntum, as if they come from Carthage (21.10.10).

One approach we can take to these Hanno episodes is to look at them as a narrative path not travelled.¹¹⁸ The idea of narrative paths not taken, or undertaken

¹¹⁷ Noted also by Clauss (1997) 175-6. Clauss notes that Cicero in his Catilinarian speeches too makes reference to the city burning when he suggests that Catiline's plans include the burning down of Rome. Interestingly Hasdrubal, urging Syphax not to be idle but to deal with Masinissa, uses fire imagery to create a similar image, that of a young man who if not checked now will grow until he is unstoppable (29.31.3). Masinissa's passion for dominion over Numidia complements the fiery passion he will show for Syphax's—and then his own—wife Sophoniba. An image that failed to rouse support against Hannibal successfully encourages Syphax to act against Masinissa, which suggests that Syphax is more easily persuaded than the Carthaginians, for an argument that fails to work in Carthage works with him. The use of this fire imagery to describe both Hannibal and Masinissa, further, suggests a possible connection between the personalities of the two men on account of both of them being African—see Haley (1990).

¹¹⁸ Mader (1993) 206. Hannibal's speech at 30.30 looks at the narrative path not chosen.

only to find they are dead-ends, has been carefully explored by Jaeger.¹¹⁹ Hanno's warnings, which Livy makes so vivid through the inclusion of fire imagery and transporting of Saguntum's falling walls to Carthage, are in a way a narrative signpost. Hanno's speeches attempt to warn the Carthaginians of the path they are about to take, and he offers them a different (better) journey. We can view the second speech as a kind of backup warning, reminding the Carthaginians that since they did not heed his warnings in the first instance, they have one more chance to do so here.

What the Hanno-Barcine debates most effectively stress is Hannibal's subjugation of his own city.¹²⁰ By discrediting the voice of opposition against him, Hannibal establishes his unrivalled dominance in Carthage politics: thus he makes the state part of him. Interestingly, Carthage for the most part disappears from the narrative until Hannibal begins to lose in the war. We can imagine Carthage, therefore, as part of Hannibal, or Hannibal as Carthage. As Hannibal travels to Italy, and defeats Romans, it moves Carthage geographically ever closer to Rome, with the implication that Hannibal's defeat of the city of Rome re-establishes Carthage on the site on which Rome once stood.

5.1.3 Hanno in Book 23.

After the reporting in Carthage of Hannibal's victories including Cannae, Himilco, a member of the Barca party ridicules Hanno (23.12.6-7). Himilco invites all to listen to the Roman senator in the Carthaginian senate house (*audiamus Romanum senatorem in Carthaginiensium curia*). Hanno is now perceived as a *Romanus*, not just someone harsher to Carthage than a Roman. It is significant that Livy allows a Carthaginian to identify one of his countrymen as belonging to another community. To the (Roman) reader, this gives Hanno legitimacy in his criticisms of Carthage. As it is not a Roman but a Carthaginian who labels Hanno a Roman, Hanno's arguments against Rome appear genuine, not solely placed in his mouth by Livy. Had Livy labelled Hanno as more like the Roman than Carthaginian, the reader might have then questioned what Hanno says.

¹¹⁹ Jaeger (1999).

¹²⁰ Note the interesting reversal at the end of the third decade, when Hannibal is recalled to Africa by the Carthage senate: *vicit ergo Hannibalem non populus Romanus totiens caesus fugatusque, sed senatus Carthaginiensis obtreptione atque invidia* (30.20.3). See also above n. 69.

Livy's own opinion would then possibly also bias the reader regarding the words and actions of other characters in the Hannibalic war.

After this verbal attack, Livy immediately records Hanno's response (23.12.8-16). This is the longest speech act by Hanno, remarkable when one considers that he is now a virtual outcast. He states that his position has not changed despite Hannibal's successes. His approach has changed, however: he argues still for peace, but says that now is a good time to end the war as terms are favourable for Carthage; they may not be so in the future (23.12.11-12). This speech is similar to the previous two in that it suggests a possible future for Carthage.

Hanno involves his opponents in his argument in this speech to prove his point that while Hannibal has been successful so far, there is still a chance of Roman victory. Mago, the one who reported Hannibal's successes, replies to three questions posed by Hanno, all of which point to the danger before Carthage: that none of the Latins have (yet) joined Hannibal, whether any of the Roman tribes have deserted, and whether the Romans had made an attempt to sue for peace (23.12.15-13.2). On the basis of Mago's replies, Hanno offers the conclusion that the news announced in Carthage merely tells that the war is ongoing. With Carthage still in a state of war, Hanno reminds his audience of how fortune in war can fluctuate. He recalls a powerful *exemplum* from their past: their first war with Rome. In that war, success seemed likely, but the course of events proved unfavourable to Carthage.

Again, Hanno can be understood as speaking for Rome. By referring to the first Punic war, Hanno tells the Roman reader that victory is likely for Rome. The variance of fortune to which Hanno refers has relevance to Rome, just as it does to Carthage: Rome might perceive their defeat as the likely outcome of this war, but just as Carthage can go from a position of success to a position of defeat, the Romans can go from a position of defeat to a position of victory. Once again a non-Roman reflects the concept of *varia fortuna*. This time a non-Roman *says* it.

Hanno's speech fails and, Livy notes, the political situation between the Barca faction and their critics is such that any criticism is a failure from the outset (23.13.6, *Haud multos movit Hannonis oratio; nam et simultas cum familia Barcina leviozem auctorem faciebat et occupati animi praesenti laetitia nihil quo vanius fieret gaudium suum auribus admittebant debellatumque mox fore, si adniti paulum voluissent, rebantur*). We perhaps should not be surprised, for the opposition against Hanno this time is more tangible, for two opponents of the anti-Barcines are named, while in the previous scene Livy does not

name any Hannibal supporters. Hannibal, appropriately perhaps, grows stronger politically at home in the near-immediate aftermath of his improved military position after the victory of Cannae.

Having shown that difference of opinion still exists within the Carthage government, the historian then shows the differences between the Carthaginians and the Romans. The Carthaginians, he notes, undertake the orders of the senate at a leisurely pace, while the Romans work quickly. Both communities do so because the present situation permits it or requires it, Livy points out, but in the case of the Romans Livy is complimentary, for they possess a natural desire for activity (23.14.1, *ceterum haec, ut in secundis rebus, segniter otioseque gesta; Romanos praeter insitam industriam animis fortuna etiam cunctari prohibebat*).

Shortly before Livy records Hanno's speech discussed above, he records Decius' opposition to Capua siding with Hannibal (23.7.4). Decius' position as the voice of opposition in Capua is just as futile as Hanno's is in Carthage. Despite Decius' highly appropriate example of what could happen to Capua, that Hannibal in Capua will repeat Pyrrhus' takeover of Tarentum, Hannibal and his men are granted access to the city (23.7.5-6). The dangers of not following Decius' advice is made clear by Livy's focus on Pacuvius Calavius, who seeks to assassinate Hannibal. The extreme nature of Calavius' plan serves to make Decius' opposition seem an acceptable compromise. However, the Capuans do not follow Decius' advice. In fact, Decius is removed from the city (23.10.10). What is very important here is that it is Hannibal who recognises the dangers posed by this element of opposition, and he takes swift action to remove it. Hannibal understands what must be done in Capua, and Decius, by pointing out to Hannibal that he does not have the right to summon summarily a Capuan citizen (23.7.7), attempts to reinforce the idea of Capuans making the political decisions in Capua. His failure in this act can be read as a sign that Hannibal cannot be excluded from any state in Italy in the political sense.

5.2 Hannibal and Maharbal.

In the book following Hanno's opening pair of speeches, Livy presents another example of internal difference within Carthage. This example is different in two respects, for the debate is not political, but military, and unlike in the Hanno orations, this time there is a

response from Hannibal. This episode is therefore important in our consideration of Hannibal, for it allows us to see first-hand Hannibal justifying his actions.¹²¹

The scene is the aftermath of Cannae. A commander in Hannibal's army, Maharbal, argues for an immediate march against Rome. He offers the image of Hannibal banqueting there in five day's time as encouragement to Hannibal to take this action. Hannibal praises Maharbal for his enthusiasm and asks for a short time to consider his options. A clear distinction is made between Hannibal and Maharbal, between immediate action and cautious thought. Maharbal retorts that while Hannibal knows how to achieve victory, he does not know what to do with it (22.51.4, *non omnia nimirum eidem di dedere: vincere scis, Hannibal, victoria uti nescis*).¹²² The chapter concludes with Livy appearing not to defend Hannibal's decision, but validating Maharbal's criticism when he credits this one day's delay as the single event that saved Rome (*mora eius diei satis creditur saluti fuisse urbi et imperio*). Both the historian and Maharbal consider Hannibal's request for time to think about his options as a rejection of this sound advice (sound to the Carthaginians, that is).

In this scene Hannibal wastes a most advantageous opportunity on two fronts. In the military sense, he fails to undertake immediate action to build upon his success at Cannae—he fails to understand what Cannae means for him, while Livy clearly points out what Hannibal's delay after Cannae means for Rome.¹²³ Cannae will eventually work its way into victory for either Carthage or Rome, and it is Hannibal who gets to make that choice. It is his failure in the narrative sense that is more important. Hannibal's apparent rejection of Maharbal's advice creates a difference of opinion in the Carthaginian army when they would be best served by presenting a united front. Hannibal reacts first to Cannae, or he fails to react appropriately, which the historian follows by describing the reaction to the battle by the Romans—at Rome. This is significant. Because Hannibal does not understand the importance of Cannae, the chance to understand (and to learn from) this event passes to the Romans. At Rome,

¹²¹ It is one of the episodes that proves central to the reading of the third decade by Cizek (1995) 172-3 (also mentioned at 176), which he calls an example of the internal monologue, and an excellent example of it also: 'célèbre est la conversation entre Hannibal et Maharbal, le commandant de sa cavalerie (22,51). Encore une fois, l'analyse psychologique des personnages se retrouve enrichie'.

¹²² Cf. Plutarch, *Fabius Maximus*, 17.1 (σὺ νικᾶν οἶδας, νίκηι δὲ χρῆσθαι οὐκ οἶδας).

¹²³ Chaplin (2000) 56. See *eadem* 65-70 on Hannibal and the example of Cannae.

after the initial panic,¹²⁴ they begin to prepare for future conflict. Livy establishes firmly that the Romans are rebuilding. Had Hannibal understood Cannae, and followed Maharbal's advice to march on Rome, the critical first interpretation of Cannae, and therefore the preparations to fight Hannibal once more and defend the city, would not have taken place.

In the scene immediately prior to this, Livy describes the *post-bellum* situation in the Roman camp (22.50.4-12). Not only are the Roman forces leaderless, but also they do not know what actually remains of the two armies. Livy presents a debate, with one side speaking in indirect discourse and the other side in direct discourse—in the reverse order of the Hannibal-Maharbal discussion.¹²⁵ Should Hannibal agree with Maharbal's advice, or should Hannibal be able to convince Maharbal to follow a different plan, the

¹²⁴ Note that Livy instensifies this scene by commenting that he is not able to convey accurately the panic at Rome (22.54.8, *itaque succumbam oneri neque adgrediar narrare quae edissertando minora vero faciam*). The breakdown of order in Rome after Cannae is so catastrophic that Rome's history cannot be accurately described. This speaks well of Hannibal's power in the immediate aftermath of Cannae, that he has not only defeated Rome, but for future generations of Romans he has established firmly his place in their history by making it not possible for the Romans to have an accurate account of this period. This line is intratextual in that it brings to the reader's mind Livy's opening comments on the war. The most memorable war ever waged becomes difficult to remember accurately.

¹²⁵ The speech made by the tribune Publius Sempronius (22.50.6-9) is important. He asks his dissenting soldiers whether they are Roman citizens or Italian allies, suggesting that loyalty to the Roman cause varies depending on nationality. Or, it could be that being loyal to Rome makes one Roman, and that the Roman soldiers are being asked to re-affirm their national identity. What is interesting is that he frames this question as an utterance within his speech: it appears that it is not he, but other Romans (in Rome?) that ask this importance question. He also provides the answer, speaking on behalf of his audience. This rhetorical ploy works. The Romans in the smaller camp cross over to the larger camp. In this scene it is also interesting to note that Livy records that the men in Hannibal's army who oppose the Romans here are Numidians. By pointing this fact out, Livy creates an important contrast, between the Romans who have just showed that they are loyal citizens of Rome united in their cause and Hannibal's army that, while victorious, is not unified as a Carthaginian force, but is made up of soldiers from different nations. Moreover, Sempronius' suggestion that allies are not as loyal to Rome as they should be is given an interesting twist by the behaviour of the Campanians at the start of book 23. After meeting with Varro, the consul who survives Cannae, who speaks about the importance of allies coming to the aid of Rome in this difficult time, one of the Campanian delegates suggests that this would be a good time for Campania to assert her independence (23.6.1). Varro can be seen to be testing the Campanians in that he is offering them the opportunity to demonstrate just how good a Roman ally they are by not abandoning Rome. Vibius Virrius not only suggests that the Campanians should seek to gain their independence, but also that they could gain authority over all of Italy (*sed imperio etiam Italiae potiri possint*).

contrast between the disagreement in the Roman camp and the agreement in the Carthaginian camp would have been impressive. By turning down Maharbal's suggestion, Hannibal forfeits the opportunity of presenting a unified Carthaginian force on either side of a disunified Roman one. With Hannibal's army united in battle in the Cannae narrative on the one side, and Maharbal and Hannibal on the other side, the Roman army would be trapped disunified in the middle, confined to a limited textual space.

By not speaking in direct discourse, Hannibal appears to be in the same mode as he was during the battle of Cannae—a man of action rather than a man of words. Cannae is still very much in the reader's mind here, as it is for Maharbal and it should be for Hannibal, for Livy has only a few sentences previously declared the end of this Roman military failure (22.50.1, *haec est pugna <Cannensis>, Alliensi cladi nobilitate par, ceterum ut illis quae post pugnam accidere levior, quia ab hoste est cessatum, sic strage exercitus gravior foediorque*). This is not to say that Hannibal does not speak; rather, he does so when it is appropriate—before battle, for example.¹²⁶ Hannibal's words also flow directly into Livy's thoughts: Hannibal requests time to think about the most appropriate action, and Livy shows the result of that action: the delay that he feels saved Rome (22.51.4, *mora eius diei satis creditur saluti fuisse urbi atque imperio*).¹²⁷ Hannibal himself, albeit looking backwards on this moment, may be included in those who believe that this day of delay saved Rome. It would show that the future Hannibal is capable of understanding where he went wrong, and the consequences of his failure to act. That this is the case is demonstrated in a fashion when Hannibal and Scipio meet at Zama (see below, section 6.2). Moreover, this narrative intervention by Livy gives the Romans hope. Even at this very desperate stage of the war, immediately after Hannibal's greatest victory against the Romans, and the Romans' greatest defeat at the hands of an enemy, Roman survival and victory has now been confirmed.

But Hannibal does make an attack on Rome, or at least he attempts to do so. So, Hannibal does take Maharbal's advice, only he does not do so at the time. This occurs at the start of book 26. In terms of the structure of Livy's history, Hannibal's assault on

¹²⁶ Not before Cannae, however. Here actions speak better than words. Scott (1998) 10 points out that Hannibal's words present him in a favourable light, and they demonstrate that he has qualities that a Roman general should have. These come in post-Cannae orations (e.g., 23.45 and 25.11).

¹²⁷ See Lancel (1995) 391-2 for reasons why Hannibal is right not to follow Maharbal's advice.

Rome will fail because it is placed in the pentad in which the historian records Rome's gaining of the initiative in the campaign. Hannibal's failure here demonstrates clearly that Rome has firmly taken the initiative in the war.

Hannibal's assault against Rome is written in such a way so that Livy can suggest that the Carthaginian is losing his potency as a military commander. This is important in thinking about Maharbal's advice, for what Maharbal says after Cannae is proven to be true. Maharbal appears to understand the importance of what to do *when*. Hannibal's delay—if we choose to read this as Hannibal employing a Jugurthine tactic—is a failure. That Hannibal should have done this before now is suggested by Livy (26.7.3, *multa secum quonam inde ire pergeret voluenti subiit animum impetus caput ipsum belli Romam petendi, cuius rei semper cupitae praetermissam occasionem post Cannensem pugnam et alii fremebant et ipse non dissimulabat*).¹²⁸ Hannibal, Livy writes, had always desired to attack Rome, but had not done so when advised by his men. The historian is, of course, referring to Maharbal's advice, and thus Hannibal's decision to attack Rome now is connected to Maharbal's earlier advice to do the same. Hannibal's failure to attack Rome when he should is magnified by the historian in this passage. Maharbal is the only person to speak of marching on Rome, but now Livy notes that several (*alii*) of Hannibal's officers urged this course.

Hannibal's failure in the attack on Rome writes down Hannibal and it writes up Maharbal. As Maharbal is a critic of Hannibal, the validation of Maharbal serves to suggest that other critics of Hannibal (i.e., Hanno) are right as well, although possibly for different reasons. Hannibal's failure to take Rome when he wants to take it suggests that possibly he should not take any further military action. Or it may suggest that Hanno's original point, that Hannibal should not be made commander of a Carthaginian army and should not attack Rome, is also correct. It could easily be argued that Hanno is right. Hannibal has displayed poor judgement, and in failing to attack Rome it might be argued that the war as a whole will be unsuccessful.

That Maharbal is right to criticise Hannibal is suggested by the thoughts of those deputies Hannibal leaves behind to defend Capua. Livy notes (26.12.11) that Bostar and Hanno write to Hannibal to complain that they have in effect been surrendered to the Romans. They also declare a failure to Hannibal's policy of trying to divert Roman

¹²⁸ On Hannibal's assault on Rome, see Horsfall (1974). Horsfall suggests possible similarities between Hannibal's assault on Rome in several Roman sources, including Livy, and the attack on Aeneas' camp led by Turnus in the *Aeneid*.

attention by attacking Rome, for the Roman force that they face still formidable. Hannibal in this passage is most strongly criticised, perhaps more so than at any other point in the war, for they note that a Roman enemy is more steadfast than a Carthaginian friend (*tanto constantiorem inimicum Romanum quam amicum Poenum esse*). That Bostar and Hanno write to Hannibal formally casts Hannibal's weakness at this critical point. Their letter is a testament to Hannibal's mistake. It is an official record of Hannibal's incorrect strategy at this point in the war, something to be reviewed.

VI.

Cn. Servilius et C. Servilius consules—sextus decimus is annus belli Punici erat—cum de re publica belloque et provinciis ad senatum rettulissent... (30.1.1). The significance of this opening phrase is that with it Livy suggests a return of Roman order to the narrative, for it is only the second book to begin with the naming of consuls,¹²⁹ which contrasts with the four that begin with the reader's attention focused upon Hannibal (books 21 [see above], 22, 23 and 25).¹³⁰ The Roman constitution is, it appears, functioning normally, with consuls being elected instead of a dictator, and they are doing a routine consul activity, bringing matters of the state before the senate (*de re publica...ad senatum rettulissent*). It is a rare glimpse of internal events in Rome, which suggests the return of political normality. Of course the war is still very much alive, even in this passage (*sextus...erat* and *belloque*).

Of course a book does not have to begin by naming the consuls, and by not doing so the historian, whether Livy or any other annalist, does not suggest that the Roman government is failing. But in this case both these books that begin by naming

¹²⁹ The other is book 26: *Cn. Fulius Centumalus P. Sulpicius Galba consules cum idibus Martiis magistratum inissent, senatu in Capitolium vocato de re publica, de administratione belli, de provinciis exercitibusque patres consuluerunt* (26.1.1). In this example, just as in the opening of book 30, Rome's domestic affairs take precedence over the current state of the war. However, in this example Livy is careful to balance the position of priority of domestic politics with the still very serious nature of the war as a whole by the three war matters he mentions after *de re publica*: (i) *de administratione belli*, (ii) *de provinciis* (iii) *exercitibusque*. Cf. Burck (1971) 22 and Luce (1977) 28.

¹³⁰ Walsh (1961) 173: 'note how each book in XXI-XXV begins by discussing Carthaginian activity, and in XXVI-XXX by a description from the Roman viewpoint'.

The opening of book 25 should perhaps be seen in opposition to the opening of book 26: thus the last book of the Hannibalic pentad and the first book of the Roman pentad open with the party who features (or in the case of the Romans, who will feature) as the stronger party in the war. See Scafuro (1987) for how different Livian pentads interrelate to each other in terms of the ending of one pentad and the beginning of

consuls are critical books in the structure of the third decade. Book 26 is the first book of the Roman pentad: thus the appearance of the consuls there tells us that the tide is turning in Rome's favour, even if it appears that Hannibal is in the stronger position. Both appearances remind the reader of the genre that Livy has chosen, and here it informs the reader that the genre is re-establishing itself.¹³¹

6.1 Scipio and Hannibal at Zama.

Without a doubt one of the defining moments of Livy 21-30 is the confrontation between Hannibal and Scipio before Zama, not only in terms of content, but also for its role in the structure of the Hannibalic narrative.¹³² It brings the two dominant figures of the third decade together: thus not only does it suggest closure, for only one will be an undefeated and the other the defeated leader of his country, but also it is a rematch of Scipio the elder's encounter with Hannibal in book 21.¹³³

The set-up of the event is important. It establishes Hannibal and Scipio on a level footing, which creates an interesting tension by occurring at this eleventh hour—both in terms of the war and in terms of Livy's history.¹³⁴ The reader here realises the importance of this scene, one that brings together two of the greatest leaders in world history so far (30.30.1-2, *summotis pari spatio armatis, cum singulis interpretibus congressi sunt, non suae modo aetatis maximi duces, sed omnis ante se memoriae, omnium gentium cuilibet regum imperatorumve pares*). Livy first clears away the armies of the two leaders, thus giving the reader a clear view of the two men. This is a scene involving Hannibal and Scipio only. The equality between them is suggested two ways: each man is accompanied by only one other (in both cases this is an interpreter), and they both pause and mutually admire each

another. We can note a similar relationship between the early portions of book 21 and the concluding half of book 30, which I compare at various points in this section.

¹³¹ Cf. Kraus (1994) 83.

¹³² As noted by Kraus (1997) 60, for example. On speeches in general serving a supporting role in Livy's work, see Oakley (1997) 114. For a general analysis of Hannibal and Scipio, see Burck (1992) 136-44. For a reading of the events that surround and include Zama, see Burck (1962) 154-63; Lambert (1948). Mader (1993) 205 notes another way these speeches achieve closure: the speeches 'restate leitmotifs of the third decade (*fraus Punica, fides Romana, bellum iustum*) and characterize the protagonists in terms of these themes'.

¹³³ This is 21.40-44. See Walsh (1961) 232-3 on how Livy sets up this pair of speeches. On the Scipio-Hannibal meeting, see Lancel (1995) 400-1.

¹³⁴ Although, as Levene (1993) 74 observes, the historian has already 'paralleled and contrasted' the two generals in religious terms.

other. The mutual admiration is a process by which Hannibal and Scipio each confirm the powerful significance of the other, as well as the importance what each leader will say, as well as what will be done. The silence that occurs here not only contrasts with the speaking that follows, but it also pauses the narrative at this critically intense and dramatic moment.

In writing this scene Livy may want the reader to recall the meeting of Achilles and Priam in the final book of the *Iliad*. Achilles and Priam, despite that they are on opposing sides in the Greek-Trojan conflict, express admiration (yambōw) for each other's achievements, and at the same time they acknowledge that what has happened to Hector will also happen to them. They thus think about what will happen to them in the future, and both men realise that they share the unavoidable fate of death. The same can be said of Scipio and Hannibal. While they both know that they meet here at the height of their powers, they think ahead to their post-bellum lives. The burden here is on Scipio, to realise that he follows in Hannibal's footsteps. What is about to happen to Hannibal—defeat and the political marginalisation—will probably happen also to Scipio.

That Livy mentions the presence of the interpreters is worthy of comment.¹³⁵ Despite the fact that in his speech Hannibal will show that he understands himself to be a slave to *varia fortuna* like anyone else, he and Scipio cannot understand each other. While fortune can be experienced and understood by Roman and Carthaginian alike, one cannot communicate this understanding to another. Hannibal has been on a journey of understanding for the entirety of the narrative of the second Punic war and this admission marks an important, and perhaps final, stage in his education. Failure to be able to communicate this knowledge to Scipio threatens not only Hannibal and Carthage, but Scipio as well. Hannibal's lesson is one that any person, irrespective of nationality, needs to know. In the AVC, this is especially true of Scipio's family, who will come under attack later in Roman history, and the suffering they experience under the

¹³⁵ Habinek (1998) 41-2 discusses the use of interpreters in these books of Livy. He notes that often the historian refers to interpreters for the Carthaginians, but not for the Romans (e.g., 23.43.9). With regards to the Romans, Habinek notes that they must have had difficulties in communicating with the many peoples with whom they had contact in the Hannibalic War. Habinek also rightly notes that connected to this are the many references to the numerous languages spoken in Hannibal's army (there are two references to this in passages that follow the Hannibal-Scipio meeting, at 30.33.8 and 30.34.2). On the Romans and foreign languages, see Balsdon (1979) 137-45.

harshness of *varia fortuna* the historian will narrate in the fourth decade.¹³⁶ The interpreters enable the two men to discuss this important concept.

When Scipio replies to Hannibal's speech, he shows that he understands well the vicissitudes of fortune (30.31.6, *quod ad me attinet, et humanae infirmitatis memini et vim Fortunae reputo et omnia quaecumque agimus subiecta esse mille casibus scio*). Hannibal impresses the reader with his speech and his understanding of the situation and the human condition in general.¹³⁷ Scipio commences his speech by demonstrating in a few words that he understands fully what has taken Hannibal many words to express. By having already come to an understanding of fortune, Scipio defeats Hannibal's philosophical argument and therefore his political argument as well: his desire to arrange peace terms. In fact, in his speech Scipio suggests that Hannibal has not actually learned any lesson from the war, for what he offers Scipio is what Scipio considers to be Roman territory they already possess (30.31.2).

In the previous chapter on Sallust I pointed out the important role that paired speeches play in Latin historical texts and that they also play an important role in establishing the historian's approach to foreign community and individual representation.¹³⁸ Andrew Laird has demonstrated the importance of dialectic (Agricola and Calgacus in Tacitus' *Agricola*), that paired speeches can be set up so that one character (in this case Agricola) comes off as the better character.¹³⁹ The same can be said of this episode. There is a clear unevenness of speaking time, for example: in the Teubner text Hannibal speaks for seventy-five lines, followed by Scipio for twenty-three lines. In fact, compared to the Agricola-Calgacus episode (*Agr.* 30-4), there is a greater discrepancy here, for while Calgacus speaks for twice the length of Agricola, in Livy Hannibal speaks for three times the length of Scipio.¹⁴⁰ Also important is the brevity of

¹³⁶ On Hannibal's *varia fortuna* as a lesson to be learned by the Romans, cf. Lucan 4.788-90: '*excitet invisas dirae Carthaginis umbras | inferiis fortuna novis, ferat ista cruentus | Hannibal et Poeni tam dira piacula manes*'.

¹³⁷ Scott (1998) 11: 'the reader is so moved by the impassioned, yet rational, petition of the enemy'. Scott suggests that this reflects negatively on Scipio: 'it comes as a surprise and disappointment that Scipio is intractable. Livy has in no way diminished the stature of Rome's greatest foe by denying him powerful speech'.

¹³⁸ See above, chapter two, section 4.2 on Sulla and Bocchus.

¹³⁹ Laird (1999) 130-2.

¹⁴⁰ Although Livy records several speeches by him, one of Hannibal's main characteristics is his silence (for example, it is mentioned by Valerius Maximus 3.7.ext. 6: *si verba numeres, breviter et absce. si sensum aestimes, copiose et valenter*).

the interlude between the two speeches: the set-up to Scipio's speech is almost all that separates the two orations. It is remarkably short, which contrasts the considerable pause when the two men meet. It offers no indication of Scipio's reaction to Hannibal's words; possibly the admiration for Hannibal expressed by Scipio before Hannibal speaks is gone, countered by Hannibal's speaking. By not recording Scipio's reaction, whether positive or negative, Livy in effect dismisses Hannibal here, which makes Scipio's verbal rebuff of the Carthaginian easier, if not a *fait accompli*. Hannibal's silence, or his use of few words was a signal of his strength in the earlier books of Livy's narrative of the war; now silence or near-silence becomes an indicator of Scipio's power.¹⁴¹

Scipio's silence, followed by his few words, is partially a response to Hannibal's words. The inverted position between Hannibal then and now is shown most strikingly when he acknowledges that what he once was, Scipio is now (30.30.11, *quod ego fui ad Trasumenum, ad Cannas, id tu hodie es*).¹⁴² The verbs are very telling here: Hannibal casts himself as a man of the past (*fui*), and Scipio is the man of the present (*es*). Important also are the pronouns, which firmly fix attention on the men at the conference: Hannibal (*ego*) and Scipio (*tu*). It is significant that no future for either Hannibal or Scipio is mentioned in this utterance. It is as if neither man has a future in their nations, or in the course of the interaction between their nations. Hannibal and Scipio thus have a place that is only in the here and now: just as this war between Rome and Carthage is about to end, so too do the military and political careers of these men.

¹⁴¹ A lack of reaction can also be a good thing—for a Roman, as Laird (1999) 131 points out in his reading of speeches of Agricola and Calgacus in Tacitus' *Agricola*. The limited reaction of the Roman soldiers suggests restraint, compared to the excessive reaction of Calgacus' followers.

¹⁴² Chaplin (2000) 71 n. 62: 'Hannibal's words...have a latent irony for the reading audience since, despite a second consulship and service in Asia Minor, Scipio's military career peaked at Zama, just as Hannibal's had at Cannae'.

In writing this scene Livy may have had in mind the banquet scene in Herodotus (9.16.2-4), in which an unnamed Persian prophesies the defeat of his people in the forthcoming conflict to a Theban. Livy gives the prediction of defeat from the perspective of the commander, while Herodotus gives the prediction from the perspective of someone serving under Mardonius. It is a brutal confession by the Persian: ξεῖνε, ὃ τι δεῖ γενέσθαι ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἀμήχανον ἀποτρέψαι ἀνθρώπων· οὐδὲ γὰρ πιστὰ λέγουσι ἐθέλει πείθεσθαι οὐδεῖς. ταῦτα δὲ Περσέων συχνοὶ ἐπιστάμενοι ἐπόμεθα ἀναγκαίῃ ἐνδεδεμένοι. ἐχθίστη δὲ ὁδύνη [ἐστὶ] τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποισι αὕτη, πολλὰ φρονέοντα μηδενὸς κρατέειν. See Flower and Marincola (2002) 127-33.

With this admission of impending defeat, the battle of Zama might appear as an anti-climax. Rather, Livy employs this battle narrative to demonstrate the virtue of Hannibal as a military commander. By fighting to his best ability, Hannibal shows that even in impending defeat he is still a character who displays *virtus*. By acknowledging that his fortune has changed for the worse, Hannibal frees himself from *fortuna* enough for his *virtus* to be noticed. And by fighting in this exemplary manner, Hannibal's defeat serves to build up Scipio.

6.2 The End of the Book and the End of the Hannibalic War.

Now to the very end of the book, which I take as the final two chapters.¹⁴³ First, Livy clearly places the Hannibalic war into a wider historical perspective with a series of dates: the establishment of peace with Carthage, the beginning of the war, and the end of the war (30.44.1-2). With both the beginning and the end of the war stated here, the historian gives the conflict chronological context that completes it. The war is now not only a past event, but it is placed within the wider context of Roman-Carthaginian, and Roman history. The panorama of Roman consuls named here echoes those named at the opening of the book, and it reinforces the image of Roman order re-established, as is the order of annalistic history-writing.

There is also the very visual return of Scipio to Rome, which occurs after Livy has formally declared victory by land and sea (*pace terra marique parta*).¹⁴⁴ This journey is a speeded-up rerun of Hannibal's march to Rome: thus it reaffirms Rome's victory, for by imagining Scipio following Hannibal's route, Livy re-writes Hannibal's march. It is no longer one of a Carthaginian assault on Rome, but of a victorious Roman return. Rome not only defeats Carthage, but also it is allowed to re-write history (or rather un-write Hannibal's past). It also serves to bring the reader back to Rome. The reader may begin this part of the AVC with Hannibal as dominant, but s/he ends it at Rome with Scipio. The multitude of people who join Scipio on his journey makes this a most powerful journey of closure, for as the crowd swells, so does the reader's sense of narrative closure, here finding himself one person among a crowd of celebrating Romans, moving inwards to the capital of their nation. It can also be read as an inverse journey, for

¹⁴³ Burck (1962) 164-6 takes the ending as 30.42.11ff. For Burck, then, the conclusion begins with the receiving in the Roman senate of the Carthaginian ambassadors.

¹⁴⁴ On the spectacle of the victorious commander's return (especially the triumph), see Feldherr (1998) 15-6.

although Scipio is returning to Rome, moving towards the centre of his world, by defeating Carthage what Scipio has in effect done is begun the next movement outwards that Rome will undertake in its imperial expansion.

There is also Livy's final thought on the Hannibalic war. Here again Scipio features as the dominant character, as the historian explains how Scipio receives the *cognomen* Africanus (30.34.6-7). This temporarily takes Scipio out of the context of the Hannibalic war and places him in a wider context of Roman history, alongside such characters as Sulla and Pompey. For Scipio, this is an especially powerful way to end his role in the third decade. He is not only the hero of this portion of Livy's history, but he is also one of the main heroes of Rome's entire history (and, we can assume, Livy's narrative of Rome's entire history). It is also an expression of personal power for Scipio and Rome, for the community that fought with Rome, Carthage, as represented by *Africanus*, is here, at the final moment of Livy 21-30, subjugated to nothing more than part of the name of a Roman character, albeit a very important one.¹⁴⁵ This is Roman order most firmly re-established.¹⁴⁶

VII.

Taken together, these fifteen books fall short, perhaps, of the first decade with its ancient legends, primitive wars and internal struggles, and all their moral lessons, and also of the epic struggle with Hannibal, which carries the third decade forward in a magnificent sweep.¹⁴⁷

In the above quotation F. W. Walbank, in his conclusion to his essay on Livy 31-45, assesses the historian's account of the Hannibalic War in positive terms. This high quality of the first and third pentad might suggest, Walbank confesses, that the fourth and fifth decades pale in comparison. Of course this is not true, as Walbank points out. If Livy did find his next topic, the Macedonian Wars, less than inspiring, one way he could improve the narrative would be to draw in the Hannibalic war. Of course, he could not discuss the war anew, but the central element of that war, the character of Hannibal, was still alive in the period following Rome's victory over Carthage and, as

¹⁴⁵ However, as Walsh (1961) 100 notes, Livy appears to lose interest in Scipio once the Hannibalic war is over, with a possible renewal of interest in him when the possibility of Hannibal as a threat re-emerges.

¹⁴⁶ An earlier (and shorter) version of this section was presented at a graduate conference 'Redefining the End' at the University of Birmingham in December 1999.

¹⁴⁷ Walbank (1971) 65.

historical evidence suggests, Hannibal played an important role in Carthaginian politics. Moreover, even after Hannibal is forced into exile, Livy does not allow this fascinating subject to exit the stage. Rather, the historian includes in the fourth decade several important scenes which feature Hannibal: his departure from Carthage (33.45-9), his meeting with Scipio at Ephesus (35.14) and his suicide (39.51). The presentation of Hannibal in these episodes builds upon that which the historian offers in the third decade.

7.1 Hannibal's departure from Carthage (33.45-49).

The most important of these episodes that feature Hannibal is the episode in which the historian records the former general's departure from Carthage. It is the most important because Hannibal is not the sole focus of Livy in this episode. The historian also examines the internal political situation of Carthage, and he assesses Roman-Carthaginian diplomatic relations.

Livy begins this discussion of events at Carthage by noting that members of the anti-Barcine faction are in contact with their friends in Rome, and these people suggest to the Romans that Hannibal has been in secret communication with Antiochus in order to incite a war against Rome (33.45.6). They also describe Hannibal's character, comparing him to an animal that cannot be tamed (33.45.7, *ut feras quasdam nulla mitescere arte, sic immitem et implacabilem eius viri animum esse*). That it is Carthaginians who observe this in a member of their own community is significant. The anti-Barcine party is doing more than simply seeking to distance themselves from their political opponent; they also desire to separate him from humans by suggesting that in his character he more resembles an animal. To Livy this may seem to be an exaggeration given what he writes about Hannibal's character at the start of book 21 (see above, section I). This serves to dismiss as not credible what Hannibal's opponents say about him.

What the anti-Barcine party think Hannibal thinks about Carthage is significant. It is said that Hannibal believes that Carthage being at peace is a weakened state (33.45.7, *marcescere oti situ queri civitatem et inertia sopiri nec sine armorum sonitu excitari posse*).¹⁴⁸ That

¹⁴⁸ That Livy uses the word *civitas* here may be significant. It may be read as Livy trying to distinguish between Rome and Carthage, that is, Rome is a *res publica* (cf. 30.1.1—see above, 114), while Carthage is a *civitas*. It also suggests a difference between Hannibal and his opponents in Carthage: Hannibal strives for better accountability within Carthaginian government, therefore he may be read as a republican, while his political enemies want a government system in which their interests will be protected.

Hannibal's thoughts are expressed through his political adversaries suggests that it is not credible. This is interesting, given that to Livy's reader Hannibal's theory may seem like a sound one. It seems to be a reworking of Sallust's theme of *metus hostilis*, that the lack of an active campaign against an enemy results in a weakened state, in this case Carthage. The anti-Barcines suggest that it is not fear alone of destruction at the hands of the enemy that is necessary for internal stability, but rather active military action against that enemy.

Livy also notes that these accusations at the hands of the anti-Barcines carry some weight given the recent past: *haec probabilia memoria prioris belli per unum illum non magis gesti quam moti faciebat* (33.45.8). Livy clearly means for the reader to think back to Hannibal's behaviour in his war against Rome. It seems likely that Livy is referring to Romans here, given that in the next sentence he mentions that Hannibal recently has also alienated the leading class at Carthage (33.45.8, *irritaverat etiam recenti facto multorum potentium animos*).

Livy now explains why Hannibal is opposed by the leading Carthaginians, which seems to include the anti-Barcine faction. First, the historian describes the current political situation in Carthage: the order of judges is the leading political order in the state, and these judges govern in their own interest (33.46.1-2). Hannibal, who has been elected praetor, which suggests that he must have sufficient political support in Carthage, finds himself a political opponent of this group when he seeks to execute the duties of his office in summoning a quaestor. Hannibal is following the established rules and procedures of the Carthaginian constitution, and the judges do not, and Hannibal's actions are taken in defence of the liberty of the citizens of Carthage. He demonstrates this when he arrests the offending quaestor, and brings him before the assembly (33.46.3-5). Here Hannibal delivers a speech in which he criticises the quaestor and the judges which, Livy notes, was well-received by the ordinary citizens of Carthage, who realise that the present political arrangement threatens their freedom (33.46.6). This speech by Hannibal, in which he upholds the rights of the Carthaginian citizen body as a whole, serves to counter the words of the anti-Barcines, who speak for themselves only.

There is another contrast here, between Roman inaction and Hannibal's action. Livy notes that Hannibal not only points out this flaw in the contemporary Carthaginian politics, but also he takes immediate action to rectify it. He introduces—and has passed—a law that limits the length and number of terms that can be served by a judge (33.46.7).

Livy here and in the next chapter shows another side of Hannibal. This is not Hannibal the military commander, but Hannibal the political reformer. Despite the fact that his actions greatly upset the nobility, and therefore threaten to cause them to take action against him, Hannibal goes further than political reform, as he directs his attention to economic reform. Hannibal seeks to maximise state revenue, not simply for the financial amelioration of the government, but so as to produce one important benefit for the Romans in that Carthage would be able to pay its debt to Rome (33.47.2). Hannibal in this passage links Rome and Carthage, for both sides would become economically stronger. And by paying the war debt off earlier, Hannibal is able to draw a line under this chapter in Roman-Carthaginian history; Hannibal is able to remove a difficult situation for Carthage for which he was chiefly responsible by losing the war.

Here Livy shows that Hannibal is thinking about the best policy for all Carthaginians. The whole nation would surely benefit from their state being able to pay the debt to Rome. But Hannibal appears to be alone in thinking this, or at the very least he is in the minority. Those in Carthage who have benefited from the current economic system now act against Hannibal by seeking to incite the Romans against him. Livy notes that Hannibal's old rival, Scipio, tries to work for an appropriate position on the Roman side, that is, the Romans should not get involved in internal Carthaginian politics:

ita diu repugnante P. Scipione Africano, qui parum ex dignitate populi Romani esse ducebat subscribere odiis accusatorum Hannibalis et factionibus Carthaginiensium inserere publicam auctoritatem nec satis habere bello vicisse Hannibalem, nisi velut accusatores calumniam in eum iurarent ac nomen deferrent, tandem pervicerunt ut legati Carthaginem mitterentur, qui ad senatum eorum arguerent Hannibalem cum Antiocho rege consilia belli faciendi inire (33.47.4-6)

Scipio comes out well in this passage. His advice to the Romans not to involve themselves in Carthaginian politics suggests that he believes one state should not interfere in the domestic politics of another nation, even when asked to do so by a faction within that state. The Romans ignore Scipio's advice by sending an embassy to Carthage to lay charges against Hannibal that he has been encouraging Antiochus to wage war against the Romans.¹⁴⁹ This scene creates a similar position for Scipio in Rome to that of Hannibal in Carthage. Both men appear to be offering advice or policy that is in the best interest of their states (and Scipio's advice might be said to be universal in that his advice could apply to all nations), and at the same time both men find

¹⁴⁹ Livy might be said to be marginalising Scipio here, for the Romans are correct to accuse Hannibal of encouraging Antiochus, as will be proven by the course of events.

themselves being marginalised politically in their states to the point where in the future they will have to leave. In the case of Hannibal this means the immediate future.

The Romans and Hannibal now come in for closer scrutiny when the ambassadors arrive in Carthage. Livy writes that the ambassadors claim their mission to Carthage is for one purpose only: to resolve the dispute between Carthage and Masinissa. This is a lie because their real intention is something else, to attack Hannibal. This is not a political campaign, Livy makes clear, but a military campaign, perhaps even the Hannibalic war anew: (33.47.9-10, *id creditum vulgo; unum Hannibalem se peti ab Romanis non fallebat et ita pacem Carthaginiensibus datam esse ut inexpiabile bellum adversus se unum maneret*).¹⁵⁰ The rift between the Carthaginians and Hannibal is stressed once more; Hannibal is truly alone, stressed by the historian twice referring to Hannibal as being alone (*unum*). Hannibal decides at this point to give in to fortune, which now he acknowledges works against him (33.47.10, *itaque cedere tempori et fortunae statuit*). Hannibal has been accused of secret plotting against the Romans; Roman fears of Hannibal's plotting are manifested in this secret planning to leave his home city.

The next chapter narrates Hannibal's departure from the city, and that Livy provides those details makes clear how important his leaving is. As Hannibal is about to sail from Africa, the historian notes that he bemoans his country's fate rather than his own, which suggests that even at this very desperate point in his life, his concern is more for Carthage than for himself (33.48.2, *ita Africa Hannibal excessit, saepius patriae quam suum eventum miseratus*). Hannibal transfers his recent bad experiences to his state, and this suggests that perhaps Hannibal knows what will happen to his nation.¹⁵¹ Hannibal's desire for his trip not to be discovered means that he must lie about his intentions on the island of Cercina, where he encounters many Phoenician ships. Hannibal having to lie to these traders, who are related to the Carthaginians, provides distance between Hannibal and his nation almost to the degree to match his increased geographic distance from his

¹⁵⁰ By writing *unum Hannibalem* the historian may be employing again his theme of the *unus vir*. See Santoro l'Hoir (1990) 230-2. See also above, 69 n.39. Livy distinguishes Hannibal as a special historical figure just as he is forced to exclude himself from the nation for which he has worked so hard in battle and in politics.

¹⁵¹ Note that here Hannibal is said not leave Carthage, but rather Africa. This might suggest that Hannibal up to this point did not represent his nation-state, but rather the interests of the continent as a whole. This in my view builds up Hannibal, suggesting that he is a transnational figure just as he loses both his privilege to be such and to represent his home nation. It might be seen as an act by the historian to magnify the injustice that is being done to Hannibal.

community. Livy describes Hannibal's arrangements for another secretive departure, this time from the island and the Phoenician traders there.

For the historian to describe Hannibal's escape from Carthage is not enough. He must complete the picture by providing the response to the departure. This enables the historian to explore how the Carthaginians felt about Hannibal at this end-point in his relationship with Carthage. Hannibal's supporters express dismay at the absence of the leading citizen of their community. Livy notes that various rumours arise as to what has happened to Hannibal—some believe that he has left the city, while most think that the Romans have treacherously murdered him. Carthage is sharply divided, between pro- and anti-Hannibal factions, and this division in turn means that the true course of events, in this case Hannibal's whereabouts, is much harder to determine. Livy seems to want to make this important point when he directs the reader's attention to the expressions on the faces of the Carthaginians in the forum: *variosque voltus cerneret ut in civitate aliorum alias partes foventium et factionibus discordi* (33.48.11). Having made this comment on the current state of affairs in Carthage, only then does Livy provide the information the Carthaginians desire.

The negative impression of Carthage that Livy creates here provides an opportunity for Rome to shine. Rome does not. The Roman ambassadors, speaking in the Carthaginian senate, present their charges against Hannibal (33.49.1-3). They do this with Hannibal absent; the accused is not able to refute the charges against him. The Romans state that they believe that Hannibal is on his way to Antiochus. The Romans' charges against Hannibal seem not to be based on any investigation conducted by the Romans, but rather they seem to be a restatement of the rumours offered to the Romans by Hannibal's enemies in Carthage. The Romans rely on slander and gossip. And the account of Hannibal's journey so far does not suggest that the rumours of his association with Antiochus, or of his potential future association with Antiochus, are true.¹⁵²

The Romans demand justice, and the Carthaginians promise to comply with that demand (33.49.4, *Carthaginienses responderunt quidquid aequum censuissent Romani facturos esse*). This places Rome and Carthage in the same position, as communities that are opposed to Hannibal, a person whose actions have been exemplary. This inappropriate treatment of Hannibal is made more noticeable when Livy records Hannibal's arrival at Tyre (33.49.5), where he is received as an honoured guest. That Hannibal is so well received at Tyre, the

¹⁵² To be sure, the Roman accusations will be proven true in time, i.e., later in Livy's narrative (see below on Hannibal and Antiochus).

city that founded Carthage is significant. Because Tyre founded Carthage, Tyre can represent Carthage, a version of its colony, but at an earlier time, say, before the Romans interfered in the internal politics of this state. And as Tyre existed before Carthage, we can view Tyre as representing Carthage in the past, a better Carthage.

There is an important contextual point I wish to make about this episode. Hannibal's political actions in book 33 may have special resonance with Livy and his reader in that they see in Hannibal what Rome lacks--an effective political reformer. Or—if we choose to read this episode as being metatextual—Hannibal as the effective political reformer could be meant to compensate for the fact that Rome in Livy's day (or at any point after the AVC was written, as in his preface he does not suggest that things could improve) needs someone like Hannibal. This episode, then, could be read as indirect criticism of the lack of success of Augustus' political reforms (or the lack of actual reform).¹⁵³ This in turn serves to reinvigorate the narrative of the Hannibalic war, on the back of which these episodes that I discuss in this section must (surely) be read, as Hannibal appears a more rounded and complex character. At this point Hannibal can be said to be the most complex character, Roman or non-Roman, to appear in Roman historical narrative so far.¹⁵⁴ If Hannibal is the political saviour for whom the Romans are (continuously) looking, then could he also be the military leader they so desperately need--if only he could have fought on their side. This in turn would serve to write down Scipio, or to foreshadow Scipio's political decline in Roman politics, a narrative thread that Livy progressively follows in the fourth decade.

7.2 Hannibal and Scipio at Ephesus (35.14).¹⁵⁵

Despite his now living in exile, Hannibal does not stop being of interest to Livy, and, equally important, he does not stop being of interest to the Romans. While Hannibal

¹⁵³ A caveat should be acknowledged my use of metatextual in this context. I mean metatextual here to mean that Livy may intend Hannibal's actions in this episode to refer directly or indirectly refer to events outside the AVC, which may refer to a specific situation in contemporary Rome, or it may be a comment on the general situation in contemporary Roman politics.

¹⁵⁴ That is not to say that the other non-Romans are not complex characters who are for their own reasons intrinsically fascinating (e.g., Alexander in Pompeius Trogus' history—see the next chapter). But I make the point here to emphasise as much as possible the outstanding complexity and intricacy of Livy's construction of Hannibal.

¹⁵⁵ See Briscoe (1981) 166 regarding the scholarly debate as to whether this meeting occurred.

remains a concern for the Romans, who fear that he may take up again a military campaign against the Romans, or that he may help someone else's campaign against Rome, at 35.14 Livy shows that Hannibal is also of particular interest to Scipio.

Scipio, according to Livy, is part of the Roman delegation to Ephesus of 193 BCE. But it is not only Scipio who speaks to Hannibal. The historian notes that Villius too speaks to Hannibal, and his reason for doing this is to discover Hannibal's opinion of the situation and to allay Hannibal's fear of being under threat from the Romans (35.14.1-3). Livy appears to question Villius' reason for this, as he notes that these meetings do not achieve their goal. The result of these meetings, which, Livy notes, may have been Villius' real objective, is that Hannibal begins to lose credibility with his host (35.14.4, *iis conloquiis aliud quidem actum nihil est, secutum tamen sua sponte est, velut consilio petatum esset, ut vilior ob ea regi Hannibal et suspectior ad omnia fieret*). The phrase *ad omnia* places Hannibal against not only his host and the Romans who may speak with him, but also anyone else who may wish to speak to Hannibal in the future. This sentence, therefore, distances Hannibal from anyone with whom he may come into contact in the future.

But there is at least one person who still wishes to speak with Hannibal: Scipio.¹⁵⁶ Livy records what occurs at one of these meetings: Scipio asks Hannibal whom he considers to be the greatest general (35.14.6). Scipio asks the questions, and Hannibal provides the answers. The positioning of Hannibal as the one with the answers gives him a degree of power over Scipio that he has not enjoyed since before Zama. If we consider these meetings a rematch between Hannibal and Scipio, then it is Hannibal who is the final victor, because he gets to answer. Scipio, who defeated Hannibal in battle, acknowledges Hannibal as the ultimate authority on military matters.

Hannibal chooses Alexander of Macedon as the greatest general, because he had defeated an army much larger than his own, and he had travelled to the end of the earth (35.14.7, *quod parva manu innumerabiles exercitus fudisset quod<que> ultimas oras, quas visere supra spem humanam esset*). That Hannibal admires Alexander for defeating an army so much larger than his own is understandable, but his second comment is more interesting. Hannibal appears to consider the amount of distance covered in a campaign to be very

¹⁵⁶ It is interesting to note that Livy in this meeting does not record the presence of interpreters. Has Hannibal learned Latin? Has Scipio learned Punic? Or do they speak another language (Greek)? Or maybe the absence of interpreters means something more. Maybe Hannibal and Scipio have progressed in their understanding of others in general, or that Hannibal and Scipio understand each other better in particular.

important, and that Alexander reached the end (*ultimas oras*) is praiseworthy. Hannibal may be thinking of his own achievements in his war against Rome here, for he fought large Roman armies and he travelled great distances.

Scipio, perhaps surprised by this response, asks whom Hannibal would consider the second greatest general. Hannibal's choice is Pyrrhus. His first reason for this choice has to do with Pyrrhus' abilities in laying out a military camp and his choice of terrain and deployment of troops (35.14.9). It is Hannibal's second reason for choosing Pyrrhus is more interesting: *artem etiam conciliandi sibi homines eam habuisse ut Italicae gentes regis externi quam populi Romani, tam diu principis in ea terra, imperium esse mallerent* (35.14.9).¹⁵⁷ Hannibal notes that Pyrrhus was successful in getting the support of the communities in the region in which he campaigned, and this meant that these communities preferred to be ruled by him, a foreign king, rather than by the Romans, despite Rome's history of control of the area.

Livy concludes this scene with a comment on the nature of Hannibal's response. Hannibal's answer is cryptic with Punic ingenuity (35.14.12, *et perplexum Punico astu responsum et improvisum adsentationis genus Scipione movisse*). By writing this Livy connects Hannibal to his former community, for in his speaking he appears to be Carthaginian. But Hannibal has always been a Carthaginian; it was the Carthaginians who pushed Hannibal out of his city. Here the role of the Romans is important. It is Scipio who perceives Hannibal's response as a typically Punic one, and by his perception Scipio reconnects Hannibal with the community from which he is separated. And that it is Scipio who perceives this is significant. To recall, it was Scipio who argued against Rome getting involved in the political affairs of Carthage. That it is a Roman, the same Roman, who upholds the connection between Hannibal and his community is significant. Scipio thus appears to be someone who understands the importance of a leading citizen being part of his home community, and the role he should play in it. What has happened to Hannibal may be a source of concern for Scipio, that a similar fate could await a leading Roman citizen. Livy may want the reader to see Hannibal's present situation as foreshadowing the situation of the Scipio family.

¹⁵⁷ This comment by Hannibal is intratextual in that it recalls what Livy writes about the campaign of Pyrrhus, narrated in books 13 and 14. The periocha for book 13 clearly suggests that Pyrrhus' campaign presented the Romans with a considerable challenge, although Hannibal's specific comment does not appear to be backed up by what the abbreviator writes in this summary.

When Hannibal and Scipio meet, their meeting is about the past. All the people discussed—Alexander, Pyrrhus, Hannibal and Scipio—were significant military figures in the past. This may seem difficult to understand given that the last two—Hannibal and Scipio—are still alive and it is they who meet each other in this scene, but both understand all too well that their successes are in the past. Scipio's question is a clear acknowledgement of this. He is no longer Rome's leading military commander, therefore he wants acknowledgement from his former adversary of his past greatness.¹⁵⁸ Hannibal, on the other hand, does not seem too upset about his current situation. This is perhaps because unlike Scipio, he can at least take action to improve his situation, albeit he cannot undertake actions that will work towards helping his community, but he can harm his former enemy.

That Hannibal can still actively participate in events is suggested by his contact with Antiochus. Livy describes a meeting between Hannibal and Antiochus shortly after Hannibal's meeting with Scipio, which occurs at the time when Antiochus is holding a *consilium* on his military plans. Hannibal appears to be making a movement, from talking about his past to talking about his (hoped for) future. Ironically, perhaps, Hannibal does this by talking about his past. Hannibal, concerned for Antiochus' apparent dislike of him, asks the king why. Livy does not record Antiochus' reply—although he does note that Antiochus explains his reason(s) for not trusting Hannibal—which may suggest that Antiochus' comments are not appropriate or his belief that Hannibal is not trustworthy is wrong. Hannibal's reply to this is to talk about the oath he took at the encouragement of his father to be an enemy of the Roman people (35.19.3-6).¹⁵⁹ The event is, to recall, a very prominent one in the opening of Livy's account of the Hannibalic War.¹⁶⁰ The

¹⁵⁸ This scene could for Scipio be prophetic in that by asking Hannibal the question of who was the greatest commander he is setting the scene for his own (self-imposed) exclusion from Rome. Had Hannibal chosen Scipio as the best military commander, it would confirm Scipio's suspicion of his own redundancy in Roman politics.

¹⁵⁹ Briscoe (1981) 173 draws attention to Hannibal's use of the word *sacramento* at 35.19.4. Briscoe writes that the word suggests that Hannibal's oath made before his father appears like 'a regular military oath of allegiance'.

¹⁶⁰ This can be said to create a group of fifteen books (21-35) that focuses on Hannibal's actions before, during and after his campaign against Rome. And that Hannibal mentions his oath here can be said to bring to a close that phase of this life. Hannibal can be said to pass the position of enemy of Rome from himself to Antiochus. Seeing this scene as the end of Hannibal as an enemy of Rome can be said to set up Hannibal's presentation as an unfairly persecuted figure in his suicide scene in book 39 (see below).

oath informs Antiochus of Hannibal's position as an enemy of Rome. Hannibal's affirmation that what he promised there to his father remains true re-establishes—if there was any serious doubt—that the Hannibal who stands before Antiochus is the same Hannibal who stood before his father at that altar in Spain. Hannibal therefore demonstrates that he has remained constant in his worldview throughout his life, although the world around him appears to be in a state of flux. Moreover, Hannibal's words serves the AVC in that they validate Livy's account of the Hannibalic War. The Hannibal written up by Livy in the third decade was not a temporary character, a persona taken on by Hannibal only while fighting for Carthage, and fighting against Rome. Hannibal's point is that he will always fight against Rome. It was true as a young boy, and it is still true thirty-six years later. That Hannibal gives the time that he has held to this oath (35.19.4) impresses upon Antiochus that Hannibal can keep to his promises. Hannibal's constancy in his position as an enemy of Rome exists not only throughout time but also throughout space. He mentions that he has kept to this oath after the war, that it drove him from his city, and he will keep to the oath no matter where he must go. This suggests a future for Hannibal, one where he must continue wandering. This he does not want to do, and he places before Antiochus the opportunity to prevent this future, and he encourages Antiochus to make the right choice by calling upon his dead father and the gods as witnesses (35.19.6).¹⁶¹ Hannibal establishes a place for himself in Antiochus' future by offering his services to the king (35.19.6, *proinde cum de bello Romano cogitabis, inter primos amicos Hannibalem habeto: si qua res te ad pacem compellet, in id consilium alium cum quo deliberes quaerito*). Hannibal ties his future to Antiochus making war against the Romans. And he makes it clear that he rejects the alternative course of action, peace with the Romans.

¹⁶¹ Briscoe (1981) 172 and 173 notes that Livy and Nepos may be using the same source here, as both use the verb *cogitare*. Nepos at *Hannibal* 2.6 records the words of Hannibal's oath thus: *quare, si quid amice de Romanis cogitabis, non imprudenter feceris, si me celaris; cum quidem bellum parabis, te ipsum frustraberis, si non me in eo principem posueris.* *Hac igitur, qua diximus, aetate cum patre in Hispaniam profectus est.* Polybius refers to the oath at 3.11.5-7, and records it in the context of Hannibal recalling the oath when speaking to Antiochus. Polybius' version is more detailed than Livy's or Nepos', as it establishes a close personal bond between Hannibal and his father. After conducting the necessary rites, Hamilcar orders the others present to stand back, and Hannibal to come forward.

7.3 Hannibal's suicide (39.50-51).

Hannibal is not the only distinguished character whose death Livy describes in his account of the events of 183 BCE. The historian precedes his notice of Hannibal's death by an allusion to that of Philopoemen, and follows it by a reference to Scipio's death. Other historians, Livy notes, grant Philopoemen the honour of having his death connected with those of Hannibal and Scipio (39.50.10), and that these historians consider Philopoemen to be as good a general as Hannibal and Scipio (39.50.11, *adeo in aequo eum duarum potentissimarum gentium summis imperatoribus posuerunt*).¹⁶² Livy makes a bold statement here, but he does not make it about Philopoemen. Rather, it is Hannibal and Scipio, who are the greatest commanders, and the communities that they have led as commanders, Carthage and Rome, which are the greatest nations.

This passage re-establishes Hannibal in his former position. His experiences since the end of the Hannibalic war appear to be no longer relevant. That Livy does this is understandable. By building up Hannibal to his former status as a military leader, Livy presents Hannibal as in effect doing what he did previously, waging a military campaign against Rome. And it gives Hannibal an appropriate stage from which he can utter his *bon mot* about Rome (see below), which serves to impress upon the reader the admirable nature of Hannibal, and to suggest the not so admirable nature of the Romans. Hannibal's utterance about Rome serves as his war of words against Rome. And it is a war he wins, as Livy in the books, pentads and decades following this scene narrates the decline of Rome.

Hannibal seems to have always known that he would have to take his own life (39.51.4, *semper talem exitum vitae suae Hannibal prospexerat animo*). The use of *semper* here stretches back in time, possibly as far back as Hannibal's time as a Carthaginian military leader (and possibly even to Hannibal's youth and his oath). He knew that he would die this way: therefore the Roman attempt to control Hannibal by capturing him, or by killing him, fails. That Livy has noted that Hannibal can see that the Romans hate him, and that he cannot trust Prusias, distances Hannibal from the Romans and his host: he can live with neither party. It is not that Hannibal cannot trust Prusias *per se*, but that he

¹⁶² See Foulon (1993) on the connection between these three men in Polybius' history. It is disappointing that Foulon does not offer a comparison between Polybius' presentation of Hannibal, Scipio and Philopoemen and Livy's, as Livy might have written his version in response to Polybius'. Livy, in my view, as my discussion above indicates, would have been reluctant to add Philopoemen to the Hannibal-Scipio dynamic, given

cannot trust a king (39.51.4, *et fidei regum nihil sane confisus*), and that he was wary of Prusias' fickleness (*Prusiae vero levitatem etiam expertus erat*). Hannibal is right to feel this way about Prusias, as Livy has noted that Prusias may have developed a plan to kill Hannibal or deliver him to the Romans (39.51.3).

That Hannibal has planned for his escape shows how he is able to think ahead and conceive for every possible outcome. The number of his possible escape routes (including some that are concealed), suggests Hannibal's determination to live, and in part it might be seen as Hannibal overcompensating for the fact that he cannot plan a military campaign. His advance planning is unsuccessful, for Prusias has anticipated everything that Hannibal might do. Prusias is not praised for being able to uncover what Hannibal has done: Livy writes that Prusias learns of Hannibal's plans through his obsessive desire to know and control everything, which is a common trait of kings (39.51.6, *sed grave imperium regum nihil inexploratum quod vestigari volunt efficit*).

Hannibal appears noble in this death scene in that he does not panic. He is not concerned about what his suicide *means* for him, an admission of defeat at the hands of the Romans (to which he had been reconciled since his meeting with Scipio before Zama), but what it *says* about the Romans. Hannibal achieves a minor victory here as he does not read his death as a victory for the Romans. Rather, he interprets his death as a release for the Romans (39.51.9, *liberemus <inquit> diuturna cura populum Romanum, quando mortem senis exspectare longum censent*). Neither Flamininus, the man who comes to Prusias' palace to apprehend Hannibal, nor the Roman nation achieve a victory over Hannibal (*nec magnam nec memorabilem ex inermi proditoque Flamininus victoriam feret*). In fact, the opposite may be true, for not only do the Romans fail to defeat Hannibal here, but also they have significant problems of their own which may, at some point in the future, cause their own defeat. Livy places in the mouth of Hannibal the suggestion that Rome is in decline:

mores quidem populi Romani quantum mutaverint, vel hic dies argumento erit. horum patres Pyrrho regi, hosti armato, exercitum in Italia habenti, ut a veneno caveret praedixerunt; hi legatum consularem, qui auctor esset Prusiae per scelus occidendi hospitis, miserunt. (39.51.10-11)

It is an effective attack on Rome. The Romans in Hannibal's words appear not to be fighting him on equal terms, as they did in the war. To pursue him all over the Mediterranean, and not to be satisfied until they have captured him are, in Hannibal's

the successful crafted intricacy of the scenes which feature Hannibal and Scipio alone in conversation.

mind, the actions of a less than honourable people. By taking his own life, Hannibal ensures that the Roman will fail in this endeavour. And Livy does not record his own observations on Hannibal here: Hannibal has the final word on Hannibal.

Livy now turns to Scipio, of whose passing the historian does not record the details once more. Rather, he weighs the evidence for the claims by previous historians that Scipio's death occurs in this year (39.52.1-6). What is important is what the historian writes after this assessment of the evidence. In a few sentences Livy compares Hannibal, Scipio and Philopoemen. He suggests that the three men have something in common, which perhaps can be seen as the historian's attempt to establish a universal rule about how leading citizens are treated by their nations (39.52.7, *trium clarissimorum suae cuiusque gentis virorum non tempore magis congruente comparabilis mors videtur esse quam quod nemo eorum satis dignum splendore vitae exitum habuit*). Each man died outside his home country, which separates each from his home, which Livy clearly sees as a bad thing.¹⁶³ Mentioning Scipio and Hannibal brings the two men together, as well as their countries, and it establishes that the historian here is thinking not about specific nations and characters individually. Scipio and Hannibal are joined together to enable the historian to think about universal experiences. It is Philopoemen who makes this analysis universal, for he is a character who exists outside the immediate context of the Hannibalic War.

VIII.

me quoque iuvat, velut ipse in parte laboris ac periculi fuerim, ad finem belli Punici pervenisse. nam etsi profiteri ausum perscripturum res omnes Romanas in partibus singulis tanti operis fatigari minime conveniat... (31.1.1)

With these words that open book 31,¹⁶⁴ Livy draws a firm line in the narrative sand under the Hannibalic war. Here the historian reaches the true end of the war (*ad finem belli Punici pervenisse*). Peace with Carthage is followed immediately by war with Macedonia (31.1.6, *pacem Punicam bellum Macedonicum excepit*). But the scale and majesty of the Hannibalic war is not forgotten, for Livy notes how the impending conflict is not life-threatening as the Hannibalic war (31.1.6-10). The historian thus contrasts wars, and

¹⁶³ Pomeroy (1991) ¹⁶⁴ suggests that in noting the death of Scipio in Book 38, the historian provides personal comment because Scipio died away from his native country, which means the historian cannot record the response of the Romans to his death. So too the case may be with Hannibal, hence Livy's decision to include Hannibal's suicide scene in his narrative of the events of 183 BCE.

¹⁶⁴ For analysis, see Briscoe (1973) 49-51.

establishes that some wars are more important than others. This could also mean that the historian means to contrast non-Romans, that is, the non-Romans of the Hannibalic war are more important than the non-Romans of the Macedonian wars.

The third decade of the AVC is more than just a narrative of a war between Rome and the greatest enemy she had ever faced. Situating Rome and Carthage at either end of the narrative, Livy positions all of the known world—textually as well as geographically—between them. With Carthage in such a dominating position at the beginning, and Rome's victory over it so impressive (mainly as a result of Livy's portrayal of Carthage's defeat and Hannibal's decline), the third decade appears to be a study in international power. Given the subject matter, to focus heavily on Hannibal is understandable. While this is impressive in its own right, the historian does not stop there. Livy also presents other stories which we can read as existing both alongside the main Roman-Carthaginian conflict as stories in their own right, stories intertwined with the main narrative, affecting its outcome (Syphax and Masinissa). By reading the third decade in this way, we rise above beholding the narrative as a series of battles, marching armies, speeches by leaders. Although this is an element of Livy 21-30, this chapter has shown that in addition Livy excitingly explores questions of cultural identity and difference.

In the final book of Livy that survives, book 45, the Rhodian Astymedes argues that nations have characters as well as people (45.23.14-6).¹⁶⁵ This chapter has shown that in the third decade at least, while Livy may have believed in what he has Astymedes say, he goes beyond that here. While some characters appear to exist solely within limited traditional national parameters (e.g., Syphax), others clearly step beyond them (e.g., Masinissa). One character defines those parameters (Hannibal).¹⁶⁶ It is Hannibal, the focus of much of this chapter, who best proves this point.¹⁶⁷ That Livy appears to

¹⁶⁵ See Luce (1977) 276-7. Greek historians, including Polybius, tended to call the conflict the Hannibal War. Their version tended to be pro-Carthaginian and portrayed Hannibal in a favourable light.

¹⁶⁶ Syphax adheres to extreme sexual appetite, as does Masinissa—although the latter moves beyond this in this fighting for Rome at Zama. In Astymedes' speech he mentions sexual desire as a national characteristic (45.23.14). Overindulgence in sex is something that Hannibal could not do, given Livy's comment on Hannibal's aversion to overindulgence (21.4.7-8; see above, section II).

¹⁶⁷ This is why the Romans call the Second Punic War the Hannibalic War (e.g. 25.3.3, *bellum cum Hannibale*). Bernard (2000) 345 writes that: 'la seconde guerre punique est vue par les Romains comme <<la guerre contre Hannibal>>'.

do both in the same part of his work suggests that in addition to questions of national identity and representation, individuality, irrespective of nationality—Roman, Carthaginian or Numidian—was a keen interest to Livy. All this occurs in the AVC despite (as pointed out by Cizek) the perfection of Livy's 'Romanocentrism'.¹⁶⁸ Livy is clearly proud to be Roman, and the Hannibalic war is one of the periods of Roman history that most likely made him especially proud. This did not cloud his judgement in making careful evaluations of foreigner characters, and in writing them 'up' in his work. And Livy was not alone in this thinking. In the fourth century CE, Ausonius, in his poem *Ordo nobilium urbium*, lists twenty-cities in descending importance. In third place was Carthage. Ausonius is probably thinking not of Carthage since it was refounded as a Roman city, which had happened well before Livy's lifetime, but rather in its original Punic form. Even in late antiquity, Richard Miles notes, 'Roman Carthage remains locked into looking back at a glorious Punic past'.¹⁶⁹ Livy, in his writing about Hannibal and other Carthaginians in his history can be said to have helped shape that positive past for Carthage that endured for centuries after her destruction. Rome therefore did not—and could not—change what Carthage meant.

¹⁶⁸ Cizek (1995) 178. But note that in the lead up to, and in the aftermath of, their defeat in the war against Rome, the Carthaginians never worry about Rome taking over Carthage and making it part of the Roman empire. Fear of Roman conquest and loss of independence is expressed by non-Roman characters in Livy. On Roman imperial expansion in Livy, see Burck (1982).

¹⁶⁹ Miles (2003) 126. He notes that for the Romans the fact that Roman Carthage stood on the site of the Punic city gave it special significance. Miles writes that 'in accounts of Roman Carthage, the Punic city was always present' (127).

CHAPTER THREE

Alexander the Great in Justin's *Epitome* of Pompeius Trogus' Alexander Narrative (*Historiae Philippicae* 11-12)

Just as Livy's history is different from Sallust's, so too is the work of Pompeius Trogus (hereafter Trogus) different from his predecessors and contemporaries. Livy, for example, writes Roman history *ab urbe condita*, focusing on the centre of his world from the beginning, charting its near-continuous expansion outwards; Trogus writes world (or, as it is sometimes called, universal) history. Trogus' world is bigger than Livy's can ever be—and bigger than Livy would want it to be—, as it contains all parts of the world, even those that never have—and never will—become part of the Roman world.

The inclusion of all nations known to the Romans should encourage us to examine Trogus' history. In theory, a work like Trogus' can be seen as the most encompassing, that is, Trogus can be seen as the writer who would be most sympathetic to the study of non-Romans. While his universal history, the *Historiae Philippicae* (= *Hist. Phil.*), is not unique, both his proximity to Livy and his identification as an Augustan author suggests additional reasons for looking at his narrative. As Sallust's *Jug.* and Livy's third decade invite close study of individual non-Romans, to focus upon a non-Roman who receives close attention in the *Hist. Phil.* will facilitate comparison between Trogus and the historians considered in the previous chapters of this thesis. The best choice here is the account of the campaign of Alexander the Great against Persia in books 11-12.

There are several reasons why these books make a good choice. First, Justin's epitomes of these books have recently received scholarly attention.¹ Second, Trogus, as a Romanised Gaul² writing about Greeks interacting with, and achieving military conquest over, the Persians allows us to examine foreign community and individual representation in the second degree. By this I mean a Roman writing about the

¹ E.g., Heckel and Yardley (1997) on these books, with a volume on books 13-15 in preparation; Yardley (2003) is an comprehensive study of the literary aspects of Trogus and Justin.

² Trogus is identified as such by Yardley (2003) 3.

interactions of two different cultures.³ Trogus' own community does not play a part in the events he narrates in these books. This view has special meaning for the (re)presentation of Alexander in particular. As a Greek who managed to do what the Romans might have seen as their speciality—military conquest—Alexander enjoyed a special place in Roman culture. Moreover, in terms of cultural representation, Alexander's campaign marked a period of (supposedly) better information on foreign cultures, as Arnaldo Momigliano suggests: 'Alexander's conquests gave new scope to Herodotean ethnography. As the regions described by Herodotus were now under Greco-Macedonian control, one could expect better information—and to a certain extent it was forthcoming'.⁴ And then there is the fact that we benefit from the number of narratives which describe that journey. The Romans had a wide choice of narratives describing Alexander's campaign. In addition to Pompeius Trogus' account, there are the works of Curtius Rufus, Arrian, Diodorus Siculus and Plutarch.⁵ Finally, several leading figures of the late republic and early empire saw themselves—or were seen by others as being (Roman) imitators of Alexander.⁶ Some Romans went as far as to try to

³ This is 'writing the world from the sidelines', on which see Clarke (1999) 252-5. It should be noted that we have seen this in the previous two chapters, but on a much smaller scale. See chapter one, section 4.1 on Jugurtha and Bocchus in Sallust, and chapter two, section four on Syphax and Masinissa in Livy. The nature of Sallust's and Livy's writing is such that they cannot explore the interrelation of two different non-Roman communities on the scale that Trogus can. Trogus, therefore, can be said to have a distinct advantage over his predecessors and contemporaries who refrain from universal history.

⁴ Momigliano (1991) 166.

⁵ Cf. Valerius Maximus 5.1. ext. 1a (*morum Alexandri praeconium facere cogor, cuius ut infinitam gloriam bellica virtus, ita praecipuum amorem clementia meruit. is, dum omnes gentes infatigabili cursu lustrat...*). And 5.1. ext 1b: *idem* [sc. Alexander] *non hominum ulli sed Naturae Fortunaque cedens*. In the case of Curtius Rufus, Arrian and Plutarch, it should be noted that as they are writing after Trogus, it is possible that they used Trogus as a source. Trogus, therefore, is an early (Roman) source on Alexander, whose work is only preceded by Diodorus. On Curtius Rufus' use of Trogus, see Atkinson (1980) 59-61 and Yardley (2003) 101-4 *passim*. On Curtius' approach to Alexander, see Baynham (1998). That so many wrote about Alexander in the century leading up to Plutarch might suggest that the intellectual élite were looking for something—or someone—whom they did not find in contemporary culture—whether Greek, Roman or otherwise. In the case of Arrian, it is possible that he found Trogus' account unsatisfactory, given his comments on why he chose to write the *Anabasis* (1.12.2-5). On this 'second preface', see Moles (1985); Marincola (1989) and (1997) 253-4.

⁶ The first port of call here is Spencer (2002); see also Gissel (2001) 281-5; Tisé (2002). Weippert (1972) examines several Roman Alexanders: Scipio Africanus, Pompey, Julius Caesar, Antony and Augustus. Spencer (2002) lists the same Romans. Imitation of

recreate (unsuccessfully) his conquest of the East.⁷ Livy, on the other hand, tried to do the reverse. Livy's imagined invasion of Rome by Alexander may be taken as an invasion of the west in retaliation by the Parthians, a Parthian invasion of Augustan Rome in retaliation for Crassus' and Antony's illegal incursions.⁸ Alexander's imagined defeat by the Romans serves to reaffirm Livy's confidence in the superiority of the Romans of the past, and possibly comment on the weakness of the Romans of the present. If Crassus and Antony could not conquer Parthia, then possibly a Alexander of the first century BCE could conquer Rome.

One aspect about Justin's summary of Trogus' Alexander narrative needs to be noted at the outset. Because of the nature of Justin's summary, and the powerful presence of Alexander, one deficiency of the narrative is that there is no detailed exploration of Macedonians, Persians or Indians who either fight for or against Alexander as there is in, say, Curtius Rufus or Arrian.⁹ Reading Justin's *Epitome* of Trogus on Alexander, therefore, can be seen as limiting distraction from a full view of

Alexander by Augustus may have had an influence of Trogus' narrative. See Weippert (1972) 215-59 on the Augustan period and Alexander. See Gissel (2001) on Germanicus as a Roman version of Alexander, in particular Tacitus' portrayal of Germanicus in his *Annals*. See *idem* 277 n.1 for further bibliography. Cf. Spencer (2002) 191-2.

⁷ E.g., Crassus in his failed invasion of 53 BCE, Caesar's campaign which was supposed to begin in 44, or Antony beginning in 41. To move forward to the early empire, the call for an invasion of the Parthia was popular with poets. Both Propertius (3.5 and 4.6) and Horace (*Odes* 3.5), for example, call for the expiation of Crassus' shameful defeat. See Clarke (1999) 262-3 on Alexander's universality and what Trogus may have meant for this to be a (negative) comment on Rome.

⁸ See Morello (2002) 80-3 on the contemporary (i.e., Augustan) context of the Alexander digression. Morello acknowledges that the campaigns against Parthia undertaken by Crassus and Antony 'would certainly be available to a reader thinking about East—West conflict, or about the effects of oriental *luxuria* on the *mos maiorum*' (80).

An imagined invasion of Rome by a Parthian/ Persian leader must surely be read on the back of Parthian impressions of the Roman empire. This is something that is very hard to uncover, as most sources on the Parthians are Roman, and are slanted in favour of the Romans. An attempt to investigate the Parthian perspective is Kennedy (1996), especially 74-82.

⁹ An example of Alexander's army playing a role in interpreting the (past) actions of their commander is Curtius Rufus book 10. Alexander's death is recorded at the mid-way point in the book (10.5); the majority of the book presents the thoughts and deeds of Alexander's subordinates and the army as they try to determine what to do with the empire that Alexander has established (10.6-10). The wide range of opinions expressed by Alexander's subordinates, and the political intrigue (including assassination) that follows on from Alexander's death suggests in a way his failure as leader when he was alive: that is, he was not able to establish his authority sufficiently over his army to ensure that his army remains orderly even after his death.

Alexander. Or—as this chapter demonstrates—the limited view that Justin provides of Alexander’s men serves to reflect back upon Alexander himself. In other words, Justin uses the Macedonian army, for example, as a means for reading Alexander from another angle. And, as this chapter demonstrates, they serve an important role in that they express their (collective) opinion about Alexander’s campaign and the transformation that he himself undertakes.

I.

Before looking at the Alexander narrative in the *Hist. Phil.*, we need to understand the positions of Trogus and Justin in relation to each other. Because what we possess is Justin’s summary of Trogus, and not Trogus’ original, the situation with this work is different from the others in this thesis in form as well as in its content.¹⁰

What we know about Trogus comes from the narrative. Justin devotes a substantial amount of text to summarising the historian’s treatment of the conurbation nearest to him, Marseille (43.3.5-5.10). Marseille was a city like no other in the ancient world: in Trogus’ time there was a mixture of the Gallic, Roman, and others who passed through travelling east, west, north or south.¹¹ It is probable that he wrote his history from this part of the Roman world rather than at Rome. This is not to say that Trogus is writing from the margin of the Roman world, which might give him a perspective of being outside looking in. Neither need we believe that it led him to place Rome on some kind of margin inside the *Hist. Phil.*¹² But this different geographical position from Sallust and Livy is significant, possibly making him more sensitive to, or at least more aware of, the non-Romans around him.¹³

¹⁰ There are general studies that outline more fully this position: Alonso-Núñez (1992) and Seel (1972).

¹¹ On the cultural position of this region, especially the degree to which it acculturated, see Woolf (1998); on Marseille, see Hodge (1998). See also Tacitus, *Agricola* 4.2-3 (see conclusion). On Trogus and Massilia see Alonso-Núñez (1994). On this position and possible criticism of Rome, see Urban (1982).

¹² His history proceeds from empire to empire, Assyria to Macedonia to Persia back to Macedonia, for example. However, when he comes to contemporary history, Rome is treated as sharing world control with Parthia, to whom Trogus devotes two books (41-2) before his Roman narrative (43-4). In doing this, Trogus may be engaging with contemporary thought on Parthia that is being expressed by the poets. See my comments above.

¹³ Heckel and Yardley (1997) 6-8 provide additional discussion. Cf. Alonso-Núñez (1987) 59.

Despite the different positions of Trogus and Livy, they were working towards a similar goal, comprehensive history, although in different ways.¹⁴ What Livy achieves in time Trogus achieves in geography. In the now peaceful Roman (Augustan) world order, the *Hist. Phil.* might better reflect the Augustan Roman Empire than Livy's history.¹⁵ This might extend to the representation of foreign communities.¹⁶

The relationship between Trogus and Justin is obviously different. It has important ramifications for our reading of the *Hist. Phil.* When Justin discovered the *Hist. Phil.* and began writing his summaries and, more importantly, what were his reasons for doing so, are not known.¹⁷ There is an important difference of the nature of what they are writing, that is, that Justin is writing (or creating through editing) an epitome of Trogus' narrative.¹⁸ Scholarship has sought to understand Justin's position as an abbreviator.¹⁹ What we ought to acknowledge is that Justin, like ourselves, is a reader of the *Hist. Phil.*: he interpreted it in his own way as he read the work, and set down his interpretation by writing (or excerpting) his summaries.

It is important to note that we can make a reasonable guess what this change was. For example, with respect to Justin's *Epitome* for book 12, it appears that he edited out the episodes of Trogus that did not have Alexander's campaign as their focus. Trogus' prologue to the book tells us that there was more to this book than Alexander's adventures in Persia and India:

duodecimo volumine continentur Alexandri magni bella Bactriana et Indica usque ad interitum eius, dictaeque in excessu res a praefecto eius Antipatro in Graecia gestae, et ab Archidamo, rege Lacedaemoniorum, Molossoque Alexandro in Italia, quorum ibi est terque cum exercitu

¹⁴ Heckel and Yardley (1997) 6: 'it would not be surprising if two of Rome's foremost historians in the Augustan period knew each other's work; indeed, it would be surprising if they did not'. Note also the possible Livian usages in Trogus, Justin or both—see Yardley (1994) and (2003) 20-78; Heckel and Yardley (1997) appendix v.

¹⁵ Alonso-Núñez (1987) 56: 'the political unification of the Mediterranean world in the last epoch of the Roman Republic doubtless provided the stimulus for the composition of world histories'. See also Clarke (1999).

¹⁶ Yardley (2003) 9-10, referring to Rambaud (1948), notes that it appears Trogus' interest in ethnography comes from Sallust. Syme (1964) 289 agrees.

¹⁷ A summary may be found in Heckel and Yardley (1997) 8-13.

¹⁸ For a general survey of the nature of epitomes and problems associated with them (including interpretation), see Brunt (1980).

¹⁹ E.g., Hammond (1983) 86-7, Cizek (1995) 267-8 and Heckel and Yardley (1997) 8-14. Another important angle of discussion is literary analysis, that is, what literary idioms are from Trogus, Justin, or poetic forms adopted by one or the other—see Goodyear (1982); Yardley (1994); Heckel and Yardley (1997) 14-15 and 333-343.

deletus. additae his origines Italicae Apulorum, Lucanorum, Samnitium Sabinorum, et ut Zopyrion in Ponto cum exercitu periit.

Justin's interest is more on Alexander in Persia, or rather on Alexander himself. This focusing on Alexander in one sense gives the work greater clarity, omitting sections of the narrative that would have weakened the reader's focus on Alexander. On the other hand, editing also weakens the narrative, making it less universal and, in this case, possibly exaggerating the perceived flaw of excessive focus on Hellenic matters.

II.

Justin's summary of book 11 of the *Hist. Phil.* does not begin with Alexander. Rather, it describes the military and political situation that exists in the aftermath of the death of Philip. It establishes a power vacuum into which Alexander must insert himself and resolve. The situation in the army comes first:

in exercitu Philippi sicuti variae gentes erant, ita eo occiso diversi motus animorum fuere. alii quippe iniusta servitute oppressi ad spem se libertatis erigebant, alii taedio longinquae militiae remissam sibi expeditionem gaudebant. (11.1.1-3)

It is not the opinion of, but rather opinion towards, the ruling Macedonians that is presented here. This establishes Philip's (now Alexander's) army as a group that encompasses different attitudes towards the events that affect them. Strategically speaking, this does not bode well for a new leader. A commander surely must have a unified army in order to have the best chances of military success. This, then, is Alexander's first challenge.

The focus on the army first in this epitome is very important. First, it establishes firmly the central role that the army will have in the narrative of Alexander's reign. And it is not so much what that army will *do*, but what the army *thinks* that the opening sentence establishes as truly important. Given that it is the army whose thoughts are expressed first, they are given a certain amount of credibility. Everyone who is mentioned from this point on must exist within, and therefore be judged by, the army. And that Philip's army is a diverse group of soldiers tells us that their viewpoint will be broad.²⁰ That is, in cultural terms they will not expect their leader to be someone who adheres solely to the Macedonian lifestyle. Rather, they should accept a leader who is accepting of a wide-range of cultures. This is important because, in fact, as the course of the Alexander narrative unfolds, this army, under Alexander's leadership in the Persian

²⁰ On the makeup of the Macedonian army, see Hammond (1980) 28-30.

campaign, will serve to point out, and to be critical of, Alexander's embracing of Persian customs.

If the army are thinking about the present situation in Macedonia, the focus then turns to the friends of the late king who are thinking about the future. And this future involves not Macedonian politics, that is, to ensure a stable situation in the Macedonian court. This seems to be taken care of by Justin when he refers to these people as *amicos*. That they are friends—of the past king and, presumably, of the new one—establishes that the Macedonian court is already stable. This makes the job of these nobles easier, as they think about future campaigns in Europe and in Asia:

amicos quoque tam subita mutatione rerum haud mediocris metus ceperat, reputantes nunc provocatam Asiam, nunc Europam nondum perdomitam, nunc Illyrios, Tracas et Dardanos ceterasque barbaras gentes fidei dubiae et mentis infidae. (11.1.5-6)

Here Asia appears before Europe, followed by three communities that are named by Justin: the Illyrians, Thracians and Dardanians, as well as other 'barbaric tribes' (*ceterasque barbaras gentes*) of 'dubious loyalty and unreliable character' (*fidei dubiae et mentis infidae*). Justin possibly believes that their being barbarians (*barbaras*) makes them *fidei dubiae et mentis infidae*. This version differs from Plutarch's account in his *Alexander*, which does not contain the negative description of the barbarians.²¹ It appears that in the Roman version it is not what the barbarian *want* that matters, but what they are *like*. These *ceteras barbaras gentes*, moreover, contrast *gentes* of the opening sentence. The barbarian peoples are untrustworthy; the *gentes* of the Macedonian army express varied concerns for themselves that seem legitimate.

Justin establishes a clear hierarchy in this passage: Asia, Europe, allies, barbarians. The first place mentioned is Alexander's future, the general geographic area that will shortly be foremost in his mind. Next comes Europe, a generalised geographic indicator of where he is at present. The communities named after this make Europe a more specific place in space (regions of Europe now have specific names) and time (these are the areas which require his immediate attention). Finally, there are barbarians, people of

²¹ Cf. Plutarch, *Alexander* 9.1, where the order is different. First, he notes that the barbarians hope to regain their independence (οὔτε γὰρ τὰ βάρβαρα καὶ πρόσσοικα γένη τὴν δούλωσιν ἔφερε, ποθοῦντα τὰς πατρίους βασιλείας). Then Plutarch mentions Greece, which has been conquered by Philip, but was not yet fully subdued. Alexander's advisors suggest that he abandon Greece and focus his attention on affirming control over the barbarian peoples (9.2). Alexander then marches against the barbarians and quickly conquers them, before learning of the Theban revolt, which he then seeks to suppress by going immediately to Greece (9.3).

minimal worth. The lack of specific identification marginalises them. As they cannot be known, they cannot—and need not—be visited and conquered by Alexander.

It is significant that Justin does not place the comment on *barbaras gentes* as a reflection of the opinion of Alexander. By writing that it was the *amicos* who refer to untrustworthy barbaric tribes, Justin frees Alexander from starting his political and military campaign from a position of prejudice when it comes to foreign communities. It is others, neither Justin nor Alexander, who express this prejudice. It also prevents Alexander from appearing to conform to a stereotype common to his own community. Alexander is not hindered by the cultural biases of the other Macedonians. More importantly, it will enable him to see beyond the *prima facie* aspects of any of these communities in his dealings with them—whether he intends diplomatic exchanges or military confrontation.

This passage also serves to delay Alexander in that he does not express his interest in other communities. Had Alexander's interest in other cultures been expressed here, it would make Alexander seem out of place with his countrymen. Justin therefore appears to delay Alexander from displaying his zeal for a non-Hellenic culture too soon.²² There will be ample opportunity for this when Alexander crosses to Persia.

Alexander appears to meet successfully the challenges before him in his early reign. Justin writes that Alexander's arrival solves the problems left by the death of Philip (11.1.7, *quis rebus veluti medela quaedam interventus Alexandri fuit*). In the sentences that follow, Justin justifies this claim as Alexander receives support from both the assembly and the people (11.1.7-9). He gets the support of his own people before he expresses interest in other communities (see above). Afterwards he responds directly to the concern of his father's friends, when Justin notes that among Alexander's early achievements was the defeat of 'many rebelling peoples' (11.2.4, *inter initia multas gentes rebellantes conpescuit, orientes non nullas seditiones extinxit*). First he deals with family matters: he arranges his father's funeral and he executes those who murdered Philip, as well as a possible challenger to the Macedonian throne (11.2.1-3). The other major concern of the

²² Unlike in Plutarch, where the youthful prince displays interest in Persia as a youth. In his father's absence he receives envoys from the Persian king. Alexander, Plutarch notes, does not ask childish questions, but rather enquires about travelling in Persia (roads and the nature of the journey) and the character of the Persian king. This intelligent inquisitiveness greatly impresses the Persian ambassadors, who almost seem to anticipate Alexander's invasion of their country (5.1, καὶ τίς ἡ Περσῶν ἀλκὴ καὶ δύναμις, ὥστε θαυμάζειν ἐκείνους καὶ τὴν λεγομένην Φιλίππου δεινότητα μηδὲν ἡγεῖσθαι πρὸς τὴν τοῦ παιδὸς ὁρμὴν καὶ μεγαλοπραγμοσύνην).

Macedonian elders, Asia, quickly receives Alexander's attention as well, for Justin writes that the new king is in the midst of preparations for this important military operation when he learns that Athens and Sparta have gone over to the Persians (11.2.7, *in cuius apparatu occupato nuntiatur Athenienses et Lacedaemonios ab eo ad Persas defecisse auctoremque eius defectionis magno auri pondere a Persis corruptum Demosthenem oratorem extitisse*).²³ He is still dealing with Greek affairs, the first stage of his career; but as Athens and Sparta turn to Persia here, they represent the next stage of Alexander's career, his defeat of Darius and the conquest of Persia. Or—to put it another way—it is not Alexander who turns to Persia, it is the Greeks. Alexander is not actively seeking to invade Persia, rather he does so in response to the thoughts and actions of others (see above on 11.1.5-6). And dealing with affairs in Greece is an intermediary step for Alexander on his journey to Persia, a prequel episode in which Alexander can demonstrate that he has the military and diplomatic skills necessary to undertake the Persian campaign pointed to by others.

There is early evidence of Alexander as a diplomat when, on his way to deal with Athens and Sparta, Alexander meets the Thessalians (11.3.1-2). In the first sentence he speaks to the Thessalians, reminding them of the good treatment they received from Philip, as well as his personal connection to these people on account of his mother's ancestry (11.3.1, *in transitu hortatus Thessalos fuerat beneficiorumque Philippi patris maternaeque suae cum his ab Aeacidarum gente necessitudinis admonuerat*).²⁴ This sentence is interesting for two reasons: (1) Alexander uses his father as a way to (re-)establish a relationship with the Thessalians; (2) his attempt to establish a personal connection to Thessaly suggests that Alexander does not want to be perceived exclusively as a Macedonian.²⁵ He would rather be seen as part of the community from which he comes, and part of the community with which he is dealing. Alexander's speech works: in the second sentence

²³ It should be noted here that Justin alters the order of events, whether intentionally or unintentionally—see Heckel and Yardley (1997) 83-5. Their verdict is that 'Justin's history of the year 336-5, from the death of Philip II to the Theban uprising, is confused' (83).

²⁴ This is repeated in the summary of Alexander's life at the end of book 12 (12.16.3) (see below, section 6). It appears to fit within one of the categories of ethnic identity listed by Hall (1997) 32-3: 'the ethnic group is distinguished...by virtue of association with a specific territory and a shared myth of descent'. By referring to his mother, Alexander connects himself to Thessaly: thus he has a bond with others from this region—the Thessalians. A thorough examination of the nature of ethnic identity is offered in Hall (1997) 17-33.

²⁵ On Alexander's interaction with the Greeks, including his position as hegemon, see Hammond (1980) 253-9.

Justin provides the Thessalian response to Alexander's words, followed by their making him their supreme commander (11.3.2, *cupide haec Thessalis audientibus exemplo patris dux universae gentis creatus erat et vectigalia omnia reditusque suos ei tradiderant*). This is an act of inclusion, that is, Alexander is made part of a Greek community. And by proclaiming Alexander *dux universae gentis*, the Thessalians expand Alexander's horizons beyond Greece for the first time.

This passage is important in another way. Diplomacy involves communicating effectively with the other party, hearing what they say and responding appropriately. In this passage Justin records the first speech act of Alexander. It is possible that in Trogus' original a speech by Alexander would have been recorded here, whether in direct or indirect discourse.²⁶

Alexander's oratorical acumen appears to achieve results in places other than where he speaks, for after describing Alexander's dealings with the Thessalians, Justin turns to the Athenians (11.3.3-5). Athens now changes sides, from being allied with Persia to embracing Alexander.²⁷ It appears to be an impressive achievement for Alexander when Justin writes that what the Athenians disliked about the Macedonian is now what they admire (11.3.4, *contemptum hostis in admirationem vertentes pueritiamque Alexandri spretam antea supra virtutem veterum ducum extollentes*). That Alexander can effect such a complete reversal of opinion about him speaks for his abilities as a diplomat. These abilities are confirmed when he meets the Athenian ambassadors, reprimanding them for their behaviour, but taking no further action (11.3.5).

²⁶ Trogus, it is often noted, had a distinct opinion on the speeches in history: in one passage he clearly indicates his dislike of Livy's uses of speeches. This is 38.3.11 in Justin: *quam orationem dignam duxi, cuius exemplum brevitati huius operis insererem; quam obliquam Pompeius Trogus exposuit, quoniam in Livio et in Sallustio reprehendit, quod contiones directas pro sua oratione operi suo inserendo historiae modum excesserint*. See Laird (1999) 136-8 for comment. However, Hammond (1983) 115 suggests that there are instances where Trogus 'freely composed' speeches: e.g., the mutiny of Alexander's soldiers, described by Justin at 12.11.5-12.3.

²⁷ This appears to be a character trait of the Athenians as perceived by Trogus, Justin, or both. As Heckel and Yardley (1997) 91 point out, this is not the first time that the 'fickleness' of the Athenians has been mentioned—cf. 5.4.11-18 on Athenian behaviour towards Alcibiades. Cf. Arrian 1.1.3, where the Athenians turn against Alexander, but then embraced him immediately upon his arrival in his territory, and concede to him greater honours than they had given to Philip: νεωτέρισαι δὲ ἅττα καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων τὴν πόλιν· ἀλλὰ Ἀθηναίους γε τῇ πρώτῃ ἐφόδῳ Ἀλεξάνδρου ἐκπλαγέντας καὶ πλείονα ἔτι τῶν Φιλίππῳ δοθέντων Ἀλεξάνδρῳ εἰς τιμὴν συγχωρεῖν.

Athens appears to be an *exemplum* of how a Greek state ought to behave—towards Alexander, that is; after dealing with Athens he directs his attention towards Thebes. The Thebans are, perhaps appropriately, the opposite to the Athenians—in how they treat Alexander. Here Justin states that it was Alexander's intention to show the same *indulgentia* as he does to Athens if the Thebans behave in a similar way (11.3.6). That is, Alexander is willing to treat all Greeks the same way. Here, however, events unfold differently, both in terms of how Alexander and the Greek community behave, and this establishes a challenge for Alexander. The Thebans take up arms only to be defeated swiftly by Alexander's forces (11.3.7). There is then a most interesting scene as the Greeks contemplate the destruction of Thebes. The Greeks speak for the punishment of the city, with Alexander remaining silent—or so it appears according to Justin's account. Two arguments are used against Thebes: first, there is Theban support of Persia, for which the other Greek states vowed to destroy the city (11.3.9-10). The destruction of the city, therefore, can represent Alexander's future conquest of Persia, in miniature. Alexander's actions against the city will foreshadow what he can achieve in Persia.²⁸ But the anti-Theban advocates go further, citing historical *exempla*, the tales of Thebes and Thebans of the past treated at length in tragic theatre (11.3.11, *adiciunt et scelerum priorum fabulas, quibus omnes scaenas repleverint, ut non praesenti tantum perfidia, verum et vetere infamia invisi forent*).²⁹

To destroy a Greek state raises important issue concerning Alexander and his desire to control all of Greece. That Trogus/ Justin record the other side of the debate is important: Alexander can thus be said to have considered the positions of both his allies and the Thebans; his decision, in full knowledge of the facts, will speak volumes for his abilities to lead and make important decisions about other communities, especially ones he seeks to have as part of his empire.

²⁸ Cf. Arrian 1.9, where the historian perceives the defeat in light of other past Greek distasters (he mentions the past defeats of Athens (e.g., the Sicilian expedition) and Sparta (e.g., Mantinea). The Athenians and Spartans who try to influence the settlement of Thebes, therefore, do so in the context of their own history of interaction with other Greek states rather than calling upon Macedonia's experiences. Thus Alexander leaves the final settlement of Thebes to the other Greeks (1.9.9), with the exception of the house of Pindar, which he orders to be spared.

²⁹ Heckel and Yardley (1997) 93: 'at the time, the king undoubtedly rehearsed the long history of actual and alleged brutalities and Theban perfidy to justify his actions. And, indeed, later historians concerned for Alexander's reputation found additional arguments to exculpate the king'.

That Justin names the Theban, Cleadas, who speaks in defence of the actions of his city (11.4.1-6), brings a possible foil against Alexander, for he is the first individual other than Philip and Alexander to be named in the epitome. His speech can be seen as a response to Alexander's to the Thessalians, for he too refers to Alexander's lineage. His references to Alexander's past threatens to recast Alexander, to place him in a context other than that which Alexander himself desires to exist. It is for this reason that Alexander must not accept his arguments in favour of saving Thebes.

In the aftermath of Thebes' destruction, there is another test in Greece for Alexander as a diplomat. Athens reappears in this scene (11.4.9-12). Supposedly loyal to Alexander, the city accepts Theban refugees. Alexander demands their return, but then demands that Athens give up her orators instead. Athens instead sends her generals into exile. Justin notes where they go: to Persia, or rather to Darius, the antithesis of Alexander (11.4.11-12, *ut retentis oratoribus duces in exilium agerentur, qui ex continenti ad Darium profecti non mediocri momentum Persarum viribus accessere*). While this may be seen as a failure for Alexander, it also compels him into action against Persia as well, for he must now deal with Persia in order to sort out finally affairs in Greece. Alexander's control over Greece, a diverse range of communities close to his own, therefore, is directly dependent upon his dealing with Persia.

If the Athenian generals going to Darius marks a widening of the geographic boundries of the narrative, in that for the first time people in the narrative go from Greece to Persia, while Alexander does the opposite in that he redirects his focus on the smallest aspect of his community: his family. He puts to death the relatives of his stepmother whom Philip had placed in important roles, as well as anyone who might challenge Alexander for the throne (11.5.1-2). This recalls a similar action taken by Alexander before his military operations in Greece, where he puts his stepbrother to death (11.2.3). The narrative of Alexander's actions in Greece are framed by Alexander's dealings with his own family. Greece, a whole community, therefore, is marginalised in the text by Alexander's family, which, by their reduction in numbers, in effect means Alexander alone. This position of Alexander surrounding the Greeks demonstrates ultimately that Greece is weak and, possibly, that it is not enough for Alexander to rule this region alone. But his connection to Greece is still important. Immediately before his departure for Persia, Alexander offers a sacrifice in which he makes it clear he

undertakes his campaign as the 'avenger of Greece' (11.5.6, *priusquam ulla navis litore excederet, hostias caedit, petens victoriam bello, quo totiens a Persis petita Graeciae ultor electus sit*).³⁰

That Trogus devotes so much attention to Alexander's actions in Greece (if Justin's epitome is a good guide here) suggests the importance to the historian of Alexander's interaction with Greeks in judging what kind of person Alexander was. Arrian, for example, in his *Anabasis* only devotes a portion of book one to Alexander in Greece (1.1.1-1.11.2), with six and two-thirds books (approximately) devoted to the Asian *anabasis*. Arrian's brevity on Alexander in Greece may suggest that he understood Alexander's history as the history of his Persian campaign.

III.

The Alexander narrative is without doubt dominated by the actions of the protagonist in Persia. Alexander, after all, is defined in history by his Persian campaign; and so it should be that a narrative of his campaign should have Persia at its centre. The basic division of the narrative should be noted here: the remainder of book 11 recounts Alexander's campaign against Darius; the first section of book 12 narrates Alexander in control of Persia.

With affairs in Greece settled, both political and familial, Alexander turns towards his Persian campaign. There is a sense that Trogus has established the important relationship between Alexander and Persia in the way he arranges his material previously in the *Hist. Phil.* The historian devotes one book to Persian history leading up to Alexander's invasion (book 10) in between the three books on Philip and the two books on Alexander. This can be seen as a digression in the sense that Trogus interrupts his narrative of Macedonian history by recounting Persian history. The historian can be said to explore Persian history in order to set up the most important event in that history, her conquest.³¹

³⁰ The identification of Alexander as avenger of Greece also appears at Curtius Rufus 5.5.8, *ut vero Iovem illi tandem, Graeciae ultorem, aperuisse oculos conclamavere, omnes pari supplicio adfecti sibi videbantur*.

³¹ We can compare Trogus' narrating Persian history before Alexander's conquest of the country to Ammianus Marcellinus' writing of a lengthy digression on the same country before narrating Julian's campaign there. See chapter five on Ammianus' digression on Persia and the Persians in his *Res Gestae*. There are two differences between Trogus' and Ammianus' approach. The first is that Trogus devotes a whole book to Persians and their history, while Ammianus only devotes a (substantial) section of one book. The second difference is that Alexander's campaign succeeds, while Julian's campaign is a spectacular failure.

Alexander firmly looks forward, in fact, for just as he sets out for Asia, he relinquishes his holdings in Greece and Europe, declaring that Asia is sufficient for him (11.5.5, *patrimonium omne suum, quod in Macedonia Europaque habebat, amicis dividit, sibi Asiam sufficere praefatus*).³² Justin's wording here, calling these territories ancestral lands (*patrimonium*), helps to direct attention towards, and emphasise the significance of, what Alexander is doing here: he cuts ties with his home, places it in the past, while looking towards Asia as his future. By stating that Persia is an adequate territory for him to rule, he is looking forwards in time, imagining the Persian campaign finished. Alexander does not completely dismiss his past home, however. By dividing his kingdom among friends (*amicis*), his European territories remain connected to him.

That his Hellenism means something for Alexander—at this early stage of his campaign—is evident in that he is careful to do things that connect him to the Greek past. While at Troy he sacrifices to the tombs of the Greek heroes who fought there (11.5.12). This is, clearly, the point of transition for Alexander from west to east, from the Hellenic to the Persian world. Justin keeps this transition brief by not noting to which hero (if to any one hero in particular) Alexander offers his sacrifice.³³ This makes Alexander's sacrifice seem Panhellenic, that he is offering sacrifice to any hero from any

³² Cf. Arrian 1.11.3, where the historian names the person whom Alexander places in charge of Macedonian and Greek affairs (ἄμα δὲ τῷ ἡρι ἀρχομένῳ ἐξελαύνει ἐφ' Ἑλλησπόντου, τὰ μὲν κατὰ Μακεδονίαν τε καὶ τοὺς Ἑλληνας Ἀντιπάτρῳ ἐπιτέψας). Trogus' reference to *Europa* magnifies Alexander's achievement, while Arrian's Ὀλλήνω diminishes Alexander. Trogus can be seen therefore as establishing the starting position for Alexander, which the Alexander historians who follow him either confirm or rewrite.

³³ Cf. Arrian 1.12.1; Plutarch, *Alexander* 15.7-9; Diodorus Siculus 17.17.3. Arrian's version is especially interesting in that he notes that Alexander visits specifically the tomb of Achilles, and there Alexander remarks how fortunate Achilles was to have his achievements recorded by Homer. Arrian at that point notes that Alexander is right to admire Achilles on that score, for Alexander's own achievements have not been adequately narrated before. Arrian compares Alexander's *anabasis* to that of Xenophon, writing that Xenophon's excellent account of the ten thousand means that this misadventure is more well-known than Alexander's (1.12.3). This is not the way it should be, as Arrian then goes on to note (1.12.4, καίτοι Ἀλέξανδρος οὔτε ξὺν ἄλλῳ ἐστράτευσεν, οὔτε φεύγων μέγαν βασιλέα τοὺς τῇ καθόδῳ τῇ ἐπὶ θάλατταν ἐμποδῶν γιγνομένους ἐκράτησεν· ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστιν ὅστις ἄλλος εἰς ἀνὴρ τοσαῦτα ἢ τηλικαῦτα ἔργα κατὰ πλῆθος ἢ μέγεθος ἐν Ἑλλήσιν ἢ βαρβάροις ἀπεδείξατο).

part of Greece from any point in her history.³⁴ This (brief) scene may be seen in a wider context, too, as marking out the beginning and ending points of Greek history. The Trojan War to many is the start of Greek history, and Alexander's campaign may be seen as the conclusion of *Greek* history in that when Persia is added to the empire, he is a figure in *world* history. From this point it will be the history of Greece and east and west, or Greece and Persia under one ruler. Alexander is more than demonstrating his zeal for Panhellenism. Rather, he is giving us the first glimpse of him as a transnational figure.³⁵

Be this as it may, Alexander's immediate focus is firmly fixed on Persia. The expression *sibi Asiam sufficere praefatus* is not the only example of Alexander perceiving Persia as his at the beginning point in the campaign. When the invaders first arrive in Persia, Alexander orders his army not to pillage the region: they should spare things that will soon be theirs (11.6.1, *inde hostem petens militem a populatione Asiae prohibuit, parcendum suis rebus praefatus, nec perdenda ea, quae possessuri venerint*). This an important step forwards for Alexander: he first announces that he considers Persia his, now he desires his soldiers to do the same. Getting his soldiers to treat Persia as their own kingdom makes Alexander's conquest of it easier, for both he and his army now are thinking in the same vein, that is, of Persia as theirs. Both army and leader mentally assume Persia as their kingdom, which makes their joint effort from this point, the physical conquest of Persia, making their thought reality, easier. That Alexander tries to set up a frame of reference for how his army thinks is significant, for it suggests the leader understands that his army must think of Persia as theirs in order to facilitate their conquest of it, and yet it shows

³⁴ Heckel and Yardley (1997) 110: 'Alexander was anxious to give the campaign a Panhellenic flavour and depict it as the continuation of the struggle between East and West, in which the Trojan War was the most famous episode'. They note also that Alexander is not the first to offer such a sacrifice to the Greek heroes of the Trojan war. The Spartan king Agesilaus conducts a similar sacrifice at Aulis (recorded by Xenophon, *Hellenica* 3.4.3 and Plutarch, *Agesilaus* 6.6-11).

³⁵ We can perhaps compare Alexander's visit to Troy here with Caesar's visit to the same as narrated by Lucan in his *Pharsalia*. Caesar's visits Troy at 9.50-99 of Lucan's poem. Caesar, like Alexander, sees his visit to Troy as being related directly to his past; furthermore, his honouring it will exert a positive effect upon his future. Spencer (2002) 169 writes that 'Lucan makes Alexander a doppelgänger for Caesar, a highly charged, negative political figure, but is Caesar portrayed as an equivalent (but Roman) Alexander, or as a Roman with the negative traits of an Alexander'. Caesar does not visit the tomb of Achilles; rather, he visits the tomb of Alexander in Alexandria (10.1-19). Caesar may have felt he had to compete with Alexander, as a passage from Suetonius, *Iul.* 7.1 suggests: *Gadisque venisset, animadversa apud Herculis templum Magni Alexandri imagine ingemuit et quasi pertaesus ignaviam suam, quod nihil dum a se memorabile actum esset in aetate, qua iam Alexander orbem terrarum subegisset*.

clearly that Alexander knows that his army *do not* think that way. This is perhaps the first glimpse of the difference between Alexander and the men who serve under him.

However, in these early chapters of the Persian campaign Justin does not write *Persia*, but rather *Asia*. This makes Alexander appear to be already looking further ahead, to campaigns further ahead—to India, perhaps. In a sense Alexander's thoughts of *Persia* as his already makes this wider geographic consideration possible—and perhaps it is an expected outcome. *Persia* is also part of *Asia*. By using this more geographically inclusive term Justin subjugates *Persia* to the status of one nation among many (perhaps all to be conquered by Alexander), instead of the substantial military challenge that at present it represents to Alexander.

Persia as a country still exists, however. Alexander tells his troops that *Persia* is ready for the taking, and that it was time for the Persians to be replaced by better people (11.5.7, *quibus longa iam satis et matura imperia contigisse quorumque tempus esse vices excipere melius acturos*). Justin writes that the expectations of the army were the same as those of the king (11.5.8, *sed nec exercitus eius alia quam regis animorum praesumptio fuit*). This is because Alexander does not suggest he will become Persian upon conquering them; suggesting that the Persians will be replaced excludes this. What Alexander is suggesting, and what his soldiers approve, is the idea of conquest without the cultural consequences. By having this position, the army's position of disliking Alexander's orientalisation seem a consistent one.

That the army are thinking of military victory only is suggested by Justin when he writes that the army had already begun to think of Persian treasures that will be theirs when they conquer the country (11.5.9, *quippe obliiti omnes coniugum liberorumque et longinquae a domo militiae Persicum aurum et totius Orientis opes iam quasi suam praedam ducebant, nec belli periculorumque, sed divitiarum meminerant*). The soldiers too, it is important to note, think farther than *Persia*. In fact, the soldiers think on a grander scale than their commander: they think not just of spoils from *Asia*, but of spoils from the whole of the East. Having being inspired by their leader, Alexander's men now take their commander's hopes further, building up the aspired goal in the process. If by conquering the east Alexander's men are thinking about India (and possibly points beyond), they redefine the war to make *Persia* not the specific goal, but just one territory over which they desire victory. And that they think about gaining spoils rather than gaining territory shows the

troops and their commander thinking differently. Alexander thinks about Persia, his men think in wider terms.³⁶

Now that Justin has set up Alexander and his army, he can shift the focus to Darius and the Persians. The Persian king is a very important character in the narrative, for, as the opponent of Alexander, how Justin represents him reflects back on Alexander. Should Darius appear as a noble leader, his defeat by Alexander will reflect positively on the conqueror. Darius as a laudable leader builds up Alexander in another way, for Darius' words and actions speak for the office of King of Persia to which Alexander aspires. Darius serves as an *exemplum* to Alexander, what Alexander must become if he is successfully to rule Persia. Alexander's treatment of Darius, that is, his demonstration of whether he understands Darius as an example, will be important in coming to a judgement of whether Alexander is someone who can cross national boundaries.

Darius at first appears self-confident but not arrogant. He immediately dismisses the idea of cheating, which possibly would give him an easy victory; he is sufficiently secure in his strength (*fiducia virium*). More important, the Persian king does not attempt to prevent Alexander from entering his kingdom: he allows the invaders to advance into the heart of Persia, so that Darius can expel them (11.6.9, *sed in intimum regnum accipere, gloriosius ratus repellere bellum quam non admittere*).³⁷ That Darius identifies his country as *regnum*, and not Persia or Asia, makes the conflict between him and Alexander a personal one. *Regnum* connects Persia to the person who is her *rex*, Darius. To defeat the *rex* is to gain the *regnum*: thus Justin is able to suggest most strongly the connection between Alexander and the man he wishes to replace. And the replacement seems soon to happen, as Darius loses to Alexander in the first battle, as do his subordinates in lesser battles shortly afterwards.³⁸ The effect of Alexander's victory is felt immediately: Justin writes that after this battle most of Asia goes over to him (11.6.14, *post victoriam maior pars*

³⁶ Of course Alexander's soldiers are behaving like soldiers all over the ancient world whereby they think of the potential for the acquisition of money and material objects. But by having their desire for spoils expressed by the historian, their selfish desire is exposed. Cf. Tacitus, *Hist.* 5.11.2, *Romani ad obpugnandum versi; neque enim dignum videbatur famem hostium opperiri, poscebantque pericula, pars virtute, multi ferocia et cupidine praemiorum. ipsi Tito Roma et opes voluptatesque ante oculos; ac ni statim Hierosolyma conciderent, morari videbantur.*

³⁷ This scene is probably Trogus' invention, as it does not appear in Arrian.

³⁸ Justin does not name Darius' helpers, just as he does not name Alexander's: thus the focus is solely on the two leaders. In Trogus it may have been the same. Cf. Arrian's accounts of these early battles in book 1 of the *Anabasis*, where Persian military figures

Asiae ad eum defecit). Despite the fact that Alexander is fighting for control over Persia, against the king of the Persians, Justin's choice of noun here suggests the possibility that here Alexander gets more. Rather, that Asia goes over to Alexander is a validation of Alexander *and* his soldiers, who, as I mentioned above, are the ones who desire victory over more than just the Persian nation. Thoughts about, and the actions of, Asia serve to move Alexander and his army closer together.

What Alexander gains in Asia, he appears to lose in Macedonia. Justin then narrates the rumoured plot against Alexander by the man left in charge of Macedonia (11.7.1-2). Alexander has not totally forgotten his Macedonian past, it appears, at least just yet—despite his statement at the outset of the campaign. Fearing the loss of his home country, Alexander has his appointee imprisoned (11.7.1-2). The friends mentioned by Justin before Alexander crosses into Persia now lose their status as *amici*; and this frees Alexander to seek new friends, new political allies in Persia, his new kingdom. If this is meant to be a setback, Alexander compensates for it by moving further forward into Persia, both geographically and mentally: he visits Gordium, the site of the famous yoke of Gordius. Alexander's intention is to solve the riddle of the knot, so that he may rule Asia, as legend states. Alexander takes the city, visits the yoke, and solves the riddle through a 'forceful'³⁹ interpretation of the legend (11.7.15-16). Alexander's solving of the legend is made more impressive by the passage leading up to this scene, where Justin tells how the legend came to be (11.7.5-14).⁴⁰ Justin explains

are named (e.g., 1.15.1), and he often points out the actions of Parmenio, carried out under Alexander's orders.

³⁹ In Yardley's translation—*violentius* in the Latin text. Hammond (1983) 97 notes that 'A[lexander], Unable to find the end of the knot, [cuts] it with his sword, *violentius oraculo*, from which the reader is expected surely to infer that A[lexander] lost his temper and did not undo the knot in the way required by the oracle'. Cf. Arrian, 2.3.1-8, where he disavows to report accurately what happened here (2.3.8, ὅπως μὲν δὴ ἐπράχθη τὰ ἀμφὶ τῷ δεσμῷ τούτῳ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ, οὐκ ἔχω ἰσχυρίσασθαι). This helps Alexander, for Arrian notes that Alexander becomes angry when he cannot figure out how to untie the knot.

⁴⁰ Cf. Plutarch, who in his *Alexander* (18.1) notes that the story surrounding the yoke come from barbarians (καὶ λόγον ἐπ' αὐτῇ πιστευόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων ἤκουσεν, ὥς τῷ λύσαντι τὸν δεσμὸν εἴμαρτι βασιλεῖ γενέσθαι τῆς οἰκουμένης). That the rumour comes from barbarians might suggest that it should not be believed, and that Alexander too easily is willing to believe whatever suggests that he can quickly achieve his dominion over Persia. But note that in this passage Persia is not identified directly, but rather the one who solves the riddle of the yoke is promised rule over the whole *oikoumene*.

the nature of the problem at some length only for Alexander to provide an immediate solution.

The next major confrontation between Alexander and Darius shows the Macedonian king's sensitivity to foreign cultures. Just prior to battle, Alexander speaks to his army, addressing each community differently (11.9.3, *ne desperatio suis cresceret, circumvectus suos singulas gentes diversa oratione adloquitur*).⁴¹ Justin then tells us the topic of Alexander's speech to each group, from Thracians and Illyrians, Greeks and Macedonians (11.9.4-5). Here Justin divides Macedonians from Greeks, despite Alexander's asserting his role as *hegemon* of Greece. This division is at least partially rectified by Justin when he appears to allocate the final sentence of his summary of Alexander's speech as directed to all communities (11.9.6, *ceterum et laborum finem hunc et gloriae cumulum fore*). For his part Darius' actions appear to mirror Alexander's: he too arranges his troops and, more important, he addresses his soldiers. This attention to the pre-*bellum* situation on both sides in Justin invites comparison of the two leaders. Alexander's address to all his troops, while it acknowledges the diversity of his army, also creates a unity among them, directly their gaze towards a single goal. When it comes to Justin's record of the speech of Darius, on the other hand, there is no such suggestion. So, this pre-fight scene places Alexander in the better position, with his army unified behind him on account of his speech, while Darius' forces remain distinct communities. Darius' situation, in fact, looks similar to that of Alexander when he first ascends the throne of Macedonia (see above on 11.1.1). Alexander was able to overcome divisions within Greece; whether Darius can do the same is not clear. And as Alexander successfully brought many different Greek states together, it is possible that he can do the same with the communities that comprise Darius' army.

Having defeated Darius, and with Persia soon to be his, how Alexander behaves in the aftermath of this battle is important. This is because Justin writes that among the captured Persians are the mother, wife and daughters of Darius.⁴² These three

⁴¹ Flower (2000) 112 points to this passage—and a similar one in Curtius—as an example of Alexander's panhellenism. He also suggests that the battle of Gaugamela that followed was 'nothing short of a panhellenic set piece'. This passage in Justin is consistent with the opening sentence of this epitome, which notes the different communities of the Macedonian army thinking differently.

⁴² Heckel and Yardley (1997) 136 connect this scene to Alexander's discovery of the riches of Darius. They cite Xenophon *Inst. Cyr.* 4.3.2, who on the one hand mentions that easterners take their women and treasures with them to induce them to fight harder

generations of royal Persian women stand as a symbol of the country, and how Alexander behaves here is critical of how we interpret his attitude towards Persia and cultures other than his own. As women, they also represent Persia in time in that they can secure for Alexander Persia's future by providing him with a Persian heir.⁴³ When he visits the women, who believe that his coming to them means they will shortly die, he is impressed by their loyalty to Darius, and assures them that they will not come to any harm (11.9.11-15). He even allays their fears that Darius is dead, informing them that he is still alive. He has no obligation to do this; rather, he shows concern for the Persian women as if they were his own charges, people of his own community.⁴⁴ This appears to be the case in the final sentence of this chapter, where Alexander tells the daughters they will be married (11.9.16). Alexander's intention here is to incorporate the daughters, and therefore Persia as well, into his own kingdom. He does this by allowing the women to marry into his community. Alexander seeks to create a new community, one that is both Persian and Hellenic. This may be seen as creating the context for his conversion to Persian ways that will shortly emerge.

What the takeover of Persia will mean for Alexander is revealed when Justin tells of what happens to Alexander when he comes across Darius' riches (11.10.1). He then begins the practice of *luxuriosa convivio*, and he becomes enamoured with one of Darius'

in battle, defending what they hold dear, but on the other hand simple love of pleasure was probably also a motivation.

⁴³ Hamilton (1969) 54 notes that Arrian, Diodorus and Curtius record that Darius' sons are captured here as well. Plutarch and Justin do not mention Darius' male heirs, which frees Alexander from having to deny Darius' sons the right to succeed their father, either by dismissing their claim, or having to have them executed. In Plutarch's account, like Justin's, Alexander is gracious to the captured Persian women. Plutarch's Alexander goes further, allowing the Persian women the right to bury those of the dead Persians they wish, and he allows them a larger allowance than they enjoyed under Darius (21.2). See Schmidt (1999) 289.

⁴⁴ Cf. Plutarch, *Alexander* 30 on the death of Darius' wife, to which a whole chapter is devoted. Alexander is upset at the lost opportunity to show his kindness here (presumably towards the newborn child). He allows for her to have a glorious burial. One of the eunuchs makes his escape from Alexander's camp, and finds and tells Darius what has happened. In response to the Persian king's upset at this news, the eunuch tells Darius that she received appropriate treatment (30.3). The eunuch maintains this story that Alexander has been a gracious host to the Persian women when questioned further by Darius (30.4-6). It is then that Darius utters his wish that, if he should fail to reclaim his kingdom, that Alexander may rule (30.7, εἰ δ' ἄρα τις οὗτος εἰμαρτὸς ἥκει χρόνος, ὀφειλόμενος νεμέσει καὶ μεταβολῇ, παύσασθαι τὰ Περσῶν, μηδὲς ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων καθίσειεν εἰς τὸν Κύρου θρόνον πλὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου).

daughters (11.10.2-3, *tunc primum luxuriosa convivia et magnificentiam epularum sectari, tunc et Barsinen captivam diligere propter formae pulchritudinem coepit, a qua postea susceptum puerum Herculem vocavit*).⁴⁵ The positive impression of Alexander showing genuine concern for the emotional well-being of the daughters now becomes most personal; in fact, it now becomes an issue of Alexander seeking his personal satisfaction. This marks the beginning of Alexander's metamorphosis into a Persian, something which will manifest itself fully in the summary of the next book of Trogus.⁴⁶

Alexander is still the invader at this point: Darius is still alive, and therefore Persia is not yet his (11.10.4, *memor tamen adhuc Darium vivere Parmeniona ad occupandam Persica classem aliosque amicos ad recipiendas Asiae civitates misit*). However, by turning his attention to the defeat of Darius, Alexander will speed up the change in him that is just beginning here. Alexander's reputation increases the speed with which this will happen. Justin notes that several cities turn to Alexander upon learning of his victory over Darius; they bring more gold, and therefore impress Alexander more with the wealth of Persia (11.10.5, *quae statim audita fama victoriae ipsis Darii praefectis cum auri magno pondere tradentibus se in potestatem victorum venerunt*).

As I pointed out, Alexander does not yet relinquish his Macedonian self. In fact, he shows himself to still be very concerned for his heritage when he visits the temple of

Darius loses his wife, but he may be said to have gained a son in that he accepts Alexander as his successor. See Schmidt (1999) 290.

⁴⁵ Alonso-Núñez (1987) 66 notes that Trogus, like other Roman historians, tends to moralize, with the corruption of luxury as one of his hallmark themes. Alexander's zeal for wealth (as well as the zeal of his men), and his subsequent criticism for that zeal by his men, is one of the examples cited. Despite his impressive stature as a character in Trogus' history, Alexander therefore fits into, and therefore is a servant of, the moral message of this historian. Note, however, that the Parthians, adversaries of Rome, are not criticised by Trogus/ Justin. Rather, their use of gold and silver (referred to by Justin at 41.2.10) only for their weapons suggests that they are not a corruptible people.

⁴⁶ Hammond (1983) 98 notes that parallels to this passage do not exist in Diodorus and other writers. Rather, Trogus may have used Cleitarchus, who would also have been an important source for Diodorus. This suggests that Trogus may have sought out passages like this in Cleitarchus, who, Hammond suggests (82) may have had special interest in 'the descriptions of outlandish places and customs' which 'came ultimately from participants in the campaigns'. Cf. 11.11.12, on which Hammond writes: 'the addition of 11.11.12, that from then onwards the arrogance and conceit of A[lexander] grew remarkably, is also due to Cleitarchus' (99).

Jupiter Hammon (11.11.2).⁴⁷ Here the subject of his mother is raised again. Justin notes the tradition that Alexander's mother believed him to have been conceived by a serpent; Philip as a result denies Alexander recognition as his son (11.11.3-4). By undertaking this visit, therefore, Alexander at this advanced stage of his campaign seeks to heal a sore point in his past, to reconcile himself with the difficulties inherent in his Macedonian self. To resolve these difficulties, Alexander leaves his human self behind when the oracle instructs Alexander's followers to treat him as a god rather than as a king (11.11.11). This is a logical step in one way, for in the previous sentence Alexander is confirmed by the oracle as being in control of the whole world (11.11.10, *tertia interrogatione poscenti victoriam omnium bellorum possessionemque terrarum dari respondetur*).

The exchange of letters between Alexander and Darius prior to their next military engagement reveals Alexander's attitude towards Persia and the king he is about to replace (11.12.1-4). Such dialogues between the soon-to-be conqueror and soon-to-be conquered are important (the Melian dialogue in Thucydides is the most famous example).⁴⁸ In response to Darius' offer of a large portion of his kingdom, Alexander retorts that he is being offered what is (already) his (11.12.4, *sed Alexander sua sibi dari rescripsit iussitque supplicem venire, regni arbitria victori permittere*). Alexander looks both forwards and backwards, and in both directions he sees his Persian self. He imagines Persia as already his, as if he conquered it fully in the past; in declining Darius' offer, Alexander keeps his focus on gaining all of Persia.

In the second battle, Alexander must reassure his troops. It is not so much the number of Persians about whom Alexander thinks his men are worried, but what they look like. He tells them not to be concerned about the unusual colour of the enemy (11.13.8, *Alexander Macedonas monebat, ne multitudine hostium, ne corporis magnitudine vel coloris novitate moverentur*). This is a very important point. The people to whom Alexander refers are not Persians, but Darius' Armenian troops.⁴⁹ Their unusual appearance marginalises them, making them not only different from Alexander's army, but also from the Persians

⁴⁷ Curtius Rufus preceeds his account of Alexander's visit to the temple by noting the difficulties faced by the army marching there due to the extreme conditions of the area (4.7.6-15). See Atkinson (1980) 344-9.

⁴⁸ On Sallust and the Melian dialogue, see the previous chapter on Sulla and Bocchus.

⁴⁹ Heckel and Yardley (1997) 166 suggest that the reference to the strange colour of the troops may refer to Indians in the Persian army. If there were Indians present in the battle, and if Alexander is here referring to them, then there are important considerations here.

(for Alexander does not need to reassure his men regarding the appearance of the Persians). Alexander's army is now familiar with the Persians. Alexander's attempt to reassure his men is also an attempt to prepare them for being part of the same community as these men; once Persia is conquered, these strange men will be part of Alexander's world, and will fight for Alexander just as the Greeks will.

The battle of Gaugamela is not only a victory for Alexander, but also it is a turning point for him in that it marks his transformation from being regent of Macedonians to ruler of Persia:

Alexander autem periculosissima quaeque adgrediebatur, et ubi confertissimos hostes acerrime pugnare conspexisset, eo se semper inmergebat periculaque sua esse, non militis volebat. hoc proelio Asiae imperium rapuit, quinto post acceptum regnum anno (11.14.5-6)

This passage encapsulates exquisitely Alexander's nature and transformation. Alexander is the quintessential man of action: he not only fights personally in the battle, but also he throws himself in the most dangerous position in this battle (*periculosissima*), and takes on the greatest challenges rather than leaving them for his men. Alexander thus puts in jeopardy not only his desire to gain Persia, but also his own life. It is for this most exemplary effort in the most important battle of his career—and perhaps the most important battle in Greek history, to say nothing of Persian history—that he is awarded the right to dominion over Asia. It is on account of his actions in this battle, Justin writes, that Alexander gains (*rapuit*) rule (*imperium*) over Asia.⁵⁰ And his new kingdom does not replace his old Greek one, for rule over Persia is defined within the context of his rule over Greece, not vice versa. Alexander gains Persia in the fifth year of his reign (*regnum*) in Greece. This Justin writes possibly to establish that Alexander is regent in Greece first, despite this much larger and perhaps impressive kingdom.

According to Heckel and Yardley, the historical period that follows immediately 'was a period that saw a significant (and necessary) change in Alexander's dealings with the Persians'.⁵¹ This seems appropriate given that the final section of the *Epitoma* of

⁵⁰ Cf. Plutarch, *Alexander* 34.1: τοῦτο τῆς μάχης ἐκείνης λαβούσης τὸ πέρας, ἡ μὲν ἀρχὴ παντάπασιν ἡ Περσῶν ἐδόκει καταλελύσθαι, βασιλεὺς δὲ τῆς Ἀσίας Ἀλέξανδρος ἀνηγορευμένος ἔθυε τοῖς θεοῖς μεγαλοπρεπῶς καὶ τοῖς φίλοις ἐδωρεῖτο πλοῦτους καὶ οἴκους καὶ ἡγεμονίας. See Hamilton (1969) 90. In the sentence that follows, Alexander also deals with matters back in Greece, declaring (ἐγὼ) that all Greek states were free (καταλυθῆναι) of their tyrannies, and could now live under their own laws—see Hamilton (1969) 91.

⁵¹ Heckel and Yardley (1997) 169, with analysis of dealings with individual states, 169-70.

book 11 covers Darius' death (11.15.1-15).⁵² The death of Darius means that Alexander must realign himself in terms of how he relates to the Persians. Alexander's kindness towards the deceased monarch contrasts sharply the poor treatment that the defeated regent receives from his own people. By providing Darius with a respectable funeral, Alexander inverts his position with that of the Persians who murdered Darius. Alexander is Persian, and the Persians are the hostile ones, therefore. It also recalls the opening of the book, where Alexander arranges the funeral of his father and deals with the conspirators against Philip. Alexander therefore appears here to bury his second, Persian father. Just as he succeeded Philip, so too he succeeds Darius.

IV.

If Alexander at the end of book 11 shows his Persian side, at the start of book 12 he shows that he has not forgotten his Macedonian past when he buries his soldiers (12.1.1-2).⁵³ If order signifies anything, however, that Alexander attends to Darius before his own men suggests that his responsibilities as a ruler of Persia are more important to him.

In fact, from this point Alexander becomes more Persian. After the burial of his soldiers, Justin digresses (briefly) on events elsewhere in the world (12.1.4-2.17). This can be seen as Justin taking stock of the current state of the world before noting an important change in it in the form of Alexander's victory. After an encounter with a local queen (12.3.5-7), Justin writes that Alexander assumed the dress of a Persian monarch (12.3.8). Justin appears to disapprove of this, for he writes that Alexander was following the rules of the defeated nation: *post haec Alexander habitum regum Persarum et diadema insolitum antea regibus Macedonicis, velut in leges eorum, quos vicerat, transiret, adsumit*.⁵⁴

⁵² Hammond (1983) 101 observes that 'the description is so full that the version of Trogus can have been only slightly abbreviated'.

⁵³ That is, books 11 and 12 chart two different aspects of Alexander's character, with book 12 narrating Alexander's ever-increasing inclination towards being Persian. The near-even division of Alexander's career seems also to have been the approach of Curtius Rufus, who narrates the rise and fall of Alexander in two pentads. Baynham (1998) analyses this in depth.

⁵⁴ Cf. Curtius Rufus 6.6.1-3, cited by Heckel and Yardley (1997) 205: *hic vero palam cupiditates suas solvit continentiamque et moderationem, in altissima quaque fortuna eminentia bona, in superbiam ac lasciviam vertit. patrios mores disciplinamque Macedonum regum salubriter temperatam et civilem habitum velut leviora magnitudine sua ducens, Persicae regiae par deorum potentiae fastigium aemulabatur; iacere humi venerabundos ipsum paulatimque servilibus ministeriis tot victores gentium imbuere et captivis pares facere expetebat*. Curtius' version provides more biting criticism of Alexander than Justin's. Cf. Plutarch, *Alexander* 45, where Alexander adopts a form of dress that mixes the Persian and Median styles, more modest than the former and more

The piling of the verbs at the end of this sentence makes Alexander's adoption of Persian dress appear all the more ridiculous. The three action verbs—they describe actions undertaken by military commanders, including Alexander very recently—direct attention on what Alexander should be doing instead of putting on Persian robes. Alexander has, in effect, given up the awesome actions identified by these verbs. He makes this worse by expanding his new-found Persian persona when he orders his friends to adopt Persian dress as well (12.3.9). This is a forced cultural conversion, that is, Alexander imposing a new culture on his men. How his men respond is important, for his soldiers must remain true to their Macedonian culture, even if Alexander does not. By doing this, they provide a point of reference, to demonstrate from what and by how much Alexander deviates from his past. The soldiers also provide a point of reference in that they stand as a beacon, should Alexander want to return to being a Macedonian. Alexander goes even further: he enjoys the pleasures of concubines and continuing the practice of luxurious banquets:

ut luxum quoque sicut cultum Persarum imitaretur, inter paelicum regiarum greges electae pulchritudinis nobilitatisque noctium vices dividit. his rebus ingentes epularum apparatus adicit, ne ieiuna et dstricta luxuria videretur, conviviumque iuxta regiam magnificentiam ludis exornat. (12.3.10-11)⁵⁵

Justin re-affirms general disapproval of this behaviour when he points that behaviour such as this leads to the loss of power, not the gaining of it (12.3.12, *inmemor prorsus tantas opes amitti his moribus, non quaeri solere*). Justin suggests that Alexander's personal behaviour

stately than the other (45.2, ἀλλὰ ἐν μέσῳ τινὰ τῆς Περσικῆς καὶ τῆς Μηδικῆς μιγάμενος εὖ πως, ἀτυφοτέραν μὲν ἐκείνης, ταύτης δὲ σοβαρωτέραν οὖσαν). At first he wears this modified form of dress only in front of the barbarians, but when he appears in these clothes before the Macedonians, they are offended, but they tolerate it due to the other qualities of Alexander which they admire (45.3, καὶ λυπηρὸν μὲν ἦν τοῖς Μακεδόσι τὸ θέαμα, τὴν δὲ ἄλλην αὐτοῦ θαυμάζοντες ἀρετὴν ὥιοντο δεῖν ἔνια τῶν πρὸς ἡδονὴν αὐτῷ καὶ δόξαν ἐπιχωρεῖν). See Schmidt (1999) 286.

⁵⁵ The phrase *convivium....exornat* also appears in Marius' harangue in Sallust, *Jug.* 85.39: *sordidum me et incultis moribus aiunt, quia parum scite convivium exorno neque histrionem ullum neque pluris preti coquum quam vilicum habeo.* Cf. Curtius Rufus 6.2.1-2: *sed ut primum instantibus curis laxatus est animus militarium rerum quam quietis otique patientior, exceperere eum voluptates et, quem arma Persarum non fregerant, vitia vicerunt; tempestiva convivia et perpotandi pervigilandique insana dulcedo ludique et greges pelicum. omnia in externum lapsa morem; quem quidem aemulatus quasi potioem suo ita popularium animos oculosque pariter offendit, ut a plerisque amicorum pro hoste haberetur.*

will have consequences for his rule over this and any other region.⁵⁶ Such a criticism would not have gone unnoticed by the Roman reader, who would be especially concerned about such things.⁵⁷

If the two instances of criticism by the narrator may make it seem that Justin is interfering with the reader's perception of Alexander, we can forgive this intrusion when the characters in the narrative, Alexander's army, express a similar concern: thus the author and (the majority of) his characters appear to share the same concern. Each party validates the concern of the other. They express the opinion that their leader has moved away from the example of his father (12.4.1, *inter haec indignatio omnium totis castris erat, a Philippo illum patre tantum degenerasse, ut etiam patriae nomen eiuraret moresque Persarum adsumeret, quos propter tales mores vicerat*).⁵⁸ Justin notes that it is not the opinion of only a few soldiers, but the majority. The army also expresses a similar concern as Justin does in the previous sentence, that Alexander's Persian-like behaviour reflects the defeated party (12.3.12, *inmemor prorsus tantas opes amitti his moribus, non quaeri solere*). Justin has carefully set up this scene: Alexander forgets, and his soldiers remind him through their opinion. While he may have conquered Persia, by becoming a Persian he is part of the defeated party. Justin then dampens criticism of Alexander by his assessment of Alexander's

⁵⁶ Cf. Livy 9.18.3-4, where the historian suggests that an Alexander invading Italy would be an Alexander like Darius, that is, someone who is more Persian than Macedonian, and this is one reason why Alexander would lose against the Romans. That is, by becoming like the person he has defeated, Alexander turns himself into someone who will lose. Livy writes that Alexander's men, too, would be more Persian than Macedonian, and they would be weaker for it (*degeneratum...Persarum mores*).

⁵⁷ Spencer (2002) 193: 'to journey eastwards is to take a trip into a region dominated by stories of excessive consumption, of luxury and wantonness, of sexual profligacy, and decadent refinement. A place where men are made effeminate and gender roles are turned upside down, where kings rule as despots over their people, and magic and superstition are rife. This is the kind of world that Roman Alexander narratives invoke'. Spencer then refers to Suetonius' comment on Antony (*Aug. 17.1, M. Antonii societatem semper dubiam et incertam reconciliationibusque variis male focilatam abruptit tandem, et quo magis degenerasse eum a civili more approbaret, testamentum, quod is Romae, etiam de Cleopatra liberis inter heredes nuncupatis, reliquerat, aperiendum recitandumque pro contione curavit*). Antony is seen as 'degenerating in Alexandrian terms'.

⁵⁸ The reader here can make reference to Justin's comparison of Philip and Alexander at 9.8.4-12. Hammond (1983) 93 notes that 'it incorporates judgements for which the evidence in A[lexander]'s case came later in books 11-12'. Cicero compares Philip's and Alexander's temperament at *De Officiis* 1.90: *Philippum quidem Macedonum regem rebus gestis et gloria superatum a filio, facilitate et humanitate video superiorem fuisse. Itaque alter semper magnus, alter saepe turpissimus, ut recte praecipere videantur, qui monent, ut, quanto superiores simus, tanto nos geramus summissius*.

policy regarding his army, which Justin notes results in the creation of an invincible force (12.4.2-10). It is a successful policy, leading Justin to note the conquest of the Parthians at the end of the chapter (12.4.12).⁵⁹ This victory proves Justin's claim as correct, which establishes the abbreviator as an authoritative judge of Alexander's actions. But even here there is criticism: Alexander's policy to allow his soldiers to marry local women is viewed by Justin as a means for their leader deflecting attention from his own love of things Persian (12.4.2).⁶⁰ Justin finds fault with Alexander's and his army's change from being exclusively Hellenic to having aspects of the Persian. What is perhaps ironic is that the army criticise Alexander for his Persian predilection, only themselves to take on Persian wives, which makes them just as Persian-like as Alexander.

The topic of Philip is important here. It becomes a subject of discussion at a banquet, when Alexander declares himself better than his father. When a close friend argues for Philip, Alexander murders him, taunting the dead body in the discussion afterwards, then going into a deep depression when he realises what he has done (12.6.1-6). By doing this, Alexander attacks not only the past, but the past of his father, which in turn affects Alexander's own past: thus he attempts a savage re-writing of what he was, and therefore what he is now. This establishes an important dangerous precedent for Alexander's behaviour when it comes to his attempt to find an appropriate position for himself in historical discourse, that is, he attempts to control the historical discourse concerning himself. Alexander's past and present can be seen here to clash with horrific

⁵⁹ Trogus' interest in the Parthians is clear in the *Hist. Phil.* (see above). How substantial this section was in Trogus' original is of course not easy to determine, but it is possible that it constituted a short digression. Whether in Justin or in Trogus, we can view this section as a narrative seed. Trogus places a marker that points to his narrative of Parthia in books 41-2, and suggests to the Roman reader of the *Hist. Phil.* that Rome is not the only world power.

⁶⁰ Cf. Rotroff (1997) 221: 'it has often been asserted that Alexander the Great intended, for his new empire, a multiracial state where Greeks, Macedonians, and other ethnic groups would be melded into a ruling elite, sharing power in their administration of the vast lands he had conquered. The marriages at Susa, where Macedonian officers wedded Persian, Median, and Bactrian women and a reported 10,000 men who had already made such marriages were rewarded...suggested an intended "policy of infusion", as it has been called'. Alexander's adoption of Persian dress, Rotroff suggests, 'can also be read as the respect and tolerance, even admiration, for oriental culture necessary to such a vision' (221). Cf. Arrian 1.24.1-2, where the historian notes that some of Alexander's Macedonian soldiers have been married just before the start of the campaign, and he allows them to return to Macedonia in order to spend time with their wives. This proves to be a decision that gains Alexander popularity amongst his Macedonian troops (καὶ

results. His Persian present seeks to replace, if not erase, his Macedonian past, extending backwards in time as far as the life and events of his father. When his Macedonian side re-emerges, he realises what he has done, how far he has strayed, and he clearly feels revulsion. Thus we can perceive Alexander's Macedonian side as a valuable gauge of the character which can still emerge at critical points in Alexander's life—when he appears to deviate too far from being what he should. It also causes him to remember other deeds from his Macedonian past that the reader encounters in the previous book (12.6.14).⁶¹ Therefore, the horrors of Alexander past and present are not so different.⁶² In the aftermath of Clitus' murder, Alexander seeks self-destruction through starvation, which can be seen as Alexander being his old self to the extreme, given his reluctance to indulge in excessive eating. This is mentioned by Plutarch, for example, but not by Justin (see above). That Justin leaves this positive attribute out weakens the redemption of Alexander in this scene. He takes food only after the entreaties of his soldiers and his close friend Callisthenes (12.6.15-16).

The presence of Callisthenes keeps focus on Alexander fighting history. We ought to regard this friend of Alexander as the lynchpin in the king's transformation from Macedonian to Persian. Callisthenes is a symbol of Alexander's past in intellectual terms, for Justin points out the connection between the two men: they were both students of Aristotle (12.6.17). The reference to the philosopher invokes an image of a pure Alexander steeped in the best of the Hellenic world: the knowledge of one of its greatest thinkers. This image does not last for long, as the next chapter shows Alexander taking what may be seen as the last step towards being Persian when he orders his troops no longer to salute him, but to prostrate themselves fully in his presence (*adorari*).⁶³

τῷ ἔργῳ τῷδε, εἴπερ τινὶ ἄλλῳ εὐδοκίμησε παρὰ Μακεδόσιν Ἀλέξανδρος).

⁶¹ Heckel and Yardley (1997) 226 call this sentence a digression on the crimes of Alexander, suggesting that in Trogus' narrative this may have been a considerable passage, stressing strongly the less laudable aspects of Alexander. Its appearance here, with Alexander at an advanced stage in his conversion to the Persian lifestyle, is well placed, serving to reinforce to the reader Trogus' point regarding Alexander's rejection of his community.

⁶² Heckel and Yardley (1997) 221 introduce this episode by providing a useful cross-reference to a passage earlier in the *Hist. Phil.* (9.8.15 in Justin, cited as appendix III in their edition): *vini nimis uterque avidus, sed ebrietatis diversa vitia*.

⁶³ This incident is mentioned in two sources other than in the Alexander narratives. Val. Max. (7.2 ext. 11) writes: *Aristoteles autem Callisthenen auditorem suum ad Alexandrum dimittens monuit cum eo aut quam rarissime aut quam iucundissime loqueretur, quo scilicet apud regias aures vel*

Justin notes that Alexander delayed introducing this for fear of what the reaction might be (thus he must understand that it will upset the Macedonians), but he does it anyway with violent results. Callisthenes is the most vocal critic, for which he is executed:

dein, quod primo ex Persico superbiae regiae more distulerat ne omnia pariter invidiosiora essent, non salutari, sed adorari se iubet. acerrimus inter recusantes Callisthenes fuit. quae res et illi et multis principibus Macedonum exitio fuit, siquidem sub specie insidiarum omnes interfecti. (12.7.1-2)⁶⁴

His death marks Alexander rejecting the past, but more importantly, Alexander attacks himself, or rather his past in the strongest possible way: Justin notes that Callisthenes' purpose in travelling with Alexander was to chronicle Alexander's campaign (12.6.17). Alexander's killing of the historian is an attack on history, *his* history. What Alexander may not realise is that he is attacking not only his negative present, but also he is attacking his positive past. The death of Callisthenes threatens the survival of what Callisthenes has written about the campaign so far.⁶⁵ But a metatextual point can be made here, that Alexander's self-directed *damnatio memoriae* fails most spectacularly, for post-Alexander narratives of his exploits do exist. Justin's point here may be that Alexander, despite his destruction of Callisthenes and what he represents, and great as he may be, cannot conquer history herself.⁶⁶

silentio tutior uel sermone esset acceptior. at ille, dum Alexandrum Persica Macedonem salutatione gaudentem obiurgat et ad Macedonicos mores inuitum revocare benivole perseuerat, spiritu carere iussus seram neglecti salubris consilii paenitentiam egit. The incident is also recorded by Ammianus (18.3.7): *ignorans profecto vetus Aristotelis sapiens dictum, qui Callisthenem sectatorem et propinquum suum ad regem Alexandrum mittens ei saepe mandabat, ut quam rarissime et incunde apud hominem loqueretur vitae potestatem et necis in acie linguae portantem.* Prostration is seen by Herodotus as one of the chief features of Persian culture: see 1.134, and, as many scholars note, one aspect of Persian culture the Greeks particularly disliked. See also Arrian, *Anabasis* 4.10.5ff.

⁶⁴ The phrase *superbiae regiae* also appears at Sallust, *Jug.* 64.5 in reference to Jugurtha: *ab imperatore consulto trahi, quod homo inanis et regiae superbiae imperio nimis gaudere.* The phrase can be said to have a Roman context too, as suggested by Livy at 1.54.1: *sciretque invisam profecto superbiam regiam civibus esse quam ferre ne liberi quidem potuissent.* See Yardley (2003) 44.

⁶⁵ On the sources for Plutarch's *Alexander*, which would (presumably include) what Callisthenes had written up to his death, see Powell (1939). Polybius draws attention to Callisthenes' shortcomings in recording military matters (12.17.1-22.7). On Arrian's use of Callisthenes, see Hammond (1992); Marincola (1997) 59.

⁶⁶ Plutarch in his *Alexander* records a lengthy section on Callisthenes (52.5-55.5). See Hamilton (1969) 146-57. Plutarch, by writing a lengthy section on Alexander and Callisthenes, places greater emphasis on Alexander's attempt to attack the past. In Plutarch the result of Alexander's execution of Callisthenes results in the narrative multiplying as Plutarch records the different versions of Callisthenes' death. Plutarch thus successfully conveys the attack on Alexander's history made by Alexander by his

V.

While Persia was clearly central to Alexander's campaign, his conquest of it did not mark the end of his military efforts. He travelled further, to India; this country marks the limit of his empire.⁶⁷ Just as India was important to Alexander's campaign, so too it is important in narratives of that campaign.⁶⁸ It was so important, in fact, that some works which describe Alexander's campaigns (Arrian and Curtius Rufus) include a lengthy examination of Indian geography, culture and history.⁶⁹ After this description

killing of his official historian. The same can be said for the ending of this life. Alexander's campaign lacks an authoritative record in Plutarch's time just as it does in Justin's day—and in our time.

⁶⁷ In this section of Alexander narrative, Trogus not only focuses solely on India, but also includes his journey home. It appears that in the Augustan period at least the Romans glossed over the difference between Persia/ Parthia and India. In the references to a (possible) campaign against Parthia by Augustus, defeat of Parthia also meant defeat of India, or at the very least a permanent Roman presence there—e.g., Propertius 3.4.1-6, *arma deus Caesar dices meditatur ad Indos, | et freta gemmiferi findere classe maris. | magna, Quiris, merces: parat ultima terra triumphos; | Tigris et Euphrates sub tua iura fluent; | sera, sed Ausoniis veniet provincia virgis; | assuescent Latio Partha tropaea Iovi.* Cf. Horace, Odes 1.12.53-6: *ille seu Parthos Latio imminentis | egerit iusto domitos triumpho, | sive subiectos Orientis orae | Seras et Indos.*

⁶⁸ Note Alonso-Núñez (1987) 69: 'the fact that Trogus includes in the work places as remote as India or Bactria reflects Rome's commercial relations with them'. Trogus was possibly tailoring his narrative to meet the expectations and desires of the reader, viz. places about which the Roman reader of the *Hist. Phil.* is interested in learning. However, if this is the case, it is not too great a concern for the historian, for he does not go as far as to devote a book or books to the history of this region, which was reasonably well-known by Augustus' time. Journeys between India and Rome, Rome and India were not uncommon, whether for economic or political reasons, as a passage from Augustus' *Res Gestae* tells us (31.1, *ad me ex India regum legationes saepe missae sunt non visae ante id tempus apud quemquam Romanorum ducem*). For comment see Brunt and Moore (1967) 73-4.

Important also are literary representations of India, e.g., Strabo book 15. In Strabo Alexander's visits to India serve to introduce India as a place for the Romans to understand. Alexander is referred to several times in the early chapters of book 15 (e.g., 15.1.2, 15.1.3, 15.1.5). Alexander's visits provide a context for the understanding of India to *begin*. Note especially 15.1.4, where Strabo notes that a king Porus sent gifts to Augustus, in a display similar to the action of Porus before Alexander (κατ' ἄλλους Πύρρου, ἦκεν ὡς Καίσαρα τὸν Σεβαστὸν δῶρα καὶ πρεσβεῖα καὶ ὁ κατακαύσας ἑαυτὸν Ἀθήνησι σοφιστῆς Ἰνδός, καθάπερ καὶ ὁ Κάλανος Ἀλεξάνδρῳ τὴν τοιαύτην θεὸν ἐπιδειξάμενος).

⁶⁹ Arrian's probable source for his *Indica* is a work probably of the same name written in the late fourth century BCE by Nearchus, who accompanied Alexander on his campaign. If the work survived for Arrian to use it as the source for the *Indica*, it is possible that Trogus (and Justin) could have consulted it for his account of Alexander's Indian campaign. See Hartog (1988) 357-9 on Nearchus using Herodotus' account of Egypt as

Alexander's campaign in this region is described. Reading Arrian's *Indica* and Curtius Rufus' digression on India clearly enhances the account of Alexander's experiences in India. Even without an examination of India—the nature of Justin's epitome would obviously not allow it—Justin's (and possibly Trogus') narrative of Alexander's Indian odyssey is as interesting as Arrian's.⁷⁰

Alexander *sought* India, so Justin writes at the opening of this section (12.7.4, *post haec Indiam petit, ut Oceano ultimoque Oriente finiret imperium*). In this sentence India is not so much presented as a place, but an end—a geographic end, for Alexander desires for it to mark the end of his world. The words *ultimo Oriente*, moreover, express what India means in another way, that to Alexander (and perhaps to Trogus and Justin as well), this is as far as it is possible to go.⁷¹

Frequently in historiography, geographic frontier regions are described in fabulous terms.⁷² So too India: Alexander meets an Indian king, Porus, whom Justin describes as a man remarkable for his physical strength and his great spirit (12.8.1, *unus ex regibus Indorum fuit, Porus nomine, viribus corporis et animi magnitudine pariter insignis*).⁷³ The battle between the two men shows Porus to be a challenge, if not the greatest challenge, to Alexander so far. The farther Alexander gets from his nation, and the longer he remains away, the greater the challenges. To his credit, Alexander demonstrates that he is still capable of acknowledging a great man, even when that person is an enemy.

a basis for his account of India. Arrian's *Indica* also serves as a basis for the exploration of Persia: see chapter five on Ammianus.

⁷⁰ And possibly it was in Trogus' mind much earlier than book 11, for in the very first book of the *Hist. Phil.* he refers to Alexander's campaign when mentioning another campaign into India (1.2.9., *sed et Indis bellum intulit, quo praeter illam et Alexandrum Magnum nemo intravit*). Note that here, outside the narrative boundaries of the Alexander narrative, he is referred to as *magnus* (see below for where Justin refers to him as *magnus* again, at the start of book 13). On India in Roman literature, see Dihle (1964).

⁷¹ Cf. to the possible meaning of Asia over Persia *passim*. On *ultimus*, see Stewart (2000).

⁷² Cf. Tacitus, *Germania* 45-46 (see chapter four). There are also traces of this in Ammianus' Persian digression (see chapter five).

⁷³ Note that Porus is credited with a greatness of spirit (*magnitudine animi*); so too is Alexander near the end of his life at 12.15.9 (*tanta illi magnitudo animi fuit*). This marks an interesting inversion from the normal pattern of Alexander's behaviour. Prior to this Justin narrates his adoption of specific negative attributes of foreign cultures. But in this instance Alexander gains a positive quality from a foreign character. His restitution of Porus to his throne, therefore, marks an immediate manifestation of a connection between these men; in fact, it may be the event that establishes the connection between them. On Porus' name indicating his nature, see André and Filliozat (1986) 382.

Having defeated the Indian king in battle, Alexander restores Porus to his throne (12.8.7).⁷⁴

By his acknowledgement of Porus, Alexander creates a mental boundary for himself and his men. It is here that his men beg to return home, citing their age. Not only is this a geographic frontier for Alexander, but also it is a temporal one, for his men note that they will barely live long enough to make the journey home (12.8.12). This creates a sense of difference between Alexander and his men, for he is much younger and could in theory continue to campaign for many years. The remark of the soldiers is ironic also, for it is Alexander who will not live much longer.

It is as if to reinforce this geographic frontier just as Alexander makes his way home, he encounters further things that can be described as fabulous. Fighting against Ambus, Alexander suffers a considerable setback when many soldiers die from the poisonous arrows (12.10.2, *cum venisset ad urbem Ambi regis, oppidani invictum ferro audientes sagittas veneno armant atque ita gemino mortis vulnere hostem a muris submoventes plurimos interficiunt*). The poison, made from elements particular to this part of the world, is a symbol of India. The effect of the poison on Alexander's men is to cause many fatalities, which suggests that the country of India itself is fatal to Alexander and his men. Alexander's dream, in which he learns of an antidote, enables him to overcome this obstacle and to take the city. But he appears to have learnt something important here, that the arrows symbolise for him that from this point on he will not find victory so easy, or he may in fact find defeat. This city, therefore, marks the boundary of Alexander's journeys (12.10.5, *ac veluti curru circa metam acto positus imperii terminis, quatenus aut terrarum solitudines prodire passae sunt aut mare navigabile fuit*). He consolidates his position here, making sure that this boundary remains by building a city, a monument to himself that will represent him here, and leaving behind one of his friends as governor (12.10.6, *ibi in monumenta a se rerum gestarum urbem Barcem condidit arasque statuit relicto ex numero amicorum litoralibus Indis praefecto*).⁷⁵

⁷⁴ Hammond (1983) 105 calls this an 'highly coloured version of combat and reconciliation'. He notes that it is not to be found in other accounts of Alexander's Indian adventures.

⁷⁵ This is an exceptionally important sentence. It appears to set up Alexander's actions here against the entirety of Livy's history. That Alexander builds a monument at Barce to commemorate his achievements (*ibi in monumenta a se rerum gestarum*) engages with discussion on the nature of *monumenta* in Livy's history—see Jaeger (1997). More importantly, *urbem...condidit* is an exceptionally strong verbal allusion to the *Ab Urbe Condita*—but it is not listed in Yardley (2003). As a result of this Livian usage by Trogus,

With Alexander out of India, and back in Persia, he shows again that he is still more comfortable with his Persian rather than with his Macedonian side. After leaving India, he turns against his own men when some are unhappy that they remain in military service while some are released (12.11.1-9). After executing some of his men, he addresses his Persian troops, praising them highly (12.12.1-6). But Macedonian leanings do still persist: Alexander proceeds to Babylon, where embassies from many nations await him. The Magi warn him from entering the city, for it will mean his downfall (12.13.3, *hac igitur ex causa Babyloniam festinanti, velut conventum terrarum orbis acturo, quidam ex magis praedixit, ne urbem introiret, testatus hunc locum ei fatalem fore*). This advice is rejected by the philosopher Anaxarchus (12.13.5, *ibi ab Anaxarcho philosopho compulsus est rursus magorum praedicta contemnere ut falsa et incerta et, si fatis constant, ignota mortalibus ac, si naturae debeantur, immutabilia*). Alexander chooses Macedonian advice over Persian advice, so he goes to Babylon, where he dies. This appears to suggest that in this case Alexander is wrong to choose the Persian over the Macedonian, for the advice from Anaxarchus leads to his death. It can still be seen as a good decision by Alexander for it suggests that at the end of his life, he chooses to return to the Macedonian side of his identity, which has been notoriously absent since his arrival in Persia. Choosing Macedonian advice seems like the return of Alexander to his former community when physically he will not live to see Macedonia again.⁷⁶

There can be no doubt as to the significance of this scene. Alexander, after travelling such a great distance, after conquering so many people, and after travelling so far from his former identity, returns to that identity only to find death. In one way it can be seen as an appropriate ending, that Alexander has travelled full circle in cultural terms. He was born Macedonian, practises the Persian lifestyle, and then he dies Macedonian. It is almost as if he dies hastily at this point lest he make another change, back to the Persian lifestyle. But also there are the embassies from the many communities. By dying just as the whole world comes to acknowledge his dominion over it, Alexander is prevented from being sidetracked by the attractions of other, perhaps even less desirable cultures than Persia.

Alexander can exist within the context of the great heroes of early Roman history whom Livy applauds as founders of the city (e.g., Romulus and Camillus).

⁷⁶ On Alexander journeying away from his Macedonian self, see Whitmarsh (2002) 190-2.

VI.

Book 11 concludes with the death of Darius. Book 12 concludes with the death of his successor Alexander.⁷⁷ While Alexander honours his Persian predecessor at the end of book 11, it is Trogus and Justin who honour Alexander at the end of book 12. In Justin's *Epitome*, it proves to be a sizeable portion of the narrative. Despite any shortcomings that Alexander may have displayed in the narrative, Justin opens the obituary by proclaiming Alexander as an extraordinary individual (12.16.1, *vir supra humanam potentiam magnitudine animi praeditus*). Here, writing at the end of Alexander's life, Justin goes back to before the protagonist's birth to show that Alexander was indeed a remarkable figure, telling for a second time the story of his mother's dream (12.16.2), and her background (12.16.3). These sentences recall events in the near-middle and beginning of the Alexander narrative respectively: thus Justin's obituary passage is as comprehensive as it is concise, and it nicely brings together the strands of the Alexander legend here at this concluding point.

We also learn of events in Alexander's life that occur outside the scope of books 11 and 12 (12.16.5-6). These provide further depth to Alexander's character, and as they both point to the greatness of Alexander, Alexander as *magnus*, their appearance here is appropriate.⁷⁸ Justin goes outside the boundaries of books 11-12 to define Alexander, which demonstrates that it *who* Alexander is that is important, not just what he *does*. Alexander is more than the two books of the *Hist. Phil.* which seek to define the man and

⁷⁷ Clarke (1999) 266 n. 46 notes that Trogus has a strong sense of what is appropriate for each book of his history, aware when he ought to mark off one section of his history from another. Death is truly a powerful way of doing this. On death as the end, see Pelling (1997). On closure in general, see Fowler (2000) 237-307.

Another way of viewing the placement of the deaths of Darius and Alexander being placed at the ends of books 11 and 12 respectively may be that Trogus wants these books to be seen as telling the stories of both. In a way books 11 and 12 appear as telling parallel lives, those of Darius and Alexander. Both books chart the decline of these two men, as both find themselves increasingly separated from the communities they rule.

⁷⁸ On the use of *magnus*, see Weippert (1972) 63-9. Alexander fares only slightly better in Livy, who refers to Alexander as *magnus* only twice, once in his passing reference at 8.3.7 (*eadem aetas rerum magni Alexandri est, quem sorore huius ortum in alio tractu orbis, invictum bellis, iuvenem fortuna morbo exstinxit*), and again in the sentence immediately prior to his digression on Alexander at 9.16.19 (*quin eum parem destinant animis magno Alexandro ducem, si arma Asia perdomita in Europam vertisset*). He does not refer to Alexander as *magnus* at any point in the digression. On the reference to Alexander in book 8, see Oakley (1998) 407; Morello (2002) 70-2.

his campaign. In effect, the text serves Alexander, rather than vice versa. What he does in the narrative matches what he does in life: to go beyond the boundaries of his home world.

However, Justin's *Epitoma* of book 12 concludes with a less than inspiring comment (12.16.12, *victus denique ad postremum est non virtute hostili, sed insidiis suorum et fraude civili*). With the narrative of Alexander now concluded, Justin has the last word and he diminishes what Alexander has achieved: to conquer most of the eastern world, only to be brought down by his own men. The contrast between Persian and Hellenic is very sharp here: virtuous Persians and treacherous Hellenes. It does, however, give the narrative of books 11 and 12 a sense of travelling full circle, for it recalls that dealing with internal matters is what Alexander tries to do at the beginning of book 11.

Within the Alexander narrative of books 11-12, Justin does not write *magnus* with Alexander's name. This does not occur until the opening sentence of book 13 (13.1.1, *extincto in ipso aetatis ac victoriarum flore Alexandro Magno triste apud omnes tota Babylonia silentium fuit*). Once Alexander is dead, if he gives up his Persian affectations in the afterlife, he earns redemption from Justin.⁷⁹ This goes some way to repairing the damage inflicted upon Alexander by the final sentence of book 12. It is a small consolation to the narrative too, for after being carefully arranged around Alexander, it experiences fragmentation in the narrative of Alexander's successors.⁸⁰

VII.

In the *Ab Urbe Condita* the historian records a meeting between Scipio and Hannibal (35.14; see chapter two, section 7.2). Scipio is said to have asked whom Hannibal thought

⁷⁹ But note that it is Alexander's Persian soldiers who mourn the loss of Persia's Alexander (13.1.4, *ut vero mortis eius fides adfuit, omnes barbarae gentes paulo ante ab eo devictae non ut hostem, sed ut parentem luxerunt*). Note also that in Curtius Rufus Alexander near the end of his campaign—and his life—praises highly his foreign soldiers in a speech, seemingly choosing to prefer them to his Macedonian/ Greek ones (10.3.7-14). This is an attempt by Alexander to establish a close relationship with his Persian soldiers, for in his speech he makes reference to his decision to marry Roxane, and he states that he considers his new Persian soldiers to be equal to—if not better than—his Macedonian soldiers (10.3.13, *proinde genitos esse vos mihi, non ascitos milites credite! Asiae et Europae unum atque idem regnum est; Macedonum vobis arma do, inveteravi peregrinam novitatem; et civis mei estis et milites*). This is followed by Alexander choosing his bodyguard from the Persians (10.3.14).

⁸⁰ Clarke (1999) 269. Cf. Curtius Rufus, 10.10.20, where the narrative of Alexander ends with the general being remembered in a city that bears his name (*ceterum corpus eius a*

to be the greatest general (35.14.6, *quem fuisse maximum imperatorem Hannibal crederet*). Hannibal's reply is Alexander: *Alexandrum Macedonum regem, quod parva manu innumerabiles exercitus fudisset quod<que> ultimas oras, quas visere supra spem humanam esset, peragrasset* (35.14.7). Besides Alexander's personal ability as a leader, Hannibal finds Alexander's sphere of military effort—to the far reaches of the world (*ultimas*)—as worthy of praise. Here Alexander's inclination towards things Persian is not mentioned. Instead, Livy grounds Alexander firmly in the Hellenic world by having Hannibal call him 'Alexander of Macedon'. Livy's Hannibal does not appear to perceive—or want to perceive—the cultural effect of Alexander's campaign on Alexander.

Justin's *Epitome* of the Alexander narrative in the *Hist. Phil.* is not a long narrative by any means. At thirty pages of Teubner text, it is only slightly longer than our next subject, Tacitus' *Germania*. Despite this brevity, and the brief life of the campaign in relative terms which the Roman reader could easily understand,⁸¹ Alexander the Great in Justin's *Epitome* is a complex and continually evolving character. His identity is not fixed, but changes from his initial point to one where he embraces another culture, and it is a culture that he conquers. Alexander may conquer Persia, but in the end Persia conquers Alexander. For the Romans reading Trogus' history, Alexander's conquest of Persia is possibly made easier by his early attitudes towards, and his rapid incorporation of, Persian culture and the peoples themselves into his world.

That Persia conquers Alexander just as he conquers Persia can be seen as a kind of poetic justice—Alexander's military conquest is matched by an equally impressive (if not more so) Persian cultural conquest. Because Alexander so strongly dominates Justin's epitome, he is in a way defenceless, and this makes the Persian transformation of Alexander possible. The Macedonian army, which on several occasions express their concern about Persia's seduction of their commander are therefore present in the text only to confirm that Alexander is becoming Persian and to serve as a point of reference

Ptolomaeo, cui Aegyptus cesserat, Memphim et inde paucis post annis Alexandream translatum est, omnisque memoriae ac nomini honos habetur).

⁸¹ Cf. Livy 9.19.12, where he writes off the achievement of Alexander's campaign by noting its brevity in comparison to some of the exceptionally protracted wars the Romans have had to fight (*equidem cum per annos quattuor et viginti primo Punico bello classibus certatum cum Poenis recorder, vix aetatem Alexandri suffecturam fuisse reor ad unum bellum*). If Alexander could not last as long as the Sicilian War (264-241 BCE), how could he be expected to manage in the more serious campaign against Hannibal, to which the Sicilian War was but a prequel? Livy perhaps writes this in the knowledge that he will be able to prove his point shortly when he comes to the fourth, fifth and sixth pentads of his history. Cf. Morello (2002) 78-9.

from which Alexander deviates. The (very) limited role of Alexander's Macedonian army in the *Epitome* can also be seen as an inversion of what Trogus sought to do in the *Hist. Phil.*, to present the history of all nations of the known world. The history of Macedonia, of which books 11 and 12 are one (important part), appears, ultimately, to be a history of Alexander. In this sense we can appreciate a significant difference between Trogus' presentation of Alexander and Sallust and Livy on Jugurtha and Hannibal, respectively, both of whom notionally exist within the context of the communities to which they belong. Alexander seems to be free of such a constraint, if we choose to view it as such. We can thus argue that by doing this Trogus effectively established a difference between his work, or at least this part of his work, and that of his predecessors and contemporaries.

And of course there is the fact that Alexander wins, while Jugurtha and Hannibal lose—to the Romans. Jugurtha and Hannibal, despite their initial threat to Rome, through their defeat help further establish Rome's place as a world power. They also serve the historical narratives in which they appear, reinforcing the historian's message. So too Alexander: by expanding the world almost as far as the ancients believed it extended, Alexander extends the geographic area of the narrative nearly to its widest point. Alexander, therefore, makes the greatest contribution to enabling Trogus' history to encompass the entire world. Alexander's dominance of books 11 and 12, therefore, which is truly an intricate and fascinating construction, serves the *Hist. Phil.* perhaps better than Jugurtha and Hannibal serve the historian in whose works they appear.

CHAPTER FOUR

Tacitus' 'Noble Savages': Ancient Germans and Germany in the *Germania*

Tacitus in his *De Origine et Situ Germanorum* (=Ger.) provides a fascinating and complex examination of the ancient Germans, who throughout the history of the empire remained Rome's most persistent enemies. Unlike with the Numidians, Carthaginians and Macedonians, Rome never achieved a lasting solution to the German problem, as they remained unconquered and for the most part misunderstood. Tacitus can be said to be helping to solve the problem of Romans not understanding the Germans through his explication of German culture. Chapter by chapter, line by line, Tacitus makes clear his appreciation of the ancient Germans—and this work may have been (foremost) in Conrad Celtis' mind when he commented upon the accuracy of the Greeks and Romans in portraying the Germans. This chapter examines how the budding historian¹ constructs his presentation of this Roman enemy. In writing this monograph, Tacitus achieves two things: first, he engages with the (vigorous) ongoing debate about the Germani, a debate that began before Tacitus, and a debate that would continue long after Tacitus. Second, he makes an important contribution to the continuing development of the representation of the non-Roman in Latin historical narrative, which contributes both to the genre as a whole, and can be read as necessary preparation for his explorations of non-Roman cultures in his *Histories* and *Annals*. Regarding the first point, in writing the *Ger.* Tacitus can be seen as having an important role in creating an impression of the Germani which serves a specific purpose to explain why Germania cannot be incorporated into the Roman empire.² Tacitus is thinking about what interaction with the non-Roman means in the here and now. This is different from Livy, for example, who wrote about Hannibal and the Carthaginians from the safe perspective

¹ I identify Tacitus as a 'budding historian' here in acknowledgement that in writing the *Ger.* Tacitus was at the start of his career as historian, and not established in the sense that Sallust was when he wrote the *Bellum Iugurthinum* or Livy was when he wrote the third decade of the *Ab Urbe Condita*. That Tacitus is at such an exploratory stage in his career should impress us given how well he handles the assignment in the *Ger.*

² Tacitus can be said to be writing exclusionist ethnography in the sense that the community he is examining will not become part of the Roman world, which perhaps requires the author to adopt a different mindset than if he were writing about a region that does become part of the empire (e.g., Sallust and Livy on Africa).

of a Roman victory having been achieved two centuries previously. Tacitus writes the *Ger.* not so much with the past in mind, but with a view to explaining the present and predicting the future.

I.

'Tacitus' structuring of the *Germania* bespeaks a very subtle artistry'³

One (very) important way in which Tacitus can convey the importance of the Germans is through the structure of the work that describes them. Just as the historian wants to impress upon his Roman reader the sophistication of German culture, employing an intricate structure can reinforce this. Each reflects and therefore reinforces the other. Here we build upon the excellent previous readings of the monograph, most of which note the intricacy of the structure of the *Ger.*, and use the complex structure of the work as a central part of their discussion of the structure of the monograph.⁴ I suggest that Tacitus creates a clear beginning and ending to the work, as well as a distinguishable frontier between the two halves—the 'middle' of the work. I discuss the ending immediately following the beginning because Tacitus, in constructing his ending to the work, appears explicitly to respond to his beginning. I focus upon these two parts of the monograph because I feel that Tacitus has been especially careful to construct them so to create a powerful impression of the Germans. Granted, there is (much) more to the monograph than the beginning and the ending, but close reading of them is valuable, I feel, in that they provide a necessary context for examining what Tacitus writes about the ancient Germans, that is, what Tacitus writes about the Germani must be read against how he starts up and then finishes off the monograph.

It is sometimes best first to view a work as a whole, and the small size of the monograph facilitates this. Tacitus divides it into two parts: (1) customs of the Germans as a whole (chs. 1-27) and (2) the tour of Germania through the description of the individual tribes (chs. 28-46). Tacitus balances these sections through his allocation of

³ Hirstein (1995) 163. See also the analysis of Giancotti (1971) 343-472, who efficiently summarises past opinion (355-95). On the structure of the work being indicative of Roman interaction with the Germans, see Rives (2002).

⁴ Commentaries on the *Ger.* usually include or begin with a full outline of the monograph—e.g., Furneaux (1894) and Anderson (1938), but not Rives (1999), although references to structure are made at the start of each section. On structure of the monograph, see also Büchner (1970) *passim*. White (1987) 6 mentions a 'well-marked

roughly an equal amount of attention to each part with the result that some scholars call them 'halves'.⁵ Upon closer examination each half can subdivide further into smaller (and again roughly equal) parts, again seemingly complementary in purpose. Part one, for example, covers public and private aspects of German society (6-15 and 16-27 respectively).⁶

The beginning of the monograph⁷ provides a clear sense of the Germans' country as a self-contained entity. Here Tacitus forcefully conveys his vision for a textual Germania, or rather a Germania and the Germans as text.⁸ The opening sentences do this exceptionally well: *Germania omnis a Gallis Raetisque et Pannoniis Rheno et Danuvio fluminibus, a Sarmatis Dacisque mutuo metu aut montibus separatur. cetera Oceanus ambit...* (1.1). It is an impressive beginning.⁹ It succinctly establishes a clear division between the Germans and other peoples (or rather Germania from other peoples, for in the text it is

beginning, middle and end' as hallmarks of historical narrative. See also Heath (1989) 77-81 on Dionysius of Halicarnassus on beginnings and endings.

⁵ By O' Gorman (1993), for example.

⁶ And division within these subsections is possible: chs. 1-5, for example, like Gaul, divides into three parts (1, geographic introduction; 2-4, ethnographic introduction; 5 on the natural resources of Germania), which in itself displays an intriguing symmetry. The middle group then subdivides further, into three parts: one chapter each (2, 4) on the German race surrounds the stories of Hercules and Ulysses (3).

⁷ That Tacitus does not begin this monograph with a preface need not be a problem, for the opening of the *Ger.* clearly functions as a suitable substitute for such (as my argument demonstrates). Even if this monograph does not have a preface like the *Ann.* or *Hist.*, this need not pose any difficulty. Note Leeman (1973) 169: 'a narration could do without a praefatio: a praefatio without a narratio would be an absurdity. To the average Roman reader the prologue was of secondary importance; but for the modern student of literature, who is looking for motives and backgrounds and is aware that he has to do his job at a 2000-year distance, the importance of those prologues is paramount'.

⁸ Note the comment made by O' Gorman (1993) 152 n. 4: 'textual countries offer scope for playing with the boundaries/ connections between representation and the physical world'.

⁹ There is obviously a relationship between Tacitus' opening here and that of Caesar's *Bellum Gallicum* (1.1.1, *Gallia omnis...*). See Melin (1960). Unlike Tacitus, Caesar names different Gallic groups, and he divides each group from the others using the rivers of Gaul. He further distinguishes the Belgae by their proximity to the Germans, which he understands as the reason why they are stronger than the other Gauls. See also Büchner (1970) 232-3.

Germania and not *Germani*).¹⁰ The Germans are represented by a powerful weapon—if not the most powerful weapon—their country, while the non-Germani mentioned in this sentence are peoples only: no territory is mentioned by the author. And Tacitus' *Germania* appears to surround the enemies of the ancient Germans: *Germania...Danuvio fluminibus* and *Germania...mutuo metu aut montibus* surrounds the Gauls/ Raetians/ Pannonians and the Sarmatians/ Dacians, respectively. Through the text the Germans are separated from their enemies, and they are unified. The opening words *Germania omnis* and the phrase *cetera Oceanus ambit*, while not directly connected by the writer, are phrases suggesting wholeness and unity.

We must consider the importance of the Rhine and Danube.¹¹ After introducing these rivers, Tacitus (briefly) follows the course of each river in turn (1.2). This suggests their equal importance as points of reference for identifying the length and breadth of the country, as well as establishing that the country is a natural—rather than an artificial—entity.¹² Both rivers are very long; by following the course of each river as they head off into different directions, Tacitus and the reader briefly travel around the whole of the country.¹³ It also foreshadows the same journey that the reader will undertake in part two.¹⁴

¹⁰ On 'otherness' and frontiers, see Hartog (1988) 61-111.

¹¹ On rivers as frontiers, see Whittaker (1994). On the Rhine as a frontier, see Elton (1996) and Lee (1993) 66-78. Braund (1997) 44 notes the existence of inscriptions which tell of cults of the Rhine and Danube. He also notes (46) the imagery of the river Danube used by Trajan regarding his Dacian campaign: the Danube is depicted on Trajan's column 'as a powerful bearded man acquiescing in and very possibly helping Trajan's crossing'; and on coins the Danube is depicted as throttling a Dacian woman. See also Nicolet (1991) 15-27, who comments on rivers as part of his discussion on Augustus' *Res Gestae*. Cf. Strabo 15.1.11 on the use of the Indus river as a boundary of India. On cultures showing reverence for rivers, see Herodotus 1.138.2 on the Persians (ἐς ποταμὸν δὲ οὔτε ἐνουρέουσι οὔτε ἐμπτύουσι, οὐ χεῖρας ἐναπονίζονται οὐδὲ ἄλλον οὐδένα περιορῶσι, ἀλλὰ σέβονται ποταμούς μάλιστα).

¹² Cunliffe (1988) 171: 'to Julius Caesar the Rhine formed the logical boundary of the Roman world'. Caesar sees it as his personal mission to cross any boundary that faces him. He thus can be seen to be stepping outside of his world, perhaps conquering nature. Tacitus' frontiers might be said to have played a part in Roman consciousness of limits of the Roman world: see Ando (2000) 277-335 on this line of Roman thinking.

¹³ Cf. Strabo 15.1.13, on the flow of the Ganges river: "Ἀπασα δ' ἐστὶ κατάρρυτος ποταμοῖς ἢ Ἰνδική, τοῖς μὲν εἰς δύο τοὺς μεγίστους συρρηγνυμένοις, τὸν τε Ἰνδὸν καὶ τὸν Γάγγην, τοῖς δὲ κατ' ἴδια στόματα ἐκδιδοῦσιν εἰς τὴν θάλατταν. Arrian in his *Indica* proclaims the rivers of India to be superior to all others in Asia—he identifies the Ganges and the Indus—and they are superior to other major

Moreover, the references to the Rhine and Danube establish a sense of Germanic identity in the text. Michael Dewar points out that rivers play an important part in catalogue scenes in Greek and Latin poetry, all the way back to the Homeric epics.¹⁵ Tacitus may be deliberately following this tradition for the second half of the monograph, which can be read as a catalogue of German tribes.

There are two other frontiers used by Tacitus in this opening passage: mountains and fear (*mutuo metu aut montibus*). Mountains are a different kind of boundary when compared to rivers for they extend upwards while rivers extend downwards, flowing downstream. Germania can be seen as not only extending north-south-east-west, but also up and down. To Tacitus, therefore, it is a three-dimensional entity, not just two-dimensional as if it were a map.¹⁶ Moreover, Tacitus connects the rivers to the mountains when he notes that the Rhine's beginning is itself inaccessible as its point of origin is (possibly) located in the mountains (1.2).¹⁷ The difficulty in crossing the mountains—if they can be crossed at all—passes to the rivers. The Rhine now gains the near-impassability of the mountains. If Germania cannot be entered by crossing the

rivers such as the Nile and the Danube, even if these last two rivers were combined (3.9). Cf. Curtius Rufus 8.9.5: *Ganges omnium ab Oriente fluvius eximius a meridiana regione decurrit, et magnorum montium iuga recto alveo stringit; inde eum obiectae rupes inclinant ad orientem*.

Rivers can also delay travel. In the *Pharsalia* Lucan provides an ethnography of the Rubicon, which serves to delay (briefly) Caesar from his invasion of Italy which will start the conflict with Pompey (1.213-22). In fact, the poet makes the river bigger when he notes that the melting winter snow has swollen the river to larger than its usual size.

¹⁴ Hirstein (1995) 168.

¹⁵ Dewar (2003) 3-5. He notes (4 n.3) that 'in earlier catalogues, indications of peoples by reference to the prominent rivers of their native lands usually appears as a brief formula employed in part for the sake of stylistic variety and in part for colour. In the "secondary epics" of the imperial period, however, the idea was often developed at length for wider literary purposes'. It is clear that in the opening of this monograph Tacitus combines aspects of both approaches.

¹⁶ It appears that elevation was not a concern of ancient map artists. But this does not mean that questions of height were not of interest to the ancients, whether they were geographers or not. See Dilke (1985) 87-101 comments on elevation in his discussion of land surveying. It is here we can associate the opening of the *Ger.* with ancient cartography. Dilke notes that 'boundaries were an important element in land survey' (95).

¹⁷ In writing about the source of the Rhine, Tacitus might be thinking about emulating Herodotus' (famous) discussion of the source of the Nile (2.28-34). Tacitus does not explore the source of the Rhine as Herodotus does the Nile for the simple reason that the Rhine marks the beginning or ending point of Germania (depending on one's position on the Roman or Germanic side, respectively), while in Egypt the Nile runs through the centre of the country.

mountains, and it cannot be entered by crossing the rivers, then the exclusiveness of Germania to the ancient Germans is suggested in an indirect way, which in itself sets the stage for Tacitus' assertions that the Germans are indigenous to their country and they are ethnically pure.¹⁸

The emotion of fear serves to bring the Germans into the text (albeit in an indirect way); for it is they who fear their enemies, and perhaps more importantly for Tacitus, it is their enemies who fear them. And by using a noun for fear in this passage the author is able to suggest that fear is atemporal: it does not exist solely in the past, present or future. With each side fearing the other, Tacitus creates an additional imposing border, possibly one equal to the rivers and mountains. Alliteration connects these two borders, which strengthens and validates the frontier of emotion by connecting it to a physical frontier. Fearing Germans therefore leads to understanding mountains as a border; the inability to overcome mountains suggests the futility of trying to overcome Germans or seek access to Germania.

With the basics of Germania established, Tacitus can now direct his attention to the task of describing the Germans. Just as the country is carefully defined, so too are its inhabitants. There are two important points raised by Tacitus concerning his subjects that require consideration first. This is his statement concerning the autochthonism of the Germans and the purity of their race (2.1, *ipsos Germanos indigenas crediderim minimeque aliarum gentium adventibus et hospitibus mixtos*). Just as the geography of Germania is precisely defined, so are the Germans: they are exclusively German and irrefutably tied to their country, which the author backs up by declaring his personal belief in this fact (*crediderim*). Tacitus appears to gain confidence in his assertion, for this verb is a subjunctive while his second vote of confidence in German autochthonism two chapters later is a more confident indicative (4.1, *accedo*).

Tacitus then takes the next logical step by demonstrating how *Germania* and *Germans* are connected, that is, how the ancient Germans and their country go together.¹⁹ Autochthonism ought to be enough, but that is in the past; here an example from the present is supplied by Tacitus. Germania, he notes, is a country with limited natural resources, viz. mineral wealth. This not a problem, however, as Tacitus observes

¹⁸ Tacitus does not waste time pointing this out. He states that the Germans are indigenous at 2.1, and that they are racially pure at 4.1 (see below).

¹⁹ Although some scholars note that there is a thematic connection here, such as Hirstein (1995) 169.

that the Germans hold items made from gold and silver in low regard (5.2, *nec tamen adfirmaverim nullam Germaniae venam argentum aurumve gignere; quis enim scrutatus est? possessione et usu haud perinde adficiuntur*).²⁰ Tacitus goes even further: the Germans perceive any esoteric object to be of little value, even ones made of clay, which the land readily provides. The Germans do not desire what their country cannot provide, and they appear to dislike the notion of recasting what their country does offer them. They therefore accept their country in its natural, unchanged form.

But this does not mean that the Germans are not aware of what material objects are worth to other cultures, for Tacitus points out that the tribes nearest to the Romans know the value of coins made from gold and silver, and can understand Roman coin denominations (5.3). Despite the limitations of their own country, and therefore their culture, the Germans demonstrate that their knowledge can extend beyond it—to the Roman world, in this case. The Roman reader of the monograph is still in the earliest stages of coming to an understanding of the Germans and Germania; with this statement it appears that the Germans already possess advanced knowledge of the Romans. Instead of the Roman reader learning about the Germans through reading this text, the Germans demonstrate that they possess knowledge about the Romans prior to their culture being fully written up by Tacitus.

With the beginning so carefully constructed, it is no surprise to find that the ending is also. Concerning geography there is a clear sense of conclusion, because Tacitus points out there is nowhere else to go in Germania:

trans Suionas aliud mare, pigrum ac prope innotum, quo cingi claudique terrarum orbem hinc fides, quod extremus cadentis iam solis fulgor in ortus edurat adeo clarns ut sidera hebetet...illuc usque et fama vera tantum natura (45.1)

The appearance of the ocean here (although it is called by another name here, *aliud mare*) recalls its appearance at the start of the work; thus in geographic terms the ocean surrounds Germania, the world, and the monograph.²¹ The reader finds himself not

²⁰ Tacitus might be seen as contradicting Herodotus, who claims that northern Europe contains large quantities of gold (3.116.1, *πρὸς δὲ ἄρκτου τῆς Εὐρώπης πολλῶν τι πλεῖστος χρυσὸς φαίνεται ἐών*). It might be argued that Herodotus' use of *φαίνε* serves to hide his ignorance of the truth in this matter.

²¹ Cf. O' Gorman (1993) 138 who argues that the 'Ocean is...presented as being more complex than the other boundaries of Germany: they separate, this surrounds and encircles, an image of far greater power'. It is interesting that Tacitus does not use the word *ultimus* here which, as Stewart (2000) 137 notes, serves to define the boundaries of the Roman empire. As Germania is not part of the Roman empire, it is appropriate that

only at the end of Germania, but at the end of the world. This should not come as a complete surprise, for Tacitus has prepared for the end of the world in geographic terms through his earlier exploration of Ocean:

ipsum quin etiam Oceanum illa temptavimus: et superesse adhuc Herculis columnas fama vulgavit, sive adiit Hercules, seu quidquid ubique magnificum est, in claritatem eius referre consensimus. nec defuit audentia Druso Germanico, sed obstitit Oceanus in se simul atque in Herculem inquiri. mox nemo temptavit, sanctiusque ac reverentius visum de actis deorum credere quam scire. (34.2-3)

This is an appropriate point of termination for the monograph in terms of geography, recalling the beginning where the writer defines Germania in natural terms.²² The greatest natural limit is surely the limit of the world itself. It gives additional significance to Germania, for it is now not only an impressive country in its own right, but also it occupies a special place in the world, serving to mark one part of the world's outer limits. And by being a complex boundary, about the nature of which Tacitus can only speculate; his exploration of this boundary serves to diminish the significance of the Rhine and Danube as frontiers. They make the exploration of Germania difficult, but Ocean makes exploration of the territory beyond it impossible. Or—to look at it another way—the inpenetrability of the Rhine and Danube which Tacitus suggests at the beginning of the monograph is transferred to Ocean.

Moreover, the power of Ocean, that is, its ability to encompass *latos sinus et insularum inmensa spatia* (1.1), and its ability to surround everything (*cetera ambit*), is forcefully restated. Should the reader wish to travel beyond this point, he cannot, as Tacitus describes the sea as *inmotum*. Unable to go any further, the reader is forced to pause and appreciate fully this boundary. The use of alliteration here (*pigrum ac prope* and

the word is not used in this passage. Lund (1988) 230-1 compares this passage to *Agr.* 10.5: *mare pigrum et grave remigantibus perhibent ne ventis quidem perinde attolli*. The use of *pigrum* in both passages suggests that both oceans are similar in nature, if not the same ocean in Tacitus' view. Cf. also Arrian's *Indica*, which at its end describes the journey of Hanno the Libyan, who sails from Carthage through the Pillars of Hercules, then heads southwards, where he encounters several obstacles such as lack of water, extreme heat, and fiery streams running into the sea (43.12, ὥς δὲ δὴ ἐς μεσημβρίην ἐξετράπετο, πολλῇσιιν ἀμηχανίησιιν ἐνετύγχανεν ὕδατός τε ἀπορίῃ καὶ καύματι ἐπιφλέγοντι καὶ ῥύαξι πυρὸς ἐς τὸν πόντον ἐμβάλλουσιν).

²² We can compare this ending to the end of the Alexander narrative in Justin (see above, section 6). Both define the end in natural terms: Germania in the geographic sense (the natural world goes no further) and Alexander in the corporeal sense (at death: life goes no further). We can also argue that Alexander reaches his end (death) at an endpoint of the world too, for his is far away from his home community (although he is not as far away from it as he was when campaigning in India).

cingi claudique) recalls the use of *mutuo metu aut montibus* at the opening of the work: thus the end of the country at the end of the text is tied in a way to the overview of the country provided by the historian in his beginning.

As I noted previously, the conclusion to the elucidation of the Germani is more difficult to understand. This is because Tacitus explores not the Germani, but he questions what is human and what is animal: *cetera iam fabulosa: Hellusios et Oxionas ora hominum vultusque, corpora atque artus ferarum gerere: quod ego ut incompertum in medio relinquam* (46.4). Tacitus writes that the exact nature of what these people look like is not certain. In fact, the author himself is not certain, for what he records here is the observation of another writer. Tacitus chooses not to question this previous observation (*quod ego...relinquam*), or he does not feel confident enough to do so.²³ That he presents this observation might suggest that Tacitus does feel it is the case; he just does not have proof. Given that Germania ends at the end of the world, it might seem appropriate that the human and animal come together, the difference between them no longer able to be maintained by nature. Tacitus' use of the neuter *cetera* effectively suggests this dubiety before he mentions the monstrous final tribes of his textual country. They lack gender as well as human form, as if they are less than animal.

While keeping the Germans inside his text, Tacitus demonstrates that with respect to his own knowledge he must do the same. Everything that exists beyond this point he not only lumps together with *cetera*, as we noted, but also he calls it *fabulosa*.²⁴ Tacitus declines to confess if he believes these stories to be true, unlike his sureness about the purity of the Germans' origins (2.1, 4.1), for example. Amongst such fabulous things, difficult to understand both by the writer and the reader, is an appropriate place for Tacitus to stop writing.²⁵

²³ Cf. Goodyear (1981) 254-5. On these final chapters, see also Wolff (1969) 283-4; Much (1967) 521-37.

²⁴ This region can be said to be *fabulosa* on account of the wondrous marvels there. Herodotus might agree with Tacitus' interpretation given what he writes at 3.116.3: αἱ δὲ ὤν ἐσχατιαὶ οἴκασι, περικληίουσι τὴν ἄλλην χώραν καὶ ἐντὸς ἀπέργουσαι, τὰ κάλλιστα δοκέοντα ἡμῖν εἶναι καὶ σπανιώτατα ἔχειν αὐτά.

²⁵ Cf. O'Gorman (1993) 151: 'the fabulous serves...as beginning and end, spatially and poetically, locating Germany in the middle, which is where Tacitus leaves it: *in medio relinquam*'. Cf. Herodotus 3.115, where the historian admits that he has no information on the margins of Europe; in particular he does not accept that there is a river Eridanus (so-called by the locals), which flows into the northern sea (possibly this marks the north of Germania), and which serves as the source of amber. It appears that Herodotus tried—and failed—to get more information on this region (3.115.2, τοῦτο δὲ οὐδενὸς

The last phrase (*quod ego ut incompertum in medio relinquam*) best expresses this desire to stop travelling and reading Germania. It sums up Roman futility at deciphering the Germans: 'in the context of the Romans' search...the final words form the ultimate expression of abandonment, as the seeker finds only the all too familiar and the irremediably strange'.²⁶ So, the Roman reader has nowhere else to go geographically, and cannot understand anything further about German culture. The personal *ego* reminds the reader that this work has been an exercise in a Roman, Tacitus, interpreting the Germans and their country.

We can gain additional insight into the ending of the *Ger.* by widening our focus and looking at the whole final chapter. By doing this we see that this ethnographic ending is the conclusion to a coherent and developed line of thought that Tacitus proffers in this chapter. The description of the tribes from the Fenni onwards (46.3) 'works up to a climax, which culminates in *fabulosa*: the Peucini-Bastarnae are somewhat below the German type, the Venedi more, the Fenni most of all'.²⁷ The Fenni certainly appear to be a step between the true Germans and these fabulous peoples as Tacitus describes them largely in negative terms (mostly by what they lack).²⁸ This sudden deterioration in the quality of the Germans appears to be caused by another (internal) ending. This is the outer boundary of territory of the Suebi (46.1, *hic Suebiae finis*), to whom Tacitus allocates the largest territory in textual Germania (see below, section II).

αὐτόπτεω γενομένου δύναμαι ἀκοῦσαι, τοῦτο μελετῶν, ὅκως θάλασσά ἐστι τὰ ἐπέκεινα τῆς Εὐρώπης).

²⁶ O'Gorman (1993) 151. Cf. *Agricola* 33.3, where Agricola tells his soldiers that the end of Britain is no longer rumour. In fact, Agricola declares Britain to be subjugated (*finem Britanniae non fama nec rumore sed castris et armis tenemus: inventa Britannia et subacta*). Agricola also tells his troops that to die in such a place is a not ignominious act (33.6, *nec inglorium fuerit in ipso terrarum ac naturae fine cecidisse*). See Ogilvie and Richmond (1967) 266-7. On the use of *naturae* at 33.6 they note (269) the word stresses the remoteness of the location, and it includes the ocean. They compare the passage to *Ger.* 45.1 and Pliny, *N.H.* 30.13 (*arte oceanum transgressa et ad naturae inane pervecta*).

²⁷ Furneaux (1894) 121. Cf. Anderson (1938) 219.

²⁸ 46.3, *Fennis mira feritas, foeda paupertas: non arma, non equi, non penates; victui herba, vestitui pelles, cubile humus; solae in sagittis spes, quas inopia ferri ossibus asperant*. Cf. Herodotus on Ethiopia, which he claims is the most remote country in the south-west. Ethiopia is a fantastic place, according to Herodotus, as it not only contains a huge quantity of gold, and has a large number of elephants, but also the people who live there are the tallest, most attractive people in the world, and they live the longest (3.114, αὕτη δὲ χρυσὸν τε φέρει πολλὸν καὶ ἐλέφαντας ἀμφιλαφίας καὶ δένδρεα πάντα ἄγρια καὶ ἔβενον καὶ ἄνδρας μεγίστους καὶ καλλίστους καὶ μακροβιωτάτους).

This final chapter of the monograph is a (very rapid) denouement, so fast that humanity itself appears to collapse.

While having a clear beginning and ending are impressive credentials for Tacitus' textual Germans, linking the two together does something more. By connecting the beginning and ending, the historian establishes a complete, self-standing country. To recall, the ocean that surrounds at 1.1 reappears at 45.1. The *fabulosa* at the end of Germania (46.4) recall the fabulous journeys and creatures experienced by Hercules and Ulysses evoked by the mention of these mythical superheroes (3.1-2).²⁹ The converse is true as well: the superhuman quality of these characters is the opposite to the subhuman quality of these *fabulosa*. The disdain for, but knowledge of, gold and silver (5.2-3) is recalled by use of amber (45.4). In geography (the ocean), ethnography (creatures/people) and materials (gold/amber), the beginning and ending of the monograph are linked.

By including Hercules and Ulysses, Tacitus may to be imitating Herodotus. In Herodotus' description of the Libyans, he notes that it is said (ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁδε λόγος λεγόμενος) that the heroes of the *Argo* visit this region (4.179). The discussion of Jason and the Argonauts here is not out of place, as at 4.177 Herodotus identifies the part of Libya that is home to the Lotus-eaters, which recalls Odysseus' visit to the same in the Homeric *Odyssey*. The visit of mythical Greek heroes to these lands identifies the lands as fabulous. It also allows historians to mark out a connection between ethnographic works, and ethnographic sections of works, to the genre of epic poetry. Making epic heroes visit these places serves to stress just how different these places are, and it serves to distance these places from ordinary people. If heroes like Hercules and Odysseus cannot establish a permanent presence there, how can ordinary Greeks and Romans?³⁰

²⁹ O'Gorman (1993) 151 and Rives (1999) 328. Hercules / Heracles also visits India—see Arrian, *Indica* 8.4-9.6.

³⁰ The reference to the visit of the *Argo* to Libya is important here still. Herodotus records that Jason is showed around the region by Triton, who prophesies that a descendant of one of the Argonauts will establish a settlement around lake Tritonis. When the Libyans learn of this prophecy, they hide the bronze tripod given to Triton by Jason (4.179.3, πειθομένου δὲ τοῦ Ἰήσονος οὕτω δὴ τὸν τρίποδα θεῖναι ἐν τῷ ἐωυτοῦ ἱρῷ ἐπιθεσπίσαντά τε τῷ τρίποδι καὶ τοῖσι σὺν Ἰήσωνι σημήναντα τὸν πάντα λόγον, ὥς ἐπεὰν τὸν τρίποδα κομίσηται τῶν τις ἐκγόνων τῶν ἐν τῇ Ἀργοῖ συμπλεόντων, τότε ἑκατὸν πόλιας οἰκῆσαι περὶ τὴν Τριτωνίδα λίμνην Ἑλληνίδας πᾶσιν εἶναι ἀνάγκην. ταῦτα ἀκούσαντας τοὺς ἐπιχωρίους τῶν Λιβύων κρύψαι τὸν τρίποδα).

Up to this point I have focused upon the borders that Tacitus has created. That they are critical to the monograph there can be no doubt. This in itself is not enough: there must be something to fill the space between them, and that space must be effectively used. The use of textual space is particularly important in this monograph, as Tacitus wants to stress the size of Germania and the impressive qualities of its people—and to do both in such a short work. He achieves this in a different way in each section. In part one, the historian does this by covering a wide range of topics, from weapons (ch. 6) to government (chs. 11-12) to marriage (chs. 18-19) and even topics such as clothing (ch. 17) and diet (ch. 23). Tacitus' interpretations of the complicated intricacies of the many aspects of German society, we can argue, reinforce the complexity of the structure. The details of German government, for example, with a developed governmental procedure and a clearly visible hierarchy (chs. 11-12), in turn serve a structural role in the monograph just as much as the beginning and ending of the work. The form of the work, the way in which Tacitus lays out the monograph (and maps out his textual country), is the obvious place to look for structure.

II.

The beginning and ending of the monograph therefore creates the appropriate foundation for Tacitus' description of German culture. If we have a carefully constructed beginning and ending, another challenge for the author is to mark out clearly the movement from the former to the latter. This Tacitus effectively does.

When it comes to the first part of the monograph, a sense of direction is perhaps not the best expression. As Tacitus is attempting to cover most of what he feels are the essentials of German culture, it is of course difficult to distinguish a sense of direction until arriving at the point of conclusion. What is important here is a coherent flow of thought, which truly the historian provides as he almost effortlessly moves from topic to topic. Most scholars point to this aspect of the work.³¹ On the passing from ch. 10 to 11, for example, 'the description of modes of augury leads on to the subject of popular Assembly: to a Roman the two were inseparably associated, and in Germany every public meeting began with a sacrifice and observation of the auspices'.³² This example is of special import. This shows both a German and Roman context that allows these two

³¹ This is the particular strength of Anderson (1938), with evidence of Tacitus' seamless transition discussed throughout.

³² Anderson (1938) 83.

chapters to be connected. The Roman reader understands the topic as it relates to his own culture; his connection between one topic and the next as it pertains to Rome facilitates the movement from aspect to aspect of German culture. So, here the Roman serves as a unseen tool that aids Germanic hegemony in the *Ger*.³³ Roman connection or not, seamless travelling from topic to topic even crosses the structural boundaries of the different (sub)sections. The transition from ch. 5 to 6, for example, is not a difficult movement: 'the mention of metals leads on to weapons, and thus introduces the section on manners and customs'.³⁴

What makes this movement from topic to topic most interesting is the fact that not only has the author by the end of this first half covered all of the main aspects of German culture, but also that where this discussion ends appears to be an appropriate point of termination. This gives the journey a sense of purpose: the reader is working towards a specific goal or ending. After discussing the elements of German culture that pertain when they are alive, Tacitus ends by discussing the one element of their culture that pertains to them when they die:

funerum nulla ambitio: id solum observatur ut corpora clarorum virorum certis lignis crementur. struem rogi nec vestibus nec odoribus cumulant: sua cuique arma, quorundam igni et equus adicitur. sepulcrum caespes erigit: monumentorum arduum et operosum honorem ut gravem defunctis aspernantur. lamenta ac lacrimas cito, dolorem et tristitiam tarde ponunt. feminis lugere honestum est, viris meminisse. (27.1)

Tacitus ends the description of German society with the end of their life, an appropriate ending point to part one.³⁵ The length of this passage forces the reader to pause and appreciate the bareness of a typical German funeral. In terms of the content of this passage, it is appropriate that just as in life the Germans do not enjoy material wealth, neither do they permit ostentatious displays at funerals. This passage, therefore, explicitly replies to the beginning of the discussion on German society, for example, their dislike of objects cast from gold and silver (5.3) (see section one above). Tacitus takes the image of German frugality further: he notes the sense of control over the emotion displayed at funerals, as if such actions are equally wasteful as unnecessary material objects.

³³ Cf. section IV below for an example the Romans as a visible player in supporting German control of the monograph.

³⁴ Anderson (1938) 61.

³⁵ Supported by Furneaux (1894) 85 and Anderson (1938) 137, but not Rives (1999). See also Lund (1988) 182-3. The literature on closure is immense: see Fowler (2000) 235-308, with further bibliography.

While the historian does bring this first section to a satisfactory close, there is a sense that it is not quite the end in terms of the life of a typical German. In the final sentence, Tacitus writes that that German men remember (*meminisse*) their lost ones, suggesting that while life may end, these dead Germans carry on living in the memories of their next of kin.³⁶ This is an appropriate final sentiment to the first section of the monograph. It places these Germans discussed by Tacitus firmly in the past (both in the minds of their kin, and in the monograph). It also allows them to live on in the memory of their kin (and in the memory of the reader of the *Ger.*). Moreover, it allows the Germans of the first half of the monograph to have a connection to the Germans of the second half.

In the second half Tacitus puts geographic movement in the place of thematic movement. Here the challenges are equally impressive, if not more so, for the historian describes a vast number of tribes covering a vast geographic area.³⁷ Tacitus must be explicit in the textual 'directions' that he provides to ensure that the reader travels in the right direction and arrives at the right place at the right time. Tacitus fails in this, or so it seems: '[the] problem with mapping the tribes named by Tacitus is that the geographical indications he provides are frustratingly vague'.³⁸ This balance of going in the right 'direction' and arriving at the destination at the right time are key to our understanding of the intricately arranged presentation of Tacitus' Germans. My use of inverted quotations around 'direction' indicates the very difficult task before Tacitus. To move the reader from tribe to tribe, from place to place is one thing; for that journey to be a logical one is something entirely different. It is here that the rivers Rhine and Danube—employed at

³⁶ There is a possible intertext here between the final sentence of this passage and the opening of Tacitus' first work (*Agr.* 1.1, *clarorum virorum facta moresque posteris tradere...*). What for the author in the *Agr.* is his all-important (personal) mission statement is here given to the Germans. That Tacitus places it at the heart of the textual world that he creates for them, is a powerful, pro-German aspect of this work that cannot be overlooked. Moreover, we can contrast the Germans' remembering with Tacitus' complaint that reflection on the past is less common in his day (*Agr.* 1.2-3). See Ogilvie and Richmond (1967) 126-30. Cf. Arrian, *Indica* 10.1: λέγεται δὲ καὶ τάδε, μνημεῖα ὅτι Ἴνδοι τοῖς τελευτήσασιν οὐ ποιέουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς γὰρ τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἱκανὰς ἐς μνήμην τίθενται τοῖσιν ἀποθανοῦσι καὶ τὰς ὠιδὰς αἱ αὐτοῖσιν ἐπάιδονται.

³⁷ Commentaries of the *Ger.* (Furneaux, Anderson and Rives) provide one or more maps in order to guide the post-classical reader in reading the second half. However, there are still problems with travelling around Tacitus' textual Germania, as Rives (1999) 227-30 discusses.

³⁸ Rives (1999) 228. Cf. Rives (2002) 169-73.

the beginning of the work in establishing Germania's geographic (and textual) boundaries—come into play. Each river forms the basis of a journey, the Rhine journey progressing roughly south to north, and the Danube journey travelling west to east, before Tacitus moves to the north.³⁹

By citing Caesar's claim that at one time the Gauls were stronger than the Germans (28.1), Tacitus establishes the starting position of the Rhine journey not in Germania but in Gaul, where Gauls live in Tacitus' day. This is where the reader of the monograph can best understand them. This is a brief view outside Germania at the beginning of the geographic tour, a glimpse beyond Germania to match the view that Tacitus provides at the end of the monograph (see above).

This passage is also an glimpse of the past, a non-Roman, that is, a German past. For a brief moment the *Ger.* appears to take on the appearance of history-writing—an history of the Germans. Just like Roman history, the past has lessons—for the Germans: the Ubii, Tacitus notes, have crossed the Rhine and therefore have changed to the point where they might be considered Romanised. Keeping themselves true Germani, therefore, means staying inside Germania. The Ubii serve another purpose.

Both Caesar and the Ubii represent the Romans, for Caesar is a Roman and the Ubii live in what in Tacitus' day is the Roman side of the Rhine. His concluding comments on them clearly suggest their Roman affinity (28.5, *ne Ubii quidem, quamquam Romana colonia esse mernerint ac libentius Agrippinenses conditoris sui nomine vocentur, origine erubescunt, transgressi olim et experimento fidei super ipsam Rheni ripam conlocati ut arcerent, non ut custodirentur*). They are not only part of the Roman world, but also they help keep the Roman world in place, that is, to separate the Romans from the Germans. Living on the

³⁹ Benario (1975) 31-2. Cf. Betrand (1997) 117-120, who argues that Roman military commanders (in this case Caesar) relied on their knowledge of routes (especially rivers), distances and clear geographic features such as mountains and forests to conceptualise the territory into which they would lead their armies. Thus for Caesar the Rhine would serve as a point of reference towards which or along which he could lead his army. Betrand observes that Caesar also used rivers as a kind of itinerary. Whenever he mentions a river as a point of reference, he charts its course, noting especially into which river it flows (118-9). Tacitus, as I noted above, does the same with the Rhine and Danube in the opening chapter of the monograph. In doing this perhaps Tacitus is following an approach set out by Herodotus. In his description of Africa, for example, he begins his discussion of Libya from Egypt, that is, he discusses first (4.168.1, ἀρξάμενοι πρώτοι) the Libyan tribe that lives closest to Egypt, moving progressively westward. Herodotus, like Tacitus in the *Ger.*, charts two journeys in his description of Libya: first, he follows the coastline from Egypt (4.168-80). He then discusses the tribes who live inland (4.181-99). See How and Wells (1928) 356.

Roman side of the Rhine, they reaffirm the river as a border. Tacitus calls them *Romana colonia*: therefore the Ubii are an extension of the Roman world, rather than part of the world of the Germans.⁴⁰

This passage suggests a history of full co-operation with, followed by incorporation into, the Roman world.⁴¹ Moreover, Tacitus constructs a history for the Ubii that emphasises their Romanness. First, they have proven their loyalty to the Romans (*experimento fides*), which can be seen as suggesting their desire to be Romans. This in turn validates the Romans' decision to bring the Ubii into the Roman world, and at the same time it can refer to a quality that is common to most—if not all—Germani: they are loyal to those with whom they choose to make an alliance. Second, the contact with, and the incorporation of, the Ubii into the Roman world marks an important transformation of the nature of this group. The Ubii appear to re-write their history—it is as if they were Roman all along. They are now a Roman colony, and they have taken a name to reflect the Roman who founded them as Romans (*libentius Agrippinenses conditoris sui nomine vocentur*). These Germanic tribes who have been Romanised do not suggest that the Romans can incorporate *all* the Germani into the empire. Rather, they should be seen as a starting point for the exploration of the individual tribes of Germania. Tacitus begins with what is familiar and then gradually works towards what is (very) unfamiliar. And perhaps these Germani are meant to be dismissed, they might appear to accept too readily incorporation into the Roman world and their Roman title. In fact, they appear to prefer their Roman nomenclature. Had they been conquered by Rome—and had Tacitus mentioned this campaign—the value of the Ubii as Germani would be clear. By not announcing a Roman conquest over the Ubii, Tacitus does not contradict his description of Roman-German conflict at 37.2-5.

The reappearance of the Rhine as a border in Tacitus' discussion of the Ubii acts as a signpost in the text which takes the reader back to a point of beginning. The reader starts Tacitus' tour of textual Germania anew, and this new starting point is important. Tacitus offers us another border, or rather, a closer look at a border he introduced at the

⁴⁰ Herodotus' description of Africa is relevant again here. He notes that the Adyrmachidae have a way of life that is essentially Egyptian except for their clothing, which is Libyan (4.168.1, οἱ νόμοισι μὲν τὰ πλέω Αἰγυπτίοισι χρέωνται, ἐσθῆτα δὲ φορέουσι οἷον περ οἱ ἄλλοι Λίβυες). By having aspects of their culture that is both Egyptian and Libyan, this group serves as a point of transition between the two cultures.

⁴¹ Outlined by Rives (1999) 237-8.

opening of the monograph—the Rhine. This passage therefore reinforces the beginning. This closer look at this border, this time from the correct, that is, the German side (to Tacitus that is), comes in the form of the Batavi. In fact, this proves to be not so much a look at the German side of the Rhine, but a look at the Rhine itself. The Batavi live on the frontier between Germania and Gaul as they occupy the land on both banks of the Rhine. They can be said to live *in* the border itself by their occupation of an island in the river (29.1).⁴² Their relegation to this geographic position points to their relative value as Germans. Stronger tribes drove them to this border position, which suggests that possibly they could be pushed to the other side of the Rhine, and thus lose their Germanness. So long as they remain in this border area, they remain Germans, and, more importantly, the border area remains the property of the Germans, part of Germania, and part of the *Ger*. This then can be seen to reinforce the opening of the monograph I outlined above (see section one). Tacitus does this another way, for he links the Batavi to the Germans and Germania proper when he points out their *virtus* (29.1, *omnium harum gentium virtute praecipui Batavi*).⁴³

By referring to the *virtus* of the Germans, Tacitus comes close to the representation of the non-Roman along the lines of Sallust and Livy as shown in chapters one and two. In fact, the next few chapters of the monograph, in the opinion of one scholar, establishes a strong sense of *virtus*.⁴⁴ Both Jugurtha and Hannibal display *virtus* at some point. However, Tacitus perhaps goes further by not only linking it to a whole group, the Batavi, but also by writing that this group displays more of this quality than

⁴² Braund (1997) 47 n.14 observes that sometimes rivers were perceived as common ground. He mentions Josephus, *Jewish Antiquities* 18.101-3, where the Roman general meets the Parthian king in the middle of the Euphrates. In 172 CE the Romans fight the Iazyges on the frozen river Ister, which can be taken not only as a battle on the river, but also a battle *for* the river. The battle is mentioned by Cassius Dio at 72.7 (τοὺς δὲ Ἰάζυγας οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι ἐν τε τῇ γῇ τότε καὶ ἐν τῷ ποταμῷ ἐνίκησαν. λέγω δὲ οὐχ ὅτι ναυμαχία τις ἐγένετο, ἀλλ' ὅτι διὰ τοῦ Ἰστρου πεπηγότος φεύγουσιν σφισιν ἐπακολουθήσαντες καὶ ἐκεῖ ὡς ἐν ἡπείρῳ ἐμαχέσαντο). See Campbell (1987) 29.

⁴⁴ On *virtus*, see Büchner (1970) 236ff. What Tacitus writes about the Batavi at 29.1 is repeated in similar words at *Hist.* 4.12.2 (although the sequence in which the information is provided is different): *Batavi, donec trans Rhenum agebant, pars Chattorum, seditione domestica pulsi externa Galliae orae vacua cultoribus simulque insulam iuxta sitam occupavere, quam mare Oceanus a fronte, Rhenus amnis tergum ac latera circumluit.*

⁴⁴ Wolff (1969) 279. He suggests that the section chs. 28-37 can be divided into three groups: 28-29; 30-34; 35-7.

other Germans. Virtue of non-Romans has been alluded to, but it has not been so explicitly expressed.⁴⁵

Tacitus then comes to the decumate lands and the people who live there (29.3). It is here that the journey appears to take a step backwards when Tacitus notes that the inhabitants of this region are Gauls whom he considers to be *levissimus quisque Gallorum*.⁴⁶ Their occupation of this land is only possible thanks to the doubtful ownership of this territory prior to their arrival, not due to their strength or ability (*inopia audax dubiae possessionis solum occupavere*). Mentioning that Gauls live there now recalls 28.1 where Tacitus quotes Caesar to the effect that Gauls were formerly stronger than Germans. The Gauls appear to surround the German tribes that Tacitus has introduced before he discusses the decumate lands. But the Gauls who live in the decumate lands are themselves surrounded, on one side by the Batavi and on the other side by the Chatti. As the Batavi and the Chatti are related (29.1, *Batavi...Chattorum quondam populus*), the decumate Gauls face a considerable frontier around them, one that appears strong due to the unity among the Germani who surround them. They are not only surrounded by Germani, but the same Germani, which might suggest a co-ordinated assault against the Gauls from both sides. Gauls are further written down through their incorporation into the Roman world, for Tacitus notes that the Roman frontier has been moved forward, and so these Gauls are under dominion (*mox limite acto promotisque praesidiis sinus imperii et pars provinciae habentur*).⁴⁷

The brief visit to the decumate lands serves to eliminate the Gauls, the main non-Roman competition to the Germans, from the contest for the best non-Romans. What Tacitus does next is to proceed from strength to strength in terms of the Germans he describes. The Germans he investigates from now on are increasingly impressive. This begins with the Chatti (30.1-31.3), an example of the best Germans—to Tacitus.⁴⁸ He

⁴⁵ E.g., aspects of Sallust's description of Africans may be taken to suggest they possess *virtus*. See chapter one, section one.

⁴⁶ 'All the most worthless Gauls' in Rives (1999) 89; 'All the least reliable sort among the Gauls' in Birley (1999).

⁴⁷ The Romans too are written down in this passage through what Tacitus might be trying to say about Domitian. Rives (1999) 243-4 suggests that by Tacitus' stating that the people of this region were Gauls and not Germani, Domitian's claim of victory over the Germani is proven false. Writing down Domitian is something that the *Ger.* has in common with the *Agricola*, in which by praising his father-in-law the author criticises the former emperor.

⁴⁸ On the Chatti (and Batavi), see Norden (1920) 265-74; Rives (1999) 246-8.

introduces them by describing their physical makeup (30.2, *duriora genti corpora, stricti artus, minax vultus et maior animi vigor*). So too government structure indicates the merit of the Chatti, as they choose the best men and ability to maintain political order (30.2, *multum, ut inter Germanos, rationis ac sollertiae: praeponere electos, audire praepositos*). It is by writing *ut inter Germanos* that Tacitus shows that from now on he is interested in better than average Germans, that is, Germans who are exemplary with respect to one or more aspects of their culture.

From now on the journey around Germania proceeds without hindrance. In one way this should be no surprise, since scholars repeatedly point out Tacitus had no clear idea on the differences between tribes.⁴⁹ It is somewhat ironic that cultural ignorance should facilitate appreciation of the work as literary product. We cannot realistically expect the Roman reader or the Roman writer to have such detailed first-hand knowledge, especially on groups (and subgroups, not to mention subsubgroups) within a tribe. Tacitus' beginning to the *Ger.*, with its impassable borders, serves as one explanation why he has not obtained, and the reader cannot obtain detailed knowledge of Germania.

So, Tacitus' careful construction of these early chapters of the second half allow the reader to proceed swiftly from the Rhine into the territory of one of the largest tribes in Germania. If textual space determines their merit as a culture, then just as their limited space suggests the poor quality of the Gauls, the increasing amount of text that Tacitus devotes to individual tribes suggests the superior quality of the Germans. This Tacitus does without compromising the geographic direction as dictated by the Rhine and Danube, that is, moving roughly north-northeastwards, from the Chatti (chs. 30-1) to the Suebi (chs. 38-45).⁵⁰

By taking a closer look at the Suebi, the last major tribe that Tacitus discusses, we can see how this is the case. The introduction to this tribe clearly establishes their importance to Germania and to the *Ger.* (38.1, *nunc de Suebis dicendum est, quorum non una ut Chattorum Tencterorumve gens; maiorem enim Germaniae partem obtinent, propriis adhuc nationibus nominibusque discreti, quamquam in commune Suebi vocentur*). This introduction clearly marks off this section of the monograph as well as indicating Tacitus' opinion of this subgroup.

⁴⁹ E.g., by Rives (1999) 227-9. Syme (1958) 126-7 argues against the idea that Tacitus visited Germania.

⁵⁰ On the Suebi, see Lund (1988) 31-4; Rives (1999) 282-5. See also Lund (1988) 210, with further bibliography.

The text has been moving forward onto bigger, more important tribes. This tribe is the biggest: they occupy the largest space of the text, with the textual territory reaching the end of the text, and the end of Germania. Tacitus' introduction makes this next section appear as the second half of the *Ger.* in miniature, an exploration of (Suebic) Germania via the (Suebic) Germans.

There are also what appear to be other movements in this subsection. He devotes consecutive chapters to the Semnones (ch. 39), who are the oldest tribe of the Suebi, which can be seen as a motion backwards in time, which enables Tacitus to convey the long history of these people in this land. This is meant to suggest that they will continue to live here without hindrance—even from the Romans. The next chapter describes the Langobardi, who are the smallest (ch. 40). Both the Semnones and the Langobardi establish positions away from which Tacitus will move in this subsection: from the past to the present, and from the small to the large subtribes of the Suebi.

III.

Thematic movement is one thing. Equally important is what Tacitus *writes* about his Germanic subjects. Close examination of a few passages will make clear this central feature of the *Ger.* The passage that appears to speak most favourably of the Germani is Tacitus' discussion of adultery, or the apparent lack thereof:

ergo saepta pudicitia agunt, nullis spectaculorum inlecebris, nullis convivorum irritationibus corruptae. litterarum secreta viri pariter ac feminae ignorant. paucissima in tam numerosa gente adulteria, quorum poena praesens et maritis permissa: abscisis crinibus nudatam coram propinquis expellit domo maritus ac per omnem vicum verberare agit; publicatae enim pudicitiae nulla venia: non forma, non aetate, non opibus maritum invenerit. Nemo enim illic vitia ridet, nec corrumpere et corrumpi saeculum vocatur. (19.1-3)

Not only are the Germani praiseworthy, but also in this passage Tacitus clearly suggests that the Germani are (very) different from the Romans.⁵¹ And it is not a difference of

⁵¹ O'Gorman (1993) 135; Rives (1999) 202-6. Rives notes (202) that 'the contrast between the pure Germani and the corrupt Romans is particularly obvious in this passage, and emphasized by the stylistic sentence structure'. Cf. Herodotus' description of sex and marriage of the Nasamones (4.172.2-3). It is not only the custom for men to take many wives, but at a marriage the bride has intercourse with all male guests present. In fact, any woman is available to any man for sex. Herodotus' Nasamones are both similar and different from Tacitus' Germani. They are different in that sexual intercourse seems to occur more freely, and there is no apparant damage caused to the relationship between husband and wife. Such customs would surely seem alien to the Romans, but perhaps Herodotus' reader would be more sympathetic. Herodotus later discusses the

degree, but rather that the Germani are the opposite to the Romans: what is abundant in Rome is almost non-existent in Germania. Adultery has, by Tacitus' period, been a problem in Rome that has been clearly identified and has been the target of largely unsuccessful legislative programmes. The punishment for adultery in Germanic culture would surely seem extreme to a Roman, but its apparent success as a preventative measure serves to expose the Roman approach of moral legislation as being particularly weak and ill-suited. Or—to put it another way—there is something fundamentally wrong with Roman culture which suggests that this problem cannot be solved in Rome no matter what approach is taken. But this passage is not about adultery alone, as Tacitus and other authors see adultery as but one symptom of Rome's wider moral and political malaise. Promiscuity, therefore, can be taken as part of a wider negative whole; the lack of promiscuity in German culture, therefore, can speak for the wider virtues of that culture. After the chapter in which Tacitus notes what the Germani lack, but do not want for, finally he ascribes something that the Romans have that is absent in the Germani. Nor do the Germani think about marriage in the same way, or so it would seem, for Tacitus writes that a German woman is chosen by her husband on account of neither her beauty (*forma*) nor her age (*aetate*) nor wealth (*opibus*). The repeated use of *non* in this clause makes clear that the Germani are, basically, people that do without. These are all things which would, Tacitus might argue, be things to be considered by a Roman man and woman when thinking about marriage. Tacitus in this passage succinctly and most effectively suggests the vast difference between the Romans and the Germani.

Tacitus needs not only to write up the Germani, but also he must do so in a way that shows he is working within the ethnographic tradition. We have noted already a few of the subtle ways in which Tacitus does this. The best way he make clear his acknowledgement of the tradition within which he works is to discuss a wide-range of topics that provide a comprehensive picture of Germani life just as, say, Herodotus does about any one of the communities explored by him in his *Histories*—the Persians, the Eypgtians, the Scythians and others.

In one instance, it appears that Tacitus does have Herodotus in mind when he writes about the Germani. For example, scholars suggest a connection between Tacitus' comments on German drinking (22.1-3) and those of Herodotus on the Persians doing

Garamantes (4.174), whose land is full of wild animals, and who shun all sexual activity and human contact.

the same (1.133).⁵² For both Tacitus' Germani and Herodotus' Persians, drinking and discussion go together. Tacitus explains why debating drunk and sober is a good thing:

nullo magis tempore aut ad simplices cogitationes pateat animus aut ad magnas incalescat. gens non astuta nec callida aperit adhuc secreta pectoris licentia loci; ergo detecta et nuda omnium mens. postera die retractatur, et salva utriusque temporis ratio est: deliberant dum fingere nesciunt, constituunt dum errare non possunt. (22.2-3)⁵³

Herodotus' version runs thus:

τὸ δ' ἂν ἄδη σφι βουλευομένοισι, τοῦτο τῇ ὑστεραίῃ νήφουσι προτιθεῖ ὁ στέγαρχος, ἐν τοῦ ἂν ἐόντες βουλεύωνται. καὶ ἦν μὲν ἄδη καὶ νήφουσι, χρέωνται αὐτῶι, ἦν δὲ μὴ ἄδη, μετιεῖσι. τὰ δ' ἂν νήφοντες προβουλεύσωνται, μεθυσκόμενοι ἐπιδιαγινώσκουσι. (1.133.3-4)

Tacitus acknowledges that the Germani are capable of lying (they therefore seem to be no different from any other community), but in their favour they have removed the possibility of deceit from affecting adversely their decisions. This aspect is not present in Herodotus' comment on the Persians' mixing of drinking and debate. In Herodotus drinking is just a feature of the discussions of the Persians—the conviviality of drinking suggests a sense of collectivity in making decisions. It is probably this feature of male Persian culture about which Tacitus is thinking here. And this feature might, in Tacitus' view, be something that is lacking in Roman culture. That is, symposia are an important feature of a culture that is a strength in their collective nature. The absence of the collective political thinking that is a hallmark of Rome as an empire means that what symposia there are solely entertainment events. And Romans interested only in pleasure is not a good thing.

IV.

My reading of the second half of the monograph can be seen to highlight Tacitus' favourable impression of the ancient Germans. Not all readers of the *Ger.* read Tacitus' tour of Germania in this way. A. N. Sherwin-White, for example, suggests that the view

⁵² Dewald (1998) 608 and Rives (1999) 213. Cf. Herodotus 3.22 for the Ethiopians' view of Persians and wine.

⁵³ Rives (1999) 212: 'there can be little doubt that Tacitus is here employing an ethnographic commonplace...it is likely enough that the Germani dealt with important public matters at festal assemblies...Tacitus may thus have adapted a fairly accurate report of actual Germanic practice into a familiar ethnographic schema'.

of the Germans offered by Tacitus is rather different from the one I have been discussing. He writes that

the Germans come decidedly less well out of the second part of the *Germania* than out of the first. The nearest and best known receive most commendation. The remoter peoples are full of horrors, including what the author calls *superstitio*,⁵⁴ a bad word in Flavian writers, and new in the context of barbarian ideology.⁵⁵

Sherwin-White sees the second half of the monograph from a Roman perspective. The Romans would perceive those tribes closest to them in the best possible light. This seems to be the case given what Tacitus writes about the Ubii (see above). These are the tribes that would be best understood by the Romans through interaction, and possibly these tribes would after the passage of time exhibit Roman characteristics.

R. H. Martin's reading of the monograph suggests how this could be the case. As he observes, with over fifty tribes named, Tacitus must somehow maintain the reader's attention. The historian effectively does this by including a 'strand of development' alongside the geographic journey—the concept of *virtus* (see above on the Batavi).⁵⁶ In the Rhine journey in particular, aspects of *virtus* link the major tribes that Tacitus covers, from the Batavi (see above) to the Chatti and the Cimbri. In fact, *virtus* applies to both the Rhine and Danube portions of this second half.⁵⁷ If the switch from following the Rhine to following the Danube seems to be an awkward transition, this makes it less so. The concept *virtus* acts like a bridge, allowing easy movement from the end of one river to the start of the other. This provides the second half of the monograph with a unity to go alongside its coherent sense of direction, holding together *and* moving forward.

That Germanic *virtus* appears most strongly in the early chapters of Tacitus' tour of Germania is significant. It suggests that the Romans are able to detect and appreciate the qualities of those non-Romans closest to themselves. In the section that comprises

⁵⁴ Sherwin-White (1967) 38 notes many other uses of this word by Tacitus, including one appearance at *Agr.* 11.4 and at *Hist.* 4.61.2.

⁵⁵ Sherwin-White (1967) 38.

⁵⁶ Martin (1981) 53. Cf. Dauge (1981) 251-3. There is also *libertas*: e.g., 11.1, 24.2, 37.3, 44.1, 45.6. See Büchner (1970) 240-1. It is important to note that both are republican ideas and both appear in the *Agr.* in the words of Calgacus. Note Rutledge (2000) 87-9 and 90 n. 42: 'Calgacus is a Roman, but one of the republic, and this type of Roman is incongruous to the current political milieu'. On *libertas* in Tacitus, see Morford (1991). On *libertas* in the *Agr.* and the *Ger.*, see Grimal (1990) 127-49. These monographs appear to represent 'une terre de liberté'.

⁵⁷ Martin (1981) 53-4.

chapters 30-34, which one scholar has identified as most strongly displaying German virtue, Tacitus discusses the Chatti. This tribe has had a colourful past of interaction with the Romans. The Chatti, brought under Roman rule in the Augustan period, frequently fought against the Romans.⁵⁸ That the Chatti were under Roman dominion, albeit their history since has been one of conflict in order to break free from that dominion, establishes the firm connection between these Germani and the Romans. The *virtus* displayed by the Chatti is connected to Roman virtue in some way. If we read the refusal of the Chatti to live under Roman rule as their rejection of Rome and what she represents, that is, the Chatti reject Roman *virtus*, then they establish that their *virtus* is different. That the virtue of the Chatti is different is suggested by what Tacitus writes at the end of his description of this tribe:

omnium penes hos initia pugnarum; haec prima semper acies, visu nova. nam ne in pace quidem cultu mitiore mansuescunt. Nulli domus aut ager aut aliqua cura; prout ad quemque venere aluntur, prodigi alieni, contemptores sui, donec exsanguis senectus tam durae virtuti in pares faciat. (31.3).

The passage establishes that the Chatti display 'harsh virtue', which suggests that their *virtus* is different.⁵⁹ Still, it must be acknowledged that for the Roman the identification of virtue in the Chatti is important. It gives the reader a valuable point of reference from which he can work. Working out the ways in which Roman virtue is different from the virtue of the Chatti establishes how the Germani as a whole are different from the Romans. And that the Chatti are discussed by Tacitus early in the second half serves to give the Romans this insight from the outset. The reader thus has it firmly in mind that the Germani are different.

If the Chatti can be said to be demonstrating their virtue through resisting Roman rule, then resistance of other tribes to the Romans suggests the virtue of those tribes. The combined effort of these Germanic tribes suggests the virtue of the Germani as a whole. The passages which describe resistance to Roman incursions of German

⁵⁸ Summarised by Rives (1999) 246-8. He notes (246) that 'first contact' between the Romans and the Chatti may have come through Drusus' campaigns of 12-9 BCE. That the Chatti display virtue in fighting against Rome questions the success of that campaign, and this explains why Drusus' exploration of Germania failed. See below on 34.2.

⁵⁹ The harsh virtue displayed by the Chatti might be something that non-Romans share. One might think of the kinds of virtue displayed by Jugurtha and Hannibal in Sallust and Livy, respectively. Hannibal's virtue, for example, could be seen as *dura*. See above, chapter two, section one on Livy's examination of Hannibal's character.

territory show their determination to live free from the Romans.⁶⁰ For Tacitus the task will be to convey the information on Roman-German contact and conflict in a way that presents the Germans in the best possible light.

The number of Roman presences in the monograph forces us to recognise the seriousness of this threat. Three episodes require attention: (1) Caesar (28.1); (2) Drusus Germanicus (34.2); and (3) Tacitus' compact synopsis of Roman-German conflict (37.2-5). In this section I focus on the second half of the monograph, for here the idea of invasion is most apt.⁶¹ This is because travelling around Germania makes the reader more sensitive to the country and its people, that is, the place to be invaded and the people to be attacked. So too the Romans who appear in this section, for they are the invaders of the country and they fight the Germans whom Tacitus describes. However, as I will argue in this section, their appearance in the monograph does not establish an adequate Roman presence in the text and by no means does it threaten the monograph's Germanic hegemony.

Despite the importance of Caesar as an historical character, in his appearance here Tacitus makes the Roman appear as a less than impressive figure. It is not so much what Caesar *does* that interests Tacitus, but what Caesar *writes*. Tacitus uses the *Bellum Gallicum* as a source of cultural information. Tacitus recasts Caesar from Roman military leader to cultural observer. The passage of Caesar to which Tacitus refers here is part of the digression on Gauls and Germans in book six of the *Bellum Gallicum*, which itself represents a substantial pause in the action.⁶² The *Ger.* has an important role to play in that Tacitus can either validate what Caesar writes, or he can refute the *Bellum Gallicum*. Tacitus' approach to Caesar is to use Caesar's digression as a starting point, not an authoritative source to which Tacitus must respond point by point. Caesar is of limited use to Tacitus.

⁶⁰ The failure to do so results in 'textual colonisation', as happens in the *Agr.* This is explained by Rutledge (2000).

⁶¹ This leaves out one Roman: Vespasian. He is mentioned by Tacitus at 8.2 (*vidimus sub divo Vespasiano Veledam diu apud plerosque numinis loco habitam*). Previous to this reference, Tacitus refers to the possible mythical visits to Germania by Hercules and Ulysses at 3.1-3.

⁶² Caesar crosses the Rhine, 6.9.2; Caesar begins his digression on Gauls and Germans while (textually) in Germania, 6.11.1; Caesar provides the information cited here by Tacitus, 6.24.1: *ac fuit antea tempus, cum Germanos Galli virtute superarent, ultro bella inferrent, propter hominum multitudinem agrique inopiam trans Rhenum colonias mitterent*. On Caesar's digression on the Germans, see Norden (1920) 84-105.

Secondly, Tacitus' approach to Caesar also neutralises the main function of the *Bellum Gallicum*, to present Caesar as a man of action. Tacitus does not mention where Caesar was when this digression occurs, in Germania, and that this is not his first, but his second, visit, or the fact that Caesar (somewhat dubiously) presents himself as having campaigned successfully in this country.⁶³ Moreover, Caesar's position as the first person to engage the Germans, against which all subsequent campaigns must be read, is dismissed.⁶⁴ Caesar's immobility is crucial for Tacitus. If he were to have referred to any other portion of the *Bellum Gallicum*, Caesar might cause irreversible damage both to Tacitus' Germans and their text through his constant and rapid movement from victory to victory to victory. Any sort of military success mentioned or even alluded to would establish a Roman presence in this important point in the text. Because Caesar appears in this strategically advantageous position, but fails (and is not permitted) to exploit it, Tacitus powerfully exposes Roman weakness and it suggests the strength of the Germans. Tacitus leaves him defenceless in the centre of Germania, with an equally seemingly long textual traverse to either end of Tacitus' Germania.

Nec defuit audentia Druso Germanico, sed obstitit Oceanus in se simul atque in Herculem inquiri (34.2). Despite referring to Drusus Germanicus' *audentia*, here a positive characteristic, the commander finds himself in a difficult position as the ocean he encounters denies him the possibility to go—and therefore to know—any further.⁶⁵ This journey serves rather to discourage the Romans from trying again to explore this area further. It is left to the realm of divine belief rather than human observation. The reference to Hercules here affirms the divine association of this region.⁶⁶ This reference

⁶³ *Bellum Gallicum* 4.19.4, *diebus omnino decem et octo trans Rhenum consumptis satis et ad laudem et ad utilitatem profectum arbitratus se in Galliam recepit pontemque rescidit*.

⁶⁴ One of the people who could benefit from the removal of Caesar from the narrative tradition on Roman-German conflict would be, of course, Tacitus himself, not only in terms of his writing the *Ger.*, but also in his writing the *Histories* (i.e., the narrative of the Batavian revolt in book 4).

⁶⁵ This is also the conclusion of Romm (1992) 147-8. See *idem* 144-7 on experience of Germanicus at *Ann.* 2.24.4. Cf. Goodyear (1981) 254-5. In the *Ann.* passage, Tacitus draws attention to the alien nature of this region (*ut quis ex longinquo revererat, miracula narrabant, vim turbinum et inauditas volucres, monstra maris, ambiguas hominum et belvarum formas, visa sive ex metu credita*). Goodyear compares this passage to the final sentence of the *Ger.* (see also above, n. 24). Augustus in his *Res Gestae* makes reference to a trip his fleet undertook (26.4, *classis mea per Oceanum ab ostio Rheni ad solis orientis regionem usque ad fines Cimbrorum navigavit*).

⁶⁶ On Hercules and Ulysses, see Norden (1920) 171-207; Much (1967) 74-92; Lund (1988) 117.

to Hercules recalls his previous appearance in the monograph (3.1). Germanicus and Hercules work together in that they surround the Germans, providing them with an enclosed textual space in which they can exist. But Hercules' position is weakened by Tacitus' doubt whether the god ever made it to this place where Drusus finds himself.⁶⁷

In the third and final example (37.2-5) Tacitus provides a synopsis of Roman-German relations.⁶⁸ Like the previous examples, the textual position of this reference is significant: Tacitus is at the end of the Rhine tour but before the start of the Danube tour. This creates an image of the Romans caught immobile between two images of motion. In strategic terms as well this is an unenviable position. The tribe that Tacitus is to describe next is the Suebi, who (as I noted before) are the largest tribe in numbers and in geographic space, and in the textual space that describes them (38.1-46.1).

More important is what Tacitus writes, or how he writes down Rome. In one sentence Tacitus the ironic writer appears when he writes that the conquest of Germania has so far taken two hundred and ten years: *ex quo si ad alterum imperatoris Traiani consulatum computemus, ducenti ferme et decem anni colliguntur: tam diu Germania vincitur* (37.2).⁶⁹ Tacitus' use of the present tense in *vincitur* serves to blur the past into the present, that is, the historian is able to suggest that Rome's past difficulties continue to the present day, and therefore the ancient Germans are people with whom Tacitus and his reader must be concerned.

The dates provided by Tacitus here are an attempt to place the Germans into a temporal context the (Roman) reader can understand. This extensive passage of the *Ger.* indicates that this ploy is a failure. Rather, the chronological references provided by the historian turn back on the Romans, locking them into the past in their struggle with the Germans. The temporal indicator *ducenti ferme et decem anni* serves to give Rome a frame of reference in their contact with the Germans. The amount of time, two hundred ten

⁶⁷ *Sive adiit Hercules seu quidquid ubique magnificum est in claritatem eius referre consensimus...sanctiusque ac reverentius visum de actis deorum credere quam scire.*

⁶⁸ This passage has been the subject of recent in-depth study by Beck (1995). Substantial analysis is also available from Anderson (1938) 174-78; Much (1967) 419-24; Lund (1988) 207-9; Rives (1999) 273-82.

⁶⁹ That Tacitus refers to the conquest of Germania rather than victory over the Germans may be significant. Burns (2002) 179 points out that Roman coins of the campaigns of Domitian and Marcus Aurelius read *Germania capta* or *Germania subacta*, respectively. Burns writes that 'Roman numismatic practice thus articulated general barbarian territories and personified them in a highly standardized way. This custom of ignoring specific groups against whom battles were really waged in favour of generic proclamations of victory began with Augustus'.

years, effectively conveys the considerable difficulties the Romans have experienced in their campaigns against the Germans. If Rome has not been able to achieve a lasting victory over the Germans after more than two centuries of fighting, then it is possible that they never will.

Tacitus substitutes Roman weakness for German strength in the next sentence. He appears to figure the Germans into a gallery of Rome's enemies, thus giving them a context in Roman history, with the negative *non* suggesting that they are the climax of foreigners with whom Rome has fought:

medio tam longi aevi spatio multa in vicem damna. Non Samnis, non Poeni, non Hispaniae Galliaeve, ne Parthi quidem saepius admonuere: quippe regno Arsacis acrior est Germanorum libertas. Quid enim aliud nobis quam caedem Crassi, amisso et ipse Pacoro, infra Ventidium deiectus Oriens obiecerit? (37.3).⁷⁰

The final sentence serves as Tacitus' final and most damning attack on the Roman record concerning the Germans (37.5, *nam proximis temporibus triumphati magis quam victi sunt*). His claim is unhelpful to the Romans, for Tacitus points out that the recent triumphs that the Romans have enjoyed over the Germans are hollow: there are no victories to substantiate them.⁷¹ This he has proved in the previous sentence. Moreover, the phrase *nam proximis temporibus* seems exceptionally vague. Without a specific temporal point of reference, the Romans are denied a foothold in this text, one that might upset the timelessness of the Germans. The Germans do have a timeless quality in the monograph, a glorious past that shadows the lacklustre past, present and future of the Romans. This appears to have been set out by Tacitus at the start of this chapter concerning the Cimbri, who are a small community but with an illustrious past (37.1,

⁷⁰ Suggested by Rives (1999) 276: 'he...supplies a chronological list of Rome's greatest enemies, moving from its hegemony over Italy to its contemporary confrontation with the great empire of the east. By then playing down the threat of Parthia, Tacitus presents the Germans as the climax, the greatest enemy of the Roman people throughout their entire history'. Cf. Ammianus' introduction to his digression on the Huns, which appears to place Rome within the context of her conflict with this most savage group (31.2.1, *totius autem sementem exitii et cladum originem diversarum, quas Martius furor incendio solito miscendo cuncta concivit, hanc conperimus causam. Hunorum gens monumentis veteribus leviter nota ultra paludes Maeoticas glaciale oceanum accolens, omnem modum feritatis excedit*).

⁷¹ Cf. Cassius Dio 40.14.4 on the Parthians (εἰς μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἄλλως ἰσχυροὶ τὰ πολέμια, μείζον δ' ὅμως ὄνομα, καίτοι μήτε τῶν Ῥωμαίων τι παρηρημένοι καὶ προσέτι καὶ τῆς ἑαυτῶν ἔστιν ἃ προέμενοι, ἔχουσιν, ὅτι μηδέπω δεδούλωνται, ἀλλὰ καὶ νῦν ἔτι τοὺς πολέμους τοὺς πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὅσακις ἂν συνενεχθῶσι, διαφέρουσι). On Dio being correct in this assertion, see Goldsworthy (1996) 60-8.

parva nunc civitas sed gloria ingens; veterisque famae lata vestigia manent).⁷² This tribe might be *parva nunc*, but the Cimbri enjoyed *gloria ingens*. Moreover, Tacitus is careful to back up his statement by writing that evidence (*vestigia*) of this past exists.⁷³ From here Tacitus begins this analysis of Roman-Germans encounters; the Cimbri, (possibly) at some point in this illustrious past, came into contact with the Romans (37.2), and thus the vicious cycle begins.

There is another possible reading here, one that sees the Romans as a tool of the writer. The actions recorded in these sentences may be viewed as actions of confinement. Tacitus describes the Roman attempt to push the Germans back into, or keep them within, the geographic boundaries that Tacitus so forcefully describes at the beginning (and later at the end) of the monograph. There is a clear movement towards Germania made by leading Romans: Marius in Italy, Caesar in Gaul, Germanicus and others in Germania itself (37.4).

That the Germans stand above Roman adversaries such as the Parthians and the Carthaginians cannot but impress upon Tacitus' reader the superiority of the ancient Germans. Impressive also is Tacitus' dismissal of the Parthian leader Arsaces (*quippe regno Arsacis acrior est Germanorum libertas*). This community and its exemplary leader are clearly inferior to Tacitus' Germans.⁷⁴ It is Tacitus' Germans who are exemplary, for they have taught (*admonere*) the Romans more lessons than any other non-Roman community. By suggesting that the Germans have taught the Romans lessons, Tacitus makes the value of understanding the history of Roman-German contact clear. The Romans must understand the history of their contact with the Germans in order to avoid the defeats they have experienced so far, and how they can bring about victory in the future. Given the importance of *exempla* in Roman historical writing,⁷⁵ this aspect of Tacitus' *Ger.* attaches it most strongly to the more mainstream historical narratives.

⁷² On the Cimbri, see Norden (1920) 219-225. Norden reads this chapter as a digression.

⁷³ And it is here that we see Tacitus playing the archaeologist. This might be seen as legitimising the use of the *Ger.* as a work with which archaeological evidence can be compared.

⁷⁴ This sentence appears to place a considerable challenge before any author who wishes to suggest the positive value of Arsaces or the community which he represents. Ammianus, who possibly saw himself as Tacitus' continuator, may have felt this challenge when he came to write his section on Persian history in his digression on the same (see chapter five, section 2.2).

⁷⁵ On *exempla* in Livy, see Chaplin (2000).

Moreover, this passage is best read alongside an earlier (brief) passage. This is Tacitus' famous prayer for German *discordia* (33.2, *maneant, quaeso, duretque gentibus, si non amor nostri, at certe odium sui, quando urgentibus imperii fatis nihil iam praestare fortuna maius potest quam hostium discordiam*). Tacitus' desire for *discordia* among the Germans seems based on historical fact. He provides one example: the annihilation of one German tribe (the Bructeri) by others. So, an example from the past suggests the possibility of a Roman future which contains success. However, brief passages such as these do not undo the overwhelming image of *concordia* that the author has created, especially at this late stage in the work: by this point the noble Germans have been firmly established by Tacitus mainly by his discussion of the Germans as a whole in the first half. Rather, it is the opposite that appears likely, as Tacitus himself explicitly refers to German success at exploiting Rome's *discordia* (37.5).⁷⁶ Our consideration of both passages creates an interesting situation. The reader travels around Germania, that is, he goes from stronger to stronger Germans. And as this occurs the situation for the Romans deteriorates from the potential advantage of German discord to definite disadvantage from the German ability to exploit Roman discord. If there is a Roman journey in the monograph, it is one that does not give the Romans much of which to be proud. If the *Ger.* 'is potentially an enquiry into relations between the free Germans and the Roman Empire',⁷⁷ then the message here clearly is that difficult times lie ahead for the Romans. Not only in Roman history, but also in Tacitus' own writings, that is, in the *Histories* and *Annals*.⁷⁸

V.

This chapter has sought to demonstrate the intricacies of Tacitus' presentation of the ancient Germans. The benefit of Tacitus' approach is clear: it allows the *Ger.* to take its place alongside the celebrated Tacitean labours that are his historical narratives. This improved standing of the monograph, both in terms of its place in the Tacitean corpus and in relation to the (ongoing) debate of foreign community representation, in turn

⁷⁶ Cf. *Hist.* 4.14.4, where Tacitus has Civilis imply that it would be easy for the Germans to fight off the Romans given the confusion in Rome which results from civil war (*numquam magis adflictam rem Romanam*). Civilis makes this speech in order to bring the Germans together under his leadership, creating a kind of German *concordia* (4.15.1, *magno cum adsensu auditis barbaro ritu et patriis execrationibus universos adigit*).

⁷⁷ Momigliano (1990) 114.

⁷⁸ And past German narratives in Roman history-writing (e.g., Livy). Many scholars suggest that Livy's digression on Germania in book 104 may have provided Tacitus with a guide for the *Ger.*

reflects positively back upon, and builds up, Tacitus' Germans. The extreme attention to detail in terms of structure is a feature of this work that cannot be emphasised enough—in fact, it is perhaps the most striking feature of the monograph. It is the structure of the work that adds another layer to reading Tacitus' Germans as 'noble'.

That this work is different from the approaches of Sallust, Livy and Trogus attests to the diverse opportunities of foreign culture representation available to the writer of Roman history. Tacitus takes a path not chosen, and by doing so he can reinvigorate the presentation of the non-Roman in his highly sophisticated historical narratives.⁷⁹ The varied and intricate examinations of non-Romans in writers before Tacitus may be seen as setting the scene for a work like the *Ger.* to be written. Moreover, in writing about a non-Roman community the way he does in terms of form and content, Tacitus can be seen as setting up the possibility for detailed focused examinations of foreign communities that can be integrated into an historical narrative. This is what we find in Ammianus Marcellinus' history, which to many is seen as the continuation of Tacitus' historical narratives.⁸⁰ It is therefore that it is to this history the thesis turns in the next and final chapter.

⁷⁹ E.g., the Batavian revolt in *Historiae* book 4, or the digression on the Parthians in *Annales* book 6. On Tacitus' Batavian revolt, see Brunt (1990) 33-52 and Haynes (2003) 148-77; on the Parthian narrative, see Ash (1999a).

⁸⁰ Although there are problems with this view. See my comment in the next chapter, 203 n.14.

CHAPTER FIVE

Ammianus Marcellinus' Digression on Persia and the Persians (*Res Gestae*, 23.6)

A leader keen to restore the prestige of his country; an enemy perceived as unique among the panorama of foreigners, one almost equal in standing to the Romans, who had been a rival of Rome for several centuries; a soldier, accompanying his emperor, who later provides a first-hand account of the conflict (to some verging on panegyric) when he becomes an historian.¹ This is the fascinating situation in our final example of foreign community representation, Ammianus Marcellinus' (henceforth Ammianus) extensive digression on the Persians in his narrative of Julian's campaign against them.

In addition to examining the Persian digression for what it contributes to the argument of this thesis, this final chapter also seeks to contribute to scholarly debate on Ammianus' history in one important respect.² Despite the continuing interest shown by the scholarly community in the *Res Gestae* (=RG),³ there has been little substantial work

¹ Although Ammianus was clearly impressed by his emperor, Thompson (1947) 72-86 points out that 'Ammianus is no blind hero-worshipper; Julian is not at all perfect' (73). Thompson summarizes this historian's approach: 'it is clear to even the most superficial reader that Ammianus had immense respect for Julian's military ability, and he describes his military achievements with some gusto and at vast length...yet the historian often becomes uneasy when he is describing some of Julian's military actions, and with considerable deliberation he ventures to find fault' (79). Ammianus provides a summary of Julian's character at 25.4. On Julian's campaign Lenski (2002) 160 writes: 'Julian invaded Persia in a lightning strike down the Euphrates. He reached the capital Ctesiphon in less than a month and lay siege to it with spectacular pomp. After his efforts failed, though, Julian's plans quickly went awry, and his army eventually found itself marching out of Persia along the Tigris under constant attack from the Sassanians'. See also Marincola (1997) 39 and 173. On the effect of Ammianus' personal experience as a soldier in Julian's army on his narrative of Julian's campaign, see Trombley (1999). On Julian, see Hunt (1998).

For a negative (ancient) view of Julian, see Augustine, *CD* 5.21 (*ipse apostatae Iuliano, cuius egregiam indolem decepit amore dominandi sacrilega et detestanda curiositas, cuius vanis deditus oraculis erat, quando fretus securitate victoriae naves, quibus victus necessarius portabatur, incendit; deinde fervide instans inmodicis ausibus et mox merito temeritatis occisus in locis hostilibus egenum reliquit exercitum*).

² This is not only true of Ammianus scholarship, but also surveys of the Latin historiography genre. Cizek (1995) 316, for example, devotes only one paragraph to them. On digressions in Ammianus, see Rosen (1982) 73-86.

³ References to book 23 of the RG are by chapter and section only. Passages from the Persian digression are indicated by section only.

devoted to his many digressions.⁴ Neither has there been detailed study of Ammianus' portrayal of non-Roman communities, both in digressions and in the narrative.⁵ This is a very surprising omission given the historian's extensive use of digressions, especially those which describe non-Roman communities, in his narrative. On those occasions when scholarship does look at the Persian digression, it is usually a focused study of one part of it.⁶

To be sure, there is a downside to the historian explaining a community in such detail. Some might argue that the digression is too long. But long digressions are not unusual in historiography or in the RG: Herodotus, for example, established that ethnographic digressions could be long—and perhaps that they *should* be long—a whole book in fact.⁷ Herodotus' examination of the Egyptians should not be taken as an act of ethnographic deviation, and by writing his long digressions Ammianus could be said to resituating ethnographic excurses as a central feature of historical writing. John Matthews appears to endorse Ammianus' approach when of the Persian digression he writes that 'an advance down the Euphrates to Ctesiphon was a journey to one of the richest, most ancient and most complex areas of civilisation of the Near Eastern world'.⁸ An ancient and complex narrative needs a long and complex digression to describe it. And—if digressions also say something about the community of the writer—the

⁴ Drijvers (1999). There are thematic studies on types of digressions—e.g., Hengst (1992) on scientific digressions. The commentary series of den Boeft et al. provides substantial analysis of digressions from a literary and historical perspective within the context of the book under discussion.

⁵ Sundwall (1996) is a rare exception, and it serves us well in that it makes clear the need for fuller discussion.

⁶ E.g., Drijvers (1999) and den Boeft (1999). It is surprising that despite the comprehensiveness of Matthews (1989), his work almost entirely ignores the Persian digression, and offers little comment on the Persians.

⁷ Cf. my suggestion in chapter three that book 10 of Trogus can be seen as a digression on Persia.

⁸ Matthews (1989) 143. Cf. Rilke (1987) 93: 'Ammianus regards the Persians, whatever their vices, as a nation of undeniable cultural achievements'.

digression can be seen to expand the scale of Ammianus' narrative of Julian's campaign.⁹

I.

Given that the Persian digression is long and complex, it needs to be understood in the context of the narrative unit in which it is placed. This is because the comments provided by the historian before and after the digression are critical to the reader's interpretation of the digression itself, for they can be seen to explain the reason for the digression, and possibly to justify its amount of detail.

Book 23 does not narrate Julian's campaign *per se*, but rather his preparations for it.¹⁰ The Persian digression therefore should be seen as part of these preparations, both for the Romans inside the text preparing to invade Persia, and the reader about to begin reading Ammianus' account of that invasion. Perhaps no other description of a Roman campaign of conquest receives such strong focus on the preparations for it. We need not consider here the whole book, but rather the final chapter before the digression, viz. Julian's speech in which he seeks to consolidate support for his cause.¹¹

The pre-digression scene is an intricate construction. As Julian prepares to speak, he stands on elevated ground and he surrounds himself with Roman officials (5.15, *cum centuriae omnes et cohortes et manipuli convenissent, ipse aggeri glebali assistens, coronaque celsarum circumdatus potestatum, talia ore sereno disservit favorabilis studio concordi cunctorum*). Julian's position can be seen as a symbolic act of creating a new Roman community on this spot by surrounding himself with Roman officials, representing the Roman government, while the soldiers, who listen to Julian's speech, represent the Roman nation.¹² The historian

⁹ Matthews (1989) 111.

¹⁰ Including a technical preparation offered by the historian in the form of his digression on siege engines at 23.4. For analysis see Hengst (1999) 29-39 and den Boeft (1998) 56-80 (with diagrams). The devotion of a whole book to the preparations for the invasion serves to emphasise most strongly the importance of the role of Julian in the RG. Ammianus does not provide the same for the campaigns of the other emperors whose reigns are recorded in the extant portions of the narrative.

¹¹ On Julian's relations with his army, see Sabbah (1978) 488-90.

¹² We perhaps should not take this scene as Julian creating a miniature Rome. To be sure, the relationship between the post-Constantine emperors and Rome is a difficult one, due to the fact that Rome was no longer the capital city of the Roman world. And yet, as O'Daly (1999) 11-13 shows, people of Ammianus' period would still regard a visit to Rome by the emperor as a special event. It is thus possible that Julian, given that he almost exclusively talks about events before Rome lost her status as capital, means here to recreate Rome and not Constantinople.

therefore brings together the two important parts of Rome, the government and the army, on the frontier between the Roman and Persian worlds.

What Julian says in his speech is of particular importance. Here we can make an important comparison between what Julian says in the speech and what Ammianus writes in the digression, that is, we can evaluate whether the emperor and his historian are working towards the same goal.¹³ First, Julian refers to the Roman emperors who have fought successful campaigns against the Parthians: Trajan, L. Verus, Septimius Severus, and Gordianus (5.17).¹⁴ Julian's history of Roman-Persian relations is a history of Roman success and, interestingly, it reads very differently from, say, Tacitus' summary of Roman campaigning against the Germani in the *Ger.* (37.2-5; see chapter four, section four). Roman success in fighting the Parthians is then followed up by Julian when he attempts to place the Persians into an historical context of past enemies, all of whom the Romans have overcome:

plures absumptae sunt maioribus nostris aetates, ut interirent radicitus quae vexabant. devicta est perplexo et diuturno Marte Carthago, sed eam dux inclytus timuit superesse victoriae. evertit funditus Numantiam Scipio post multiplices casus obsidionis emensos. Fidenas ne imperio subcrescerent aemulae, Roma subvertit, et Faliscos ita oppressit et Veios, ut suadere nobis laboret monumentorum veterum fides, ut has civitates aliquando valuisse credamus. (5.20)

Because the Romans have defeated nations like Carthage, Numantia, the Fidenae and Veii, they will do the same to Persia. Julian's use of the first person plural *credamus* establishes an important connection between himself and his audience at a critical time:

¹³ den Boeft (1998) x and 129 suggests that in his speech Julian provides information that Ammianus would have earmarked for another digression, one summarising Roman-Persian history. A third digression in such a short space might have seemed too much to Ammianus: therefore he cleverly places the historical information in the mouth of Julian. The emperor therefore speaks for his historian, just as to many scholars this historian speaks for the emperor.

¹⁴ Chaplin (2000) 124 notes that Julian claims to be citing examples from recent memory (*recens memoria*), but the campaigns he mentions all occur over one hundred years in the past (the closest campaign is that of Gordianus in 242 CE).

There is also the important question of whether the campaigns mentioned here were recorded in the RG. It is generally assumed that Ammianus began his history with the start of the reign of Nerva in 96 CE (31.16.9, *haec ut miles quondam et Graecus, a principatu Caesaris Nervae exorsus*). However, the pace of narration in the RG suggests that it was not possible for Ammianus to have begun then (the three books on Julian's Persian campaign seems to me to be a better indicator of the pace of Ammianus' history), or at least his treatment of the earlier period was extremely condensed. It is my opinion that Ammianus began his narrative proper with the death of Constantine in 337 CE, but his history begins with a Thucydidean-like Pentacontaetia in which he summarises in extreme brevity the history of Rome 96 to 337 CE.

Ammianus suggests that Julian and his audience agree about Rome's conquest of her past enemies, and therefore they should be able to agree about the conquest of Persia. Roman history repeats itself, Julian argues. Rome has defeated all these communities, and the first and last communities named, Carthage and Veii (albeit named in reverse order), represent key points in the growth of Rome as a world empire.

What Julian says here appears to contradict partially what the historian will write later in the historical section of the digression (§ 9), when Ammianus focuses on Roman-Persian conflict, suggesting an even contest so far between the two countries (see below, section 2.2). It is important here to note that the historical information more relevant to Julian's situation is contained in the digression, not in Julian's speech. The historical *exempla* most relevant to the present situation are omitted by the emperor. Julian appears to have missed the point, not referring to events where the circumstances may be more relevant. This may be a subtle way in which Ammianus explains why Julian fails in his campaign, because he misunderstands Rome's previous experiences with Persia. The fact that Ammianus assesses Roman-Persian contact in the digression is an indication that the historian intends the digression to be an educational experience. In this case the lesson has a particular relevance to Julian, his army, and the readers of the RG.

The emperor's speech is received well, especially by one part of his army, as the historian is careful to point out: his Gallic troops (5.24, *maxime omnium id numeri Gallicani fremitu laetiore monstrabant, memores aliquotiens eo ductante, perque ordines discurrente, cadentes vidisse gentes aliquas alias supplicantes*). At this point in the narrative it appears that Julian's oration has not achieved its objective of making his soldiers enthusiastic for the invasion of Persia. Julian has a divided army (*centuriae omnes et cohortes et manipuli*): some of his soldiers are identified by their position in the army, and some are identified by their nationality. They do not express their unanimous support for the campaign—yet. This breaks apart Julian's army at a point when surely it must be fully unified, as it is about to go into Persia to fight a whole country. This passage about Julian's Romans in some way reflects Ammianus' Persians. Persia and the people who live there, as the historian will explain it in the digression, do not comprise a single unified community, but rather a diverse group like Julian's army.

Given that Ammianus will note the unanimous support for Julian's campaign at the start of book 24 (see below), in stressing the lack of support at 23.5.24, the historian might be accused of misleading the reader. Perhaps Ammianus does this deliberately. He postpones the expression of the whole army's enthusiasm for the invasion until after

the digression. This situates the soldiers as respondents to Ammianus' digression. Their enthusiasm at 24.1.1 makes clear their approval of what Persia represents, that is, a place worthy to be conquered. The enthusiasm of the soldiers can be taken as an expression of their thoughts on the easiness of the task before them. Or—to think in terms of the structure of Ammianus' narrative—they are thinking of the easiness of the task behind them. Any fear of the unknown in Persia has been removed by Ammianus' thorough explanation.

To go back to the Gauls' response at 5.24 for a moment, their act of remembering interestingly parallels that of Julian in his speech, although their remembering possibly is severely limited to those events that Julian mentions that occurred after Gaul became part of the Roman world—or more specifically events they have experienced in Julian's service (events within the narrative boundaries of the RG). Some of his *exempla*—if not all those recorded by Ammianus—will be meaningless to them. This difference within Julian's army mirrors those within Persia that Ammianus will explain in the digression. Julian's Roman army can therefore be seen as foreshadowing what the historian will explore in the digression. Or—to put it another way—the Persians in the digression to a degree are presented by Ammianus as a reflection of the Romans. These Romans in Julian's army, looking into Persia, see something of themselves looking back at them.

There could be another reason for the historian's focus on the Gauls. It may be an attempt by Ammianus to draw the reader's attention to Julian's first campaign, the battle of Strasbourg in book 16. Drawing attention to the Gallic troops for the historian may be a means of encouraging the reader to recall an event in the country from which these troops originate. This scene therefore has an intratextual significance, establishing a connection between beginning and ending points of Julian's military career. The Gauls provide a unity in Julian's military career. Despite Julian's travels throughout the Roman empire, his Gauls provide a consistent point of reference in military terms that enables Julian to orient himself.

II.

The digression divides into five parts: Ammianus' introduction (§ 1), his history of Persia (§§ 2-9), Persian geography (§§ 10-74), Persian customs (§§ 75-84) and, finally, his discussion of, or sub-digression on, pearls (§§ 85-88). At first glance, Ammianus appears to cover all the relevant aspects of Persia in this digression—history, geography

and customs—with the second of these areas receiving extremely detailed examination. By dividing his material in this fashion, Ammianus is following in the established conventions for exploring foreign cultures.¹⁵

2.1 Ammianus' introduction (§ 1).

Ammianus begins by explaining his reasons for writing this digression:

res adigit huc prolapsa ut in excessu celeri situm monstrare Persidis, descriptionibus gentium curiose digestis, in quibus aegre vera dixere paucissimi. quod autem erit paulo prolixior textus, ad scientiam proficit plenam. quisquis enim affectat nimiam brevitatem ubi narrantur incognita non quid signatius explicet, sed quid debeat praeteriri, scrutatur. (1)

Ammianus succinctly explains why he is going to write a very long digression.¹⁶ The historian provides two important reasons: (1) previous accounts have not been accurate and (2) brevity results in learning more about what to leave out than about the subject in question.¹⁷ At the heart of his introduction the historian explains his personal suitability for the task: he offers full knowledge (*scientiam plenam*).¹⁸ This is a standard topos

¹⁵ It is interesting to note that the common approach in ethnographic treatments is to discuss geography followed by history. This is the case, for example, in book 2 of Herodotus (albeit the very beginning of the treatment can be labelled historical in that Herodotus recounts Psammetichus' search for the oldest race). It can be said to be the case also in book 4: Herodotus discusses Scythian culture, then he provides a compelling account of what can be considered the most important historical event of Scythian history: the invasion of Scythian territory by the Persians. The geography-history rule appears to apply to Roman historical narratives too: Sallust, for example, in his digression on Africa (*Jug.* 17-19), discusses geography before history. The rationale could be this: one must describe the place before describing events that occurred in that place. Ammianus' decision to reverse the order may be seen as his attempt to make this digression different from previous examples.

¹⁶ On what Ammianus means by phrases of conciseness such as *ut in excessu celeri*, see den Boeft (1998) 131. Cf. the beginning of Sallust's digression on Africa (see above, Chapter one, section 1.1).

¹⁷ In this sense we learn not so much why Ammianus writes this digression, but his view of digressions in general, viz. his digressions versus those of other historians, or writers such as Strabo and Pliny—see den Boeft (1998) 131.

¹⁸ Sundwall (1996) 625. Ammianus' claim to offer the truth, as Sundwall points out, is a common historical topos. On this phrase, see Rosen (1982) 81 and 107. Cf. Ammianus' comments in his conclusion at 31.16.9, where the historian claims to have narrated events without trying to debase them through omission or lies (*opus veritatem professum numquam (ut arbitror) sciens silentio ausus corrumpere, vel mendacio*). A connection can surely be made between Ammianus in his conclusion claiming not to have neglected the truth through silence and his advertisement to offer full explication of the Persians at 23.6.1. Ammianus' statement in his conclusion, therefore, has a cultural context in that he means

employed by historians not only for digressions, but also usually for their works themselves. Ammianus' extensive knowledge of Persia comes from his experiences there as part of Julian's campaign, and he describes Persia so that the reader may have adequate/ full background to reading the same. This ties the digression to the narrative that follows it, and it makes the digression an integral part of the Persian narrative. If Julian's speech scene establishes the need for Ammianus to explain fully the Persians, this opening comment can be seen to build on that in an important way. Julian's men agree to the invasion of Persia, then Ammianus provides them with the detailed information they will require.

2.2 History of Persia (§§ 2-9).

The section on Persian history might appear inadequate when compared to the vast expanse of Ammianus' discussion of geography, especially considering that it exists within an historical narrative, and this section on Persian history, should Julian's campaign be successful, marks the end of Persia as an independent nation; from this point on it is part of the Roman world. If we read Ammianus' reading of Persian history as the last record of Persian history as far as Persia is an independent nation, then a fuller record might be expected. A more detailed account of Persia's pre-Roman history, including a record of her extensive military successes, would enable Ammianus to suggest the greatness of Julian's endeavour. Persia's history, therefore, can serve to suggest Rome's present.

Perhaps Ammianus' aim here was to compress substantially the history of Persia in order to limit any suggestion that Persia is a better nation than Rome. Too many exemplary Persians like Arsaces (see below) would serve to provide the Romans with too many enemies to fight.¹⁹ A more detailed account of Persia's history would serve through the Persian past to delay significantly in textual terms the Roman future of the region that Julian intends to initiate by his invasion.

Geography and history are joined together when Ammianus begins by writing that at some point in the past Persia was a small kingdom (§ 2). Ammianus stretches back to Persia's earliest period. In fact, Ammianus might be seen as going back to the

not just the events of history which he narrates, but also the cultural digressions that play such an important role in the RG.

¹⁹ The historian may be worried that too many noble Persians from Persia's past would place the Romans in an inferior position, to which Ammianus himself may have

pre-Persian period when he notes that it was called by various names (*multisque antea nominibus appellatum*). What Ammianus does here is explain how the country became the size it is in Julian's time, and how it becomes to be called Persia, which justifies the length of the geographical section and the length of the digression as a whole.

The reference to Alexander the Great in this first sentence identifies Persia as a place to be conquered—and a place that can be conquered (*cum apud Babylona Magnum fata rapuissent Alexandrum*). He is the first person to be identified in the section on Persian history, and his presence casts a shadow over the approximately seven centuries of Persian history that follow. Persia begins her history in Ammianus' digression at a clear disadvantage.

If Tacitus in his *Ger.* does not provide a non-Roman character to function as a focal point, Ammianus chooses the opposite approach through his elucidation of Arsaces, who, coincidentally, is mentioned in Tacitus (37.3). As he appears in the second sentence, immediately following the reference to Alexander, he is the first part of Persia and his people that the reader encounters. This first impression is very important given Alexander's presence. We can therefore see him as a symbol for his country, a rival for Julian: the emperor's actions in the present campaign will be judged against the successes of Arsaces in the past. Arsaces and Persia appear to grow in stature together. Early Persia is small; likewise Arsaces, who begins his historical journey as a man of low birth (§ 2). This changes when his beliefs change, and he then rises in standing through exemplary behavior (*post multa gloriose et fortiter gesta*).²⁰ Not only is this Persian ruler valiant in action, but also his rule is described in positive terms. He enjoys a reign of peace (§ 3, *ipse tranquillius agens temperator oboedientium fuit et arbiter lenis*), which contrasts the subject of books 23-5, a narrative of the war against Persia (but in union with the digression as a refuge from the said war narrative). This also stands in stark contrast to the situation before the digression, Julian's address to his troops, where he portrays the Persians as warlike (for they fight the Romans)—Julian and the Romans appear as unnecessary aggressors, therefore.²¹ But perhaps more important than being a peaceful

contributed through his writing down of Julian's rivals for the throne in the earlier books of the RG.

²⁰ Cf. Sallust, *Jug.* 5.4 on Masinissa: *multa et praeclara rei militaris facinora fecerat*. On this passage, see chapter 1, section 2.

²¹ Cf. Livy, *periocha* LXX, where Arsaces sends ambassadors to Sulla in order to establish peaceful relations with the Romans (*Parthorum legati a rege Arsace missi venerunt ad Syllam ut amicitiam populi R. peterent*).

character, Arsaces expands Persian territory and fills it with cities. As we shall see in the geographic section to the digression, cities are mentioned constantly by Ammianus, viewed by him as the main hallmark of civilization. Here they are seen as a sign of the Persians as a civilized people. This establishes a connection between the history and geography sections. Arsaces' achievements justify the historian's frequent references to cities and the length of the geography section.

As I suggested above, it is possible that in setting out Arsaces in this way Ammianus may have intended this character to stand as an opponent to Julian, that is, he is a Persian inside the digression to match a Roman outside the digression. Arsaces is a leader of Persia in the past; Julian will (hopefully) be leader of Persia in the future. This seems an especially strong case when we reflect that there is no contemporary Persian mentioned here, as if Ammianus has deliberately omitted the present Persian leader(s) to make it easier for Julian to take over. There may be a Roman reason for this. Ammianus may omit naming the recent and current leaders of Persia due to the kind of position they hold in their state: the position of kings. Roman dislike of monarchy is well-established; it is perhaps surprising that Julian does not criticise the Persians for having monarchy, which might to the Romans suggest a compelling reason to attack Persia, to get rid of monarchy.

Ammianus instead may want to suggest that contemporary Persia does not need monarchs—or leaders of any kind. The greatest strength of Persia is that it is a large unified community. No single individual is named, because in fighting the Persians Julian is not fighting against a leader of this community, but against the whole nation. Persia appears as a collective, and Julian appears alone.

There is also an important contrast here that the historian may want the reader to note: Arsaces' peaceful lifetime, that is, he enjoys a successful future, which is the opposite to the tense present (nervous anticipation of the campaign about to begin) and the unfortunate future to be experienced by Julian.

The contrast between past and present (and possibly the future) is clear within this compact section, moreover, between what Ammianus writes at §§ 2-4 and §§ 7-9: thus there is a (delicate) balance between the good aspects of Arsaces and the negative aspects of earlier Persian history. In these concluding sentences Ammianus considerably condenses Persian history, perhaps because it is the history of Persian interaction with the Greek and Roman world. The first two sections offer examples of the less than glorious episodes in Persian history: Cyrus' defeat at the hand of the Scythians (§ 7),

followed by Xerxes' failed subjugation of Greece (§ 8). And there is another reference to Alexander (*ut bella praetereamus Alexandri, ac testamento nationem omnem in successoris unius iura translata*). The two references to Alexander almost serve to enclose Persia's history with the greatest defeat she has experienced so far.²²

In fact the references to Alexander serve to enclose Persia's history before her contact with Rome. The real analysis of Persia's place in history, therefore, will be judged by her contact with the Romans. Roman-Persian contact proves to be balanced: sometimes the Romans win, sometimes the Persians win, and sometimes the contests are equal (i.e., there is no definite result):

quibus peractis transcursisque temporibus longis sub consulibus et deinceps in potestatem Caesarum redacta re publica, nobiscum hae nationes subinde dimicarunt paribusque momentis interdum, aliquotiens superatae, non numquam abiire victrices. (§ 9)

Julian's invasion is therefore set up as the event that will break the tie. In terms of the narrative, the historian creates anticipation of his narrative of his historical turning point in Roman-Persian relations. By describing Roman-Persian history leading up to Julian's invasion, Ammianus provides the historical background necessary for the reader to appreciate better the story that he will tell in the narrative following the digression.²³ But it is important to note that Ammianus does not refer specifically to particular Roman-Persian conflicts. While this means that the historian does not have to mention the shameful defeat of Crassus, it does mean that the great Roman victories of, say, Trajan are omitted also. Writing a non-specific history of Roman-Persian conflict does serve a purpose. It means that attention is not focused on past campaigns, but rather the campaign that is about to begin. Crassus and Trajan make way for Julian. What Ammianus writes in this sentence, then, is open-ended history. He provides an interpretation of Roman-Persian conflict that he knows is accurate up to the present, but it is an interpretation that will shortly change. And the reader at this point might begin to anticipate Julian's invasion, and by instead describing in detail the geography of the country, the historian creates a dramatic tension.

²² Julian in undertaking his Persian expedition may have thought he was recreating Alexander's victory for the glory of the Roman Empire. Ammianus himself suggests this: (16.5.4-5). See Issac (1998) 439.

²³ What Ammianus writes here is perhaps recast when he places the Roman defeat in Persia and the peace subsequently negotiated against the backdrop of past Roman defeats at 25.9.7-11. The historian provides the following past examples: the Caudine forks, Albinus in Numidia, and Mancinus at Numantia.

2.3 Persian Geography (§§ 10-74).

Jan Willem Drijvers notes some of the deficiencies in Ammianus' history, namely the historian's failure to record the shift in power from one group to another.²⁴ The reason for this, Drijvers argues, is that the Romans did not distinguish between the different kingdoms of rule in Persia; rather, they perceived Persia as one country with one history. This explains the brevity of the history section. If it is a fault, it is one for which Ammianus compensates. The section that follows, on geography, is lengthy on account of the amount of territory that comprises the Persian empire. In this central section of the digression, Ammianus appears to acknowledge fully the great variety of regions of Persia.

Scholarship prefers to divide this section, between a general introduction (§§ 10-14) and the rest (§§ 15-74). In this section, Ammianus 'delineates the general geographical setting of the Persian Empire. The Persian gulf is central to this setting; furthermore, the border areas of Persia are given'.²⁵ The historian, perhaps appropriately, writes about his subject first in general, then in specific terms. His general observations of Persian geography serve to ease the reader from the history section to the detailed explication of the different Persian regions. Persia can be described in such a manner in keeping with the conventions of foreign community representation as it has thus far evolved.²⁶ Fortunately the historian does not over-complicate his long digression with a complicated structure and approach, for that would risk confusing the reader and losing him somewhere in Persia; rather, he employs a 'systematic pattern'.²⁷ Ammianus' tour begins with Assyria. There is a clear reason for this: it is the nearest Persian province to the Roman world, and it is 'famous' (*celebritate*) on several accounts: its large population, its size, and the abundance of the products therein:

*citra omnes provincias est nobilis Assyria celebritate et magnitudine et multifor-
mitate ditissima. quae per populos pagosque amplius diffusa quondam et copiosa, ad unum concessit
vocabulum et nunc omnis appellatur Assyria, ubi inter bacarum vulgareque abundantiam
frugum bitumen nascitur prope lacum nomine Sosangiten, cuius alveo Tigris voratus fluensque
subterraneus percursis spatiis longis emergit.* (§ 15)

²⁴ Drijvers (1999) 195.

²⁵ den Boeft (1998) 130.

²⁶ Cf. the opening of Tacitus' *Ger.* (see chapter four, section I).

²⁷ Drijvers (1999) 194.

The journey through Persia begins with what is perhaps its most impressive region. Or—to put it another way—the first region to be described has clear benefits to the Romans. It was important to the historian on a more personal level as well, for it played a role in Julian's campaign, and to some Assyria was, due to Trajan's past conquest of it (one might assume), part of the Roman world—although by Ammianus' time it was not.²⁸ The tour of Persia, therefore, begins with what is perhaps the easiest for the Roman reader of the RG to come to terms with: closeness to his own world, in terms of size and wealth of resources. Beginning with the region closest to the Roman world has one obvious advantage, for it allows the geographic journey to begin in an area possibly familiar to the reader (or a region of less than total unfamiliarity), and progress to regions less and less well-known, if known at all.²⁹ This allows the digression to be a journey of learning and discovery, as the reader travels from the Roman world out, just as we assume Julian is progressing from a Roman point of reference into the heart of Persia, into some areas perhaps never visited before by a Roman.³⁰

Despite the length of the geographic section and the Persian digression as a whole, Ammianus does not gradually work up to establishing Persia as a place very different from the world in which the Roman reader lives. One such place where nature is different from the Roman world occurs early on in the geographic tour (§ 17, *in his pagis hiatus quoque conspicitur terrae, unde halitus letalis exsurgens, quodcumque animal proxime steterit, odore gravi consumit*). By stating that the vapours are able to kill any living thing, Ammianus establishes this region as something not only alien to the Romans, but also alien and dangerous to all living things. To some scholars, a passage such as this demonstrates the merit of Ammianus' work, 'his genuine interest, his attention to detail, and his desire to present the truth'.³¹ This sentence clearly establishes Persia as very

²⁸ den Boeft (1998) 147.

²⁹ Here, then, the importance of the directions that Ammianus provides comes into play. Sundwall (1996) 633-4 demonstrates that the historian always begins with a fixed starting point, and provides directions from there, whether compass points or directions such as *super*, *dexter*, *prope*, *exadversum*, and so on. The reader does not have to be familiar with the fixed starting point, for sometimes Ammianus begins by familiarising the reader with this point.

³⁰ Exploratory expeditions were a feature of the Roman empire. Expeditions can be seen as preparing the way for military conquest, especially as these explorers would make maps of the regions through which the travelled, and collectively explorers would chart out the whole world. See Nicolet (1991) 85-94.

³¹ Sundwall (1996) 631.

different from the Roman world. And that Persia appears so different from the Roman world so soon into the geographic tour of this vast country can serve to impress upon the reader just how different Persia is. This could after all only be the beginning of Ammianus' catalogue of the vastly alien nature of this country.

But this is not entirely the case. While the historian distances Rome and Persia from each other in one part of the digression, in another part he appears to bring them together. Thus Persia emerges as a complex country, one of contradictions. One example of this comes via the god Apollo, a statue of whom the Romans take from a Persian city and relocate to Rome:³²

*qua per duces Veri Caesaris, ut ante rettulimus, expulsata, avulsum sedibus simulacrum
Comei Apollinis perlatumque Romam in aede Apollinis Palatini deorum antistites collocarunt.
fertur autem quod post direptum hoc idem figmentum incensa civitate milites fanum scrutantes
invenere foramen angustum, quo reserato, ut pretiosum aliquid invenirent, ex adyto quodam
concluso a Chaldaeorum arcanis labes primordialis exiluit, quae insanabilium vi concepta
morborum eiusdem Veri Marciue Antonini temporibus ab ipsis Persarum finibus ad usque
Rhenum et Gallias cuncta contagiis polluebat et mortibus. (§ 24)*

By describing an event in the reign of Verus Caesar, Ammianus is possibly referring to an episode in an earlier book of the RG. If Ammianus did narrate Verus' campaign in the 160s CE against Persia, then Ammianus is linking his digression on Persia in book 23 to this earlier narrative, possibly for the purpose of inviting the reader to compare the two invasions. The disaster of Verus' homecoming may suggest that Julian's return may be equally disastrous for Rome.

Equally important is the cultural message of this passage. Not only do the Romans and Persians share the same god, it seems, but by taking a Persian artifact to Rome the Romans symbolically relocate Persia to a place at the heart of their own territory. And the statue not only goes to Rome, but to an important part of Rome—to the temple of Apollo on the Palatine hill. The pestilence that the Romans release upon sacking the temple, moreover, links this chapter with the one we have looked at above. In this instance the destructive element is directed specifically at the Romans, in effect countering any positive impression of national joining that might be gained from the taking of the statue. The spread of the contagion to the frontier of the Roman empire creates the image of a Persian infestation of Rome. This passage can also be read as a

³² Rilke (1987) 27-8 discusses Ammianus' frequent discussion of shrines to Apollo in various parts of the world. He argues that the burning of the shrines on the Palatine and at Daphne were signs that Julian enters Persia *nondum pace numinum exorata*. Apollo is the

warning that Julian's campaign may not be fully successful. Verus' assault against Persia was a moderate success, but the damage to Rome caused by the plague the Roman army brought back suggests that even if a Roman can conquer Persia, returning to Roman territory after victory does not exclude a Persian counterattack.

The sacking of the temple of Apollo might be meant to recall an event at the opening of book 23, Julian's attempted rebuilding of the temple at Jerusalem (23.1.2-3).³³ The spatial and textual relationship suggested by these two temples is interesting, for we have a temple (re)built at the start of the book, at the start of Ammianus' narrative of Julian's campaign, and the destruction of a temple at the end of the book. Julian's attempt to rebuild the temple may have been an attempt to build a monument to himself. That Julian's chosen person to carry out the rebuilding must abandon the project suggests that Julian's reign will be a failure.³⁴ The destruction of the temple of Apollo, although it occurs before Julian's campaign, internalises the failure of Julian within the context of the Persian campaign.

god of prophecy and, appropriately perhaps, in book 23 Julian receives two 'warnings' about his expedition, at 1.7 and 5.4.

³³ On this episode, see Drijvers (1992). Cf. Matthews (1989) 110.

³⁴ This is due to the supernatural circumstances that prevent work at the site of the destroyed temple (23.1.3). Given that this is the opening event of the three books on Julian's campaign, it establishes a powerful image in the reader's mind concerning this emperor, and the campaign he will undertake.

The idea of the temple of Apollo signalling the future defeat of the Romans can possibly find as its model the reference to the altar of Apollo in Aeschylus' *Persians*. The Persian queen describes a scene she witnessed there which suggests the defeat of the Persians in the war against the Greeks:

ὄρῳ δὲ φεύγοντ' αἰετὸν πρὸς ἐσχάραν
 Φοίβου, φόβῳ δ' ἄφθογος ἐστήθην, φίλοι·
 μεθύστερον δὲ κίρκον εἰσορῶ δρόμῳ
 πτεροῖν ἐφορμαίνοντα καὶ χηλαῖς κάρα
 τίλλονθ'· ὁ δ' οὐδὲν ἄλλο γ' ἢ πτήξας δέμας
 παρεῖχε· ταῦτ' ἔμοιγε δείματ' ἔστ' ἰδεῖν,
 ὑμῖν δ' ἀκούειν (205-11)

It would perhaps be going too far to suggest that the eagle to which the queen refers here is Rome, since here she means it to represent Persia, but if it could represent Rome, and therefore the hawk now refer to Persia, then this passage could by broad extension refer to a future defeat of Rome by Persia. On the Persians in Greek drama, see Hall (1989) 56-100.

Moreover, to move further back in the history of Greek literature, Ammianus in this passage could mean for the reader to think of Apollo's role as the bringer of calamity in first book of the Homeric *Iliad*. The deaths of the Greeks at the hands of Apollo's arrows can be interpreted as a kind of defeat.

The reference to Apollo here provides a connection between Romans and Persians, for Apollo is a god of both. The temple of Apollo founded by the Romans under Verus, possibly mentioned earlier by Ammianus in one of the lost books of the RG (as I mentioned above), gives them a point of reference within Persia in the past. It is a Roman geographical point of reference to which Julian's army could have travelled; Ammianus compensates for the loss of the temple by pointing out where it once stood. The destruction of this site removes that point of reference, which denies Julian's army the mapped out journey there would be had the temple still been there.

Just as Ammianus' digression quickly passes over one part of Persian culture (i.e., its history; see above), it can equally contain extreme focus.³⁵ Thus the journey which Julian's men take, if their march is meant to follow the rhythm of the historian's digression, is not a consistent pace, but rather it is start-stop. Perhaps the best (known) example is the section devoted to the Magi (§§ 32-6). As Ammianus is involved in his geographic journey, his need to digress at this point in the digression is explicitly made (§ 32, *in his tractibus Magorum agri sunt fertiles, super quorum secta studiisque, quoniam huc incidimus, pauca conveniet expediri*). It is as if Ammianus is aware that he is digressing too far, that his offer to explain the Magi will be compensated by a claim that here at least he will be brief. Geography here stands aside in the name of intellectual curiosity. While these chapters provide interesting information about the Magi, and it may have suited the overall goals of the digression, it does not directly contribute to the flow of the geographic section of the digression.³⁶ Rather, it may have found itself a better home in the next section, on customs, for religion would seem to be a (very) important topic for that section.³⁷

Moreover, this section appears to be at odds with the geographical nature of the section in which it exists in another way: its historical focus. This materialises in another shift in attention in the final section of the Magi digression, as Ammianus provides an

³⁵ Rather, this is a digression within a digression, a feature of Ammianus' writing that has been noted by many scholars, including Drijvers (1999), where this section is cited as an example.

³⁶ den Boeft (1998) 168 defends Ammianus' inclusion of this information: 'it was indispensable for the author to pay due attention to an aspect of Persian life and religion which had fascinated the Greco-Roman world'.

³⁷ It does, however, recall the Roman sacking of the temple of Apollo. The reverence that the Persians display for the religious role of the Magi in a way connects to the pestilence that the Romans suffer after failing to show reverence for a religious site,

history of the Magi: *ex hoc magorum semine septem post mortem Cambysis regnum inisse Persidos antiqui memorant libri docentes eos Darei factione oppressos, imperitandi initium equino hinnitu sortiti* (36). The historian has already covered the history of Persia. However, as this is history as it relates specifically to the Magi, we appreciate its place here. The chapter on the Magi serve to link Persian history and geography, and Ammianus has the opportunity here to supplement what he writes in §§ 2-9 above. Note that here the historian provides information that the history section does not, namely information concerning Darius' rise to power. Ammianus therefore remedies partially his gloss on Darius' place in Persian history. We perhaps understand now why this is a digression in the third degree:³⁸ it is an history section transposed.

A very important aspect of the digression is the frequent use of contrast by Ammianus. It appears that the historian was particularly fond of contrasting parts of this section of the digression against each other.³⁹ Doing so adds a degree of complexity to these literary Persians. One example is the northern people of this part of the world, the Parthians (§§ 43-44). The historian stresses the inhospitable nature of their land (in Roman eyes) when he notes its abundance of snow and frost (§ 43). The natural environment determines the characteristics of the inhabitants, or so it seems, for they are described as savage and warlike (§ 44, *feri sunt illic habitatores pagorum omnium atque pugnaces*).⁴⁰ The Magi, as religious figures of sorts, are civilized.

If the historian does not situate the Parthians in opposition to the Magi, then he very much appears to do so with the next community that he describes: the *Arabes beati* (§§ 45-7). The historian presents these people as the Parthians turned inside out. Their

albeit one without Magi. On the thematic context of this chapter, see den Boeft (1999) 210-1.

³⁸ den Boeft (1999) 207. Perhaps that it is a digression in the third degree allows Ammianus to make a direct reference to Herodotus, who discusses this event at 3.70-80. And possibly it is Herodotus himself to whom Ammianus refers when he writes *antiqui memorant libri*.

³⁹ Sundwall (1996) suggests a possible reason why Ammianus does this: 'places or regions, while sometimes sharing characteristics, are always presented in a way that prevents them from becoming interchangeable'.

⁴⁰ Cf. Tacitus, *Ger.* 45.1ff. After Tacitus notes a near-insurmountable natural frontier, the people who live in such a region are described mostly by what they lack. Here, the situation is different, but the idea of a boundary and inhospitable conditions is the same. Note also Drijvers (1999) 200 on the Parthians, as it was 'in Roman eyes a geographically marginal and barren land: therefore its inhabitants could only be uncivilized people. Whereas fertile lands, like those around the Mediterranean, were the natural habitat of civilized man'.

territory is described in positive terms, by what it offers: fruit, livestock, and material (luxury) goods. They also know how to make use of their environment, especially the seas that define the limits of their territory (§ 45), which in turn leads the historian to mention the abundance of safe harbours, their many cities, and adorned buildings.⁴¹ The Parthians, by contrast, possess only the dimensions of their kingdom (§ 43).

Ammianus' fondness for contrast becomes more pronounced as he progresses through his textual Persia. It is as if he does so to stress the increasing difference between the Persians and the Romans who will shortly invade under Julian's leadership. First, there are the Sacae (§ 60, *his contigui sunt Sacae natio fera, squalentia incolens loca, solum pecori fructuosa, ideo nec civitatibus culta*). The difference between these people and the Arabs could not be greater: while the Arabs have cities of tremendous opulence, the Sacae have nothing that can even be compared to these, for they do not have cities. In fact, it seems that their land is not suitable for human habitation, only for the grazing of cattle.⁴² Given the attention that Ammianus gives to naming and on occasion evaluating the cities in each region as a measure of their value as a civilization, the Sacae are the most desperate people.

The Seres are different from the other communities that Ammianus mentions, for they appear to live in an Eden within Persia (§§ 67-8).⁴³ Their country is described

⁴¹ Sundwall (1996) 628 notes that Ammianus 'views the world for the most part in terms of cities. He always notes the density or dearth of cities in a region, often discussing their importance, history, and background'. Matthews (1989) 140 carries the discussion further when he notes that the historian knew that as a result of Alexander, Persia was populated with Greek cities 'which were within the intellectual horizons of men of the Classical world'. This is not what Ammianus is doing here by mentioning cities, I feel; rather, he treats them as status symbols, items that determine the worth of a part of Persia in terms of their number and quality. See also Berger (2002), who reads this chapter in the context of Ammianus' apparently frequent references to paradise-like areas in the Persian narrative of book 23-5. This passage foreshadows what the Romans will find when they march through Persia: Berger notes (177-8) two 'paradises' encountered by the Romans as they approach Ctesiphon (24.5.1-2 and 24.6.3).

⁴² In writing this chapter Ammianus may have had in mind Sallust's description of Africa in his *Bellum Iugurthinum*. See above, chapter one, section 1.1.1 on *Jug.* 17.5.

⁴³ Berger (2002) 179 writes that 'les lieux paradisiaques présents chez Ammien sont souvent proches de ce qu'on appelle dans la littérature latine un *locus amoenus*. Mais une de leurs caractéristiques importantes est d'être situés géographiquement: il ne sont donc pas imaginaires, du moins pas entièrement; ils ne reposent pas non plus sur une croyance religieuse, comme celle en l'Éden. Cependant—et c'est là un point de rapprochement avec le paradis chrétien—, les paradis d'Ammien sont tous situés en Orient, à celui de la Méditerranée ou à l'Orient du monde. Ils ont donc quelque chose à voir avec l'exotisme, au sens premier du mot. Or on sait que, dans l'exotisme, les clichés sont rois, ce qui

as pleasant, and they are described as noble. The two clearly go together. Very close to the end of the geographic section, the journey that Ammianus has been taking around Persia, then, ends with a clear goal. This can be identified as marking out the ending point of the Roman journey into Persia. At the end of such a long voyage, one finds something that is worth reaching, a place that Julian would want to incorporate into his empire.

Ammianus ends the section on geography by claiming that he would go further, but to do so would cause him to stray too far from his subject (§ 74, *ne igitur orae maritimae spatia alluentia Persidos extremitates per minutias demonstrantes, a proposito longius aberremus*). Instead the historian provides a complete view by stating the length and breadth of Persia, which establishes the country's massive size.⁴⁴ The reader has already achieved an appreciation of this through the geographic journey through Persia. This sentence confirms this. What is especially interesting here is that the historian surrounds the specifics of Persian geography with general information. The reader therefore has a feeling of travelling full-circle, finishing at the point where s/he started. This is appropriate, for it brings the reader back to the original vantage point, thinking about Persia as a whole, as Ammianus is about to begin his next topic, Persian customs.

2.4 Persian Customs (§§ 75-84).

Regarding the historian's approach in this section, den Boeft points out that there is an 'implicit feeling of Roman superiority' and that 'the "otherness" of the Persians is emphasised'.⁴⁵ I feel that this is perhaps too harsh a comment, and needs refinement. Ammianus' brief description of the Persians can be seen to correspond roughly to Herodotus' description of the same in his (brief) digression in his *Histories* (1.131-40).⁴⁶ If Herodotus does not write extensively about Persian customs, then Ammianus can be forgiven for doing the same. But one point should be stated from the outset. While Ammianus does not contradict Herodotus, he does not confirm what Herodotus writes, because he discusses many topics different from those discussed by Herodotus. Perhaps

nous invite à analyser les belles images qu'Ammien met sous les yeux de son lecteur quand il évoque ces régions idylliques'.

⁴⁴ This can be seen as the opposite approach to, say, Tacitus, who provides his overview of German geography at the beginning of his *Germania* (see chapter four, section one).

⁴⁵ den Boeft (1998) 131.

⁴⁶ On Ammianus' relationship with Herodotus, see Marincola (1997) 255-6.

the best way of reading the digression is that it complements Herodotus' digression by writing on other topics which can be seen as a supplement.

If the geography section focuses on differences between regions, and by doing so separates the different subgroups of the Persians, the section on customs suggests that there is a commonality among Persians despite these regional differences. The Persians are thus brought back together. But there is contrast *within* this section, and this makes the Persians appear as a complex people. Ammianus uses contrast in the cultural section while keeping to the expected historical stereotypes and *topoi*, as Sundwall observes.⁴⁷ There are several interesting examples: while the Persians have a gluttonous sexual appetite, they avoid excess at banquets (§§ 76-7), which corresponds to Herodotus' comment on the Persian fondness of wine (1.133.3, οἴνωι δὲ κάρτα προσκέαται, καί σφι οὐκ ἐμέσαι ἔξεστι, οὐκὶ οὐρῆσαι ἀντίον ἄλλου);⁴⁸ they rarely pass water in public, which shows restraint, but their manner of walking is meant to suggest a lack of restraint (§§ 79-80). That Ammianus' Persians do not pass water in public may be meant to recall not Herodotus' Persians, but his Egyptians. The Egyptian men, Herodotus claims, relieve themselves indoors, but they eat outdoors (2.35.3, εὐμαρείῃι χρέωνται ἐν τοῖσι οἴκοισι, ἐσθίουσι δὲ ἔξω ἐν τῇσι ὁδοῖσι, ἐπιλέγοντες ὡς τὰ μὲν αἰσχρὰ ἀναγκαῖα δὲ ἐν ἀποκρύφῳ ἐστὶ ποιέειν χρεόν, τὰ δὲ μὴ αἰσχρὰ ἀναφανδόν).

Their extensive military training (§ 83) suggests discipline (and it is possibly meant to warn Julian and the Romans explicitly about what they are about to face). Herodotus too suggests the military battle when he notes that Persians prove their worth by fighting in battle, and by producing many sons (1.136).

Ammianus contrasts the image of the strong male with his comment on the Persian predilection for luxurious dress, which indicates a lack of frugality:

indumentis plerique eorum ita operiuntur lumine colorum fulgentibus vario ut, licet sinus lateraque dissuta relinquant flatibus agitari ventorum, inter calceos tamen et verticem nihil videatur intectum. armillis uti monilibusque aureis et gemmis, praecipue margaritis quibus abundant, adsuefacti post Lydiam victam et Croesum (§ 84)

⁴⁷ Sundwall (1996) 629. He states that this approach 'do[es] not seem to reveal any larger purpose other than to meet his reader's expectations of the historical genre'.

⁴⁸ Cf. 25.4.4, where Ammianus notes Julian's moderation in the consumption of food and drink. The same is said of Hannibal by Livy (see chapter two, section one).

According to Herodotus such a manner of dress is not really Persian. He notes that their dress is Median because they consider it more attractive than their own (1.135.1, καὶ γὰρ δὴ τὴν Μηδικὴν ἐσθῆτα νομίσαντες τῆς ἑωυτῶν εἶναι). Herodotus' Persians appear willing to adopt aspects of other cultures which they deem better than their own, by which he may mean to suggest that the Persians of his time have not fully settled on cultural signifiers that are distinctly their own. If Herodotus' comment about the predilection for attractive clothes is still true in Ammianus' day, then Ammianus' criticisms of the Persians, if he means what he writes in this sentence to serve as a criticism, are invalid.⁴⁹ Rather, what Ammianus appears to be doing here, which then shows him working in the same line as Herodotus, is that eastern dress—whether Persian or Median, for the two are hardly distinguishable by Ammianus' time—is luxurious. Throughout the history of western contact with Persia, there has been a constant in the form of attractive clothing which ultimately is meant to suggest that even after over seven centuries the Persians are still interested in attractive material goods.

Ammianus' comments on Persian law (§§ 81-2) do not seem to have a parallel in Herodotus. The historian appears to judge the Persian legal system as both just (albeit severe) and efficient. This gives the country an impressive social-political structure that explains the existence of the contrasts elsewhere in the digression, and in this section in particular, without the country being in danger of descending into disorder. We are therefore not meant to consider this aspect of Persian culture in opposition to another, but rather to see Persian law as the background force that holds the community together despite the contrast Ammianus outlines both before and after his evaluation of the legal system. Sitting in the middle of the many contrasting aspects of Persian culture allows it to act as the centralized, stabilizing influence in this community. At the core, therefore, Persia is unified under—or rather by—law. As I mentioned, Herodotus in his digression on the Persians does not refer directly to their legal system, although he does refer to the general sense that the Persians are law-abiding (1.137.2).

⁴⁹ The descriptions of Persian dress in Herodotus and Ammianus are exceptionally tame when compared to Curtius Rufus' comments on Indian clothing and the display of material wealth in the upper echelons of their society (9.5.23-30).

Significant also in this sentence is the reference to Croesus which, I feel, directs the reader's attention to Herodotus' narrative of the Lydian king. Croesus' misadventures against the Persians might be taken as the start of Greek-Roman contact with Persia, the first chapter in a long history, which Julian's invasion, as far as Ammianus is concerned, is meant to mark the final chapter.

That Persia is pervaded by the rule of law is something that the Roman reader of Ammianus would understand well—and approve. But the historian appears to criticise Rome—and possibly himself—at the same time. When he refers to judges, Ammianus notes that the Persians have a negative opinion of a Roman custom: *ad iudicandum autem usu rerum spectati destinantur et integri, parum alienis consiliis indigentes, unde nostram consuetudinem rident, quae interdum facundos iurisque publici peritissimos post indoctorum conlocat terga* (§ 82). In this passage, near the end of the digression, Ammianus changes the reader's position from a Roman reading Persians, to a Persian reading Romans. And the purpose of this inversion is not for the Persians to appreciate a positive aspect of Roman culture, which the Romans largely do with respect to the Persians in this digression with Ammianus' guidance, but for the reader to understand something that is wrong with Rome. Recording what the subjects of a digression think about those outside the digression adds an important degree of complexity to an already complex cultural investigation.

Moreover, that the historian redirects attention back on the Romans makes it clear that in writing about Persian customs, Ammianus is not only inviting comparison between Persians and Romans, but also he is inviting comparison between what he writes about the Persians in this section and what he writes about the Romans in the narrative as a whole. By doing this the historian can explain why his digression is so long: Persia must be explained in such detail to counter the analysis of Roman culture that underlies most of Ammianus' history. Or—to suggest another possibility—Ammianus may want his reader to compare this digression with digressions elsewhere in the narrative, in particular the digressions in which the historian explores aspects of *Roman* culture. For example, Ammianus examines Rome in a digression on the senate and people of Rome in the first surviving book of the RG (14.6.2-27). That Ammianus writes a digression about Rome suggests that the historian feels the reader of his narrative needs to be informed about what things are like in Rome, just as he needs to be informed about what things are like in Persia and, most important, that the reader may need a point of reference on both cultures. That is, the reader of Ammianus might find himself in an intermediary position whereby he is not fully familiar with things Romans and/or things Persian.

2.5 On Pearls (§§ 85-88).

Ammianus concludes with a brief section on pearls (§§ 85-88).⁵⁰ This is not unique to Persia, for the longer digressions in the RG end with a short section that focuses on a particular topic that is both connected to, and in some ways different from, the digression as a whole.⁵¹

This section is unlike the others in the Persian digression in another way, for it begins with an obvious connection to the previous section.⁵² Ammianus ends the previous section, on Persian customs, by discussing their style of clothing (§ 84), which he describes as luxurious. Pearls are the main indicators of this luxury, of which the Persians are not only fond, but also possess a large number.⁵³ Ammianus therefore progresses naturally to this final discussion point, working his way to the most detailed point.

Pearls can be read as a symbol of Persia itself, and the historian's interest in them here becomes a kind of ecphrasis. By describing pearls, Ammianus in effect undertakes another description of Persia, and by providing the details of their development Ammianus suggests that he may have researched this topic with an equal intensity to this study of the Persians and their country. That he does this makes sense: as a symbol of Persia, the difficulty of obtaining pearls can read as another indicator of the difficulty that faces Julian in his quest to conquer the Persian empire (§ 87, *capturas autem difficiles et periculosas*). It is not just difficult to obtain pearls, but it is also dangerous.⁵⁴

⁵⁰ Or a digression in the second degree, as den Boeft (1999) 207 calls it. Sabbah (1978) 527, cited by den Boeft (1998) 168, notes this frequent action taken Ammianus when he writes 'il multiplie les digressions dans la digression'.

⁵¹ Another example is the digression on the Pontus Euxinus at 22.8, where the final section (46-8) covers climate and fishes. See Drijvers (1998).

⁵² Barnes (1998) 38 treats this section as distinct from the Persian digression, which he takes as sections 1-84 only.

⁵³ Cf. Tacitus, *Ger.* 5.2-3, where the lack of gold and silver in Germany is not viewed by Tacitus as a problem, for they hold such items in little regard (see chapter 4, section I); see too *Agr.* 12.6-7. The similar approach of Tacitus and Ammianus is interesting; these two historians argue the same point from different ends, that is, what the country does not provide the resident community does without; what the country does provide is especially coveted, taking a special place in the culture of that community. In both cases, there is a bond between the community and the place in which they live, accepting it for what it gives (or does not give) them.

⁵⁴ The ancient Greeks and Romans may have seen the collection of pearls as a task that can only be completed by the most capable of individuals, that is, heroes from mythology. Arrian in his *Indica*, for example, notes Heracles' fascination with pearls, and

The historian concludes the digression with a comment that (momentarily) shifts the reader's attention away from Persia. Ammianus re-directs the reader's geographic focus to the other side of the world—to Britain (§ 88, *quod genus gemmae etiam in Britannici secessibus maris gigni legique (licet dignitate dispari) non ignoramus*). From one end of the world as perceived by the Romans to the other, Ammianus concludes his digression on the Persians by taking them as far away as possible from the country he has just finished describing at near-exhaustive length.

This concluding sentence is interesting in two respects: first, he defines the boundaries of the world by the existence of a corporeal object at either end. Second, as the kind of pearl that is found in Britain (which as a province of Rome here represents the whole empire) is of a lesser value than the Persian variety, the Roman world (as a province of the empire we can view Britain as representative of the Roman world) is suggested as being of less value than its rival Persian world. By encapsulating the digression in this sentence, Ammianus effectively concludes the digression by placing Persia in a context of the world.⁵⁵

III.

With the resumption of the narrative at 24.1.1, there is the impression time has barely passed. Ammianus resumes the story almost exactly where he left off at 23.5.24. While Julian does not speak here, his audience appear to respond to his speech for a second time.⁵⁶ This is a delayed response (a very delayed response in fact). Julian, by explaining (if we read the digression as speaking for the emperor) to the soldiers the history,

his desire to collect the same (8.10, τὸν γὰρ Ἡρακλέα, ὡς καλὸν οἱ ἐφάνη τὸ φόρημα, ἐκ πάσης τῆς θαλάσσης ἐς τὴν Ἰνδῶν γῆν συναγινέειν τὸν μαργαρίτην δὴ τοῦτον, τῇ θυγατρὶ τῇ ἐωυτοῦ εἶναι κόσμον). In fact, Arrian credits the discovery of pearls to Heracles (8.8).

⁵⁵ Wiedemann (1986) 193 notes that all digressions in the RG contain formal beginnings and endings, except this one, which has the benefit of sharing its ending with the end of a book. den Boeft (1998) 233 strongly defends Ammianus' ending. It would have been possible for the historian to continue, den Boeft suggests, next discussing pearls from other parts of the world, but in the end 'the time had come to bring the excursus on the origin of the pearls to a close. After all, it was only a digression within a digression and it should not be too long'.

⁵⁶ The fact that the soldiers respond to Julian's speech for a second time may be related to a doublet in the narrative, for Ammianus records twice the arrival of the army at Dura, once before the digression (23.5.7) and once after it (24.1.5). See Matthews (1989) 130-1. Sabbah (1978) 489 n.107 claims that there is a disparity between 23.5.25 and 24.1.1. On doublets, see Kraus (1998).

geography and customs of Persia, removes the fear of the unknown, as well as providing the strategic benefit of knowing of the differences within Persia and among the Persian people. The digression appears to have worked to the benefit of army morale. Before the digression only the Gauls appear eager, now the whole army show their zeal (*uno parique ardore impetrabilem principem superari non posse*).

Taking the digression as a representation of the country itself, therefore, we have symbols of Roman resolve on either side of the country, albeit the enthusiasm is shown by only part of the army (the Gauls) in the pre-digression scene. Julian and his army surround Persia, therefore. For Julian there is a sense of progression, or increasing Roman strength: before the digression, the Gauls demonstrate zeal for the task; now Ammianus' description of Roman enthusiasm appears to apply to all soldiers. The *omnes* of 23.5.15 is responded to by *uno parique* in this sentence. Not only is the entirety of Julian's army eager, but Julian remains just as keen for the task as he was before Ammianus shifted to the Persian digression (*summae rei finem imponendum maturius credens*). At this final pause before the campaign begins, then, leader and army appear unified in their cause.

Roman unity in the first post-digression scene is the opposite to the impression of Persian disunity that the digression so strongly suggests. The Roman army is made up of many communities, but at this point immediately prior to entering Persia they demonstrate themselves to be a single, coherent, and most importantly, pro-Julian force. This situation is most important in light of Ammianus' narrative of Julian so far, that is, Julian's rise to power beginning with the battle of Strasbourg and the reaction to it by other leading Romans. With the Persians the situation is the near opposite: there are many communities described in the digression, and nowhere does Ammianus suggest any kind of national unity. Julian enters Persia, therefore, with maximum advantage.

IV.

cuius loci es tu...vel quid acturus huc venisti? responde.
comes...Valentiniani sum, **orbis terrarum domini**⁵⁷

In this conversation recorded by Ammianus, it appears that the emperor of Rome does not distinguish between his role as leader of the Romans and leader of the world. In the later Roman empire, it seems, the Romans have finally achieved their manifest destiny of a world empire: Theodosius does not identify himself as leader of the Romans: he prefers the more inclusive *orbis terrarum domini*. In one way, this belief may be a common parlance of Ammianus' time. However, Ammianus did not necessarily share that view.⁵⁸

We can best appreciate Ammianus' predilection for cultural digressions (and therefore his exceptionally strong interest in non-Roman communities) as a reflection—and possibly as an affirmation—of the increasingly diverse cultural nature of the Roman world.⁵⁹ In the considerable space of time between our last subject, Tacitus' *Germania*, and the RG, there had been a fundamental shift in the Roman world. Thomas Burns makes an excellent point about what it meant to be Roman in the fourth century CE:

Even the literary elite found being Roman a difficult concept to define. The tidy legal definition had blurred and all but disappeared after Caracalla extended the citizenship to virtually everybody inside the empire, and instead Ammianus speaks of *Romanitas*, the quality of being Roman, but never defines what he or his contemporaries meant by that.⁶⁰

⁵⁷ An exchange between Igmazen and Theodosius, extracted from 29.5.46. On *orbis terrarum*, see Nicolet (1991) 15-27; Vasaly (1993) 222-6; Yardley (2003) 15. The phrase also appears at Sallust, *Jug.* 17.3; Justin, 12.2.1. On the relationship between Romans and non-Romans in the fourth century, Burns (2002) 309-73 is useful.

⁵⁸ Pointed out by Ando (2000) 333: 'Elsewhere Ammianus revealed that he, at least, knew better: in describing negotiations between Rome and the Limigantes, he recorded a request by that people to take up residence in far-off lands, so long as they lay within the confines of the *orbis Romanus*'. Ammianus records this at 19.11.6.

⁵⁹ For a study of the perception of non-Romans in late antiquity, see Geary (1999). He notes (110) that there was a fundamental change beginning with the time of Ammianus' writing. Note especially what he writes about the period following Ammianus: 'the Romans of the 5th century contemplated the barbarians of their own day from the perspective of almost a millennium of interaction with the barbarian world' (110).

⁶⁰ Burns (2002) 363-4.

Not only were there more communities along its frontiers,⁶¹ some pushing inwards, but also Roman knowledge of their world, and their place in it, was at its most extensive—and at its most fluid. This in theory would make Ammianus the most sensitive historian possible to the world around him, both to his fellow Romans, and the non-Romans outside of the empire.

In part this is a result of the fact that Ammianus is himself an excellent representative of the new Roman diaspora. He is from the Greek east, but when he comes to write his Roman history, he does so in Latin, symbolizing that despite the cultural change in the Roman world, some things remained within their pre-existing traditions.⁶² Ammianus may have felt that by writing in Greek he would distance his Persians from Tacitus' Germani and Livy's Carthaginians, making the power of the Persians that the historian suggests through his comprehensive digression on them appear inappropriate. The use of Latin allows Ammianus' description of the Persians to engage with (and perhaps supersede) the non-Roman communities of previous Latin historians.

Ammianus' Persians and Persia prove themselves to be worthy successors of the non-Romans represented in Sallust, Livy, Trogus and Tacitus. 'Ammianus was all too conscious that he was writing a work of literature...Ammianus is a soldier and official who wants to be obedient to the clear, straightforward rules of historical writing', writes Thomas Wiedemann.⁶³ Burns appears to agree: 'Ammianus is by far our best narrative source for Rome and the barbarians in late antiquity, but his work is far from the model of reliability it was once thought. Like every other ancient Roman historian Ammianus adjusted his personal bias to the rules governing the genre in which he wrote. As Julius Caesar and Tacitus before him, Ammianus loved to engage in traditional ethnographic portrayal'.⁶⁴ Ammianus' presentation of the Persians, and all other non-Roman

⁶¹ The interest in frontiers in late antiquity (from Ammianus' time onwards, including the post-Roman period) is considerable: Lee (1993) and Elton (1996) are recent studies.

⁶² Cf. von Albrecht (1997) 1423: 'his choice of the Latin language was probably inspired by patriotism; moreover, there was no Latin work on Julian's exploits'. There were personal and practical reasons for Ammianus' choice, therefore. Had Ammianus composed the RG in Greek, it might affect our perception of the work as inheritor of the Roman historiography tradition established by Sallust, Livy and Tacitus; moreover, it might make it harder to behold the RG as the direct continuation of Tacitus' *Historiae*.

⁶³ Wiedemann (1986) 193.

⁶⁴ Burns (2002) 331-2. Ammianus also receives praise from the editors of the Loeb Classical Library, who on the dustjacket of volume II note that 'he was broadminded

communities described in his history, therefore, should be seen as working within the traditions of the genre. And this assessment of Ammianus' approach speaks not only for the RG, but also all the other historical narratives written by Romans. This last great Latin historian may have pushed the boundaries of historical writing, but he was at least conscious of, and obedient to, the pre-existing rules of the genre. He would follow those rules to the end of his history, and the end of Roman historical narrative. In the final book of his history, Ammianus would include a digression on the Huns, whom the historian portrays in a similar vein to Tacitus' ancient Germans in the *Germania*. Ammianus' Huns are a final reminder of Rome's prevailing interest in cultures other than her own. That this historian pushed those rules without breaking them, finally, was perhaps most appropriate given this position as the last Roman historian writing in Latin. He was the last historian, and where the outer boundary of the parameters of historical writing lay was his choice.⁶⁵

towards non-Romans and towards Christianity'. Ammianus' attitude towards the former has been validated by this chapter. As for Ammianus and the Christians, the debate is still very much ongoing. The appropriate starting points are: Hunt (1985) and (1993); Barnes (1998) 79-94.

⁶⁵ von Albrecht (1997) 1424: 'in principle, excursuses are part and parcel of ancient historiography...the large number of geographical digressions are reminiscent of Sallust's *Historiae*. Deviating from the tradition of historians, Ammianus does not avoid digressions of a technical and scientific nature. His excursuses follow his own structural theme'.

CONCLUSION

Quo Barbarus

Pre-Hannibalic Rome was a small, involuted, land-locked, poverty-stricken, unenterprising community of counter-suggestible xenophobic anti-intellectuals ruled by a smug holier-than-thou philistine militaristic elite.¹

Nicholas Purcell's comment on pre-Hannibalic Rome suggests just how far the nation has come by the fourth century CE. One thing did change. Rome was not so xenophobic; rather, the Romans from the third century BCE² on showed more than passing interest in the communities other than their own, both those close to Italy, and those that were thought to exist at the edges of the world.

Through the examination of five Latin historical narratives, this thesis has shown the remarkably diverse approach of Roman historians—and therefore the Romans themselves—towards foreign individuals and communities during a substantial period of Rome's history (four centuries from the 40s BCE to the late 300s CE). The diversity of approach demonstrates, above all else, that the Romans did not believe that there was a single approach to the representation of the foreigner in historical narrative. And this reflects back upon the Romans themselves: Roman historical narrative was written by Romans for Romans. There were certain expectations on the part of Roman readers, and the success of the historical narratives (and parts of those narratives) suggests that those expectations were met.

There is one important distinction to be made regarding foreign community representation in this genre: representations of individuals and representations of whole communities. This thesis has considered both. To be sure, non-Roman individuals must exist on the back of the representation of their communities. But the opposite is true as well: we learn a great deal about Carthage by exploring the words and deeds of Hannibal, for example. Moreover, the complex nature of the portrayals of Jugurtha, Hannibal and Alexander demonstrate the strong and continuing interest the Romans had in foreign individuals, especially those whose opposition to Rome marked a serious threat (or—in

¹ Purcell (2003) 34.

² Perhaps Purcell should have used the First Punic (Sicilian) War as his point of division, for it was this war that involved the Romans attempting to conduct war outside the confines of Italy for the first time.

the case of Alexander—an imagined threat) to the rise of Rome as a world empire—or those who threatened to cause its decline or extinction.³

A few points can be made here. The portrayal of Alexander is both in the spirit of the presentations of Jugurtha and Hannibal, and it goes further. The interest in, and the exploration of, Jugurtha and Hannibal by Sallust and Livy are mirrored by the close focus on Alexander in Justin's rewriting of Trogus. But the presence of Alexander is so much stronger. Alexander dominates the whole of the narrative, and he shares it with no one else, nor does he yield his dominant position (as Jugurtha does to Marius, or Hannibal does to Scipio). Not only does the historian explore the character, but also the historian explores the character's exploration of another culture: the Persians. The Romans therefore perceive this culture from a position of (further) distance. They gaze upon the Persians through the eyes of Alexander and his army.

There is also something that Jugurtha, Hannibal and Alexander share. This is that all three do not adhere to the construction of the *barbarus*. This explains why Dauge writes so little about them. The conception of the *barbarus* for the most part is the means by which the Romans perceive peoples to be inferior to them in some way, and this inferiority as a general rule is explained by the author. While Jugurtha, Hannibal and Alexander all have faults, and they are cast as being different from the Romans, or becoming different from the Roman, the reason why these three men are so fascinating to the Romans is that they also did so much that was *right*, that is, they worked for the benefit of their own community.

We can see a development in the genre, from representation of the individual to the whole community. We might argue that historians start with small, manageable pieces, slowly working their way up to a whole community. We can perhaps detect this trend in the works of the earlier historians. Sallust and Livy, for example, do not focus only upon individuals (although individuals are very important). There is a movement towards exploring whole communities through the detailed study of other non-Roman characters in these works. And by exploring several characters, they invite the reader to compare and contrast them (e.g., Sallust on Masinissa and Jugurtha, Livy on Syphax and Masinissa, or Hannibal and Hanno).

³ Kraus (1999) 242 links three African opponents who would have stood in the first rank of Roman interest in foreigners: Hannibal, Jugurtha and Cleopatra. The threat to Rome that Cleopatra represented in the period immediately before the reign of Augustus may have influenced Livy's construction of Hannibal. Or it may have influenced his approach to Sophoniba. See chapter two, section 4.4.

Ammianus Marcellinus' digression on Persia and the Persians can be seen as a successful synthesis of these two different approaches. Individuals are named and their actions are (briefly) explored (e.g., Arsaces), and the historian contrasts subgroups, yet the lengthy examination of the Persians exists comfortably in the larger work. It serves the historian's narrative of Julian's campaign, providing both a context for it and an explanation why Julian's campaign unfolds as it does.

Another feature that we can observe are the varied supportive roles of the Romans in these texts (except, of course, in Trogus, where in his narrative of Alexander's anabasis the Romans do not appear). In Sallust's *Bellum Jugurthinum*, for example, Jugurtha is a character who is clearly written by the historian to display dependence on no one, Roman or non-Roman, and yet he is best appreciated when studied alongside the main Roman against whom he fights—and ultimately loses. The same can be said of Hannibal. In this case, his impending defeat is what brings him into relief against his adversary Scipio. Livy also understands the complexities of Alexander and his actions against an invented scenario in which the Romans conquer the conqueror. It is not so much the case of Roman versus non-Roman, but rather Roman historian versus Roman historian.

This role of the Romans in reading the non-Roman might be seen to question one prevailing approach to the representation of the Other: the inversion of cultural representation, that is, the historian's presentation of the Romans to make them look foreign/ bad, and at the same time he presents the foreign community in a positive light—like the 'noble savage'.⁴ Tacitus' *Germania* perhaps comes closest to this model. However, the historian limits the amount of Roman material, and that Roman material which does appear serves to further the impression of the Germani that Tacitus seeks to convey.

In this respect the Roman historians can be said to have employed a different approach from their Greek predecessors. Granted, Roman historians did have their equivalent of the Greek *barbārow*, the *barbarus*. There are examples of this in Latin

⁴ See Hall (1989) 201-23 on how this works in Greek tragedy. The Romans as barbarians comes through in Polybius' history: see Champion (2000). On barbarians in Polybius, see Eckstein (1995) 119-25. Despite Polybius' praise of Roman achievement in his narrative of their wars against Carthage, when it comes to Roman involvement in the Hellenic world, the impression is different. Livy too seems to portray the Romans in a negative light: the Romans' chasing down of Hannibal makes them look bad, and Livy allows Hannibal to voice (valid) criticism of Rome in direct discourse (39.51.4-12).

historiography. The most noteworthy examined in this thesis is Syphax in Livy.⁵ But the major characters examined by Roman historians—Jugurtha, Hannibal and Alexander—are by no means like what is commonly associated with *barbarus*. To be sure, while *barbari* exist in Roman historical narrative, they are situated in the background so as not to detract attention from other more complex characters like those mentioned above. In other words, in Livy Hannibal's magnificence clearly eclipses Syphax's barbarity.

Roman historians do not limit themselves to either the 'noble savage' or 'wild man' representations of foreigners. Granted, examples of these two types can be found: Tacitus' Germani (chapter four) are perhaps the best example of the 'noble savage'.⁶ The presentation of non-Romans studied in this thesis for the most part fall somewhere in between these two positions. There is surely ample scope between the 'wild man' and the 'noble savage' positions to allow for varied representation of foreigners.

What does this varied representation of foreigners in Latin historiography signify about the Roman people themselves? If we take the works of ancient Roman historians as representing accurately the attitudes of the Romans, then, there was generally speaking an acceptance of other cultures. Any representation of the 'Other' is a reflection of the self.⁷ The varied presentations of foreign cultures can be said to be an externalised reflection of the varied internal composition of the Roman empire.⁸ This should not

⁵ Syphax is called *barbarus* on several occasions, sometimes by Roman or non-Roman characters in the narrative, or by the historian. See above, chapter two, section four *passim*. Bocchus too should be mentioned here, but his involvement in Sallust's narrative is limited compared to Syphax in Livy.

⁶ An example of the 'wild man' may be the digression on Huns in the final book of Ammianus' history (31.2). Here textual geography serves to isolate this community. They exist in what is in effect the last book of Latin historiography. There is also a link between the Huns and one of the first communities to be explored in depth in an ancient historical text: the Scythians in Herodotus (4.1-82). Both the Huns and the Scythians are nomadic. See Hartog (1988) 193-205. Balsdon (1979) 59-60 summaries Roman perceptions of peoples who inhabit the extreme North and South, which broadly would include Huns and Scythians.

⁷ See Hartog (1988), esp. 3-205 (where he discusses the Scythians and the war against them led by Darius); Lateiner (1989) 155-7.

⁸ While to many this may be seen as a good thing, to some Roman homogeneity was still the preferred option, especially when it came to the social and political institutions. An example of this may be seen when Claudius speaks to the senate regarding the admission of Gauls as senators (covered by Tacitus, *Annals* 11.24). That Claudius would need to speak on the subject suggests that the prevailing view was to keep the senate Roman-Italian.

surprise us. From the time of Sallust, the first Roman historian whose work comes down to us in sizeable portions, Rome was firmly established as the world empire. This also raises the question of readership of Roman historical narratives: readers would have a diverse background: therefore the approach of Roman historians can be said to meet the needs of, and perhaps be a response to, the readers of this genre.

The best example of this can be said to be Alexander and the Persians in Pompeius Trogus. In Herodotus' history, the Persian invasion of the kingdom of the Scythians is seen as a precursor to the Persian invasion of Greece.⁹ For the Roman reader of Trogus, Alexander's expedition may have been perceived as precursor to a Roman invasion of the same region led by Augustus. Alexander's successes surely could be recreated by the Romans. Livy, by writing that Alexander would fail in an invasion of Italy, proves that the Romans are better than Alexander. Therefore, what Alexander could achieve, so could the Romans.

There can even be said to be a celebration of what these cultures can offer to the Romans. One example is the consistent positive impression of ancient Marseille in Roman writers. In his *Agricola* Tacitus suggests that Agricola's time spent in the city had a positive influence on him:

arcebat eum ab inlecebris peccantium praeter ipsius bonam integramque naturam quod statim parvulus sedem ac magistram studiorum Massiliam habuit, locum Graeca comitate et provinciali parsimonia mixtum ac bene compositum. (4.2)

Here Tacitus finds the mixture of two non-Roman cultures, Greek and Gallic, as producing a positive environment for Agricola, providing him with the right disposition to serve the Roman world so well, as Tacitus' monograph makes clear line-by-line.¹⁰ And Agricola's actions not only serve the Romans, but also they feed back into Marseille, enhancing its reputation still further. The Roman reader of the *Agricola*, whether in Rome, Africa, Greece, or Judea, would have understood what Tacitus means here.

As a final thought, I offer a *caveat*. Interest in the representation of the 'Other' in Greek and Latin literature, and in the Greek and Roman world in general, is in part grounded in a response to the changing nature of our own world. Many western cultures in the last twenty years have become 'multicultural': sometimes this has been deliberate

⁹ Hartog (1988) 35 calls it a 'rehearsal'.

¹⁰ See Ogilvie and Richmond (1967) 143. Tacitus here is working within an established viewpoint held by Roman authors about this city. Other writers portray Marseille in a positive light: e.g., Strabo (4.1.4-5) and Valerius Maximus (2.6.7-10). Cf. too Trogus' comment on his 'home' city: see Alonso-Núñez (1994).

policy.¹¹ This is an ongoing process. Therefore, our sensitivity to cultures other than our own, and our ability to analyse critically the sensitivity of ancients, will change. This brings us back to my comment at the beginning of the thesis, that our world is becoming increasingly diverse. Diversity is always a good thing, for it offers a myriad of opportunities. The historians of ancient Rome would have appreciated this—and eagerly sought to exploit this.

The last word goes to Herodotus. It is only fair that this is the case. When in his mission statement the father of history defines his aims and objectives for writing history, he makes clear that both Greek and non-Greeks share equal places in his history

ὥς μήτε τὰ γενόμενα ἐξ ἀνθρώπων τῷ χρόνῳ ἐξίτηλα γίνηται,
μήτε ἔργα μεγάλα τε καὶ θωμαστά, τὰ μὲν Ἕλλησι, τὰ δὲ
βαρβάροισι ἀποδεχθέντα, ἀκλεᾶ γίνηται, τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ δι' ἣν
αἰτίην ἐπολέμησαν ἀλλήλοισι.

This opening sentence makes clear that for Herodotus, and for every writer of history after him, communities other than that of the author are important.¹² This is because no community exists in pure isolation from all others; and a community will be influenced, either positively or negatively, through contact with foreigners.¹³ The historians of Rome would want to demonstrate that they work within the spirit of Herodotus, and this they do through their careful attention to non-Romans. After all, in Herodotus' history the actions of non-Greeks are equally important to those of the Greeks in that they are ἔργα μεγάλα τε καὶ θωμαστά. That the historians of Rome display considerable sensitivity to non-Romans, that is, they do not engage in a concerted campaign to write down non-Romans shows that they, like Herodotus, understand that

¹¹ Barnes (1998) 69-71 suggests how the modern reader's cultural frame of reference can facilitate—and not hinder, as some might think—the understanding of an ancient historian's cultural position. Barnes feels that his residence in a country with two official languages enables him to understand better Ammianus' position vis-à-vis being a Greek speaker writing Latin. In making his point Barnes takes a passing shot at the country's former Prime Minister: 'the present writer lives in an official bilingual country whose Prime Minister at the time of writing [Jean Chrétien] is a Francophone with an imperfect command of English'.

¹² On Herodotus' opening statement, see How and Wells (1928) 53; Munson (2001) 30-2.

¹³ One example of a community who avoid contact with other peoples are the Garamantes, as described by Herodotus (4.174, τούτων δὲ κατύπερθε πρὸς νότον ἄνεμον ἐν τῇ θηριώδει οἰκέουσι Γαράμαντες, οἳ πάντα ἀνθρώπον φεύγουσι καὶ παντὸς ὁμίλην, καὶ οὔτε ὄπλον ἐκτέαται ἀρήιον οὐδὲν οὔτε ἀμύνεσθαι ἐπιστέαται).

Romans and non-Romans have something in common, that they are all *homines*, or in Herodotus' words, *ἄνθρωποι*.

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